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What explains dominant party emergence and strength and opposition party 
weakness in Russia? Important structural underpinnings of party dominance, namely a 
weak party system, were present in Russia even in the 1990s, but it was not until the 
2000s that a genuine dominant party emerged, despite Yeltsin‘s attempts to fashion a 
successful party of power of his own prior to United Russia. I focus on a weak party 
system as a factor contributing to dominant party emergence, using extensive empirical 
analyses drawn from original fine-grained data from the case of Russia. I contend that a 
combination of contingent factors, namely leadership by an individual with political 
clout, favorable economic developments that allow for patronage politics, and a security 
situation that allows for centralization of power, as well as decisive structural factors, 
specifically electoral-geographic conditions ripe for machine politics in the countryside 
and areas with dense populations of ethnic minorities, have buttressed the dominant party 
and frozen out the opposition in Russia. My dissertation leverages new dataset that 
combines fine-grained, county- and region-level data, including county-level election 
results from five Russian parliamentary elections—1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011—
and county-level census data on sociodemographic indicators, as well as data on regional 
contextual characteristics, such as gross regional product and resource dependence, to 
examine patterns of electoral support for various parties.  
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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The evolution of competitive authoritarianism in Russia across the 2000s and 
2010s has coincided with United Russia‘s meteoric rise to power in the 2003 
parliamentary elections and consolidation thereafter. In the 2003 election, the first 
election United Russia contested after the merger of the two potential parties of power 
that created it, United Russia displayed its electoral prowess, capturing almost 40% of the 
party list vote. In 2007, the rapidly maturing party quickly dispatched its opponents in 
classic dominant party fashion and shattered its previous performance with almost two-
thirds of the vote. Finally, in the most recent election to the State Duma, United Russia 
again scored electoral windfalls with nearly half of the vote. United Russia‘s success is 
unprecedented, given the track record of pro-government parties in Russia‘s rather short 
post-communist history. In 1993, democratically oriented leaders who were the chief 
architects of Yeltsin‘s reforms, namely ―privatization tsar‖ Anatoly Chubais and former 
acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, created a pro-government party called Russia‘s 
Choice, but it experienced only limited success. The ultra-nationalist LDPR trounced 
Russia‘s Choice by more than seven percent in the snap election, despite the latter‘s 
overwhelming advantages in terms of ideational capital (Hale 2006). Two years later in 
1995, President Yeltsin largely abandoned Russia‘s Choice because of its poor 
performance and created yet another party of power, Our Home is Russia, that ultimately 
failed miserably as well. In fact, Our Home is Russia performed even worse than Russia‘s 
Choice, marking the end of Yeltsin‘s experiments in party building. While United 
Russia‘s success is remarkable objectively, it becomes even more so when compared to 
its predecessors in the 1990s. Thus, two distinct stories emerge: in the 1990s, there was 
not one party that dominated legislative elections and a kind of wild east chaos prevailed 
in a weak party system; in the 2000s, there was a dramatic shift to one-party dominance 
under Vladimir Putin‘s tutelage, a remarkably recent development in Russia‘s short post-
communist history.  
The principal question animating this inquiry is: what explains dominant party 
emergence and strength and opposition party weakness in Russia?  
 2 
Like the well-studied cases of the PRI in Mexico or the LDP in Japan, Russia 
offers another case of dominant party emergence, but the Russian case is particularly 
puzzling precisely because of the timing of United Russia‘s birth. As outlined by 
Huntington (1970), existing theories of dominant party emergence focus on homogenous 
class structures in some societies, the need to establish a counterweight to the ―fissiparous 
tendencies of a heterogeneous society‖ (10) or the ―efforts of a political elite to organize 
and to legitimate rule by one social force over another‖ (11) in a society bifurcated 
profoundly by class, race, religion, or ethnicity in the wake of social revolution, 
decolonization, or a war of liberation, which produced significant periods of nation 
building (Duverger 1954; Tucker 1961; Huntington and Moore 1970; Blondel 1972; 
Arian and Barnes 1974; Sartori 1976; Pempel 1990; Brooker 2000; Cheng 2001). 
However, this body of research travels poorly into the present, a time when widespread 
decolonization and revolution, for example, are comparatively rare. The majority of more 
recent scholarship on dominant parties has focused primarily on the mechanics of 
survival and failure, explicitly treating the initial emergence of party dominance as 
exogenous (Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006; Greene 2007).  
Important structural underpinnings of party dominance, namely a weak party 
system, were present in Russia even in the 1990s, but it was not until the 2000s that a 
genuine dominant party emerged, despite Yeltsin‘s attempts to fashion a successful party 
of power of his own prior to United Russia. Existing scholarship has attributed the 
maladies manifest in the party system in the 1990s to overly weak political parties, while 
explaining pernicious developments in the 2000s by stressing an overly strong dominant 
party that engages in corruption and widespread electoral manipulation using its vast 
resource endowment. My dissertation bridges the currently bifurcated literature by 
connecting the weak party system in the 1990s to the emergence of the dominant party in 
the 2000s: the fragmented party system was far from orthogonal to the development of 
dominant party politics in Russia, but rather created conditions necessary for the 
emergence of United Russia during the Putin era.  
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The answer to this question is also important from a practical perspective: United 
Russia, as the vehicle through which all of Putin‘s authoritarian reforms have been 
codified in law, is the linchpin of authoritarianism in Russia. With its stable and 
substantial majority in the legislature, United Russia has played an instrumental role in 
advancing the executive‘s agenda and authoritarianism more broadly by dramatically 
reconfiguring the political arena to the benefit of current power holders. Legislatively, the 
party swept through the abolition of direct elections for regional executives in 2004, 
subjecting them instead to executive appointment and hence increased central control, 
which further crystallized the institutionalization of the ‗power vertical‘ under the 
Russian president (Gelman and Ryzhenkov 2011). It also shepherded comprehensive 
reform of the electoral system that made it significantly more difficult for opposition 
parties to gain representation in parliament. Lacking as powerful of a party in the 
legislature, the Russian political system might be wholly different. Examining the 
dynamics that precipitated United Russia‘s emergence and the conditions undergirding its 
continued strength can therefore shed light on the future course of Russian politics quite 
broadly.  
What explains dominant party emergence and strength and opposition party 
weakness in Russia? My dissertation contributes to the extant scholarship on dominant 
parties by focusing on a weak and fragmented party system as a factor contributing to 
dominant party emergence, using extensive empirical analyses drawn from original fine-
grained data from the case of Russia. The weak party system in Russia in the 1990s 
transformed dramatically into a dominant party system in the 2000s, in the absence of the 
key factors highlighted in established theories about dominant party emergence. The case 
of Russia thus offers an ideal laboratory for examining dominant party emergence and an 
empirically rich environment within which to uncover new dynamics and yield 
theoretical discoveries of broader comparative interest.  
 As I will discuss later in more detail, I contend that a combination of contingent 
factors, namely leadership by an individual with political clout, favorable economic 
developments that allow for patronage politics, and a security situation that allows for 
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centralization of power, as well as structural factors, specifically electoral-geographic 
conditions ripe for machine politics in the countryside and areas with dense populations 
of ethnic minorities, have buttressed the dominant party and frozen out the opposition in 
Russia. Collectively, these factors explain why dominant party politics in Russia emerged 
only during the Putin era, and not before.  
A distinctive brand of political leadership has proven essential to the rise and 
subsequent consolidation of a dominant party in Russia. Vladimir Putin, with an 
extensive background in the security services, favors ruling with a strong hand in 
domestic political affairs and is hostile to the competitive multipartism that is part and 
parcel of democratic governance. His firm commitment to building a successful dominant 
party, in contrast to his predecessor, and willingness to engage in electoral machinations 
to achieve overwhelming victories across the 2000s have shored up United Russia‘s 
position at the expense of the opposition.  
My explanation of the emergence and subsequent consolidation of a dominant 
party in Russia moves beyond largely monocausal accounts of a successful autocrat 
building a ruling party to undergird his political power by emphasizing auspicious 
political and economic factors that converged during the 2000s and, importantly, 
structural conditions that United Russia has exploited in election after election. Favorable 
economic conditions have paved the way for party dominance in Russia by keeping 
United Russia‘s war chest flush with patronage resources. The party has presided over a 
protracted economic boom due to the combination of skyrocketing natural resource prices 
and the partial or complete strategic renationalization of oil and natural gas concerns, 
which forged the Russian petrostate and underwrote United Russia‘s performance in 
legislative elections. A vast resource endowment has provided United Russia with the 
wherewithal to engage in electoral manipulation, particularly in ethnic republics, that 
showcases its electoral prowess.  
The security situation in Russia since the early 2000s, the final of the contingent 
factors, has created conditions ripe for the centralization of power under Vladimir Putin 
and United Russia: domestic security has been compromised repeatedly by terrorist 
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attacks occurring across the country, giving rise to a permanent crisis mentality among 
the populace that demands increased control, chiefly at the level of the federal 
government. National security emergencies have provided crucial pretexts for the 
reconfiguration of political power and the rules pertaining to national elections that have 
heavily tilted the playing field toward the dominant party.  
 Structural conditions, namely ethnicity and urbanization, have played an 
indispensable role in undergirding dominant party strength and opposition party 
weakness in Russia and therefore form the heart of my empirical analysis. Areas with 
dense concentrations of ethnic minorities and those in the countryside have furnished 
arenas for patronage-based voter mobilization and various electoral machinations that 
have become the hallmark of dominant party politics in the 2000s. Especially in the 
context of ethnic federalism, ethnicity is politicized and ethnic-based political machines 
can be leveraged as a strategic resource by the central government in exchange for 
patronage goods at election time. The latent or real threat of ethnic-based secessionist 
conflict creates powerful incentives for the federal government to signal its political 
supremacy and deter potential challenges to its authority in these areas by ensuring 
overwhelming vote shares. As more votes translate into more seats in Russia‘s 
proportional representation system, capturing nothing less than staggering vote shares in 
areas with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities helps catapult the dominant 
party to the top in election after election. In addition to areas with dense populations of 
ethnic non-Russians, the countryside has served as another venue for voter mobilization 
and hence electoral windfalls channeled to the dominant party at the exclusion of all other 
parties. Residents in rural areas are frequently organized around their employment in 
large-scale agricultural enterprises and employers in these one-company towns can exert 
immense organized pressure to vote. Under the threat of job loss, employees can be easily 
coerced into voting according to the preferences of their employer, who face powerful 
incentives to churn out votes for the dominant party based on their own dependence on 
the federal government for continued operation. As already noted, the contingent factors 
discussed above also exacerbate the structural conditions: for example, Vladimir Putin‘s 
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firm predilection for political control and the tense security situation, particularly in the 
restive ethnic republics, incentivizes the federal government to fully penetrate and 
dominate ethnic areas, while a booming economy provides the wherewithal to carry out 
patronage-based voter mobilization there.  
 This study is primarily quantitative in orientation and leverages an original and 
unique dataset that combines fine-grained, county- and region-level data, including 
county-level election results from five Russian parliamentary elections—1995, 1999, 
2003, 2007 and 2011—and county-level census data on sociodemographic indicators, as 
well as data on regional contextual characteristics, such as gross regional product and 
resource dependence. In contrast to the vast majority of existing research on Russian 
parties and elections that relies heavily on regional level data, I utilize data at the level of 
the raion, roughly equivalent to U.S. counties and the smallest geographic unit in Russia 
for which there is available data. This increases the number of observations from roughly 
80 regions to approximately 2,700 sub-polities in each election. More importantly, my 
dataset captures the great variation on the independent variables and outcome of interest: 
decisive structural conditions, specifically ethnicity and urbanization, are both measured 
at the lowest level of analysis, as well as the dependent variable, i.e. electoral strongholds 
for various parties. I also draw on in-depth interviews with Russian political party 
leaders, activists and observers that I conducted during fieldwork at the time of the most 
recent Duma election in 2011. These elite interviews strongly corroborated my 
overarching argument and uncovered nuanced party system dynamics that contextualized 
my quantitative findings.  
 The remainder of the dissertation unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the state 
of the current literature pertaining to conceptualizing party dominance, macro-level top-
down and bottom-up explanations of dominant party strength and opposition party 
weakness, and micro-level explanations of electoral support for various parties. Chapter 3 
discusses the selection of the Russian case, furnishes my argument, and discusses the 
research design and empirical setup of the study. Chapters 4 through 8 form the empirical 
core of the dissertation and analyze each Russian legislative election in turn, beginning 
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with 1995 and culminating with the most recent election in 2011. Each election supplies a 
crucial component of the story of how the dominant party emerged initially and why it 
rose to power in the 2000s, rather than the 1990s. In each chapter, I examine 
systematically the profile of electoral support for each party focusing on ethnicity, the 
urban-rural cleavage, regional geographic and socioeconomic indicators, and electoral 
manipulation. The analysis provides the extent of strongholds and showcases the distinct 
zones of expansion or contraction. Strongholds provide a unique empirical index that 
capture party strength by measuring unusually high vote shares for each party in each 
election under examination. In contrast to alternative indices, such as regional or national 
level party vote share, strongholds are assessed at the raion level and therefore maximize 
variation on the outcome of interest. Raion-level party strongholds are ideal indicators of 
the success of various parties relative to their own performance at the national level and 
facilitate the geographic pinpointing of that success, both within and across elections.  
Chapter 4 examines the 1995 legislative election, which furnished opposition 
parties with their best chance at electoral success due to the competitiveness of the 
election and the relative vulnerability of the Kremlin‘s party of power, Our Home is 
Russia. The 1995 election showcased Russia‘s weak party system to the full extent: 
before the emergence of a successful dominant party, the party system was not defined by 
a few major parties, but rather by dozens and dozens of minor parties and electoral blocs 
that made narrow appeals to exceedingly limited electorates. No less than 43 parties 
competed in 1995 and, as a consequence, nearly half of the votes cast were wasted on 
parties that failed to cross the threshold for legislative representation. The extreme 
fragmentation in the party system, exemplified by the 1995 election, created the 
conditions ripe for party dominance in the 2000s.  
 Chapter 5 turns to the final contest to the State Duma in the 1990s that included 
two competing potential parties of power, Fatherland-All Russia and Unity, the latter 
publicly supported by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Although the 1999 election 
roughly marks the inception of the Putin era in Russian politics, the overall 
competitiveness of the contest allowed opposition parties an opportunity to fortify 
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pockets of support established in the mid-1990s and expand their budding constituencies 
by carving out new strongholds. The two elections in the 1990s will provide the basis for 
comparison with those in the 2000s and 2010s to assess whether patterns of electoral 
support for various parties hold under conditions of contracted competition.  
Chapter 6 concentrates on the 2003 election, the first in which United Russia 
competed and flaunted its electoral prowess as the emerging dominant party, capturing 
nearly 40% of the party list vote. Unlike the two in the 1990s, 2003 (as well as 2007 and 
2011) is treated as an uncompetitive election. The 2003 contest thus acted as a crucial test 
for opposition parties as to whether they would wither under the weight of United Russia 
or live to fight another day.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the final election of the 2000s, in 2007. In the new purely 
proportional representation system, United Russia fully displayed its strength and 
dynamism, securing a firm chokehold on the political system and harvesting almost two-
thirds of the vote, while opposition parties stagnated on the whole. It was in this election 
that the dominant party in Russia reached the height of its political power.  
Chapter 8 analyzes the most recent legislative election that was held in 2011 and 
revealed signs of opposition party inroads as well as both dominant party durability and 
decay. Large-scale public movements against the dominant party before the election was 
held urged voters to vote for ―any party but United Russia‖ and even larger mass protests 
occurring after the results were announced called into question the durability of the 
dominant party. Finally, the conclusion evaluates the overall findings and discusses 
recent developments that will likely impact the future of the Putin regime and its party 
apparatus, as well as those parties in the opposition.  
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Chapter 2: The State of the Literature 
 In this chapter, I begin by assessing the state of existing scholarship on the 
conceptualization of party dominance and situate the Russian case within recent research. 
I then turn to macro-level explanations of dominant party strength and opposition party 
weakness, focusing on top-down and bottom-up analyses, and conclude by evaluating 
micro-level explanations of electoral support for various parties specific to the Russian 
case.  
Conceptualizing Party Dominance 
The existing literature on dominant party conceptualization can be roughly 
bifurcated into two broad categories: relatively abstract definitions and more empirically 
grounded characterizations. Abstract definitions rely on perceptual qualities of party 
hegemony and categorize a party as such when it is ―identified with an epoch […] 
Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength: it is also linked with belief. 
A dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant‖ (Duverger 1963: 
308-309). However, this type of vague conceptualization may result in a 
methodologically challenging disjuncture between publically perceived dominance and 
the empirical degree of influence or strength that the party possesses in the government. 
Abstract conceptions are thus exceedingly difficult to operationalize because they lack 
essential definitions, e.g. of epoch, influence or belief, and thus provide scant empirical 
criteria by which to identify and measure the degree of party dominance.  
 Conceptualizations that are empirically oriented gain significant analytic leverage 
over abstract characterizations because they provide quantifiable criteria for identifying 
party hegemony. Frequently, empirical identifications include longevity thresholds 
(Sartori 1976; Pempel 1990; Cox 1997; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007) based either on a 
number of years in power, e.g. 20 years, or a number of consecutive legislatures, e.g. four 
legislative periods. A variety of longevity thresholds have been proposed, from the most 
relaxed measure of one election to one of the most restrictive measure of 50 years 
(Coleman 1960; Cox 1997). Although longevity thresholds are appropriate in many cases 
of enduring party dominance, such as Mexico or Japan, even the most frequently 
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employed ―one-generation‖ standard severely discounts theoretically important dominant 
party regimes by arbitrarily excluding cases of consolidating dominance. Magaloni 
(2006) avoids this concern by proposing a longevity threshold of more than 20 years, and 
therefore formally excluding cases of proto-dominance, e.g. Russia and Uzbekistan in the 
mid-2000s, but subsequently arguing that her theory applies to cases of consolidating 
hegemony as well.  
Alongside a longevity threshold, a power or influence criterion has been 
frequently proposed as an additional factor identifying party dominance. For example, 
dominant parties have been identified as surpassing power thresholds in terms of 
legislative seats (Sartori 1976; Pempel 1990; Brownlee 2007; Greene 2007). This 
condition for identifying party hegemony is more empirically useful for application to 
emerging and consolidating dominant party regimes, such as Russia, where the ruling 
party has not yet established dominance temporally, but has retained a majority of 
legislative seats in all but one legislative election, i.e. 1999, since its formal establishment 
in 1999 (Hale 2004a). Other criteria based on influence, such as a dominant bargaining 
position or indispensability in terms of creating governing coalitions, are similarly useful 
for application to new cases of dominance based on the dominant party‘s role in the 
government as the fulcrum of the legislative process (Colton and McFaul 2003; Greene 
2007).  
Macro-level Explanations of Dominant Party Strength and Opposition Party Weakness 
Top-Down Analyses 
In a variety of regional contexts and temporal waves, scholars have explored the 
durability of dominant parties and the concomitant weakness of the opposition. Existing 
research seeking to identify the factors that influence electoral support for political parties 
does so by focusing either on macro-level party-system dynamics, such as the relative 
strength of the party of power vis-à-vis the opposition or persistent coordination problems 
that plague ideologically similar parties, or by concentrating solely on micro-level 
individual-oriented determinants of party support, such as personal economic welfare, 
age, education, and gender.  
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Analyses of electoral support conducted in the context of other dominant party 
systems, i.e. Mexico under the PRI or Japan under the LDP, and from the macro-level 
perspective locate casual import primarily in vast resource asymmetries between the 
incumbent party and political challengers, whether those incumbency resource 
advantages manifest through the use of administrative resources, state-owned enterprises, 
or electoral manipulation, or flow through widespread clientelist channels (Greene 2007; 
Scheiner 2006; Cox 1997; White 2007). According to this literature, both dominant party 
democratic regimes (DPDRs) and dominant party authoritarian regimes (DPARs) use 
patronage resources and clientelist networks, facilitated by numerous state-owned 
enterprises to undergird the ruling party‘s dominance and weaken potential challenges to 
their political power (Scheiner 2006; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; Levitsky and Way 
2010; Brownlee 2007; Arian and Barnes 1974; Smith 2005; Schedler 2002; McElwain 
2008; Oversloot and Verheul 2006; Gelman 2005; White 2007; Riggs and Schraeder 
2005; Smyth 2002; Sakwa 2005). For example, research has demonstrated that dominant 
parties use state ownership over the economy as a source of patronage in the form of 
appointments, public jobs, and public works projects, which are distributed on a 
discretionary and highly politicized basis (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). 
The literature on the role of patronage in dominant party systems highlights the 
two primary groups that are targeted to receive these political rents: key constituencies 
among the electorate offering the dominant party either a new basis of support or 
continuing loyalty, or the ruling party‘s own leaders as a mechanism to deter defection to 
opposition parties or encourage promising politicians to affiliate with the dominant party 
to secure access to hyper-incumbency advantages (Scheiner 2006; Magaloni 2006; 
Greene 2007). While acting as the primary vehicle for rent distribution, dominant parties 
reinforce their political power by controlling the cost of opposition activity for both 
specific constituencies and party elites alike. For party insiders, the cost of defection rises 
because deserters lose privileged access to assorted administrative advantages under the 
ruling party‘s exclusive control. Similarly, various geographic constituencies may lose 
large public works projects that aid local economic development and provide jobs for 
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residents of the community (Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). Therefore, vast patronage 
resources and dense clientelist networks raise the cost to both politicians and the 
electorate of supporting alternative parties, thus contributing to opposition party 
weakness since outsider parties are likely unable to make significant inroads in the 
dominant party‘s electoral territory without comparable resource endowments (Greene 
2007).  
This strand of research has also emphasized that patronage resources are 
particularly important to these types of regimes because they may reduce the necessity of 
pursuing more costly forms of political repression to undercut opposition party activity 
that may spawn domestic unrest or attract unwanted international scrutiny. In the 
Mexican context, Greene (2007) and Magaloni (2006) argue that dominant parties rely on 
hard coercion only as a secondary strategy when patronage-based resources decline due 
to economic downturn or when the party becomes electorally vulnerable for other 
reasons, such as repeated public scandals involving corruption within the state 
bureaucracy (see also Diamond 2002). Compared to hard coercion or repression, 
significantly less political risk is involved in weakening opposition parties through the 
distribution of economic resources and vote-buying strategies and, for that reason, these 
practices provide a vital foundation on which the power of dominant parties frequently 
rests (Greene 2007; Scheiner 2006).  
Nevertheless, the literature specifying the mechanisms through which dominant 
parties maintain power highlights both soft and hard methods of manipulation used to 
damage electoral support for opposition parties  (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 
2006; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2002; Brownlee 2007). As in the case of 
patronage resources, dominant parties, especially in the context of authoritarian regimes, 
have used hard coercion against specific constituencies that tried to frustrate the goals of 
the dominant party, or against opposition leaders and activists who tried to overthrow the 
dominant party using electoral avenues (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 2007; 
Levitsky and Way 2010). For example, after vote-buying strategies failed during the 
Aleman administration, the PRI in Mexico engaged in waves of repression against labor, 
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a relatively militant constituency which the PRI feared may be able to create a broad left-
wing opposition party against the dominant party (Greene 2007). Similarly, UMNO in 
Malaysia detained opposition activists from the Communist Party (CPM) and physically 
harassed candidates from other opposition parties, such as the Islamic Party of Malaysia 
(PAS) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), as a way of reducing political threats to 
the regime (Greene 2007; Brownlee 2007). Although the cost of repression may be 
prohibitive in a general sense, hard coercion is a tool that DPARs leverage to contain the 
activities of opposition parties when deemed necessary.  
Although the extent of hard forms of repression, such as jailing opposition party 
leaders and activists or raiding opposition party headquarters, depends on the level of 
political competition tolerated by the regime, the literature on DPDRs and DPARs 
suggests that soft coercion is typically utilized in both political environments to keep 
opposition parties at bay. In Japan, the LDP‘s financial intimidation of local politicians 
provides an example of soft coercion frequently replicated in other counties. Under the 
dominant party system, Diet members were aware of the number of votes available in 
their district and punished local politicians by withholding financial support and major 
public works projects if they were unable to mobilize the necessary votes (Scheiner 
2006). In more authoritarian dominant party settings, soft coercion commonly involves 
lesser intensity political intimidation of the opposition, and the dominant party‘s use of 
state agencies to investigate opposition candidates and those individuals who provide 
them with financial support (Greene 2007; Hale 2006).  
Similar to patronage resources and types of soft coercion, the literature on 
dominant parties underscores how the manipulation of the electoral system, at both the 
micro and macro level, provides an additional instrument that dominant parties across 
regime types can utilize to contain or weaken opposition party electoral success. The 
strategic manipulation of electoral formulas and rules is made possible by the fact that 
dominant parties hold legislative majorities and therefore unilateral control over the 
policymaking process (Magaloni 2006). Dominant parties in numerous countries have 
revised electoral rules to institutionalize their advantage by weakening opposition parties‘ 
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ability to capture new voters (McElwain 2008). For example, the LDP repeatedly altered 
particular features of the Japanese electoral system, such as severely restricting 
electioneering activities to the effect that lesser known opposition candidates would be 
unable to significantly increase their visibility among the electorate through television 
and radio advertisements (McElwain 2008; Scheiner 2006). Likewise, the Mexican PRI 
also manipulated rules pertaining to elections and political parties, such as registration 
requirements for new parties by requiring them to become national organizations with an 
adequate distribution of members across the states before they were eligible to compete 
in elections (Magaloni 2006). At the macro level, the manipulation of electoral rules 
affects how votes are converted into representation at the national level (McElwain 
2008). The PRI manipulated the electoral system itself by instituting a mixed electoral 
system for the Chamber of Deputies in order to reinforce the ruling party‘s power while 
fragmenting the opposition and mitigating incentives to coordinate (Magaloni 2006). 
Various micro- and macro-level changes to electoral law have not guaranteed the 
universality of application with regard to the new rules, and various dominant parties 
have used electoral laws as an administrative lever that is applied on a discretionary basis 
to engineer the party system according to the dominant party‘s advantage and suppress 
opposition party electoral success (Wilson 2006). 
With regard to manipulation practiced during elections, common to macro-level 
theories of dominant party survival generated outside the Russian context is the 
presumption that electoral manipulation plays only a secondary role in sustaining these 
parties over time (Greene 2007; Sartori 1976). In dominant party regimes, ruling parties 
are assumed to have ―w[o]n elections before election day. As a result, fraud is typically 
unnecessary and is considered only when other pre-election mechanisms fail and 
elections are predicted to be close‖ (Greene 2007: 14; Magaloni 2006; Diamond 2002). 
Therefore, these analyses fall short when empirical facts demonstrate that electoral fraud 
conducted on behalf of the dominant party was comparatively widespread in elections 
that the ruling party would have easily won without such costly resource mobilization 
and coordination among many levels of government. More recent research examining 
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why parties manipulate elections shows that ruling parties may engage in excessive and 
blatant electoral manipulation in elections that they would have won anyway to deter 
challengers to their political power and signal dominance (Simpser 2013). Another 
disconnect between existing theories and empirical realities arises when theories expect 
that the fraud that does crop up to occur when resource advantages decline but facts on 
the ground in particular cases indicate otherwise (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006).  
In the Russian context, since the emergence of United Russia, investigations have 
focused almost exclusively on top-down explanations of dominant party strength and 
opposition party fragility based on various forms of manipulation and repression 
practiced by the regime (Wilson 2006; Sakwa 2005; Riggs and Schraeder 2005; White 
2007; Oversloot and Verheul 2006; Ross 2007; Jack 2004; Shevtsova 2003). Paralleling 
the mechanisms of dominant party maintenance employed outside of Russia, these 
arguments stress United Russia‘s disproportionate resource endowment generated by 
increasing state ownership in the economy, frequent employment of soft and hard 
coercion against opposition candidates and activists, and the systematic manipulation of 
the electoral playing field under Putin‘s leadership in favor of the dominant party. 
Resource-based arguments of United Russia‘s maintenance of power and corresponding 
opposition party failure highlight the increasing discretionary control over the economy 
since 2000 through the renationalization of important economic sectors, such as energy, 
transportation and communication (Levitsky and Way 2010). Given that the state‘s share 
of oil production increased from 16 to 50 percent between 2000 and 2007, and coupled 
with sharply increasing oil worldwide prices, these economic resources have helped 
consolidate United Russia‘s political position and expand the party‘s patronage system by 
capturing new constituencies and geographic pockets of support (Ibid). United Russia has 
also mobilized the regional political machines in the ethnic republics and tapped into 
those pre-existing clientelist networks to solidify the supply of party resources (Ibid).  
A common focus of the Russia-specific literature is United Russia‘s frequent 
reliance on soft and hard coercion to maintain power, such as denying secret balloting by 
eliminating individual voting booths in polling stations, or detaining opposition campaign 
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workers and impounding their campaign materials (Wilson 2006). Since 2000, the party 
of power has also undertaken an aggressive campaign against independent media with the 
aim of quelling political opposition and preventing opposition parties‘ access to outlets to 
promote candidates and broadcast campaign appeals. Most notably, the television stations 
ORT, NTV, and TV-6 were all taken over by the state, effectively eliminating all 
independent television at the national level (Levitsky and Way 2010). With the 
eradication of independent sources of information, opposition parties‘ access to media 
was drastically reduced, severely weakening their electoral potential (Levitsky and Way 
2010). These repressive measures have significantly raised the cost for opposition 
candidates and activists and deterred the formation of new and significant challengers to 
the dominant party.  
Institutionalist arguments in the Russian context focus on the strategic 
manipulation of the electoral system to United Russia‘s advantage that has been 
especially frequent since 2000. Similar to electoral reforms undertaken by the PRI in 
Mexico to weaken geographic pockets of political opposition, the 2001 Russian law ―On 
Parties‖ essentially prohibited regional parties from participating in elections, requiring 
that parties have electoral bases in at least half of Russia‘s over 80 regions to register 
(Wilson 2006). This law concerning political parties, coupled with federal reforms 
introduced in 2000 recentralizing political power, reinforced the dominant party‘s power 
by preventing or eliminating regional centers of power that could develop into full-
fledged challenges to the regime (Ross 2007). Furthermore, the law explicitly excludes 
specific types of parties from electoral activity, such as those founded on a professional, 
racial, national or religious basis (Wilson 2006). The institutionalist strand of research on 
the Russian party system post-2000 thus highlights how recent changes to electoral law 
made by the dominant party have curtailed the formation and activities of opposition 
political parties and systematically weakened their ability to compete in elections (Wilson 
2006; Ross 2007).  
In contrast to research conducted outside the Russian context, explanations of 
United Russia‘s continued success have identified electoral fraud as a key mechanism. 
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Extant scholarship has concentrated chiefly on the detection of electoral fraud by using 
multifarious methods, such as aberrant distributions of regional-level turnout or testing of 
vote counts based on the second-digit Benford‘s Law (2BL) distribution, and has shown 
that electoral manipulation not only occurs, but is also highly clustered in ethnic regions 
(republics, autonomous okrugs and the autonomous oblast) and predominantly non-
Russian and rural raions (Myagkov and Ordeshook 2008; Reisinger and Moraski 2008 
and 2009; Myagkov et al. 2009; Mebane and Kalinin 2009 and 2010; Goodnow et al. 
2012). Collectively, these analyses suggest that electoral malfeasance occurs in dominant 
party authoritarian regimes even when elections are not predicted to be close, and that 
nefarious practices on election day play a crucial role in preserving party hegemony in 
Russia. However, these investigations frequently posit that United Russia performs well 
only under conditions of grave electoral falsification, dismissing instances in which it 
performs well in areas that do not display obvious signs of manipulation.  
Generally, theories explaining dominant party strength and opposition party 
weakness, whether particular to the Russian context or elsewhere, based solely on top-
down factors face two shortcomings. First, implicit in these theories is a presumption that 
ruling party strength affects electoral outcomes for opposition parties uniformly, rather 
than irregularly, because these strategies are directed against the opposition in the 
aggregate. From this perspective, dominant party methods are aimed at the opposition as 
a whole, instead of designed strategically to target specific parties. Thus, the political 
opposition is frequently considered a unitary actor in these analyses, rather than 
disaggregated into its constituent parts (Sartori 1976). However, dominant party methods 
may affect opposition parties unevenly, owing to party-specific characteristics and 
constituencies. Whether or not opposition parties are uniformly affected by party strength 
is more appropriately considered as an empirical question to be explored and answered, 
rather than assumed. Only by disaggregating the opposition are the potentially diverse 
electoral trajectories of these parties explainable. Therefore, the treatment of opposition 
parties as a collective causes current scholarship to fare poorly when the electoral 
trajectories of opposition parties differ greatly from one another empirically. 
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Second, scholars have rarely tested the validity of these top-down theories by 
comparing opposition party electoral support and its determinants prior to the emergence 
of a successful dominant party and thereafter. Research in this vein often presumes that 
opposition parties were stronger before the dominant party‘s rise and that incumbent 
resource advantages are the key causal factor explaining opposition party emasculation. 
However, these largely monocausal arguments may offer a presentist account of electoral 
outcomes when party weakness preexisted the formation and consolidation of the 
dominant party. In such an instance, opposition party fragility is likely not attributable to 
one causal factor alone. Although this research has succeeded in identifying the 
mechanisms undergirding dominant party survival, it can only partially explain variation 
in opposition party support because it does not engage in the type of explicitly 
comparative and longitudinal analysis necessary to evaluate the full range of potentially 
causal variables.  
Arguments oriented from a top-down vantage may incorporate opposition parties 
in a less systematic manner, folding opposition dynamics into the analysis only to 
illustrate missed opportunities in the context of an economic downturn or persistent 
failures to coordinate against the hegemonic party. Rather than focusing exclusively on 
the dominant party, I concentrate on both Russian opposition parties and the dominant 
party, which productively shifts the focus of analytic inquiry and creates a new frontier of 
research in dominant party systems through a multifaceted approach that contrasts with 
that common of the existing literature (Colton and McFaul 2001; Hale 2004a; Boxer and 
Hale 2000; Fish 2005). The dual analytical strategy proposed here helps fill existing 
lacunae in the literature regarding the systematic and rigorous treatment of opposition 
parties in dominant party systems generally, and electoral outcomes specific to the Russia 
case. Furthermore, I disaggregate the opposition and differentiate between characteristic 
types of opposition parties and their associated electoral trajectories (Sartori 1976). 
Therefore, this research will move considerably beyond the current literature by shedding 
light on why particular opposition party strategies can foster the conditions ripe for a 
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dominant party in the first place, as well as why specific types of opposition parties 
flounder when a hegemonic party becomes more consolidated.  
Bottom-Up Analyses 
Other avenues of inquiry have utilized a bottom-up approach, rather than focusing 
on the top-down relationship between the party of power and opposition parties, in the 
period before the emergence of United Russia in the early 2000s. For example, scholars 
have argued that Russian political parties have been persistently weak and failed to 
monopolize the political arena since the collapse of communism due to the pervasiveness 
of regional political machines and other nonparty organizations that fully penetrated the 
polity during the communist era and supply the goods and services the electoral market 
demands (Hale 2006). Other scholarship has shown that within-party cohesion and 
opposition parties‘ ability to forge connections to the electorate has been comparatively 
low in Russia compared to other post-communist states due to clientelist linkages that 
reduce the necessity of creating strong parties and programmatic platforms on which to 
contest elections (Kitschelt and Smyth 2002). Aside from contending with competing 
nonparty-based networks, the bottom-up literature on the Russian party system in the 
1990s underscores that the enduring weakness of opposition political parties, especially 
those promoting liberal ideological orientations, was caused by intra-party factionalism 
regarding important programmatic issues, such as security and the conflict in Chechnya, 
high barriers to entry for new members and candidates, and various organizational and 
strategic problems that contributed to the parties‘ poor showings in repeated elections 
(Hale 2004 and 2006). Additionally, a tendency towards personalistic parties and weak 
programmatic platforms obstructed consolidation into stronger parties rooted in societal 
interests and a stable electorate (Reddaway 1994). A free-floating party system emerged 
as a result, which was characterized by an erratic and frequently shifting supply of 
parties, many of which did not participate in more than one election (Rose 2000). Thus, 
these arguments explain opposition party electoral outcomes and persistent 
underinstitutionalization based on intra-party dynamics, short political time horizons on 
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behalf of would-be party builders, and the inability to overcome and replace parallel 
social-economic structures, namely clientelist networks, with party-based alternatives.  
Bottom-up explanations of opposition party failure from the 1990s, however, are 
difficult to reconcile with the de facto emergence of a dominant party in the early 2000s 
because, according to this scholarship, opposition parties were unsuccessful in the 
absence of a dominant party and there was no viable competition in the party system 
from the perspective of the ruling elites. Therefore, bottom-up theories would not expect 
dominant party formation because a party mechanism was not necessary to win elections 
or effectively advance a political agenda. Indeed, even without a ruling party at times 
during the 1990s, especially after the disastrous failure of the party of power in 1995, 
President Yeltsin was reasonably successful at advancing his political agenda by ruling 
by decree.  
Micro-level Explanations of Electoral Support for Various Political Parties 
A competing school of thought to macro-oriented research in the Russian context 
explains variation in parties‘ electoral support by focusing almost exclusively on 
individual-level determinants, such as economic well-being, age, gender, and education, 
using nationwide surveys of the voting age population at electoral junctures (White, Rose 
and McAllister 1997; McAllister and White 1995; White, Wyman and Kryshtanovskaya 
1995; Wyman 1996 and 1997; Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997; White, Wyman and 
Oates 1997; Whitefield and Evans 1999). Collectively, this research has found various 
parameters of the vote for different parties: rural and poorer areas are associated with 
support for the Communists; the nationalists perform best in areas populated by ethnic 
Russians, located in the countryside and those that are economically disadvantaged; 
finally, the liberals succeed in urban centers, wealthier areas and those populated by 
ethnic Russians (White, Rose and McAllister 1997; McAllister and White 1995; White, 
Wyman and Kryshtanovskaya 1995; Wyman 1996 and 1997; Rose, Tikhomirov and 
Mishler 1997; White, Wyman and Oates 1997; Whitefield and Evans 1999; Brader and 
Tucker 2001; Colton and McFaul 2003).  
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Previous survey-based analyses have often evaluated the salience of structural 
cleavages on electoral support but have reached disparate conclusions, especially with 
regard to social distinctions following ethnic lines. Ethnicity at the individual level is 
frequently included in survey instruments, but is often considered in broad brushstrokes 
in the form of dichotomous Russian, non-Russian distinctions (Rose, Tikhomirov and 
Mishler 1997; White, Rose and McAllister 1997; Brader and Tucker 2001; Colton and 
McFaul 2003; Hale 2006). Operationalized as such, scholars have found that ethnicity 
both is and is not an important predictor of the party-list vote (Colton and McFaul 2003; 
Hale 2006; White, Wyman and Oates 1997). White, Wyman and Oates (1997) indicate 
that ethnic cleavages clearly manifested and produced associations that were more than 
trivial in the 1995 legislative election (Cf. Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997). Other 
investigations leave ethnicity largely unexplored, either because the ethnicity of the 
respondent was not requested or because it was presumed to be minimally important 
(White, Wyman and Kryshtanovskaya 1995; McAllister and White 1995; Rose, 
Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997). For example, Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler (1997) 
argue that ethnic cleavages should not be pertinent to electoral outcomes in post-
communist Russia because Russians are ―by far the largest nationality in the Federation, 
and other nationalities are relatively small and fragmented‖ (805). This line of research 
thus holds that ―the effects of structural cleavages on voting behaviour are relatively 
insignificant. It is hard to identify the stable societal bases of several parties […] among 
certain social groups‖ (Gelman 2006: 548; Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997; Colton 
and McFaul 2003; Hale 2006).  
Leaving these critical distinctions concealed, however, also leaves unexplored 
patterns of electoral support between these groups, which may differ significantly. 
Endemic to survey-based scholarship is the epistemological assumption that electoral 
support for political parties can be explained almost exclusively by individual-level 
characteristics. Maintaining the individual level-of-analysis to pinpoint the 
sociodemographic and spatial distribution of parties‘ unique pockets of support critically 
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underestimates or neglects the role that raion- and regional-level contextual factors may 
play at election time.  
Scaling up from the individual level of analysis and paying greater attention to 
contextual correlates of electoral support, scholars using reported social and economic 
data rather than survey results have showcased the import of sub-national and sub-
regional factors in voting patterns (Clem and Craumer 1997 and 1998; Moraski and 
Reisinger 2003; Reisinger and Moraski 2008; A. White 2013). For example, this 
scholarship has consistently shown that the urban-rural divide ―separates the [Russian] 
population along political lines perhaps more distinctly than any other single factor‖ 
(Clem and Craumer 1997: i; see also Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Cf. Gelman 2006). 
Russia‘s urbanization occurred swiftly, generating stark contrasts between urban centers 
and the countryside, especially in income, age, education, and occupation (Clem and 
Craumer 1998). The level of urbanization may also act as a rough proxy of geographical 
location because the north is significantly more industrialized that than the south, which 
is predominantly agricultural (Ibid). Prior research holds that pro-reform opposition 
parties, notably Yabloko, performed the best in urban settings, while the Communists and 
nationalists competed for support in the countryside, as rural inhabitants conventionally 
voted either left or right in support of anti-reformers (Wyman 1996 and 1997; Rose, 
Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997; White, Wyman and Oates 1997; Clem and Craumer 1998; 
Colton and McFaul 2003).  
Although some analyses examining the explanatory power of socioeconomic 
welfare on patterns of electoral support in legislative elections suggest that economic 
distinctions do not produce a clear cleavage, such as McAllister and White (1995), the 
preponderance of extant literature indicates that economic differences have a discernible 
impact (White, Wyman and Kryshtanovskaya 1995; Wyman 1996 and 1997; Rose, 
Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997; White, Wyman and Oates 1997; Whitefield and Evans 
1999). Regional economic differences may influence support for parties by conditioning 
the impact of either ethnic composition or rurality. For example, rural areas situated 
within wealthier regions may produce different responses to political parties than rural 
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areas located in poorer regions, as regional economic wealth may translate into higher 
individual incomes (Clem and Craumer 1998). Wealthy rural areas may therefore be 
more supportive of reform parties and less willing to vote for the Communists (Ibid). 
Thus, economic contextual variables may modify the effects of demographic and 
geographic correlates at the county level (Ibid).  
Variation in regional economic affluence may also directly impact electoral 
support for various parties. Regional wealth, especially in the form of abundant natural 
resource endowments, may benefit liberal parties that support free trade policies and the 
growth of the market economy because extraction and energy industries are highly 
export-dependent. Regions with abundance in specific sectors enjoy a comparative 
advantage over others that makes them well equipped to compete in the free market: 
cheaper input costs create cheaper products that are more competitive in the market, 
allowing these industries to benefit from competition. Therefore, regions endowed with 
natural resource reserves, and regions that otherwise benefitted in the economic transition 
guided by the Yeltsin administration, may be more likely to support pro-reform parties 
because they hope to further enhance their economic fortunes (Ibid). Furthermore, 
regions with energy resources in private hands may support liberal parties because their 
political platforms and ideological orientations do not threaten regional economic drivers 
with re-nationalization, as clearly advocated by the Communists. Prior scholarship firmly 
substantiated that the liberal Yabloko excelled among the wealthy, while the Communists 
and nationalists made sizable inroads in poorer and underprivileged constituencies 
(White, Wyman and Kryshtanovskaya 1995; Wyman 1996 and 1997; Rose, Tikhomirov 
and Mishler 1997; White, Wyman and Oates 1997; Whitefield and Evans 1999). 
Analyses of county- and regional-level contextual effects, such as levels of 
relative urbanization or economic development, have yet to be examined across all 
legislative elections and across parties to determine whether and to what extent urban-
rural differences, as well as other social or economic cleavages, persist in conditioning 
electoral outcomes across time. In seeking to establish the geographic bases of political 
parties to uncover the links between opposition party weakness and dominant party 
 24 
strength, I adopt an approach different from individual-oriented survey research and one 
that follows previous, contextual-oriented scholarship. Tackling the influence of regional 
factors, as well as cross-level interactions between the county- and regional-level, on 
varying electoral outcomes in legislative contests, enhances understanding of electoral 
support for a range of parties in the post-communist period. My approach thus adds 
much-needed contextualization and systematization to existing macro- and micro-
oriented research.  
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Chapter 3: The Argument and Setup of the Study 
 In this chapter, I explain the rationale behind the selection of Russia as the 
singular case in my examination of dominant party strength and opposition party 
weakness. Subsequently, I set forth my argument, which concentrates on influence of the 
weak party system and highlights the contingent components of political leadership, 
favorable economic conditions, and a permissive security environment, as well as 
structural factors, namely ethnicity and urbanization. I then outline the election-by-
election framework that structures the research and reveals the distinctive essence of each 
of the five legislative elections from 1995 to 2011. Finally, I discuss the new and original 
data employed to carry out this investigation.  
Case Selection  
I challenge the conceptual orthodoxy and overcome conceptual voids in the 
existing literature on dominant parties by focusing exclusively on a party-based regime 
that, in all areas other than longevity, clearly resembles a dominant party authoritarian 
regime, rather than examining a case of established hegemony that conforms to standard 
longevity thresholds. The current system in Russia underscores that dominant party 
regimes can be identified and measured according to a variety of relevant criteria, and a 
highly restrictive set of conditions may artificially eliminate cases that are theoretically 
important to the study of both hegemonic party systems and hybrid regimes. At present, 
United Russia is comparable to other dominant parties because it clearly surpasses power 
thresholds for party dominance, if not longevity hurdles, as the incumbent controls the 
presidency and enjoys an absolute majority of Duma seats, thus ―determin[ing] social 
choice‖ (Greene 2007: 15).  
Existing research on party change in hegemonic party systems has primarily 
examined how greater electoral competition, manifest through opposition party success, 
can pose genuine challenges to a dominant party regime (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). 
However, considerably less attention has been paid to the opposite trajectory, i.e. 
relatively competitive electoral systems evolving toward a hegemonic party system. 
Furthermore, unlike other potential cases, such as Mexico or Japan, Russia provides a 
 26 
unique opportunity to examine a hegemonic party system under construction and the 
specific strengths and weaknesses of such a regime during the initial phases of party 
hegemony, across multiple years and election cycles, instead of examining such a party 
post hoc. Insights on dominant party survival in Russia are in fact most fruitful at this 
juncture because United Russia has not fully consolidated as a dominant party, according 
to standard longevity thresholds established in existing scholarship: examining a case of 
crystallizing party dominance can uncover new dynamics regarding the conditions under 
which dominant parties thrive and opposition parties are able to gain more or less 
electoral support in the context of a comparatively more fluid political environment than 
those cases of established dominance (Sartori 1976; Pempel 1990; Cox 1997; Magaloni 
2006; Greene 2007).  
Moreover, at this time in United Russia‘s development, opposition parties are 
theoretically more capable of making specific inroads into support for the dominant party 
or, conversely, more susceptible to its various tactics, such as electoral manipulation. 
Understanding the dynamics of opposition party success or failure can help assess the 
implications of how a competitive political system can transform into a monopolistic 
environment, or conversely, how emerging partisan competition poses legitimate 
challenges to the ruling party (Greene 2007). Dominant party authoritarian regimes 
(DPARs) are of particular importance because the mode of transition to a more 
competitive political system likely occurs gradually, e.g. through opposition party-
building and strategy, rather than through abrupt changes occurring in the wake of a 
political or economic breakdown, which is the common focus of much of the 
democratization literature (Greene, 2007; O‘Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Karl and 
Schmitter, 1991; Schedler, 2006). The Russian case thus offers an empirically rich 
environment in which to study dominant party durability and opposition party fragility 
and fully captures the importance of electoral politics and party-based instruments of 
political control in contemporary competitive authoritarian regimes. 
In addition to its theoretical significance, Russia is ―among the world‘s largest 
and substantively most influential hybrid regimes‖ (Colton and Hale 2014: 5). Russia has 
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played a key role as a ―resister state—one which actively seeks to halt or contain the 
spread of democracy in order to preserve its own autocratic political system‖ (Ambrosio 
2007: 233), and clearly the diffusion of democracy to its near abroad is by far the most 
threatening. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and United Russia, Russia has 
become an ―exporter of regime practices‖ to other countries that similarly lack dense 
linkages to the West and are largely free from Western leverage that would otherwise 
exert strong democratizing pressures on those regimes (Colton and Hale 2014: 5; 
Levitsky and Way 2010). By insulating itself from the so-called orange plague, bolstering 
authoritarianism in Belarus, and undermining democracy in Ukraine in the aftermath of 
the Orange Revolution, Russia actively seeks to cripple the process of diffusion both at 
home and abroad (Ambrosio 2007: 233). Russia has also cultivated strong ties to the near 
abroad, especially with authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, and Putin has ―warn[ed] 
fellow autocrats in surrounding countries of the dangers‖ of Western influence, offering 
―parallel forms of assistance, through election monitors and political consultants,‖ to help 
them resist such undue meddling (Carothers 2006: 57). Moreover, some of United 
Russia‘s most notorious practices during elections may spread to other countries, whose 
leadership is in search of effective methods of maintaining control in the context of their 
competitive authoritarian or dominant party regimes. One potential example known in 
Russia is the so-called ―‘Bashkir technology,‘ that is, the disqualification of viable 
challengers from running‖ (Golosov 2012: 8). With Russia rather than the West 
functioning as their center of orbit, authoritarian countries in Russia‘s own neighborhood 
and perhaps others around the world look to Putin and United Russia, reinforcing 
Russia‘s importance vis-à-vis its authoritarian counterparts and the West, which 
consistently tries to exert countervailing pressure. Therefore, investigating the dynamics 
that foster regime durability and opposition fragility in Russia may contribute to a greater 
understanding of the regimes that seek to emulate Russia‘s example.  
Leveraging Variance Within the Russian Case 
 The case of Russia provides significant empirical leverage over my research 
question and offers crucial longitudinal variation based on national differences, namely 
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the relative strength of a dominant party, across time. This research incorporates an 
extended time dimension, between 1995 and 2011, that includes both the Yeltsin and 
Putin/Medvedev administrations and a number of interesting episodes in party politics. 
Compared to parliamentary elections in the 2000s and 2010s that were marked by a 
remarkably capable and successful dominant party in United Russia, the elections in 1995 
and 1999 occurred in drastically different electoral environments at the national level: the 
first characterized by an anemic, ineffective and unpopular party of power in Our Home 
is Russia, and the second characterized by two competing parties of power in Unity and 
Fatherland-All Russia, which ultimately merged in 2002 creating United Russia after 
Fatherland-All Russia was defeated.  
I examine dominant party strength and opposition party fragility by pinpointing 
the party of power and opposition parties‘ strongholds in legislative elections, which 
offers an optimal laboratory to assess how the opposition fared in the absence of an 
effective party of power in the mid-1990s and under a remarkably successful one in the 
2000s and 2010s. The elections in the 1990s offer an opportunity to assess the contours of 
opposition party support in environments most conducive to their success based on the 
presence of an especially vulnerable party of power, while subsequent chapters 
examining the elections in the 2000s and 2010s provide the opposite. Thus, Russia offers 
both an example of an unsuccessful party of power and a successful one within a single 
case. These three distinct time portholes provide exceptional variation in the dependent 
variable, i.e. electoral outcomes for various parties.  
In addition to highlighting variance between elections based on party system 
competitiveness, a detailed study of five legislative elections—1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 
and 2011—leverages variation within elections based on cross-sectional differences at the 
regional and raion level (roughly equivalent to U.S. counties and the smallest geographic 
unit in Russia for which there is available data). I utilize the substantial sub-national 
variation of key independent variables – electoral manipulation, important structural 
cleavages and socioeconomic factors such as ethnicity, urbanization, and economic 
development – to explain sub-national variation in various parties‘ strength. Research at 
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the lowest level of analysis available also avoids potential inferential errors, such as 
ecological fallacy, by validly drawing inferences about sub-national phenomena using 
sub-national ecological characteristics. County-level research also increases the number 
of observations from roughly 80 regions to thousands of raion sub-polities and therefore 
maximizes variation on the independent variables and the outcome of interest. From a 
theoretical perspective, the examination of party politics within thousands of raions can 
also inform macro-level questions regarding the extent of competition under various 
political systems since the collapse of communism, and also project the likely course of 
political competition into the near future (Moraski and Reisinger 2003). 
Variation within elections also manifests across political parties, particularly those 
in the opposition. Within each of the three unique time portholes, the electoral outcomes 
of opposition parties varied greatly. For example, the KPRF was able to withstand the 
entry of two potential parties of power in 1999 by engaging in competitive electoral 
manipulation, while Yabloko found itself edging closer than ever before to the threshold 
for parliamentary representation as a result of a party system crowded with more 
formidable challengers. In more recent Duma elections, Yabloko has shown itself unable 
to consolidate the electoral gains it scored in the 1990s, confining it to the political 
wilderness as a non-parliamentary party, while the Communists and nationalists have 
adapted comparatively well to drastic changes in the party system as a result of United 
Russia‘s accession and subsequent consolidation.  
Between 1995 and 2011, important changes to the electoral system were 
introduced: between 1995 and 2003, half of the Duma‘s 450 seats were allocated through 
party-list proportional representation with the remaining half allocated through single-
member districts but the electoral system shifted in 2005 to pure party-list proportional 
representation system. Electoral rules allowed political parties a legal monopoly on 
access to the ballot in the proportional representation tier under the mixed system, 
furnishing a rich environment in which to study their varied electoral trajectories under 
conditions of competitive and contracted contestation (Robertson 2011). Although the 
potentially complex interactions between the two distinct tiers of legislative elections in 
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the 1990s and early 2000s are not considered here, a concentrated focus on the 
proportional representation tier facilitates comparisons between elections even after 
reform of the electoral system. The analysis will thus focus on elections to the lower 
house of parliament, the State Duma, and specifically the proportional representation tier, 
because such contests are the one sphere in which parties actively operate in Russia 
(McFaul 2004). 
Argument 
Weak Party System 
A weak and fragmented party system created conditions ripe for the emergence of 
a dominant party in Russia. In the 1990s, the Russian party system was characterized by a 
plethora of political parties and electoral blocs: no less than 43 organizations contested 
the 1995 legislative election, dozens of which were so-called ―apartment parties,‖ i.e. the 
party‘s supporters could all fit into a single Moscow apartment. The party system 
remained splintered throughout the decade, but some of the infinitesimal parties 
competing in 1995 dropped off the ballot by 1999, leaving 26 parties seeking votes that 
year. However, the winner of both the 1995 and 1999 election captured less than one-
quarter of votes cast in the party-list tier, providing an indication of the extent of the 
fragmentation.  
Despite incentives to cooperate created by the five percent threshold for 
legislative representation, coordination failure was an enduring feature of the party 
system throughout the 1990s. Ideological purism and, in many cases, personal political 
ambitions erected strong barriers to cooperation, since meaningful coordination would 
have compelled parties to create platforms reflecting all of their constituent parts and 
high-ranking party leaders may have been forced aside for the greater good if an 
individual from another party had a higher public profile or experience in government 
(Riker 1976; Sartori 1976; Pempel 1990; Cox 1997; Magaloni 2006; Hale 2004a). In an 
interview during the 2011 legislative election,  a high-ranking party official of the liberal 
Yabloko party revealed that, even before the ban on electoral coalitions took effect in 
2007, opposition parties in Russia have not coordinated because ―they are all for 
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themselves‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). Although 
coordination problems may plague any multiparty system, these obstacles were especially 
acute in the context of the weak party system because the level and extent of cooperation 
necessary for parties to surpass the threshold for legislative representation was 
considerable. Parties and electoral blocs thus emerged at will and elected to ―go it alone‖ 
with bases of support so limited that the likelihood of gaining legislative representation 
dwindled to virtually zero.  
The maladies manifest in weak party systems, such as the one prevailing in Russia 
in the 1990s, are partially due to opposition party coordination failure and the sheer 
number of parties supplied, but, more importantly, are attributable to the types of parties 
that are supplied, namely niche parties. In the Russian case, opposition parties have 
advanced niche ideological appeals to exceedingly narrow electorates, prioritizing their 
desire for autonomous action in the electoral arena and preservation of their undiluted 
party platforms over the promise of capturing additional pockets of support (Hale 2004a). 
On the ideological front, these parties‘ niche appeals have moved them away from the 
average voter and their dogged determination in retaining their purism ideologically has 
essentially ceded to the dominant party the centrist ideological space where voters are 
most heavily concentrated (Greene 2007; Downs 1957). According to one political 
analyst, ―the main problem‖ that contributed to United Russia‘s rise was ―the ideology of 
opposition parties‖ (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). For example, 
the liberal Yabloko targeted its appeals chiefly towards the urban intelligentsia living in 
the two federal cities, i.e. St. Petersburg and Moscow. Similarly, the ultra-nationalist 
LDPR concentrated exclusively on capturing the small segment of the electorate 
composed of xenophobic ethnic Russians. Despite the fact that the ideological center was 
largely up for grabs in the 1990s due to the absence of a successful and centrist party of 
power, these parties held fast to their comparatively extreme ideological orientations.  
Under conditions of hyper-fragmentation in the party system, a high proportion of 
votes may be wasted (Cox 1997). For example, voters in party systems fractionalized 
along ethnic lines, such as those in some African countries, ―tend to vote for [parties 
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representing] their own ethnic group […] even if this entails wasting their vote on losing 
candidates‖ (Magaloni 2006: 26; Van de Walle 2006). The party system in Russia in the 
1990s epitomizes the phenomenon of wasted votes under conditions of party system 
weakness. In the mid-1990s, the electorate faced a bewildering roster on the party list 
ballot and ultimately more than 48% of votes were wasted on parties that did not cross 
the threshold for representation or were votes against all. An immense floating electorate 
emerged that was effectively casting about for a major party to channel its votes toward.  
The existence and persistence of weak and niche parties created an optimal 
environment for dominant party emergence because a party that advanced more broad-
based appeals with the potential to reach a significant segment of the electorate could fill 
the lacuna that existed in the fragmented party system. According to one political analyst, 
people wanted something different than the parties that had been in politics since the 
1990s; they ―wanted to see someone [and some party] who will be the real leader of 
Russia‖ (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). Another politician argued 
in a similar vein: ―in the fragmented [political] space after Yeltsin, Putin saw that the 
ideas of United Russia were stronger and [would] unify people more‖ than those of the 
opposition (Politician Formerly Affiliated with United Russia 2011). Political 
entrepreneurs and then Prime Minister Putin himself identified an opportunity to build a 
dominant party from Russia‘s weak party system and harvest the floating electorate that 
comprised nearly half of all voters. Scores of voters who previously cast their ballots for 
minor parties, and therefore wasted their votes, were presented with an alternative in 
United Russia that more closely corresponded to their own ideological positions and had 
a higher chance of gaining legislative representation due to the party‘s catchall 
orientation. After United Russia‘s rise to power, the proportion of wasted votes dropped 
precipitously, from nearly half in the first legislative election under examination to 
merely five percent in the most recent contest to the State Duma. Undoubtedly, the 
dominant party captured many of the votes that would have been wasted in its absence. 
Thus, the conditions that foster the emergence of dominant parties are the mirror 
image of those that transform dominant party regimes into more competitive systems. 
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Existing scholarship has demonstrated that dominant party systems become more 
competitive only when other parties acquire major party status and adopt a catchall 
character, rather than remaining small and niche (Riker 1976; Greene 2007). For 
example, in PRI-dominated Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of 
the Democratic Revolution (PRD) ―remained small parties that made niche appeals to 
minority electoral constituencies and were thoroughly uncompetitive at the polls. It was 
not until the 1980s and 1990s that they expanded into major parties with a catchall 
character that could challenge PRI dominance‖ (Greene 2007: 2). A similar phenomenon 
occurred in Taiwan under the Kuomintang (KMT): the oppositionist Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) remained ideologically rigid during the majority of the KMT‘s 
tenure, affirming ideological and symbolic politics at the expense of appealing to the 
country‘s majority that was pragmatic and conservative, and only effectively challenged 
the KMT after moderating its message and positioning itself closer to the center (Greene 
2007). In treating the emergence of dominant parties as exogenous and focusing 
exclusively on the dynamics of durability and decay, however, these theories critically 
overlook the role that party weakness can play in the initial rise of ruling parties, well 
before these parties consolidate and are ultimately challenged at the polls. Structural 
conditions in the party system that produce party dominance may also contribute, in fact, 
to its reproduction over time (Cf. Greene 2007).  
My theory of dominant party emergence diverges from existing scholarship that 
concentrates chiefly on significant periods of nation building that precipitated the rise of 
ruling parties, such as a war of liberation, revolution, or post-war reconstruction in the 
event of defeat (Duverger 1954; Tucker 1961; Pempel 1990; Brooker 2000). For 
example, Tucker (1961) argues that party dominance emerges from revolutionary 
struggle: these parties come to power after the ―revolutionary displacement of a pre-
existing order, and seek to maintain revolutionary momentum after they come to power‖ 
(286). Arian and Barnes (1974) argue in a similar vein, it is ―virtually necessary for a 
party to preside over the establishment of the polity in order for it to achieve the […] 
identification with the epoch‖ (594). These theories‘ focus on cataclysmic events 
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underestimates the potential for the conditions that create dominance to help sustain it 
and for party dominance to arise under more prosaic conditions. My theory draws 
attention to how the character of the party system, in the absence of a revolutionary 
moment, can lead to the emergence of a dominant party.  
A weak party system provides an opportunity for the emergence of a dominant 
party, but it is a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition. My explanation of dominant 
party emergence and strength and opposition party weakness in Russia highlights the role 
of contingent components, namely the character of the political leadership under 
Vladimir Putin, economic performance and resources, and a permissive security 
environment, and structural factors, such as ethnicity and urbanization. Each of the 
contingent components contributes independently, but also serve to exacerbate the effects 
of structural conditions.  
Contingent Factors 
 Dominant party durability and opposition party fragility is undergirded by a set of 
contingent factors that bolster a dominant party but also exacerbate salient structural 
conditions to the ruling party‘s advantage. The most decisive components in this category 
are political leadership or the ―Putin effect,‖ economic conditions that allow and 
encourage patronage politics under Putin, and the security environment that permitted a 
dramatic centralization of power under Putin and his party apparatus, United Russia.  
Political Leadership: The “Putin Effect” 
A specific type of political leader has paved the way for the construction and 
maintenance of a dominant party: in Russia, the leadership and political acumen of 
Vladimir Putin has been indispensable to United Russia from its initial rise to its 
subsequent consolidation. Putin‘s unique brand of leadership will be discussed by way of 
contrast to that of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. In the transitional milieu of post-
communism in Russia, political leaders have had ―unusually broad opportunities to 
choose the country‘s direction‖ and Putin is certainly no exception: his personality and 
background profoundly shape his ideas about politics and the policies he has pursued 
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during his political tenure, now nearly a decade and a half in length (Treisman 2011: 
242).  
Putin learned a series of important lessons from the mistakes of his predecessor 
that he has sought to correct during his tenure in office, which explains the centralization 
of power in Russia under Putin, as well as the creation of United Russia and the pervasive 
electoral manipulation practiced in the 2000s and 2010s. First, Putin believed that 
projecting the image of, and acting as, a strong leader was essential to govern the country 
effectively. Yeltsin‘s ―weak and increasingly ineffective leadership‖ created a 
―dysfunctional‖ political system and economy in which the rule of law was not enforced, 
corruption ran rampant, and Russian citizens suffered (Collins 2005: xiii). Yeltsin also 
believed that ―Russia could only survive if it had a strong president‖ and sought to 
increase his power at the expense of his opponents by constantly shuffling his top 
advisers, including his prime ministers, but was largely unable to achieve prolonged 
power in the face of strong opponents (Herspring 2005: 6). Despite the sweeping formal 
powers given to the Russian president, Yeltsin was patently incapable of implementing 
his own decisions (Shevtsova 2003: 66).  
Yeltsin‘s choice of a ―KGB colonel with at most a pragmatic commitment to 
democracy‖ for a successor had dramatic implications for the course of Russian 
democracy (Treisman 2011: 72). Putin‘s background in the security services, serving as 
an officer in the KGB for 16 years, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
and chair of the Security Council before becoming Prime Minister and the subsequently 
the President of Russia, contributes to his ruthlessness and predilection for political 
control at all levels of government. As a silovik, that is a member of the security services, 
Putin‘s approach to politics is one of ―pragmatic authoritarian[ism]‖: subordination, 
discipline, order, control, rationality and predictability are emphasized at the expense of 
―diversity of opinions and interests within the state machinery‖ (Shevtsova 2003:  188; 
Colton and McFaul 2005: 15). His distinctive brand of leadership has ―promoted his 
image as a decisive, active, and engaged leader‖ well equipped to ensure domestic 
stability and couple up the country to the proper track after the tumultuous Yeltsin years 
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(Collins 2005: xiii). Through his leadership, Putin ―managed to show Russians that 
Russia is a powerful state‖ (Politician Formerly Affiliated with United Russia 2011). Part 
and parcel to engaged leadership a la Putin, is the ―desire to […] touch everything 
personally,‖ ranging from interfering in the conduct of national elections to managing the 
manner in which the media present him and his agenda to personally monitoring the 
rebuilding of homes razed by the wildfires that engulfed western Russia during the 
summer of 2010 (Shevtsova 2003: 81). According to Yabloko‘s leader, Grigory 
Yavlinsky, ―Boris Yeltsin took mistaken steps in the right direction toward democracy; 
Putin took correct steps in the wrong direction toward an authoritarian petro state‖ 
(Goldman 2008: 172). Putin‘s beliefs about leadership and the prerogatives inherent in 
the office of the presidency shape his responses to a variety of domestic circumstances, 
notably elections and the security situation. 
Second, Putin learned that the public approval his predecessor lacked for a variety 
of reasons was a crucial resource that increased the wherewithal of the president to 
pursue his desired agenda both domestically and internationally. Voters punished Yeltsin 
for the state of the economy, although he had little control over the course the economy 
would take in his initial years, as Gorbachev bequeathed him a ―macroeconomic bomb‖ 
that had been constructed by reckless money printing, widespread inefficiency inherent in 
state-led economies, and collapsing oil prices (Treisman 2011: 76). Although Yeltsin 
could not avoid taking a hit to his and Our Home is Russia‘s popularity due to the 
economy, he was also continually haunted by low public approval ratings for reasons in 
which he retained at least a degree of control. For example, facets of Yeltsin‘s character, 
such as his boorishness and his tendency to, according to his own words, ―fly off the 
handle in a stupid way, like a child,‖ caused his popularity to tumble (Treisman 2011: 
72). Furthermore, his taste for alcohol produced embarrassing behavior and numerous 
public blunders that became etched in the collective memory during his tenure in office. 
Yeltsin‘s poor health, exacerbated by his alcoholism, ―made it impossible for him to 
focus properly on matters of state‖ (Goldman 2008: 55). Yeltsin chose to polarize his 
relationship with the parliament more than compromise, and his ability to push through 
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reforms that were of vital importance to Russia‘s dual transition suffered. Clearly, his 
failure in enacting reforms to the extent required also negatively impacted his popularity. 
At its nadir in March 1999, Yeltsin‘s popularity was a pitiful six percent, quite the tumble 
from its high in late 1990 when it reached nearly 90% (Treisman 2011: 245). Yeltsin and 
Our Home is Russia‘s unpopularity were the result of a mix of factors under the 
Kremlins‘ control to varying degrees.  
Putin sought to project an image of a competent leader who would not fall into 
personal disarray in front of the public‘s very eyes. His background in the security 
services created a strong leader but he recognized that ruling effectively as an autocrat 
without public support was impossible. Putin cultivated his charismatic appeal by 
―add[ing] a certain charm to his pallid personality‖ and learning the art of speaking to 
various audiences in a manner that resonated thoroughly (Shevtsova 2003: 82). He also 
reinforced his popularity in December 2000 by restoring the Soviet national anthem 
music, albeit with new words, which Stalin ordered the composition of during World War 
II and Yeltsin scrapped during the collapse, introducing the red Soviet flag sans hammer 
and sickle as the official banner of the Russian armed forces, retaining the tsarist double-
headed eagle as Russia‘s coat of arms, and also preserving the pre-revolutionary tricolor 
flag. The mix of national symbols, which Putin sought to codify in law per the Russian 
Constitution, were selected after Putin carefully consulted public opinion surveys to 
identify those that would be the most popular among the public. Introducing a Russian 
national anthem with words was especially popular because the former tune decreed by 
Yeltsin lacked a song, and Russians were humiliated during the Olympics when Russian 
medalists were forced to watch awkwardly as the other medalists belted out their home 
country‘s national song. In October 2003, Putin also capitalized on public sentiment that 
had turned sharply against the oligarchs with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the 
head of the Yukos oil concern.  
Putin has recognized that high public approval, his own never falling below 60%, 
has allowed him considerable leeway in domestic policy: only with the Russian citizenry 
firmly behind him has Putin be able to push through authoritarian reforms and policies 
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the most relevant of which have severely constricted the opportunities for political 
activity in opposition to the Kremlin. Compared to Yeltsin, Putin has been ―fantastically 
free‖ to pursue his agenda, especially economic modernization and various political 
reforms, based on consistently high popularity (Treisman 2011: 93). Putin‘s astronomical 
approval rating has been largely ―frozen, being a talisman against defeat‖ (Shevtsova 
2003: 220). He has capitalized on his high approval ratings to bolster his own authority 
and the capacity of the state, and thus ―belongs to a long tradition of Russian statesmen 
who have sought change through autocratic action from above to mold society‖ 
(Herspring 2005: 5). Putin seems to believe that public tolerance of his non-democratic 
agenda flows from his popularity, which itself is bolstered by a combination of factors 
within his control and largely outside of it. Like Yeltsin before him, Putin has not been 
single-handedly responsible for his popularity: several contingent factors that will be 
discussed subsequently have played a central role, such as solid economic performance as 
a result of high natural resource prices across most of the 2000s and an arresting security 
environment that afforded him the opportunity to act as a strong leader and benefit from a 
rally ‗round the flag effect. Nevertheless, Putin follows public opinion polling 
assiduously to the point of becoming ―hostage‖ to them, and seeks to build up his 
popularity to preserve his freedom of action in public affairs (Shevtsova 2003: 161).  
Third, Putin developed a strong distaste for multipartism in the lower house of the 
Russian legislature that contributed to his desire to create and maintain a dominant party 
in the 2000s and 2010s. Yeltsin‘s personal support for multipartism during the 1990s 
resulted in a party system run amok, a sort of wild East kind of chaos typified by parties 
such as the ―Beer Lover‘s Party‖ and the ―Russian Party of Car Owners‖ competing in 
the 1995 legislative election. Yeltsin was fundamentally incapable of building a 
successful party of power: his feeble attempts at political engineering failed because he 
was ―not persistent‖ and, consequently, the parties Yeltsin invested in lost elections by 
horrendous margins (Shevtsova 2003: 181). A long-serving politician commented, 
―Yeltsin was not successful with power parties […] Yeltsin had power but he couldn‘t 
use this power because he was ill for four years and, before that, he didn‘t know what he 
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had to say, to do‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). Complete 
support and obedience from the Duma proved elusive throughout Yeltsin‘s tenure and 
instead he was forced to battle with the Duma at every turn with disastrous results: the 
protracted conflict between Yeltsin and the parliament from 1991-1993 culminated with 
the dissolution of parliament and the president‘s orders to shell the parliament building; 
in the late 1990s, the opposition-dominated legislature brought impeachment charges 
against him for a wide-range of missteps, including provoking the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991; using force inappropriately against the legislature in 1993; initiating the 
first war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s; subjecting the Russian people to genocide based 
on social and economic policies; finally, ruining the military (Shevtsova 2003: 159; 
Dougherty 1999). Before 1999, Yeltsin had escaped no less than five bids of 
impeachment in December 1992, March 1993, September 1993, July 1995, and June 
1998. Without an effective party apparatus and faced with a hostile parliament, Yeltsin 
resorted to ―permanent cadre revolution [as] his major instrument for holding onto 
power‖ and his power to rule by decree, which created at most the ―illusion of 
governance‖  (Shevtsova 2003: 18). By the end of Yeltin‘s presidency, the time spent 
passing significant but non-budgetary legislation was two years, lengthening considerably 
from the six-month average in the early 1990s (Treisman 2011: 253).  
When he ascended to the presidency, Putin wanted to prevent what his 
predecessor faced at all costs: the ―messy‖ multiparty system during Yeltsin‘s time 
―interfered with Putin‘s idea of politics and gave rise to too many irritating little parties 
that were difficult to control and that might someday cause problems for the ‗party of 
power‘‖ (Shevtsova 2003: 129). Putin believed that pursuing his agenda efficiently and 
avoiding the type of domestic political strife that Yeltsin struggled with required him to 
―create and maintain the support of a centrist majority if he were to become an effective 
political leader of the Russia of the twenty-first century‖ (Collins 2005: xiii). The 
architects of United Russia would therefore distinguish the new party of power from its 
predecessors that failed: the new party project would pursue a more centrist platform than 
Our Home is Russia, which espoused a liberal ideology despite the fact that ―free market 
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liberalism was never popular in Russia […] no liberal parties […] were popular in Russia 
in the beginning of the 1990s. If it was a liberal party, it had no chance to win‖ (Senior 
Political Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). One politician argued in the same vein, 
―the liberal policy of the government [and Our Home is Russia] was not supported by the 
society‖ (Politician Formerly Affiliated with United Russia 2011). United Russia would 
not make the same mistake of Our Home is Russia in orienting itself out of step 
ideologically with the majority of the electorate.  
Unlike Yeltsin, Putin invested heavily in political engineering and party building, 
and his increased wherewithal as a leader gave his party of power ―every chance of 
winning‖ in elections (Shevtsova 2003: 181). The role that Putin has played in United 
Russia‘s success is integral, with one politician not affiliated with United Russia 
commenting, ―United Russia [has been] successful first because of the person of Putin‖ 
(Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). What Kremlin political 
technologists and Putin envisaged was a party that would ―follow the same path as Japan 
with its Liberal Democratic Party, which spent dozens of years in power‖ or the Christian 
Democratic Party in postwar Italy that dominated the legislature for 35 years (Shevtsova 
2003: 182; Treisman 2011). The creation of a strong dominant party in United Russia has 
proven integral to closing the deep chasm between the president and the legislature that 
existed in the 1990s and imposing dominance in the legislature that Boris Yeltsin was 
never able to achieve. United Russia has greatly ―simplified the management of politics‖ 
for Putin because the party passes any and all legislation supported by Putin, rather than 
the president needing to negotiate for support from various parties on an ad hoc basis 
(Ibid). United Russia ensures that Putin‘s favored legislation travels seamlessly through 
the Duma from proposal to enactment. For example, Putin signed legislation shifting 
from a progressive income tax structure to a 13% flat tax into law only two months after 
its presentation in the Duma (Treisman 2011: 253). Putin has transformed the Duma from 
a political cesspool where recalcitrant opposition parties have the numbers to hold the 
president and his agenda hostage to a situation in which the government and the 
legislature ―work in harmony, as if part of the same organism‖ (Shevtsova 2003: 140). 
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Fourth, Putin learned that he not only needed to form a party of power to gain a 
majority in the Duma that would usher through his legislative agenda, but it was also of 
paramount importance that his party avoid going the same way as Russia‘s Choice in 
1993 and Our Home is Russia in 1995, i.e. into the dustbin of history. Yeltsin was 
committed to free and fair elections, indeed, to the point that the party he supported was 
defeated decisively by the Communists in the 1995 contest, which ―made him look like a 
loser‖ (Treisman 2011: 59; Shevtsova 2003). Despite Our Home is Russia‘s ―big 
advantages‖ in the 1995 Duma election, Yeltsin failed to win (Politician Formerly 
Affiliated with United Russia 2011). The political system that Yeltsin built put in place 
all the hallmarks of democracy, allowing Russians more freedom than ever before (and 
since), and his rejection of or tampering with competitive elections would have been 
inconsistent at best. To be sure, however, Yeltsin undoubtedly undermined the 
development of democracy in Russia when he chose to designate his own successor 
rather than allowing democratic politics to play out fully in the presidential election of 
2000.  
Putin rejected Yeltsin‘s attitude toward democracy and elections, endeavoring to 
ensure that United Russia would succeed at all costs: ―when push came to shove, the 
survivalist ethics were what mattered‖ (Treisman 2011: 119). Certainly, Putin‘s 
background in the security services shaped his views about political contestation. 
Working in the KGB is a ―way of thinking‖ rather than a profession, and one that 
cultivated in Putin a deep ―hostility toward dissent of any kind, an inability to tolerate 
variety in the environment, the rejection of everything alien and not easily 
understandable, an excessive suspiciousness, and a tendency to make decisions in secret‖ 
(Shevtsova 2003: 81). Sitting with Yeltsin in August 1999 as the president‘s heir 
apparent, Putin said, ―I do not like electoral struggle. I really do not. I do not know how 
to carry it out, and I do not like it‖ (Colton and McFaul 2003: 171). Putin, an 
―authoritarian at heart,‖ seems to personally distrust the uncertainty that accompanies free 
and fair elections as the legitimate essence of democracy that Yeltsin tolerated, and his 
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personality allows and even encourages machinations in the electoral arena (Shevtsova 
2003: 95).  
Under the leadership of an autocrat-like individual, the Kremlin utilizes egregious 
methods of manipulation, such as stuffing the ballot box or changing results, which were 
considerably less common during Yeltsin‘s tenure to capture electoral windfalls and send 
a signal of invincibility. Putin recognizes that voter turnout offers one indication of the 
public‘s confidence in the legitimacy and fairness of elections (Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 
2008). Putin and United Russia seek to ensure robust turnout as a signaling mechanism to 
domestic and international audiences alike that the citizenry is politically engaged and 
supportive of the regime because it provides an important source of legitimacy. However, 
the regime fears that Russians‘ low confidence in the fairness and legitimacy of elections 
may result in low voter turnout if not artificially augmented. Thus, the combination of 
Putin‘s incentives to augment turnout in elections and a broadly disengaged citizenry 
suggests that high voter turnout is a product of illicit regime interference in elections 
rather than a naturally occurring phenomenon. 
Under Putin‘s leadership, United Russia inflates turnout to improbably high levels 
to send a powerful signal of invincibility to domestic actors in search of areas of regime 
vulnerability and international audiences interested in exerting democratizing pressures 
on the regime. Electoral malfeasance resulting in unbelievably high voter turnout has not 
concealed by Putin and the central authorities, but rather flaunted conspicuously in a 
manner that calls into question interpretations of high turnout as a true reflection of 
citizen interest and political efficacy. The logic of signaling helps explain why United 
Russia has engaged in electoral manipulation even when elections are not predicted to be 
close. For a variety of reasons, including its access to the resources of the state and ability 
to repress the opposition, dominant parties like United Russia essentially win elections 
before election day and therefore do not need to rely on electoral fraud to produce a 
victory in an election the party otherwise would have lost (Greene 2007). Moreover, 
―excessive and blatant‖ fraud is committed by United Russia ―in full view of the public‖  
and is used to send a signal of dominance and immortality stands in stark contrast from 
 43 
the notion that manipulation ought to be well camouflaged (Simpser 2013: 2). Such 
egregious manipulation deters voters from supporting the opposition, such as the KPRF, 
LDPR, or Yabloko, and political elites from joining other parties or even entering the 
political arena in the first place (Simpser 2013). Excessive fraud also serves United 
Russia in the post-election aftermath by augmenting the party‘s bargaining position over 
other parties and allowing the party to keep a larger share of the ―rents and spoils of 
government‖ (Simpser 2013: 3).  
The systematic inflation of both voter turnout and United Russia‘s vote shares 
showcases the dominant party‘s capacity and control over all aspects of elections; in 
short, the regime can do as it pleases without consequences, emanating from either 
domestic opposition groups or international actors. More subtle forms of manipulation, 
such as patronage-based voter mobilization through political machines, ensure high vote 
shares for United Russia, but not necessarily high electoral participation. The importance 
of elections in Russia and other dominant party authoritarian regimes therefore makes 
―both the level of turnout and the level of electoral support important indicators of the 
regime‘s sustainability and consistency‖ (Mebane and Kalinin 2010: 4). Large-scale 
electoral manipulation that exaggerates United Russia‘s vote share and inflates turnout 
puts on full display the party‘s monopoly of political power. With more subtle forms of 
manipulation at work, dominant parties do not need to rely on fraud to win elections 
repeatedly, but ruling parties like United Russia may nevertheless engage in egregious 
electoral manipulation to fulfill other valuable political objectives. During the Yeltsin 
years, particularly in the 1995 election, comparatively limited electoral manipulation was 
more likely practiced, not as a show of all-encompassing political strength, but to inflate 
the party of power‘s vote share in the context of competitive elections in which the 
Kremlin-backed party could not be confident of winning, let alone a strong showing. 
Despite Yeltsin‘s commitment to free and fair elections, the Kremlin‘s Our Home is 
Russia needed outcome-changing electoral manipulation to combat its widespread 
unpopularity, but lacked the resources and type of leadership necessary to carry it out 
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successfully. In contrast, United Russia‘s manipulation is chiefly redundant in the sense 
that the party would have won landslide victories without it. 
Putin watched in the 1990s as manipulated raions that held the promise of 
electoral windfalls were subject to a fierce tug-of-war between parties. During the Yeltsin 
years, electoral manipulation was associated with electoral windfalls for opposition 
parties, notably the KPRF in 1995, and Fatherland-All Russia, the KPRF and the LDPR 
in 1999. Although the Kremlin benefitted from electoral manipulation in addition to 
opposition parties in the 1990s, ―fraud […] served to weaken the Kremlin‖ because the 
party of power was unable to monopolize the electoral manipulation that did occur and 
instead was forced to fight for its position with the KPRF and others (Treisman 2011: 
97). In stark contrast to this pattern, an important feature of ―Putin effect‖ that manifested 
in the early 2000s and continued into the 2010s was the efficiency of fraud in legislative 
elections: as a charismatic leader with the wherewithal, political clout, and economic 
resources necessary to engage in effective patronage politics and ruthless strong arm 
tactics, Putin was able to achieve a high degree of efficiency in the electoral manipulation 
that occurred and the Kremlin‘s United Russia became the sole beneficiary of such 
machinations. Under Putin‘s leadership, the Kremlin‘s party not only won elections in 
manipulated raions, but also won them decisively as opposition parties were cowed. The 
Putin factor explains part of the difference between the scatterplots detailing the 
relationship between voter turnout and various parties‘ vote shares in the legislative 
elections in the 1990s versus 2000s and 2010s, shown in Figures 3.2-3.6. Putin‘s style of 
leadership and personality directly contributed to the efficiency of fraud under his watch, 
but environmental factors, such as favorable economic conditions, also lent themselves to 
Putin‘s machinations.  
Finally, Putin learned that the absence of central control in Russia‘s ethnofederal 
system led to, at best, extortionist attempts by unruly regions to gain favors from the 
center and, at worst, intractable secessionist conflict. During Yeltsin‘s presidency, the 
central government fought two wars with Chechnya, the first of which occurred from 
1994 to 1996 when the central government attempted to regain control of the region after 
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it declared independence in 1991, and the second of which was launched in 1999 in 
response to the invasion of Dagestan by Islamic separatists. The federal government 
expended considerable resources and political capital to subdue the unruly republic 
during the 1990s and the repeated conflicts laid bare the vulnerabilities of Yeltsin‘s 
political power to both domestic opposition groups and the West. Beyond Chechnya, 
Yeltsin allowed the ethnic republics considerably autonomy, famously offering them to 
―take as much sovereignty as you can swallow‖ in 1990 (Petrov and Slider 2005: 239), 
and consequently, several regions ―paid little attention to Moscow. They passed whatever 
local laws they preferred, even if they ran counter to the Russian constitution‖ (Herspring 
2005: 6).  
In large part because of his intractable struggle with the parliament, Yeltsin was 
forced to negotiate constantly with the regions, especially during elections, dolling out 
concessions and in many case formalizing such agreements through bilateral treaties 
(Petrov and Slider 2005). Yeltsin turned to the regional governors for political backing, 
particularly those presiding over economic powerhouses such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan 
and Yakutia, because they were directly appointed, or dismissed, by the president (Ibid). 
Yet the governor‘s power and bargaining position vis-à-vis the center was greatly 
enhanced by the fact that, coupled with freefalling economy in the 1990s, the 
government‘s lack of administrative capacity prevented it from collecting the taxed 
required to fund its policies, which in turn forced regional executives to assume many of 
the responsibilities that had previously fallen within the purview of the federal 
government (Ibid). Yeltsin thus presided over a system of asymmetrical federalism that 
favored the regions rather than the central government and the result was that Russia in 
the 1990s appeared ―less federal than feudal‖ (Treisman 2011: 96). Putin witnessed the 
dysfunction in Russian federalism first-hand in the late 1990s when he acted as the head 
of the Main Oversight Department in charge of ensuring that regional laws and policies 
did not contravene those of the federal government (Petrov and Slider 2005).  
In contrast to Yeltsin, Putin benefitted from a growing economy, a majority in the 
State Duma, and astronomical levels of public support that provided a ―much stronger 
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basis to exert leverage‖ over the regions and fundamentally restructure the federal system 
(Petrov and Slider 2005: 255). His response reflected his ―life experiences and 
background‖: just months into his presidency in 2000, Putin issued a decree that 
fundamentally reformed center-periphery relations and forged a system of vertical power 
that created a single, unbroken chain of command from the regional level all the way to 
the Kremlin to ensure potentially unruly regions and those that had become too 
accustomed to home rule would be kept firmly under the Kremlin‘s thumb (Petrov and 
Slider 2005: 254). Central to this system was the creation of seven new federal 
administrative districts, or ―super regions,‖ that added a layer of administration between 
the regions and the federal government, each with its own head appointed by the 
president himself. Five out of seven who were appointed to these new administrative 
positions were siloviki themselves (Shevtsova 2003: 91). Expanded oversight of the 
regions and better coordination of federal agencies in the regions allowed the central 
government to penetrate the Russian state across the country‘s expanse to a degree that 
Yeltsin could have only dreamed of. Within the first year, thousands of regional laws that 
previously paid no heed to the Russian constitution were ―corrected‖ (Petrov and Slider 
2005: 248). Putin also amended the distribution of economic assets from the federal 
government to the regions in a manner that increased the resources of the former at the 
expense of the latter: the share of government revenue available to the regions was 
slashed from 54% in 1999 to 35% once Putin became president (Treisman 2011: 96).  
With the regions and their ―little tsars‖ cut down to size politically and 
economically, the Kremlin became the first among none, rather than the first among 
equals (Shevtsova 2003: 8). Through these reforms, Putin ―demonstrated to everyone that 
Russia is a one and united state territory […] and completely eliminated the problem of 
the North Caucasus, that is, Chechnya and Dagestan‖   (Politician Formerly Affiliated 
with United Russia 2011). In short, ―the direction of politics had changed‖ under Putin: 
with a package of legislation reigning them in, the regional governors, who in the 1990s 
had flaunted their independence vis-à-vis the center and ran against the Kremlin‘s party 
in 1999, became ―one of the foundations of the pyramid [of control] under Putin‖ and 
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United Russia (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). With the 
regional governors cowed into submission, Putin could exert overwhelming influence 
over these executives and ―use the governors and mayors to build United Russia,‖ a 
dominant party with an immense regional reach (Ibid). 
Although Putin succeeded in pacifying the Caucasus militarily, the Kremlin has 
exchanged such strategies for alternative mechanisms of political control, such as 
patronage-based relationships, that signal dominance during elections and ward off 
political challenges by showcasing the regime‘s thorough penetration of possibly 
rebellious regions. Through these mechanisms, Putin has been able to purchase loyalty 
and deference to the Kremlin from these regions without resorting to hard repression. 
United Russia performs a key role in this system because regions‘ deference to the 
Kremlin manifests concretely, through electoral results delivered in legislative contests, 
rather than through abstract rhetoric (Golosov 2012). United Russia‘s vote share is thus 
the barometer used to gauge the Kremlin‘s dominance over these regions during each 
election to the State Duma.  
Economic Conditions 
In addition to the ―Putin effect,‖ dominant party strength has also been fueled by 
auspicious economic conditions that contributed to the ruling party‘s popularity and kept 
the party‘s patronage reserves well stocked. Putin and United Russia have sought to 
ensure that the tide of economic growth keeps flowing through proactive policies. 
Russia‘s macroeconomic policy in Putin‘s first two terms as president had been ―among 
the most responsible in the world‖ (Treisman 2011: 147). Across most of the 2000s, 
United Russia presided over a protracted economic boom: the federal government ran 
budget surpluses for back-to-back years, real wages and disposable income increased 
significantly (to the tune of 12% a year between 2000 and 2007 pertaining to the latter), 
and unemployment ticked downward continually (Treisman 2011: 101; World Bank 
2005; Hale et al. 2004). Actual economic growth far exceeded official government 
forecasts year after year. In the early 2000s, Putin insisted that the government set ―more 
ambitious goals‖ for economic growth: rather than the 2003 projection of four percent 
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growth, he wanted between 9 to 11% (Shevtsova 2003: 229). Sweeping reforms that had 
been blocked or abandoned during Yeltsin‘s tenure were passed in a flurry, such as a 13% 
flat tax rate for personal income in lieu of progressive taxation, reductions in taxes on 
profits from 35 to 24% and payroll from 36 to 26%, and a decrease in the value added tax 
from 20 to 18% (Treisman 2011: 93). The introduction of the flat tax alone hiked revenue 
collection by 50% (Shevtsova 2003: 215). The nonpayment of wages and pensions that 
had become depressing hallmarks of the Yeltsin years ceased. Rather than spend 
tremendous natural resource profits in the initial years, the government socked away 
windfalls into a stabilization fund that buffered the economy against the seemingly 
uncontrollable free fall experienced in other countries when the global financial crisis 
struck in the late 2000s. Adopting a prudent fiscal policy before the onset of the crisis 
allowed the government to actually increase pensions by 11% in 2009 and by an 
additional 13% at the start of 2010 (Treisman 2011: 161). 
Overall, Putin and United Russia have been largely credited with economic 
growth and modernization when it was, in fact, developments prior to 2000 that set the 
economy on a better track, which then allowed the Kremlin to pursue its economic and 
political agenda more easily. To be sure, Putin and his team did not do anything to 
encumber economic growth, but robust economic performance under United Russia and 
Putin is more the product of high world oil prices throughout the 2000s and beyond 
Russia‘s control than a result of deliberate planning and management by the Kremlin 
(Millar 2005; Treisman 2011; Goldman 2008). United Russia rose to power and has 
preserved its position due to a favorable economic situation, which provided ―greater 
budgetary resources that could be used to pay off past debts[,] finance federal 
institutions,‖ and increase social spending when the going got tough in the late 2000s 
(Petrov and Slider 2005: 255).  
When Putin assumed the presidency, traditional industries had become more 
competitive and real wages fell as a result of the ruble devaluation in 1998, a year before 
Putin even became Prime Minister: the sectors that managed to survive the 1990s were 
energized as other enterprises were finally ravaged and the domestic market was 
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insulated because Western goods became more expensive (Treisman 2011: 234). In fact, 
economic improvement began to take hold when Yevgeny Primakov was still Prime 
Minister in early spring of 1998; as such, Primakov rather than Putin presided over the 
initial uptick in the economy immediately following the financial crisis (Goldman 2008: 
96). The Russian economy was boosted by international demand for energy that was 
higher than the capacity of Russian producers at the time, but they reacted quickly by 
accelerating production (Goldman 2008: 14). The devaluation thus sparked the much-
needed shedding of inefficient enterprises and initial economic growth that Russians 
subsequently attributed to current power holders. With the ruble losing value, foreign 
imports became more expensive for Russian consumers, which incentivized them to 
purchase goods made in Russia rather than abroad; as a result, the Russian manufacturing 
sector benefitted from the less competitive market domestically (Goldman 2008: 171).  
In addition to the positive effects of the ruble devaluation, Russia‘s recovery from 
the 1998 financial crisis was also due to the high price of oil exports that played a more 
integral role in the process than the Prime Minister, regardless of who was in office at the 
time (Millar 2005; Goldman 2008). The economic recovery that followed the catastrophe 
would have buoyed any current power holders, including Yeltsin, had he not resigned 
abruptly as president at the end of 1999. In the wake of the 1998 crisis, the price of Urals 
crude, Russia‘s primary oil blend, skyrocketed from $15.2 per barrel on average in 1999 
to $27.2 in 2003 (World Bank 2005: 16). In 2000, fuel and metals accounted for an 
―estimated 65 percent of value added in industry‖ (Tompson 2005: 340). With an 
estimated 40% of the central government‘s budget coming from oil and natural gas 
production, the federal budget and Russian economy at large benefitted from a protracted 
windfall (Hale et al. 2004; World Bank 2005). In the year immediately preceding and 
following the 2003 Duma election, the dominant party benefited considerably from 
climbing oil exports and increased oil extraction that surged by 32% in 2002-2004: oil 
wealth triggered demand for services and a range of consumer goods, and manufacturing 
went into high gear to meet the demands of the oil sector expensive (Treisman 2011: 
234). As a share of export earnings between 2002 and 2003, oil, gas and metals increased 
 50 
from a 60% share to 75%, equivalent to over 30% of GDP, indicating an intensifying 
reliance on natural resources under Putin and United Russia (Fish 2005: 258; Tompson 
2005: 340).  
Oil has played an ―important if not crucial role in Russia‘s economic and political 
life‖: the rise of the Russian petrostate has fueled the Kremlin‘s capacity to shore up 
United Russia in election after election (Goldman 2008: 11). In the 2000s, the Kremlin 
sought to ensure that natural resource windfalls accrue directly to the state, rather than the 
Russian oligarchs, by establishing direct control over the primary sector, either by 
acquiring controlling stakes in various producers or via wholesale renationalization. The 
Kremlin‘s agenda of economic revanchism has stripped the oligarchs of the jewels of 
their crowns, in many cases acquired illegally in the corrupt loans-for-shares privatization 
scheme adopted, and essentially reversed the wave of privatization that occurred in the 
mid-1990s.  
During the 1990s, Yeltsin eagerly privatized oil and metal industries on the cheap, 
which is surprising, given that the government was ―not even able to tax them 
effectively‖; nevertheless, the political leadership ―surrender[ed] these spectacular rents 
without a fight‖  (Tompson 2005: 351). But Yeltsin presided over a weak regime, which 
forced him to try to secure the political backing of the Russian oligarchs by privatizing 
the country‘s most valuable assets during his 1996 re-election bid and ensure that, even if 
he was not successful, ―his opponents would face powerful opposition to any attempt to 
reverse course in economy policy‖ (Ibid). Political expediency combined with a weak 
regime demanded that Yeltsin relinquish these most prized state assets. The influence that 
Yeltsin allowed the oligarchs, however, also cost him dearly in terms of his party of 
power‘s prospects: ―Yeltsin was not successful with power parties because he was 
connected with the oligarchs and they said, ‗you must do this and this.‘ Yeltsin allowed 
businesses too much influence‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 
2011). Thus, although the oligarchs backed Yeltsin for his re-election, their close 
involvement in politics also jeopardized Our Home‘s chance of becoming a successful 
party of power. 
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In contrast to his predecessor, Putin‘s political position, and that of his party, has 
been more secure throughout his tenure and he also operates according to a different 
political logic, one that views direct control over the primary sector as part and parcel to 
his continued political power. Putin‘s own thesis, fulfilling part of the requirements for 
the Candidate of Sciences degree in economics at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute he 
pursued in the late 1990s, charts a comprehensive course for Russian economic 
development based on mineral resources that were to be renationalized or otherwise 
controlled by the state (Balzer and Putin 2006). Beginning in the early 2000s, Putin 
embarked on a campaign to reassert state control over natural resource industries, chiefly 
oil and gas, but also metals. According to one political analyst, ―Putin has victimized all 
aspects of economy‖ since taking power in 2000 (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM 
Foundation 2011). The Kremlin stripped the Yukos oil concern of its assets and 
transferred them to state-owned Rosneft in 2003, as well as acquired a controlling stake 
in the Gazprom natural gas monopoly two years later, multiplying the state‘s capacity to 
appropriate resource rents. Before Rosneft‘s purchase of additional shares in Gazprom in 
the mid-2000s, the state had held only 35-40% of the company (Goldman 2008: 101). But 
the process of positioning Gazprom for state takeover began much earlier in Putin‘s 
tenure: in May 2001, Putin leveraged the state‘s share in Gazprom to force out the CEO 
and, having already fired former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin as the chairman of the 
company‘s board of directors, duly installed Alexei Miller and no other than Dmitry 
Medvedev to replace those atop the Gazprom giant. As a result of Rosneft‘s purchase in 
the mid-2000s, the proportion of crude oil production accounted for by state-dominated 
companies rose from a paltry 16% in 2000 when Putin assumed the presidency to nearly 
50% by 2007 as he prepared to transfer his presidential powers to Dmitry Medvedev 
(Goldman 2008: 99).  
Due to the increase in controlling stakes or complete renationalizations, the ruling 
party has been buoyed by record-setting oil and gas prices: over his second term as 
president, Putin and the rest of Russia witnessed the price for Russian Urals crude, 
Russia‘s chief oil blend, skyrocket from $33 a barrel to $94, which boosted demand 
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across the economy (Treisman 2011: 235). Paralleling the recovery from the 1998 crisis, 
the price of oil also rebounded quickly in the late 2000s, from below $35 a barrel in the 
beginning of January 2009 to more than double that figure by the end of that year 
(Treisman 2011: 161). The initial economic recovery after 1998 and consistently high oil 
prices throughout the 2000s generated higher tax revenues and expanded social spending 
and the Kremlin‘s patronage reserves, which in turn bolstered the perception of Putin and 
Untied Russia as effective leaders and increased their public support, permitting the 
Kremlin the leeway to forge an authoritarian system (Treisman 2011). Although the 
Kremlin socked a portion of the natural resource windfalls away into a stabilization fund, 
they also distributed part of the surplus to the population at critical junctures, perhaps in 
direct response to public opinion polls that showed the public strongly supported 
spending the surpluses created by high oil prices on social welfare provisions and 
pensions (Tompson 2005: 347). Indeed, beginning with the 1999 election, made possible 
at that time due to increasing world oil prices and the positive effects of the ruble 
devaluation, the Kremlin consistently rolled out new social spending packages at election 
time, in ―nakedly political move[s]‖ that leveraged the Kremlin‘s influence over the 
economy to deliver the goods to voters (Colton and McFaul 2003: 57). The policy of 
economic revanchism and rents derived from the exploitation of resources have created a 
valuable stockpile of patronage resources for the Kremlin and allow the political 
leadership to pursue ―politically rational ends‖ with an eye toward both ―enrich[ing] itself 
and […] entrench[ing] itself‖ (Tompson 2005: 348, 355). Thus, the rise and consolidation 
of United Russia has tracked closely the rise and consolidation of the Russian petrostate.  
A booming economy has allowed United Russia to exploit the structural 
conditions discussed in the subsequent section. For example, the improving economy 
furnished Putin with the wherewithal to “reestablish Moscow‟s dominance over some of 
Russia‟s restless regions,” namely the ethnic republics (Goldman 2008: 95). In areas with 
geographically concentrated ethnic minorities, United Russia relies on the distribution of 
economic and political benefits to targeted regions in exchange for votes delivered by 
regional authorities during elections and economic boom times build up the Kremlin‘s 
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war chest to leverage at election time. The Kremlin and regional elites have made a grand 
bargain that ensures United Russia‘s continued dominance in the legislature and 
guarantees regional elites continued political power and resources from the Kremlin. By 
enforcing the primacy of federal over regional law and subjecting the governors to 
presidential appointment, regional executives have been brought in line under Putin‘s 
leadership, but retain enough political clout to make trouble for the Kremlin at election 
time if carrots do not also accompany the sticks. Upon his ascension to the presidency, 
―Putin came to understand that without preserving Yeltsin‘s policy of deal making in the 
regions, he would not survive‖; advantageous economic conditions coupled with high 
popularity ratings have enabled Putin and the ruling party to offer extraordinarily 
attractive deals to regional elites, effectively underwriting United Russia‘s performance 
in elections (Shevtsova 2003: 126).  
To recapitulate, United Russia‘s strength has been bolstered by high oil prices and 
other propitious conditions that helped stabilize and grow the economy, facilitate the 
provision of social services to the citizenry and the management of political elites and 
specific constituencies alike using patronage. Without the currency devaluation occurring 
before Putin‘s time in office and consistently high oil prices that the Kremlin has 
captured windfall rents from during his tenure, United Russia would have almost 
certainly traveled a path more akin to Russia‘s Choice and Our Home is Russia than the 
LDP in Japan or the Christian Democrats in Italy, as the citizenry would have punished 
the party of power for economic underperformance and elites would have at least 
entertained the thought of jumping ship to a more promising political vessel. For their 
part, powerful regional elites would have enjoyed their choice of patrons, as a range of 
political actors from the Communists to the ultra-nationalists would have competed with 
the Kremlin to vie for their political support. The political topography may have 
resembled that which prevailed in the 1990s, when the powerhouse republics were split in 
elections between the Kremlin‘s Our Home is Russia and the Communist opposition 
because the Kremlin lacked the economic and political resources necessary to buy off the 
regional elites en masse.  
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Historically, citizens‘ evaluations of Russian presidents have tracked closely their 
perceptions about the state of the economy, which themselves mirrored objective 
economic indicators such as the unemployment rate and average wages and pensions: 
when the economy is booming, Russians report higher presidential approval than in times 
of downturn (Treisman 2011: 249). Accordingly, Yeltsin‘s approval rating plummeted 
along with the economy in the 1990s and Putin‘s has remained high owing to the 
opposite, the product of pure luck based on when he became Prime Minister and then 
Presidents. One political analyst argued that due to the ―economic crisis that started at the 
end of the 1980s and continued through the end of the 1990s, any ruling party that would 
have had power in that time would be unpopular, it was inevitable‖ (Senior Political 
Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). It is ―without doubt‖ that Our Home is Russia 
would have been more popular had the economy been better at the time (Ibid). It is thus 
difficult to overestimate the influence of auspicious economic conditions in undergirding 
United Russia, from its initial rise through its consolidation. It has been a ―factor of luck‖ 
that United Russia has been in power during economic good times, but Putin and United 
Russia might have won anyway because of his personal leadership skills (Politician 
Formerly Affiliated with United Russia 2011). Nevertheless, while favorable economic 
conditions may have ensured high public approval and the loyalty of political elites, such 
conditions are underdetermining in the sense that another leader or party may have 
leveraged economic growth and stability, and the accompanying approval ratings, to erect 
strong democratic institutions rather than entrenching authoritarianism through a 
dominant party (Treisman 2011). 
Security Environment 
 United Russia and Putin have undoubtedly benefitted from a security environment 
conducive to the centralization of political power at the expense of democratic 
institutions and governance. While high economic performance has created an 
environment ripe for additional modernization and bolstered the ruling party‘s popularity 
based on economic deliverables and expanding patronage reserves, the security situation 
provided a crucial window of opportunity for Putin and United Russia to act with an eye 
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toward putting the political system in order to the benefit of current power holders. In 
short, the Kremlin has leveraged the continual crisis environment that has prevailed in 
Russia since the late 1990s to centralize power.  
When Putin became Yeltsin‘s new Prime Minister in early August 1999, he took 
the lead role in managing the renewed outbreak of conflict in the Caucasus: Islamist 
Chechen separatists invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan, triggering feelings of 
vulnerability and widespread fear of yet another protracted secessionist conflict that had 
the potential to derail Russia‘s recovery from the 1998 financial crisis. Just one month 
after the invasion, several apartment buildings in Moscow, Volgadonsk and Buynaksk 
were blown up, killing nearly 300 people and injuring over 600. Additional bombs were 
located and defused in Moscow and Ryazan, although authorities commented that the 
bomb identified in Ryazan was part of a training exercise, prompting speculation that the 
government was also responsible for those bombs that ultimately detonated in an attempt 
to justify military action in Chechnya and generate a rally ‗round the flag effect 
(Treisman 2011; Shevtsova 2003). Central authorities connected the chain of apartment 
bombings to Chechens, before a formal investigation was opened and despite a lack of 
evidence, and the Kremlin moved tanks and troops into Chechnya to annihilate those 
fomenting state disintegration (Treisman 2011). Putin leveraged the ―war to rally the 
country to fight what he saw as a potentially disastrous terrorist threat‖: he quickly 
mustered a strong hand to calm the hysterical citizenry, promising that the government 
would track down the terrorists without mercy (Goldman 2008: 172; Treisman 2011). 
Speaking to the Duma, Putin framed the security situation as one in which ―bandits‖ were 
―blowing up the state‖ and ―undermining authority;‖ Putin‘s duty was to ―defend the 
population‖ from terrorists (Shevtsova 2003: 37). Russians rallied behind Putin: he was 
the type of resolute leader who could restore order amid chaos, protect them from 
dangers emanating from the Caucasus that had spread to their very own doorsteps, and 
finally set the country on the right track after the prolonged catastrophe that was the 
Yeltsin administration. According to Yeltsin, Russians believed that Putin, ―personally, 
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could protect them. That‘s what explain[ed] his surge in popularity‖ (Treisman 2011: 
248).  
Putin was catapulted to the highest levels of Russian government at a time when 
the security situation created an environment desirous of the kind of strong hand that he, 
with his background in the security structures, was well equipped to provide. Putin‘s 
hawkish response to the invasion of Chechnya and the subsequent apartment bombings 
caused his popularity to skyrocket and the Kremlin‘s pick in the 1999 legislative 
elections to secure a surprise second-place finish, just months after the party‘s creation, 
by riding Putin‘s coattails. The counterfactual scenario, in which the Caucasus remained 
relatively tranquil, thus depriving Putin the opportunity to shine as Prime Minister 
immediately preceding the Duma contest, may have produced an overwhelming 
Communist victory or resulted in a more even distribution of votes among the largest 
parties in 1999 rather than thrusting Unity into the political spotlight. Yet with a national 
security emergency transpiring, the Kremlin‘s party clearly benefitted from its 
association with Putin and Sergei Shoigu, the Minister of Emergency Situations. In fact, 
the invasion of Dagestan was a pivotal moment for Putin as an individual because he 
believed that it threatened the whole country‘s territorial integrity, which ―overrode his 
temperamental aversion to mass politics and electioneering‖ (Colton and McFaul 2003: 
172). The national security emergency that began in the Caucasus and leapt to the capital 
not only animated the electorate behind Putin and Unity, but also provided a compelling 
rationale for Putin to enter the political fray despite his initial aversion. Thus, the war in 
Chechnya ―helped Putin build a party‖ because the people wanted the federal government 
to win (Politician Formerly Affiliated with United Russia 2011). 
Into his presidency, national security emergencies that had opened a window of 
opportunity at the outset of Putin‘s tenure as Prime Minister largely remained in place, 
buttressing United Russia‘s popularity in the 2003 legislative election and Putin‘s in the 
2004 presidential race. In October 2002, dozens of Chechen rebels who supported the 
Islamist separatist movement in their home region seized the Dubrovka Theater in central 
Moscow and took 850 people hostage, promising to blow up the building if their 
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demands, chiefly the Russian withdrawal from Chechnya and an end to the war there, 
were not met. Elite Russian forces raided the building after introducing a chemical agent 
that was ultimately responsible for killing all of the 130 hostages that died. Although the 
administration was criticized for its handling of the theater hostage crisis, Russians again 
witnessed as the conflict in the Caucasus came to the capital, and Putin again leveraged 
the crisis to centralize power. Putin likened Russia‘s struggle with Chechen separatists to 
America‘s struggle against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and framed the events at 
Dubrovka as the work of individuals belonging to an international network of terrorists 
(Shevtsova 2003: 255). Putin had ―decided to use the crisis to make the regime more 
authoritarian. Manipulated from above, military hysteria and xenophobia had created the 
ground for an increased role for the security services and more macho rule. Frightened 
Duma deputies immediately endorsed restrictions […] apparently ready to endorse 
anything to please the president‖ (Shevtsova 2003: 256). Two years after the events at the 
Dubrovka Theater, dozens of armed rebels who were later identified as Islamic 
separatists held over a thousand hostage, including more than 750 children, in a school 
gymnasium mined with explosives in Beslan, North Ossetia. Mirroring the government‘s 
response to Dubrovka, Russian security forces stormed the school and exchanges of 
gunfire and explosions continued for days, leaving over 300 dead, of which 186 were 
children, and over 800 wounded. Russia‘s deadliest terrorist attack was cited as the 
pretext for comprehensive political and electoral reform aimed at shoring up the power 
vertical: fundamental restructuring of all levels of government was required to create a 
single system of authority and prevent state fragmentation or wholesale collapse (White 
and Kryshtanovskaya 2011).  
During Putin‘s tenure as president, ―each terrorist attack prompted a further […] 
centralization of political power,‖ and he ultimately ―centralized power more than some 
would have‖ (Treisman 2011: 110, 108). In contrast to the course of action that other 
leaders might have pursued, Putin elected to capitalize on domestic security events that 
were well beyond his control, but also lent themselves to Putin‘s machinations. Putin 
transformed into a ―wartime leader with astronomic popularity‖ based on a string of 
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terrorist attacks during his tenure as Prime Minister and then President: Russia was 
shaken by the apartment bombings in three cities in 1999 that killed more than 200, the 
Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 in which more than 120 perished, a suicide 
bombing at a military hospital in North Ossetia in 2003 that killed 50, an explosion in a 
train in southern Russia that killed 46 just five months after the suicide bombing, another 
suicide bombing that killed about 40 in the Moscow metro in 2004 just two months after 
the train explosion in the south, an attack on an interior ministry building in the republic 
of Ingushetia in 2004 in which 92 perished, a simultaneous attack on two Russian 
commercial airliners that killed 90 three months after the events in Ingushetia, and, 
finally, the worst terror attack that Russia has experienced, the Beslan school hostage 
crisis in 2004 that killed over 300 people, mostly children (Treisman 2011: 93).  
The public already stood firmly behind Putin and United Russia due to high 
economic performance and because they feared for their personal security and believed 
current power holders were the best equipped to protect them, but the Kremlin also 
sought to enact changes that essentially institutionalized United Russia‘s position in the 
legislature and the center‘s dominance over the regions, which also reinforced the ruling 
party‘s strength. Putin leveraged the security situation to achieve domestic political 
objectives that fortified his own personal power and that of United Russia. For example, 
in the wake of the apartment bombings, the Kremlin introduced the law ―On Political 
Parties‖ and other associated reforms that were sweeping in content and far ranging in 
their effect on political parties and the party system. Membership requirements pertaining 
to political parties were substantially increased and the regional distribution of party 
branches essentially prohibited regional parties from participating in elections. Regional 
governors were thus prevented from creating niche parties at the sub-national level that 
could be used to establish an independent base of power from the Kremlin. State 
financing of parties was introduced contingent on how well they performed in legislative 
elections, a reform undoubtedly designed to augment the position of Russia‘s largest 
parties, namely United Russia (Hale 2006).  
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After Beslan, the Kremlin traveled farther down the road of political 
centralization by leaps and bounds with two reforms, one aimed at bringing the regional 
governors into line and another that fundamentally altered the electoral system governing 
legislative elections. Regional governors were no longer to be appointed by direct 
election, but would instead be subject to presidential appointment, and dismissal. This 
significantly curtailed the power of regional executives and, coupled with changes to the 
electoral system, provided strong incentives for them to bandwagon with United Russia 
rather than risk their political power by supporting the opposition. Dramatic changes to 
the electoral system included the increase in the threshold for legislative representation 
from five to seven percent and the introduction of a purely proportional representation 
system for populating the State Duma. With parties monopolizing access to seats in the 
Duma through the party-list electoral formula, regional elites were no longer able to run 
as independents and challenge the Kremlin once in the legislature, but were instead 
forced to affiliate with national parties under the watchful eye of the Kremlin or remove 
themselves from national politics altogether.  
Undoubtedly, other leaders would likely have reacted to the Beslan school 
hostage crisis differently: perhaps they would have been content with soaring presidential 
popularity and the ruling party‘s dominant position in the legislature and elected to 
merely tinker around the edges rather than pursue sweeping changes. Where other leaders 
may have seen repeated tragedy in the apartment bombings and hostage crises, Putin saw 
a political opportunity structure that progressively widened. He was resolute in his 
determination to shape the public narrative regarding the national security emergencies 
that occurred away from the idea that the country was actually less safe under his watch 
and toward the notion that a strong hand was needed from leaders with the political 
leeway necessary to successfully combat the enemies of the state and ensure the safety of 
the population. Paradoxically, each terrorist attack augmented Putin and United Russia‘s 
position rather than weakening it, which can be credited to Putin‘s political shrewdness in 
particular, indicating the degree to which Putin as a person critically shaped the Russian 
political system at several critical junctures. United Russia has therefore preserved its 
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strength due to auspicious circumstances owing to the economy and the security situation 
that provided a critical window of opportunity for the political leadership to act in ways 
that further reinforced United Russia‘s popularity and position.  
The security environment intensified the effects of structural conditions, 
especially concerning ethnicity, on the strength of United Russia. Renewed conflict in the 
powder keg of Russia that had also spread into the heartland on several occasions created 
an environment ripe for Kremlin control and manipulation. The public‘s support of a 
strong hand, as evidenced through numerous public opinion surveys, provided the central 
authorities with a firm mandate to bring the Caucasus, and ethnic republics in general, 
back into line using virtually any means necessary. When legislative elections rolled 
around, the Kremlin leveraged the center‘s increased penetration of the ethnic republics 
as a result of the precarious security environment to capture electoral windfalls through 
political machines organized around shared ethnicity and methods of manipulation to 
signal political dominance. With each terrorist attack that the Kremlin links to the 
Caucasus, the Kremlin enjoys a renewed rationale for political intervention on behalf of 
the ruling party during elections. 
In addition to the seemingly unending string of terrorist attacks during Putin‘s 
tenure, color revolutions in bordering countries, namely Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 
2004, encouraged the centralization of power and shaped the regime‘s repressive 
response to political opposition. A high-level politician argued, the ―color revolutions 
have influenced Russian politics because Putin saw that [the] possibility existed [for] him 
to lose power. What happened in Ukraine and Georgia allowed Putin to clamp down 
more. The regime became stronger and stronger [through] the Law on Parties and the 
election law‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). The color 
revolutions in particular reinforced Putin‘s desire to build a dominant party, which could 
be used as an instrument to increase political control and marginalize the opposition, 
mitigating incentives to organize against the regime. The combination of domestic terror 
attacks and color revolutions occurring in Russia‘s backyard galvanized the already 
highly motivated Putin to ―build a pyramid of power with controls [operating] at a high 
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place. Only he himself controls all areas of our lives, he and his people around him, […] 
and United Russia is an instrument of this‖ (Ibid). Without a robust ruling party, Putin‘s 
regime would be more vulnerable to overthrow via a popular uprising and, as a result, 
Putin has invested considerable resources in United Russia to ensure that his regime does 
not go the way of Shevardnadze‘s in Georgia.  
Structural Conditions 
United Russia leverages structural conditions to the party‘s benefit by engaging in 
subtle but systemic and widespread forms of manipulation involving the politics of ethnic 
minorities and the countryside using patronage-based relationships and organized 
pressure to vote. The contingent factors discussed above therefore exacerbate structural 
conditions. The ability of the party of power in Russia to maintain its strength hinges on 
controlling areas with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities and those in the 
countryside exclusively, and that strength is compromised when it is unable to 
monopolize these avenues, either due to insufficient capacity and resources or other 
domestic political contingencies.  
Ethnicity 
Like dominant parties in other authoritarian regimes, United Russia has 
maintained a toolbox containing various instruments that can be employed to preserve 
power, key among them are engaging in forms of manipulation carried out by local 
political machines through patronage-based voter mobilization (Schedler 2002). Vast 
resource endowments bolsters ruling parties‘ capacity to engage in reliable patronage-
based relationships, in which the party delivers political and economic benefits in 
exchange for the delivery of electoral support. Various resources of the state, such as 
administrative capital and hyper-incumbency advantages, are leveraged to achieve 
partisan ends by allowing the dominant party to engage in widespread clientelism 
targeted at specific social groups (Greene 2007).  
In the context of ethnic federalism, ethnic minorities may be predisposed to 
engage in patronage-based arrangements because the ruling party may fear ethnic-based 
autonomy movements or challenges to their political control from these areas. Enshrined 
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through ethnofederalism, ethnicity is prioritized and politicized, and when given such 
pride of place, demands from ethnic groups may increase and ultimately result in 
secessionist conflict (Snyder 2000). Sweeping autonomy from the center increases the 
administrative and infrastructural capacity of ethnic regions or states, as well as 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the central government, allowing local elites to make more 
credible threats of secession or conflict on a lesser scale because potential seceders have 
extensive experience with home rule (Treisman 1997). Examples of secessionist conflicts 
in the presence of ethnofederal structures have occurred in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Myanmar 
and Russia (Deiwiks 2011). For these reasons, ruling parties face strong incentives to 
inflate electoral support in specific areas as a demonstration of political strength against 
potential challenges (Simpser 2013; Goodnow, Moser and Smith 2012). Dominant parties 
can exploit vote shares, ―far beyond the victory threshold and in excess of any plausible 
safety margin,‖ secured in potentially unruly areas, in other words those least likely to 
support the dominant party genuinely, as a credible threat to other truculent regions or 
states (Simpser 2013: 1). Unbelievably high vote shares communicate to others crucial 
information about the party‘s capacity, for example, the resources at the party‘s disposal 
to either reward supporters or punish defectors (Simpser 2013). In areas with 
geographically concentrated ethnic minorities, dominant parties may seek to ―maximize 
votes rather than treating votes as simply being instrumental to winning […] by winning 
with huge margins of victory the [party] is more capable of creating an image of 
invincibility‖ (Magaloni 2006: 231). From the perspective of the dominant party, an 
image of invincibility is achieved most powerfully when the party‘s vote shares in these 
areas reach levels that cannot be mistaken for genuine support. Therefore, the dominant 
party faces strong incentives to inflate electoral support to implausibly high levels, rather 
than merely padding their vote share by a few percentage points.  
Ethnic minorities in various countries and regions are frequently organized around 
deeply embedded and widespread ethnic networks and heavily influenced by local ethnic 
elites, better positioning them to carry out voter mobilization. Hierarchical social 
organizations headed by co-ethnics in the form of tribal chiefs, village elders, or clan 
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leaders prescribe loyalty and deference from co-ethnics in exchange for the distribution 
of resources to group members, augmenting the power and influence of local elites in 
everyday affairs as well as during elections. For example, in exchange for the 
dispensation of jobs, promotions, contracts, living supplies, and so on, from powerful co-
ethnic patrons or ―bosses,‖ members of such ethnic networks will return the favor at 
election time by voting for the party specified by the local ethnic elite. The dominant 
party and ethnic elites in these areas make a grand bargain that ensures the party‘s 
continued dominance in the legislature and guarantees ethnic elites continued political 
power and economic resources in exchange. The state may therefore prioritize ethnicity 
due to the role of political machines in ethnic areas.  
Ethnic minorities are an especially important "constituency" for dominant parties 
because local ethnic elites can mobilize and pressure large swaths of voters at election 
time using and make a credible promise to deliver votes exclusively to the ruling party. 
Although other local elites may wish to curry favor with the dominant party to gain 
access to the vast resources at its disposal, more horizontal forms of social organization 
prevent these political actors from making similarly credible promises. One political 
analyst argued that such electoral machinations are ―easy‖ to carry out in ―such regions 
like the Caucasus, like some so-called national republics, Mordovia, Bashkortostan, 
Tatarstan, and so on. But in Moscow, in St. Petersburg, in Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, 
Novosibirsk, even Stavropol or Krasnodar, it is much more difficult,‖ chiefly because the 
population is comprised primarily of ethnic Russians (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM 
Foundation 2011).  
Clearly, voter mobilization increases turnout, but not necessarily to levels that 
would provoke suspicions of electoral manipulation in and of itself. The primary effect of 
voter mobilization through political machines is thus that the votes are channeled to one 
party rather than scattered across many, while the effects on turnout vary according to the 
capacity of the machines.  For dominant parties, support from ethnic minorities has a 
multiplier effect because the party channels resources accrued through its cozy 
relationship with the state through the most effective mechanism for churning out the 
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vote or engaging in clientelism, i.e. ethnic-based social organizations. Political machines 
in these areas thus multiply the effects of the dominant party‘s distribution of resources. 
Therefore, while dominant parties have the will to ensure high levels of support from 
ethnic minority areas, local ethnic elites have the way.  
Political machines may be important electoral resources for dominant parties 
when ―a form of proportional representation is employed [because] more votes […] 
translate into more seats‖ (Magaloni 2006: 231). Since dominant parties ―seek to control 
constitutional change and to set the basic rules of the game,‖ ruling parties often need 
―oversized‖ legislative majorities in order to amend the constitution without constructing 
coalitions with opposition parties (Ibid). Political machines entrenched in various local 
communities can thus augment the dominant party‘s national vote share considerably and 
help the party either attain or preserve its constitutional majority by delivering large 
numbers of votes to the party at election time. However, in cases where the party would 
have won a sizable majority even in a clean vote, the ruling party‘s genuine aim may not 
be collecting votes to reach the promised land of a constitutional majority in the 
legislature, but rather to signal political supremacy ―to deter and preempt potential 
challenges to their rule—to nip opposition in the bud, so to speak‖ (Simpser 2013: 5). 
Whether political machines are used to achieve a constitutional majority or to signal 
dominance depends on where they operate and the likelihood that the ruling party will 
reach an overwhelming majority in the election without their assistance.  
Urbanization 
Similar more subtle forms of manipulation, notably organized pressure to vote, 
operate in the countryside and further undergird dominant party strength. Rather than 
following ethnic lines, those living in rural areas are often organized around their 
employment in large-scale farms or other agricultural enterprises, the owners and 
managers of which control future employment, job promotions, and access to basic 
provisions and social services that may be difficult to acquire outside urban centers. 
Many rural areas, especially in transitional economies, are essentially ―one-company 
towns, characterized by the presence of a large employer in a local labor market. In spite 
 65 
of their name, one-company towns are not […] urban agglomerations […] In all cases, 
the company accounts for a substantial share of the jobs in the town and those who […] 
work for the company depend on it to make a living. If the company were to cease its 
operations, the one-company town could easily become a ghost town‖ (Rama and Scott 
1999: 185). Due to lack of education, low skills, low wages, and geographical 
impediments, workers in the countryside are relatively immobile, making them highly 
vulnerable to employer influence (Rama and Scott 1999: 194). Presumably, employer 
influence increases as the size of the company increases relative to that of the town. 
Especially in countries with a history of state-led planning and state ownership, one-
company towns are more widespread and are found in relatively isolated areas, compared 
to their industrial counterparts (Rama and Scott 1999: 186). Company towns that were 
fostered as a result of central planning are typically ―inefficient and overstaffed,‖ making 
these enterprises significantly more dependent on the central government for continued 
operation (Ibid). The ruling party can threaten company towns with closure if votes are 
not delivered in massive quantities at election time and employers are well positioned to 
pressure workers to vote accordingly. In short, the countryside is ―dependent on [the 
federal] chiefs‖ and therefore votes for the ruling party are concentrated there (Senior 
Political Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). 
Furthermore, dominant parties pursue electoral windfalls via organized pressure 
to vote in rural areas due to a lack of oversight. Particularly in large countries, political 
parties and international election observation missions frequently lack the resources and 
personnel necessary to conduct widespread observation outside of urban centers and 
ensure rural workers are not coerced to vote collectively for a specific party. Because of 
limitations on observers, dominant parties are free in the countryside to conduct elections 
as they always have, making its control of rural votes one of its ―greatest electoral 
advantages‖ (Brooker 2009: 240). A close observer of Russian politics commented with 
regard to the possibility of United Russia harvesting high vote shares from urban areas 
compared to the countryside: ―the more [located] in the city, the more difficult it is to do‖ 
because of the presence of election monitors (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM 
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Foundation 2011). Some political parties and international agencies have ―enough people 
who are able to control elections in cities and towns, not in [the] countryside, but in cities 
and towns without any doubts‖ (Ibid). Therefore, dynamics prevailing in the countryside 
allow these areas to be leveraged to the exclusive advantage of the dominant party.  
Research Design 
Election-by-Election Framework 
 I engage in an in-depth analysis of each Russian legislative election from 1995 
through 2011 to investigate dominant party strength and opposition party weakness. A 
discrete analysis allows for full consideration of the unique aspects of each election and 
reveals the arc of United Russia‘s electoral trajectory in the 2000s and 2010s. Although 
important continuities endured across elections, notably the two elections in the 1990s 
under Yeltsin and the three contests in the 2000s and 2010s under Putin, equally 
important differences within the Yeltsin and Putin eras manifested and may be concealed 
if the elections were consolidated. Table 3.1 displays the discrete essence of each 
election.  
 
Table 3.1: Distinctiveness of Russian Legislative Elections, 1995-2011 
Election Year 
 
Overarching Picture of Election 
 
1995 Competitive, but Chaotic 
1999 Transitional 
2003 Birth of United Russia 
2007 United Russia‘s Apex 
2011 Dominant Party Decay 
 
To highlight some of the most significant characteristics distinguishing each election: the 
1995 election was the first conducted according to the constitutionally-stipulated 
schedule and occurred in the absence of an effective party of power, thus offering 
opposition parties the best chances at electoral success. The party system was incredibly 
weak and fragmented, as 43 parties and electoral blocs vying for seats in the Duma in the 
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party-list tier. Opposition parties benefitted from the fact that the 1995 election was the 
most competitive in Russia‘s short post-communist history.  
The 1999 election differed from 1995 because it was a transitional contest that 
bridged the Yeltsin and Putin eras and included two potential parties of power, 
Fatherland-All Russia and Unity, the latter publicly supported by Putin. This contest thus 
roughly demarcated the beginning of the Putin era from that of Yeltsin in the Russian 
political arena. Additionally, aside from the fact that there were two parties competing for 
the party of power prize, the outcome of the final election in the 1990s was far from a 
foregone conclusion because, as the landslide winner of the 1995 election, the 
Communist Party (KPRF) remained a formidable opponent to both Fatherland-All Russia 
and Unity. Ultimately, despite widespread predictions of a Fatherland or Unity triumph, it 
was neither potential party of power that won the 1999 election, but the KPRF.  
The 2003 election marked the first occasion that the newly formed United Russia 
entered the electoral fray as the clear frontrunner after Fatherland-All Russia and Unity 
merged immediately following the 1999 contest. United Russia demonstrated its electoral 
prowess with a stunning victory and opposition parties were forced into submission under 
the weight of the quickly consolidating dominant party.  
United Russia reached its apex in the 2007 election by capturing electoral 
windfalls in areas that previously served as opposition party strongholds and engaging in 
widespread electoral manipulation. The dominant party won close to a two-thirds vote 
share in the new purely proportional representation system in 2007.  
The most recent Duma election in 2011 witnessed a reversal of the trend of 
increasing dominant party vote shares in legislative contests: United Russia‘s vote share 
declined to roughly half of all votes cast and opposition parties made some inroads into 
dominant party territory, challenging United Russia‘s near universal dominance that had 
prevailed in the previous election. Thus, treating each legislative contest separately rather 
than grouping elections together by era enhances variation between elections within the 
same era.  
Data and Variables    
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 To investigate dominant party strength and opposition party fragility by 
pinpointing the party of power and opposition parties‘ strongholds in legislative elections, 
I leverage an original dataset combining fine-grained, raion-level and region-level 
information to investigate dominant party strength and opposition party fragility by 
pinpointing the geographic strongholds of various opposition parties and the party of 
power in five legislative elections. 
Parties of Interest 
This study is limited to parties that contested each of the five elections examined, 
except for substitution in the parties of power, and crossed the threshold for legislative 
representation in each election year, except for Yabloko in the 2000s and 2010s. Despite 
the party‘s failure to gain representation in the three most recent legislative elections, as 
the archetypal liberal party in post-communist Russia, Yabloko‘s political trajectory is 
integral to the development and evolution of the party system, especially given its 
disappearance from the political scene once United Russia rose to power. In 1995, 
electoral support for the following parties is analyzed: the KPRF, LDPR, Yabloko, and 
Our Home is Russia. In 1999, the core party troika (KPRF, LDPR, and Yabloko) remains 
and the failed party of power from the previous contest, Our Home is Russia, is replaced 
by the two competing parties of power, Unity and Fatherland-All Russia. In the 2003, 
2007 and 2011 elections (after Unity and Fatherland-All Russia‘s merger), the core party 
troika is analyzed alongside the dominant party, i.e. United Russia.  
Dependent Variable: Electoral Strongholds 
The dependent variable is electoral strongholds at the raion level for opposition 
parties and the party of power or dominant party competing in the 1995, 1999, 2003, 
2007 and 2011 legislative elections. Party strongholds have been measured in myriad 
fashions in various regional contexts:  partisan candidates winning every election in a 
given constituency for a decade (Keefer and Khamenei 2009), winning one election with 
a clear majority (Erdmann 2007), or winning at least 70% in the previous two contests 
(Wantchekon 2003) under a single-member district formula. However, measures of party 
strongholds formulated in single-mandate contexts travel unsuccessfully to electoral 
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systems employing proportional representation because it is more relevant the districts 
where each party performed unusually well, relative to its performance elsewhere, than 
which party (or parties‘ candidates) ―won‖ a given district across multiple elections.  
Since I am interested in political parties rather candidates and Russian elections to 
the State Duma are currently governed by pure proportional representation, I measure 
party strongholds based on high vote shares at the raion level, operationalized 
dichotomously. Rather than using more arbitrary electoral performance thresholds to 
identify party strongholds, such as 70 or 80% vote shares, empirically-grounded 
measures of the dependent variable are employed and capture different degrees of raion-
level party strength based on unusually high vote shares. I exercise two distinct measures 
of party stronghold in the statistical analysis for each party. First, a raion is classified as a 
stronghold for a particular party when the party‘s vote share is at least one standard 
deviation above the party‘s raion-level national average. This threshold ensures that 
support for the party was sufficiently strong compared to its average level of support, and 
that an adequate number of strongholds exist in the data to secure meaningful and robust 
results. Second, a raion is classified as a stronghold for a particular party when the party‘s 
vote share is at least two standard deviations above its raion-level national average. 
Compared to the lower threshold, this higher measure is significantly stricter and requires 
truly extraordinary electoral success in a given raion. Although the strict threshold 
reduces the number of strongholds, employing a second measure of the dependent 
variable is essential because it facilitates the evaluation of the sensitivity of the results to 
different measures of the dependent variable. The statistical models are specified first 
using the relaxed threshold, and then re-specified using the strict measure. Raion-level 
electoral results from the five legislative elections under investigation were collected 
from the Central Election Commission of Russia‘s website.  
There are several advantages to examining party strongholds, rather than 
leveraging party vote share in its continuous form. First, strongholds are assessed at the 
raion level and therefore offer a unique avenue of inquiry into Russian elections that are 
most frequently examined at the national and regional level of analysis. Strongholds thus 
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provide a novel and more fine-grained instrument with which to investigate various 
contours in Russian elections. Second, strongholds are well-suited indicators of the 
relative success of different parties and allow for the geographic pinpointing of that 
success. Rather than simply charting and explaining levels of success for various parties 
at the national or regional level across legislative elections, strongholds facilitate the 
identification of the diverse locations of opposition parties‘ success relative to their own 
performance at the national level. Third and related, strongholds reveal more fully the 
variance within smaller parties that fail to cross the threshold for legislative 
representation, e.g. the liberal Yabloko party that remained afloat in the 1990s but was 
woefully incapable of surpassing the threshold in 2003, 2007 and 2011 and was thus 
confined to the extra-parliamentary political wilderness. Although Yabloko received 
comparatively minuscule vote shares at the national level, strongholds highlight how the 
party‘s ability to preserve their pockets of support changes over time and help identify 
where the party could reap a better harvest in future elections. Moreover, strongholds 
reveal the variance within the more formidable opposition parties and can explain where 
and when long-standing constituencies were preserved or, conversely, lost irreparably to 
other parties, e.g. the large-scale dealignment of the countryside from the Communists in 
favor of United Russia in the 2000s. The analytical utility of strongholds is thus wide-
ranging and leveraged fully in this investigation of Russian legislative elections. 
Independent Variables: Explaining Variation in Electoral Outcomes for Various Parties 
Ethnic Composition 
To examine the contours of support for the aforementioned parties, I use raion- 
and regional-level data. At the raion level, data on ethnic composition are available 
through the 2002 All-Russian National Census, the first conducted in post-communist 
Russia. Ethnic composition is measured in three continuous variables: first, with an 
aggregate measure of percent ethnic minority, and, second and third, with two 
disaggregated variables that refine the percent minority variable by measuring percent 
titular minority and percent other minority. Percent other minority measures non-titular 
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minority populations, such as Indo-Europeans or other small ethnic groups, the Avars, 
Dargins, and Kumyks in Dagestan, for example.  
Urbanization 
Raion-level urbanization data are available from the Russian Federal Service of 
State Statistics (Rosstat) and measure the percentage of the rural population in each raion.  
Electoral Manipulation 
My data include a raion-level dichotomous variable measuring the occurrence of 
electoral manipulation indirectly by assessing whether the reported turnout at the raion 
level was at least one standard deviation above the raion-level national turnout average. 
This threshold for suspected manipulation ensures that positively coded raions were 
outliers in electoral participation. Coding suspected fraud at the lowest level of analysis 
can expose meaningful patterns that might be concealed if assessed only at the sub-
national level. Despite the competitiveness of the elections in the 1990s, the fraud 
variable is included in the quantitative analysis to preserve continuity in model 
specification across elections. Measuring electoral manipulation based on reported results 
is suitable for my purposes because turnout data are available across all legislative 
elections, facilitating the investigation of cross-sectional differences at the raion and 
regional level within elections and as well as different forms of variation across elections. 
Furthermore, reported results offer a more systematic method of operationalization, 
particularly when compared to relying on potentially biased grievances filed by private 
citizens and reporting from election observers, who are unevenly spread throughout the 
country (Lehoucq 2003; Moser and White 2013). Admittedly, using reported results does 
not capture all forms of electoral manipulation, such as denying opposition parties ballot 
access based on questionable legal reasoning or flooding government-controlled media 
with favorable coverage of the party of power‘s party-list candidates. Nevertheless, using 
data collected from official results offers the most appropriate avenue to evaluate how the 
general pattern of electoral manipulation maps onto the geographic and social distribution 
of party strongholds because reported results do not suffer from obvious partisan bias that 
may cause instances of electoral malfeasance to be severely over- or under-reported.  
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 In adopting this strategy of measuring fraud indirectly, I follow examples 
provided by recent scholarship on electoral fraud in Russia, such as those supplied by 
Myagkov, et al. (2009), Mebane and Kalinin (2009, 2010) and Goodnow, Moser and 
Smith (2012). Unrealistically high voter turnout may be an indirect indicator of electoral 
malfeasance, such as ballot stuffing or machine politics-based voter mobilization, 
especially in the absence of mandatory voting (Myagkov, et al. 2009, Reisinger and 
Moraski, 2002, 2008). Accordingly, augmented turnout ―would be expected to be a more 
significant potential factor in [elections] in countries where voting is voluntary, or where 
compulsory voting laws are […] weakly enforced‖ (Nichter 2008: 29). Figure 3.1 
compares the distributions of voter turnout in the 1990s with the 2000s and 2010s. 
Although the distribution of voter turnout across raions ought to follow a normal or 
Gaussian distribution if the data are roughly homogenous and outliers are the result of 
uncorrelated or random factors, the distributions from those elections that occurred in the 
United Russia era reveal suspiciously elongated right tails and distinct peaks, or local 
maxima, large enough to produce virtually bimodal distributions, strongly suggesting 
inflated turnout.  (Myagkov, et al. 2009: 31).  
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of the Distribution of Voter Turnout in the 1990s with the 2000s 
and 2010s 
       
                                        
       
 
Clearly, using high voter turnout to measure electoral manipulation does not take into 
account similar types of malfeasance that may have the opposite effect, i.e. depressing 
rather than inflating turnout (Cox and Kousser 1981). Although the secret ballot allows 
political parties to reward voters who support opposing parties to abstain from voting, a 
dominant party faces significantly stronger incentives to inflate turnout for reasons 
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previously cited. Additionally, if voter turnout were deflated en masse, suspicious fat tails 
and peaks on the left sides of the distributions of voter turnout would be observable in 
Figure 3.1.  
 As noted by Myagkov, et al. (2009), the association between turnout and a party‘s 
share of the electorate ought to be ―logical‖: with other conditions remaining equal, 
increases in turnout should not drastically revise parties‘ vote shares, or at least specific 
parties should not suffer from higher participation (31). If more voters go to the polls, the 
distribution of voters supporting each party should not change in the absence of nefarious 
practices driving only selected segments of the electorate to the voting booths in droves 
and presuming something akin to the law of large numbers operates (Myagkov et al. 
2009: 83). But in the Russian case, particularly since 2000, ―numerous cases of ballot 
stuffing [and] falsification of results‖ has coincided with the soaring ―number of localities 
and regions with implausibly high turnout and support for the incumbent, and the 
distributions of results [shown in Figure 3.1] have become quite bizarre from a statistical 
point of view‖ (Treisman 2011: 348). As demonstrated in Figures 3.2-3.6, comparatively 
high turnout disproportionately benefitted the parties with the most robust organizational 
infrastructures and capacities for patronage, while other parties‘ vote shares either 
remained stable or precipitously declined with increases in turnout. Disproportionate 
electoral gain from high voter turnout strongly suggests methods of manipulation were 
practiced, such as ballot stuffing or the illicit changing of results protocols, especially 
given that other raions in the same country or even the same region reported much more 
limited turnout (Moser and White 2013). 
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Figure 3.2: Voter Turnout and Party Vote Shares in 1995 
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Figure 3.3: Voter Turnout and Party Vote Shares in 1999 
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Figure 3.4: Voter Turnout and Party Vote Shares in 2003 
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Figure 3.5: Voter Turnout and Party Vote Shares in 2007 
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Figure 3.6: Voter Turnout and Party Vote Shares in 2011 
 
 
 
Evaluating the impact of fraud, even in the context of the generally competitive 
elections in the 1990s, allows me to test arguments suggesting that opposition parties are 
uniformly affected by incumbent party strategies. It is crucial to assess whether, and to 
what extent, opposition parties were disadvantaged by electoral manipulation well before 
the rise of a successful dominant party engaging in widespread fraud. Moreover, the 
relationship between party strongholds and suspected malfeasance during the Yeltsin era 
necessitates elucidation to determine whether even a comparatively weak party of power 
benefitted from unusually high turnout. The extent of both illicit electoral activity and the 
advantage gained by the party of power in the 1990s are expected to be comparatively 
limited in relation to legislative elections under United Russia in the 2000s.  
Ethnic Republic Status  
Supplementing the three raion level independent variables are a variety of 
regional-level variables highlighting contextual characteristics. A region‘s status as 
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federal ethnic republic as opposed to a Russian federal region is indicated. Russia‘s 
ethnofederal structure divides its 83 subjects or regions as follows:  46 oblasts, nine krais, 
two federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), 21 republics, four autonomous okrugs 
and one autonomous oblast. The 26 subjects named after a non-Russian ethnic group are 
drawn from the republics, autonomous okrugs and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Thus, 
the oblasts and krais have predominantly ethnic Russian populations while primarily 
ethnic minorities populate the republics and autonomous okrugs.  
Muslim Region 
 A refinement of the ethnic republic status variable is included that indicates 
whether an ethnic republic has a majority-Muslim population.  
Location in the Caucasus 
 A third dichotomous variable assesses whether a region is located in the 
Caucasus.  
Economic Development and Resource Dependence 
A region‘s level of economic development is evaluated by gross regional product. 
Additionally, regions are classified as resource regions based on the percentage of 
regional economies based on natural resource exports, as provided by Bradshaw (2006). 
Together, these two variables provide an indirect measure of socioeconomic welfare. 
Raion-level data on socioeconomic indicators, such as income, unemployment or 
occupation, are not readily available for analysis, but gross regional product and resource 
dependence serve reasonably well for the purpose of pinpointing the general 
socioeconomic contours of party support.  
Analysis 
To analyze opposition party and dominant party (or party of power) support, I 
specify a series of multilevel logistic models, using maximum likelihood estimation, that 
relate the varying proportions of ethnic and rural populations at the raion level and 
contextual characteristics at the regional level to the probability that a stronghold will 
occur for the given party under consideration. A multilevel model is well-suited for this 
analysis, given Russia‘s federal structure and the corresponding hierarchical properties of 
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the data. There are two levels of analysis considered: raion (level-1), and region (level-2); 
thus, raions are nested within regions. As mentioned, the level-1 predictors of electoral 
support are ethnicity (measured in three variables), urbanization and electoral 
manipulation, and the level-2 predictors are ethnic republic, Muslim region, Caucasus 
location, gross regional product and resource region. The number of level-1 units is 
approximately 2,700, but may be fewer in some elections due to missing data and some 
redistricting over time. Although raion boundaries are relatively static geographically, 
some redistricting is evident in the data, as demonstrated by raion name changes. To 
ensure comparability and maintain the continuity of raions across legislative elections, 
raions that were apparently subject to redistricting measures have been omitted from the 
analysis. Thus, only raions that preserved the identical name and therefore the same 
geographic definition across the five legislative elections under analysis are included. At 
level-2, there are 89 regional units in 1995, 1999 and 2003. Since 2005, a series of 
mergers have left 83 regions in toto: Perm Oblast and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous 
Okrug merged to create Perm Krai in 2006; in 2007, Taimur and Evenk Autonomous 
Okrugs were absorbed by Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Kamchatka Oblast and Koryak 
Autonomous Okrug merged to form Kamchatka Krai; finally, one year later, the Ust-
Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug was incorporated into Irkutsk Oblast, and Zabaikal Krai 
was formed via the merger of the Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug with Chita Oblast 
(Petrov 2011: 68). I employ a random intercept multilevel model, which allows the 
intercept to vary across the level-2, or regional, units. In this model, each region may 
have a different level of party support. I am therefore able to elucidate relationships 
between variables measured at different levels of a hierarchical structure and test their 
varying impact on the outcome of interest. The inclusion of cross-level interaction 
variables allows me to assess how the macro regional context affects the influence of a 
variable at the more micro raion level.  
The following model, presented below in system-of-equations form, is specified 
for the first type of region, ethnic vs. non-ethnic, using the aggregate percent minority 
variable: 
 82 
Level 1: logit(Pr(Yij =1)) = 0j + 1j(percent minority)ij  + 2j(percent rural)ij + 
  3j(electoral manipulation)ij + rij 
            Level 2: 0j = 00 +10(ethnic region)j + u0j 
  1j = 10 + 11(ethnic region)j  
  2j = 20 + 21(ethnic region)j 
 3j = 30 
Above, the left side of the equation is the probability that the dependent variable is equal 
to one rather than zero for the party under consideration, indicating a party stronghold for 
a raion i at level-1 located within region j at level-2. 1j, 2j and 3j are the coefficients for 
percent minority, percent rural, and electoral manipulation, respectively. These 
coefficients indicate the effect that a one percent increase in the minority and rural 
population, and the change from membership in the reference group to the indicator 
group of electoral manipulation, has on the log-odds of an opposition party stronghold. 
The error is divided into the variability between raions within a region (rij) and between 
regions (u0j). In other words, u0j is a random effect that accounts for the random variation 
at level-2, while rij is the level-1 error (Guo and Zhao 2000).  
To avoid difficulties in interpretation that may arise when using untransformed 
coefficients in logistic regression, I have exponentiated the regression coefficients so that 
the independent variables influence the odds of the dependent variable, rather than 
retaining the logged odds format. Substantively, a coefficient of one represents even odds 
of a party stronghold, while a coefficient greater than one increases the odds and a 
coefficient less than one decreases the odds. Like the electoral manipulation variable at 
level-1, four out of five of the level-2 variables are dichotomous, i.e. ethnic republic, 
Muslim region, Caucasus location, and resource region; again a one-unit increase in these 
variables compares the odds of the indicator group (coded as 1) to the reference group 
(coded as zero). 
 In addition to the model presented above for each party of interest in each 
legislative election, I specify four other models that account for the remaining region-
level independent variables, i.e. Muslim region, Caucasus location, economic 
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development, and resource region. I also re-specify the aforementioned series of models 
leveraging the more refined ethnic composition covariates, i.e. percent titular minority 
and percent other minority. For each model, I present multiple model fit indices, 
specifically, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic, the AIC and the Wald statistics. The 
multilevel model results for each party in each election are located in the Appendix.  
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Chapter 4: The 1995 Parliamentary Election: Fertile Ground for Opposition Party 
Success in a “Normal” but Chaotic Competitive Election 
  The 1995 election to the State Duma was the first to occur according to the 
constitutionally stipulated schedule, rather than as a political exigency following 
parliamentary dissolution, as was the case in 1993. The election occurred in the context 
of a relatively competitive party system, before the contours of the party system were 
largely determined by dueling potential parties of power in Unity and Fatherland-All 
Russia in the 1999 election, or evolved toward a hegemonic party system in the early 
2000s with the emergence of United Russia. Despite the fact that the Kremlin‘s party of 
power, Our Home is Russia, was ineffectual compared to the remarkably successful 
United Russia in the 2000s and 2010s, the absence of an effective party of power did not 
engender a party system with several major parties, but rather one that was competitive 
but also highly fragmented and chaotic: 43 parties contested the legislative election and 
ultimately nearly half of the votes cast in the party list tier went to parties that failed to 
meet the threshold for legislative representation. Notwithstanding the gross proliferation 
of parties, this election furnished opposition parties with their first opportunity to 
compete in a ―normal‖ election in post-Soviet Russia and also their best chance of 
establishing their respective niches in the electorate.  
The 1995 election provides an optimal laboratory to assess how the opposition 
fared in a state with a vulnerable governing party by pinpointing the geographic 
strongholds of both the opposition and the party of power. A detailed examination of 
electoral support for numerous political parties in the most competitive context can shed 
light on why the character and strength of the opposition can foster the conditions ripe for 
a dominant party in the first place, as well as why specific types of opposition parties 
flounder when a hegemonic party becomes more consolidated. Furthermore, it is possible 
to assess whether an ineffective party of power, Our Home is Russia, initially sowed the 
seeds of dominant party strength that emerged in the 2000s with United Russia. 
The 1995 Legislative Election in Context  
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 The 1995 election proved a critical stepping-stone along the path of political 
development and democratization in post-Soviet Russia for numerous reasons. First, the 
election resulted in the first ―constitutional transfer of power from one freely elected 
legislature to another,‖ which helped consolidate the fledgling democracy because the 
winners took up their new positions in the Duma and the losers peaceably waited until the 
next opportunity in 1999, rather than attempting to overturn the results via extra-
constitutional measures (Belin and Orttung 1997: 5).  
Second, and related to the first, the 1995 elections were not postponed or 
cancelled, against the demands of numerous sitting Duma deputies who argued that a 
delay would give the legislature sufficient time to pass the necessary electoral laws 
before the upcoming contest (Bershidsky 1994). Other analysts believed that Yeltsin 
might postpone or cancel the contest because the prospects for pro-government parties 
appeared grim and a delay might allow reformist parties to wait out the nationalist fervor 
that emerged after the 1993 election (OSCE 1996). Thus, the fact that the elections 
occurred as scheduled signaled that political reform was progressing and the instability 
surrounding the 1993 elections would not reappear in 1995.  
Third, the second legislative election since the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
free and fair. Numerous parties, many have argued too many, were permitted to compete 
and were at liberty to criticize the government and the party of power, Our Home is 
Russia. Although the KPRF‘s surprise first place finish was far from the result desired by 
supporters of continued reform and Western governments, the positive evaluation of the 
election itself by observation delegations suggested that the fledgling democracy was 
capable of conducting free and fair elections (Ibid). Surprisingly high voter turnout 
reversed the trend of declining participation in previous national elections, indicating that 
Russian society was not turning away from the political process en masse and that 
Russia‘s nascent democratic institutions were ripening gradually (Ibid).  
Fourth, the elections to the State Duma acted as a dress rehearsal for the 
presidential contest in June 1996, just six months later, and thus served an important 
political purpose aside from electing the lower house by revealing Yeltsin‘s major 
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opponents, all of whom were Duma deputies (Belin and Orttung 1997). In this way, the 
legislative elections functioned akin to a presidential primary and signaled that the 
presidency was ―up for grabs‖ (OSCE 1996: 12). Ultimately, the Communist victory in 
the 1995 elections catapulted KPRF-leader Zyuganov to the top of the presidential 
contenders list, calling into question the prospects for Yeltsin‘s reelection, and therefore 
also the possibility of continued political and economic reform. Nevertheless, the 
legislative election allowed Yeltsin an opportunity to assess the mood of the electorate 
prior to the presidential election and make explicit overtures to segments of society and 
opposition parties in an attempt to win their support the following June. Thus, the stakes 
of the 1995 election were extraordinarily high from a variety of perspectives.  
Prior to the 1995 election, conflict was rife within the nascent Russian democracy. 
In the early 1990s, relations between the reformist President Yeltsin and the anti-
reformist, Communist- and nationalist-controlled Congress of People‘s Deputies became 
increasingly fractious and produced a prolonged political standoff, culminating in 
President Yeltsin‘s order to dissolve parliament and use military force against the Russian 
White House in 1993, effectively ending the First Russian Republic. President Yeltsin 
used this decisive political victory to announce snap legislative elections and a popular 
referendum on his new draft constitution that thoroughly redistributed power within the 
constitutional framework towards the president, at the expense of the legislature. Leading 
up to the 1995 election, the political milieu combined the certainty of Yeltsin‘s bloody 
victory over the parliament and the codification of his 1993 draft constitution establishing 
a democratic form of government and multipartism, with the uncertainty produced by the 
unexpected nationalist victory in the 1993 snap elections, sparking fear of an emergent 
Weimar Russia that could capitalize on growing disillusionment with the reform process 
(Yanov 1995; Hanson and Kopstein 1997; Ryavec 1998). Indeed, the LDPR‘s 
unexpected success in the first post-communist election signaled that the emergence of 
anti-system parties and the strength of the protest vote should not be easily dismissed, as 
it was frequently during the emergence of Hitler‘s movement in Weimar Germany 
(Hanson 1998).  
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There was comparable uncertainty in the economic sphere, with the economy 
continuing to contract and eventually falling ―below half the level of economic activity 
that had been recorded in the last years of communist rule‖ (White, Wyman and Oates 
1997: 768). Inflation continued spiraling out of control and reached levels of upwards of 
a thousand percent, effectively eliminating individuals‘ savings accounts due to currency 
devaluation and price increases. Additionally, unemployment and the non-payment of 
wages affecting up to twenty percent of the population reinforced an environment of 
pervasive insecurity that spread throughout the country (White, Wyman and Oates 1997). 
Adjusted for inflation, average wages were merely 57% of the 1985 level and 
approximately $120 per month (Ingwerson 1995). The real GDP growth rate indicated 
severe economic shrinkage in 1995, with a reported figure of less than negative four 
percent (Wolf and Lang 2006). Furthermore, a prime mover in the economy and a main 
source of government revenue, Russian oil production was at an all-time low in 1995; the 
country produced just over six million barrels per day in the mid-1990s, compared to 
nearly ten million four years earlier (Cooper 2009).  
The breadth and depth of both political and economic uncertainty framed the 1995 
legislative election as a fundamental choice between staying the course of arduous 
economic reforms and the jump towards the free market, or jumping ship and embracing 
either a return to the past led by the Communists, or a new fascist future envisioned by 
the extreme nationalists (Wyman 1997). Despite Yeltsin‘s victory over the anti-reformist 
parliament in 1993, ideological polarization between reformers and anti-reformers 
continued to plague Russian politics and elections. The 1995 legislative election was 
therefore critical because the results would settle decisively the debate between these two 
opposing camps.  
The new electoral law governing the 1995 election required each party and 
electoral bloc seeking votes in the parliamentary election to register with the Ministry of 
Justice six months prior to election day, a stricter waiting period than the zero waiting 
period operable two years prior in the snap election. In addition, each party needed to 
collect 200,000 signatures to register, in which no more than seven percent of signatures 
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could be from any one of the regions or republics. Compared to the previous regulations 
in place, these rules were substantially more stringent because they doubled the signature 
threshold and halved the requisite geographic distribution in the new law, which were 
intended to consolidate the party market by ensuring that only those parties with truly 
national presences would be able to contest the elections (Marsh 2002). Prior to the 
Duma settling on the 200,000-signature threshold, the KPRF had advocated for an even 
more demanding 500,000-signature requirement, hoping to leverage the regional 
infrastructure the party had acquired from the CPSU (Belin and Orttung 1997). The 
increased signature requirement had the unintended effect of creating a market for 
signatures, in which professional signature collectors would sell lists to parties. The price 
of signatures varied widely, between 500 and 14,000 rubles, or approximately ten cents to 
$3, based on how far in advance of the October deadline they were collected (Belin and 
Orttung 1997:59). Indeed, 16 of the 43 parties registered by the CEC received fewer than 
200,000 votes on Election Day itself, strongly suggesting that their signatories were not 
genuine supporters (Marsh 2002). If the signatures were collected without the assistance 
of professional collectors, only twelve parties would have been represented on the ballot, 
according to one analyst (Belin and Orttung 1997). 
 The dizzying supply of parties that were seeking votes in the 1995 election led 
many to criticize the Ministry of Justice for registering the lot: the head of the Central 
Electoral Commission, Nikolai Ryabov, commented that the Ministry was ―making a 
mockery of the system by allowing ‗groups of rock-climbers and beekeepers‘‖ to 
compete (Belin and Orttung 1997:56). Echoing CEC Chairman Ryabov‘s complaints 
concerning the number of parties in the competition, numerous politicians argued that the 
electoral law required amendment to bring the threshold for parliamentary representation 
down, lest the new Duma represent only the minority of the electorate (Belin and Orttung 
1997). The fear was that the Duma‘s public legitimacy would be called into question if it 
represented a minority of voters and, on top of that, Yeltsin could leverage the fact that 
the legislature was unrepresentative to either dissolve the Duma or cancel the June 
presidential election (Ibid).  
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Another important innovation of the electoral law was that it enforced a limit on 
the proportion of candidates residing in the capital that were eligible to populate the 
party-lists, save for the top twelve candidates (Marsh 2002). This stipulation forced 
parties to cultivate ties with local politicians across dozens of regions rather than 
populating their party lists solely with capital dwellers. Save for the top 12 candidates, 
which constituted the ―federal‖ part of the party list, the remaining candidates were to 
represent specific regions as part of the ―regional‖ list, allowing for more regional 
influence in the party-list tier than might otherwise have been the case with 
predominantly Moscow-based political parties (Belin and Orttung 1997). Each party list 
was permitted to name up to 270 candidates in toto. Puzzlingly, the electoral law did not 
oblige candidates populating the regional portion of the party list to reside in the areas 
they claimed to represent and, subsequently, many regional candidates were found to live 
in the capital rather than in their ―home‖ region (Ibid).  
The voter turnout threshold was the subject of debate as well: Yeltsin favored 
increasing the 25% minimum turnout threshold that validated the 1993 snap elections to 
50% but the Duma balked at the idea because the deputies were frightened that a 
citizenry uninterested in politics would invalidate the elections, providing Yeltsin with 
additional leverage to institute direct presidential rule (Belin and Orttung 1997: 26). 
Ultimately the Duma won the negotiation over the turnout threshold and the 25% 
minimum was preserved.  
Campaign finance requirements obliged parties set up a temporary election 
account in the Russian Federation State Bank through which to transact all campaign 
expenditures, and the creation of an auditing service to monitor those accounts (OSCE 
1996). Furthermore, restrictions on campaign finance and donations were established: 
parties were permitted to spend up to the equivalent of 100,000 minimum salaries in 
Russia, approximately $1.3 million, and a range of actors were prohibited from 
contributing to political parties, including foreign nationalist, local governments, 
charitable and religious organizations, military institutions, and state-owned enterprises 
(OSCE 1996: 5).  
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Continuity in the electoral law from 1993 to 1995 was maintained by preserving 
the five percent minimum threshold for parliamentary representation. The five percent 
hurdle was intended to consolidate the party system by either weeding out nonviable 
contenders or encouraging mergers between smaller parties into more cohesive electoral 
blocs. Although individuals were able to contest the election in the single-mandate tier, 
many politicians created their own parties to guarantee their personal success, which 
ultimately proved counterproductive for the agenda they purportedly supported and the 
party system writ large by grossly inflating the supply of parties (Belin and Orttung 
1997:10).  
Moreover, other changes concerning equal and free media time had a detrimental 
effect on party system consolidation. Governmental media outlets were required to 
provide free and equal airtime to all registered political parties by devoting two hours 
each day to political parties, with each party receiving an equal share (Monitoring the 
Media Coverage of the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections Final Report, 1996; OSCE 
1996). Parties were, however, allowed to purchase additional media time in state-owned 
outlets (Monitoring the Media Coverage of the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
Final Report, 1996). State-owned media were prohibited from giving preference to any 
candidate, party, or political movement in their coverage of the campaign and election 
(Ibid).  
Finally, each party received 115 million rubles (approximately $25,000) from the 
state to spend on the campaign, which encouraged parties with little or no chance of 
crossing the threshold for representation to throw their hats into the ring (Belin and 
Orttung 1997: 59). With free media time and public financing available to all, parties 
elected to go it alone rather than forming coalitions with other like-minded electoral blocs 
(Belin and Orttung 1997). Thus, various reforms concerning the media and the public 
financing of parties counteracted the potentially positive affect of the five percent hurdle 
for representation on party system consolidation. As mentioned, numerous parties and 
movements entered the political fray in 1995; the Central Election Commission 
ultimately registered 43 parties (up from 13 that competed in the 1993 snap election) to 
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compete for State Duma seats in the proportional representation tier of Russia‘s mixed 
electoral system. Collectively, the 43 parties fielded a total of 5,675 candidates on their 
lists (White, Wyman and Oates 1997).  
Collectively, the registered parties offered a full spectrum of political ideologies 
and interests, stretching from far-right nationalists to hardcore leftist Stalinists and 
Communists. Following Belin and Orttung (1997), White, Wyman and Oates (1997), and 
Marsh (2002), I classify the emergent party system‘s developing ideological core in 1995 
using a four-party taxonomy. I specifically highlight those parties featured in my 
quantitative analysis, i.e. the KPRF, the LDPR, Yabloko, and Our Home is Russia.  
First, the communist-agrarian left offered the most orthodox array of parties in the 
post-Soviet context, of which the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) 
was the most prominent. The KPRF boasted the well-developed organizational 
infrastructure and was the only party with a membership base of over half a million, both 
largely inherited from the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (White, Wyman, 
and Kryshtanovskaya 1995). Indeed, the party‘s network of 20,000 branches at the 
regional and sub-regional level helped it collect the 200,000 signatures required for 
registration in only one week (Belin and Orttung 1997: 43).  
The 1995 legislative elections offered the Communists their last opportunity to 
run on a largely rejectionist program because numerous policy platforms articulated by 
the party would become moot over the course of time; for example, the likelihood that the 
Soviet Union would be refashioned dwindled rapidly and economic recovery would 
eventually take hold under the leadership of the reformist camp (Sakwa 1998). 
Domestically, the KPRF sought to reverse market-oriented reforms, reestablish the state‘s 
active involvement in the economy by renationalizing vital economic sectors, such as 
natural resources, and guaranteeing social services for workers. Although the party 
advocated for a greater role of the state in the national economy, the KPRF alleged to 
support a type of mixed economy (OSCE 1996). The KPRF targeted appeals at those who 
had lost in the course of drastic economic reform leading to a market economy and were 
concerned about corruption resulting from the botched privatization process and the 
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unbridled confusion that permeated society at the time (OSCE 1996). Surprisingly 
though, the party did not devote significant attention to workers‘ rights, although it firmly 
established its support of Marxism in its policy platform (Oates 1998). The party‘s 
decision to trim the attention paid to workers in its platform and broaden its concentrated 
emphasis on narrow class interests was a deliberate attempt to court the majority of the 
Russian people, rather than electoral niches (Sakwa 1998). The KPRF also harnessed 
popular nostalgia for the past, which manifested as a direct consequence of the Yeltsin 
administration‘s aggressive agenda for political and economic reform and produced 
widespread tumult (Marsh 2002). Internationally, the party was the most pro-Slavic, 
seeking to eliminate Western influence in domestic and international affairs, to pursue a 
Russophilic foreign policy, and to restore the former Soviet Union in some fashion and 
―by voluntary means‖ (OSCE 1996: 6). Restoring the Soviet Union would proceed by 
annulling the Belavezha Accords, which dissolved the Soviet Union, and then gradually 
re-integrating the former constituent republics (Belin and Orttung 1997). The KPRF‘s 
―true‖ platform, intended exclusively for party-member consumption rather than the 
electorate writ large, revealed more extremist plans if the Communists regained control: 
banning ―speculation,‖ introducing controls on prices, re-nationalizing the state savings 
bank Sberbank, and keeping a watchful eye over the mass media to prevent it from 
―foster[ing] public acceptance of murder, violence, and nationalism or propagate 
‗distortions of the truth‘ about developments in the county‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 44). 
The party was led by Gennady Zyuganov, who articulated a unique vision for 
Russia that was based on the country becoming a great power once again, which would 
subsequently pave the way for Moscow to reemerge as the Third Rome (Hanson 1998). 
Zyuganov worked in ideology and propaganda during the Soviet Union, and played an 
essential role in shaping the KPRF‘s ideology of nationalist socialism after the collapse 
of communism (Hale 2006). But to signal that the KPRF was no longer a dogmatic party 
and was open to moderates, the third spot on the party list was given to Aman Tuleev, a 
deputy of the Federation Council and the head of the legislature in Kemerovo Oblast, but 
not a party member (Belin and Orttung 1997). The party‘s revival is largely credited to 
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the KPRF‘s addition of nationalist and patriotic overtones during the campaigns, as this 
strategy helped retain the KPRF‘s core group of supporters, who longed for the former 
Soviet system, but also attract new constituencies, most notably supporters of the LDPR 
and the Agrarian Party of Russia (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 684).  
The KPRF was the first-place finisher in 1995, but the party‘s triumph may have 
represented a protest against the Yeltsin regime and current conditions more than an 
indication that the electorate craved a return to Communism (Marsh 2002). Many 
observers argued that the KPRF had won the contest ―not because they [were] right, but 
because their opponents [were] not right‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 113). Nevertheless, 
the KPRF‘s victory in the party list tier and its over 20% vote share established the party 
as the stalwart leftist opposition to the country‘s reformist trajectory. Indeed, the 
Communists were the only party that saw their vote share increase, in nearly doubled in 
fact, from the 1993 snap elections. The KPRF‘s resurgence was remarkable: Yeltsin had 
banned the Communists after the failed coup in 1991, declaring victoriously to a joint 
session of the U.S. Congress three and a half years before the 1995 contest, 
―Communism, which spread everywhere social strife, animosity, and unparalleled 
brutality, which instilled fear in humanity, has collapsed. It has collapsed never to rise 
again. I am here to assure you, we will not let it rise again in our land‖ (The New York 
Times 1992). Considering the KPRF was only reinstated when the Constitutional Court 
overruled Yeltsin‘s decree in November 1992, the party‘s performance in the election 
sent a clear signal that it was a force to be reckoned with in post-Soviet Russia and that a 
return to communist may not have been as inconceivable as Yeltsin defiantly claimed.  
Second, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia best represented the nationalist-
patriotic side of the party system. Although the LDPR claimed it was a ―centrist‖ party in 
campaign materials, the LDPR was neither liberal nor democratic, but rather far right and 
ultra-nationalist (Belin and Orttung 1997: 61). The LDPR offered a related, yet distinct, 
political platform from the KPRF. While the two parties shared a desire to reestablish the 
Soviet Union and pursue a hawkish nationalist foreign policy, the LDPR supported the 
turn to the market economically based on a noncommunist, non-Gaidar approach, and the 
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continuation of noncommunist government. Vladimir Zhirinovsky led the LDPR with a 
highly personalist and charismatic approach to campaigning and politics, capitalizing on 
growing discontent with the reform process and President Yeltsin himself among 
ordinary Russians. But, unsurprisingly, the LDPR elected to focus almost wholly on 
nationalist themes rather than economic policy, which was its weak point (Oates 1998). 
Zhirinovsky combined policy appeals targeted toward specific constituencies with 
outrageous antics during the electoral period, such as distributing beer and his 
eponymous vodka to voters, promising military personnel unrealistically high salary 
increases, throwing a glass of orange juice over the governor of Nizhny Novgorod on live 
television, and getting into a brawl with a female Duma Deputy during a televised session 
of the legislature that culminated in Zhirinovsky pulling her hair and putting her in a 
headlock (Belin and Orttung 1997: 50-51).  
The LDPR was the most expressly anti-Western and harnessed pro-Russian, 
xenophobic beliefs, even overtly threatening former Soviet states for mistreating ethnic 
Russians (Oates 1998). Zhirinovsky fear-mongered by declaring that a ―plot existed to 
destroy the Russian people and leave them a minority in their own country by the year 
2030‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 82). Accordingly, the Duma elected in the 1995 contest 
was charged with defending ―Russia and all things Russian‖ (Ibid). Party leadership 
openly forecast an invasion by Turks and Muslims, stating, ―Pan-Turkism threatens 
Russia, for in Russia there are a large number of Turkic-speaking people, of Muslims, of 
Farsi-speakers—and all of this is a comfortable soil, a good enticement for Afghanistan, 
Iran and Turkey to rise upwards, to the north, creating a greater Afghanistan, a greater 
Iran, a greater Turkey‖ (Hanson 1998: 118). The role of rabid racism in the LDPR‘s 
ideology bore a striking resemblance to anti-Semitism in Nazi dogma because it 
furnished an explanation for the country‘s degradation and identified a target for ultimate 
retribution  (Ibid). But the LDPR also acted upon its anti-Semitic ideology: the number 
one candidate on the LDPR‘s party list in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast was the editor 
of an anti-Semitic newspaper called Russian Resurrection and that candidate had 
published anti-Semitic diatribes, stating ―If a person isn‘t an anti-Semite, then he is a fool 
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or a scoundrel…It is the unalienable right of the Russian to kill and rob kikes‖ (Belin and 
Orttung 1997: 82). The party‘s fierce xenophobia gained traction in the populace due to 
ongoing hostilities in Chechnya, which the LDPR expressly supported as a way to curb 
corruption and immorality that originated in the south (Hanson 1998: 118). Zhirinovsky 
excoriated Yeltsin for not engaging in a full-scale war in Chechnya (OSCE 1996). 
The LDPR had the most to lose based on its performance in the 1993 snap 
election because other parties appropriated nationalist rhetoric and themes to adapt to the 
surge of anti-Westernism in the electorate (Hanson 1998: 118). Despite the commonality 
of nationalist motifs in the 1995 contest, the LDPR captured second place with 
approximately 11% of the proportional representation vote, filling out the ideological 
spectrum on the far right. This result was particularly surprising to observers and 
analysts, who anticipated the LDPR would fare even more poorly as a result of 
Zhirinovsky‘s flamboyant behavior and provocative rhetoric, on top of the numerous 
explicitly nationalist parties that competed with the LDPR in 1995 (OSCE 1996). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the KPRF harnessed the majority of the protest vote rather than 
the ultra-nationalists suggested that Zhirinovsky‘s party was appealing ―not so much to 
the national idea, but to the national feeling‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 163).  
Third, the democratic-reformist ideological space was perhaps the most crowded, 
with at least 12 parties classified as reformist or tied to the reformist agenda. The Central 
Election Commission initially refused the registration of the archetypal liberal party in 
post-Communist Russia, Yabloko, based on procedural violations (Marsh 2002). 
However, numerous reviews by the Supreme Court, coupled with public protests, 
encouraged the CEC to overturn the decision and allow Yabloko ballot access (Ibid). 
Yabloko represented the reformist agenda well: the party occupied the center of the pro-
market ideological zone and was committed to the reformist agenda but implemented 
gradually rather than using the shock therapy approach favored by the Yeltsin 
administration. Yabloko leaders openly criticized Yeltsin and the dual process of political 
and economic reform, portraying Yabloko as the only genuine reformist party of the 
bunch (OSCE 1996). The party endured blowback as a result of this strategy because 
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some believed Yabloko was little more than a ―spoiler [that had] split the democratic 
movement‖ and all but ensured a Communist victory, in the legislative and presidential 
elections alike (OSCE 1996: 2).  
Under the leadership of economist Grigory Yavlinsky, who had worked with both 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the party‘s platform was aimed at strengthening the role of the 
legislature, and focused primarily on democratic reforms, especially civil liberties and 
support for minorities (Oates 1998). In the 1995 campaign, Yabloko toned down 
explicitly pro-Western statements that constituted a core campaign message two years 
prior, which the most notable adaptation the party pursued after the nationalist‘s 
unexpected success in the 1993 election  (Ibid). Nevertheless, Yabloko continued to harp 
on the themes of democratic governance and freedom, even as other parties moved away 
from them, either because they understood the complexities of transitioning from 
authoritarianism or because they feared they would gain little traction in an increasingly 
nationalist and anti-democratic electorate (Ibid). Furthermore, in other policy avenues, 
the liberal party distinguished itself from other leading parties; for example, Yabloko‘s 
platform was the only one that did not include statements on defending ―the national way 
of life‖ (Oates 1998: 87).  
Yabloko pursued a strategy of enlarging their membership by attracting niche 
constituencies to their cause. Alongside Our Home is Russia, Yabloko enumerated 
detailed policies targeted at specific constituencies, such as women, young families, and 
workers, suggesting that the party believed its strength did not lie in the broad themes 
espoused by the KPRF and LDPR, but rather in the policy preferences of niche 
electorates (Ibid). With KPRF support outpolling that for the government, Yabloko tried 
to woo potential KPRF voters by using the slogan, ―We are not fighting communism, we 
are fighting poverty,‖ and gaining traction with policies to redress wrongdoings 
committed during the process of privatization and restoring strong ties with members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Belin and Orttung 1997: 73). The 
campaign strategy of appealing to more niche constituencies may have unintentionally 
relegated the party to a minor role in the post-communist party system.  
 97 
Despite the party‘s narrowly defined constituency, Yabloko was the only 
undoubtedly liberal party to cross the five percent threshold in the 1995 election with just 
under seven percent, crystallizing its position in the Russian party system as the ―sole 
liberal standard-bearer‖ (Hale 2004: 12). Many observers argued that Yabloko‘s showing 
was mediocre at best because the party would have performed significantly better had it 
joined up with other like-minded parties, but intractable factionalism in the liberal camp 
created the most wasted votes (merely 35% of pro-reform votes were translated into 
seats), which the KPRF and LDPR directly benefitted from (Belin and Orttung 1997: 
125). Indeed, KPRF leader Zyuganov commented before the election, ―the democrats are 
eating each other. We wish them ‗bon appetit‘‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 123).  
An essential feature of the 1995 legislative election, especially when compared to 
those elections in the 2000s, is the absence of an effective dominant party or party of 
power. Parties of power can be defined as ―coalitions forged before electoral cycles 
whose intent is to defend the interests of those already in power‖ (McFaul 2004: 113). 
More detailed formulations of the concept suggest that a party of power is ―profoundly 
fragmented into various interests and concerns and lacks a sustained social or political 
base, other than proximity to power itself and the resources it provides for enrichment 
and ‗empowerment‘‖ (Sakwa 1998: 148). With regard to resources, parties of power rely 
heavily on so-called ―administrative resources,‖ a term that was first used in the at the 
time of the 1995 election and which can be defined as the ―‗combination of means at the 
disposal of the directors of enterprises and/or territorial units (districts, towns) to 
influence the opinion and behaviour of electors‘ or as the ‗organi[z]ational, financial, 
human, time and other resources of state bodies and the government administration‘ that 
could be ‗used for the achievement of various political objectives‘‖ (Quoted in White 
2011: 534).  
The first attempt at constructing a pro-government, centrist party of power was 
made during the 1993 election cycle with Russia‘s Choice. Although President Yeltsin 
never officially endorsed Russia‘s Choice, the pro-reform party was poised to win the 
election because key presidential appointees headed the party and organized the most 
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well financed campaign due to their extensive access to state resources and media outlets 
owned largely by the federal government (Colton and McFaul 2003). The party was also 
well positioned to recruit important regional elites who wanted to curry favor with the 
President after his violent defeat of the anti-reformist legislature (Hale 2006). 
Furthermore, the abruptness of the 1993 elections reinforced the privileged position of 
Russia‘s Choice because key leaders from Russia‘s Choice were able to quickly marshal 
the resources of the state and media to concentrate on organizing the most effective 
electoral campaign, while other parties scrambled for signatures and rushed to complete 
registration requirements. Thus, these snap elections effectively reduced the number of 
parties that would be able to compete because they had to organizationally cohere in time 
to obtain the requisite registration signatures. 
After Russia‘s Choice placed second behind the ultra-nationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in 1993, Yeltsin lost confidence in the Russia‘s 
Choice party project and replaced it with a new right-of-center, moderately reformist 
party of power, Our Home is Russia, to compete in the 1995 elections. Yeltsin had hoped 
that the creation, from above, of Our Home is Russia and another party, the Ivan Rybkin 
Bloc, that would serve as the left-of-center loyal opposition would stimulate the 
emergence of a two-party system that would crowd out the radical nationalists and other 
anti-government parties positioned to succeed in the 1995 election (OSCE 1996). Yeltsin 
had hoped that the Ivan Rybkin Bloc would attract left-leaning elites and specific smaller 
parties that would resist formally coordinating or coalescing with the explicitly pro-
government Our Home is Russia but also balk at supporting more extreme parties such as 
Zhirinovsky‘s ultra-nationalist LDPR (Belin and Orttung 1997). The guiding motive for 
creating both Our Home and the Rybkin Bloc was to bolster the ideological center while 
hollowing out the extremist wings on either side (Ibid). The Rybkin Bloc would also 
serve a useful purpose for Our Home is Russia by absorbing many influential, and 
moderate, opposition leaders that may be convinced not to pursue an anti-government 
stance if they were led by the powerful State Duma Speaker Rybkin (Ibid). Although the 
creation of Our Home and the Rybkin Bloc was intended to reduce the seemingly 
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uncontrollable supply of parties, efforts to engineer the party system from above 
ultimately proved counterproductive because ―none of the existing parties were willing to 
join the two new ‗centrist‘ blocs‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 33).  
 Thus, the final ideological contour of the party system in the mid-1990s was 
filled out by the pro-government, slightly right of center, Our Home is Russia (NDR). 
NDR was founded as a political coalition that would later form the basis of President 
Yeltsin‘s reelection campaign in 1996. Although the party‘s leaders publicly rejected 
political ideology, Our Home‘s platform espoused individual civil liberties, the 
continuing growth of the market economy combined with social and welfare services 
protecting those made vulnerable by the reform process, and the importance of 
maintaining public order. As the government-backed party, Our Home‘s message was 
comparatively more guarded regarding additional expenditures for social services (Oates 
1998). The party of power appealed to wide swaths of the electorate by centering on the 
vague themes of stability and levelheaded leadership and calling for the preservation of 
the government‘s overarching policies pertaining to political and economic reform 
(OSCE 1996). Generally, the party‘s appeals were designed to attract everyone rather 
than a core constituency that could be counted on to help propel Our Home into the 
Duma. Perhaps because of this catch-all strategy, Our Home did the ―worst job of 
defining its principles‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 162).  
NDR‘s platform on specific issues included support for domestic producers and 
preserving the basic integrity of the county. When Our Home did try to court specific 
groups of voters, the party did so by leveraging advantages accruing to those already in 
public office, i.e. the ability to distribute resources from the public budget (Belin and 
Orttung 1997). For example, leaders of Our Home traveled around Russia and essentially 
purchased support: the government paid overdue salaries to teachers to obviate the need 
for a strike, investors who were deceived received compensation, each veteran would 
receive a plot of land from the government, and veterans‘ payments would be increased 
in the beginning of 1996 (Belin and Orttung 1997: 81). Thus, due to the financial 
resources available to the party of power, promises made by party leaders on the 
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campaign trail were kept rather than ultimately proven empty, as they argued of their 
opposition (Ibid). Yeltsin and Our Home generally pursued an appeasement strategy to 
quell the red-brown opposition to reforms, and those voters in support, by pledging to 
punish those who benefitted from the reform process through corrupt means (OSCE 
1996). However, the president and the party of power also explicitly warned voters 
against the dangers that would accompany a communist victory in the legislative 
elections, drawing a distinction between ―nostalgia [and] the realities of communism and 
the danger it posed to hard-won freedoms‖ (OSCE 1996: 4). 
The party was led by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who previously chaired the 
colossal state-owned gas and oil monopoly Gazprom from 1989-1992, and enjoyed 
extensive financial support from the company during Our Home is Russia‘s 1995 
campaign as a result. In contrast to the leaders of extremist parties that might lead the 
country dangerously off course, Chernomyrdin represented responsible leadership by 
seasoned professionals that would guide the country safely through the dual political and 
economic transition. Like its predecessor, Our Home is Russia attracted the most well-
known politicians and financiers to its cause, marshaling the support of almost the entire 
Russian cabinet (Hale 2006). Numerous regional executives supported Our Home and 
party leaders tried to attract other regions to their cause by publicizing a power-sharing 
agreement that the central government concluded with the republic of Urdmurtiya and 
stating a similar agreement was in the works with Orenburg Oblast (Belin and Orttung 
1997). Our Home faced considerable difficulty, however, when attempting to absorb 
smaller political parties due to Yeltsin‘s explicit support for the party, when his own 
popularity ratings hovered in the single digits, and the widespread support of the cabinet, 
when the economy made only negligible advances (Belin and Orttung 1996: 35).  
The government-sponsored party ultimately failed to meet widespread 
expectations that it would be the landslide winner in 1995: it captured a smaller vote 
share than Russia‘s Choice had two years prior, securing a paltry 10% in the proportional 
representation vote, compared to 15.51% for its predecessor (Colton and McFaul 2003: 
48). The triumph of the communist and nationalist opposition over Our Home is Russia 
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was staggering: the KPRF secured over 22% of the votes in the party list elections, while 
the LDPR finished with over 11%, proving that these two parties were viable even in an 
extremely crowded party market. The drastic proliferation of parties from 1993 to 1995 
may have diminished the party of power‘s electoral support because numerous parties 
could be classified as reformist or tied to the reformist agenda, and these parties split the 
vote amongst them, causing the ideological center to collapse, rather than coalescing 
around the most workable alternative. In a post-election autopsy of the party‘s defeat, 
Chernomyrdin diagnosed Our Home‘s failure was a result of ―excessive self-confidence; 
extravagance and ineffective use of money; mistakes in personnel policies, including the 
choice of candidates; and insufficient work with the regions‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 
122). Our Home‘s disastrous showing, coupled with the inability of the Rybkin Bloc to 
surpass the five percent threshold for representation, decidedly proved that Yeltsin‘s 
experiment of installing a two-party system from above had failed miserably.  
The 1995 Legislative Election as a “Normal” Competitive Election 
The 1995 legislative election will be treated as a ―normal‖ competitive election in 
post-communist Russia. Many scholars of Russia and independent international 
organizations argue, ―by several measures, the 1995 parliamentary elections […] rank as 
the most competitive, free, and fair elections in Russian history,‖ and that Russian 
elections in the mid-1990s were ―very competitive—critics would argue ‗too 
competitive‘‖ (McFaul and Petrov 2004:40; Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997:799). 
Indeed, in contrast to the elections in the 2000s and 2010s under United Russia, it seems 
improbable that Yeltsin and Our Home is Russia carried out ―widespread rigging, since 
the opposition parties gained control of the Duma‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997:133). The 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly‘s 
report concluded that, overall, the 1995 legislative election was carried out in an ―overall 
free and fair manner‖ (The First Decade of OSCE PA Election Observation, 2003). The 
OSCE observer group ―did not witness irregularities or conscious attempts to alter the 
election count or unduly influence voters‖ (OSCE 1996: 9). The election observation 
report from the International Republican Institute corroborates the OSCE‘s conclusions, 
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stating that observers ―did not witness systematic or deliberate misconduct that would 
call into question the basic integrity of the process‖ (Russia State Duma Election 
Observation Report, 1995). Scholars and election observers regard this election as 
―substantially free‖ and the ―most competitive and consequential in Russia‘s brief 
democratic history‖ due to the sheer number of parties competing in the proportional 
representation tier, the number of candidates offering themselves in the single-member 
district portion, and the Central Electoral Commission‘s September 1995 adoption of 
detailed procedures for regulating both campaign expenditures and media coverage 
(Wyman 1996: 277; McFaul and Petrov 2004: 26; Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997; 
White, Wyman and Oates 1997). The European Institute for the Media found that the free 
airtime was ―allocated fairly‖ and conformed to the new regulations (Ibid).  
Figure 4.1 supplies additional proof that the 1995 contest was competitive, as the 
distribution of voter turnout better approximates a normal or Gaussian distribution than 
those contests in the 2000s, when suspicious fat right tails and local peaks around 95-
100% turnout emerged.  
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Voter Turnout in 1995 
 
 
Despite consensus that the 1995 legislative election was the most competitive in 
Russian history, this contest was not an entirely free and fair one by Western standards. 
For example, the secrecy of the vote was compromised in some instances: the OSCE 
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reported, ―the unwieldiness of the large party bloc ballot, which opened to the size of a 
tabloid newspaper, made maneuvering into the [voting] booth physically difficult, so 
many voters simply marked their ballot on a nearby table or windowsill. On the other 
hand, some couples crowded into one booth‖ (OSCE 1996: 8). In one area in Tver Oblast, 
two precinct stations were combined into a single building and an auditorium that was 
attached was used by voters to engage in ―consultative voting,‖ that is by discussing the 
parties together before casting their vote (Ibid). In isolated cases, proxy voting occurred 
in which family members would attempt to vote for their relatives (Belin and Orttung 
1997). In Smolensk, a member of the OSCE delegation was refused registration as an 
observer and, when a poll worker ultimately registered the observer in accordance with 
the poll worker‘s duties, an official threatened him with the loss of his job (OSCE 1996).  
The counting of the votes was also marred, albeit to a comparatively limited 
extent: some alleged that election officials and poll workers colluded to disqualify ballots 
cast for ―undesirable‖ parties (OSCE 1996: 9). One election analyst claimed that the 
KPRF vote was artificially augmented in the oblasts of Smolensk, Lipetsk, Tambo, 
Pskov, Ulyanovsk, Bryansk, Volgograd and Penza, after comparing similar precincts in 
particular regions and evaluating whether those precincts reported voter turnout and 
results that approximated or deviated from the regional norm, in this case 
uncharacteristically higher turnout rates and vote shares for the KPRF (Ibid). More than a 
week passed before the Central Election Commission tabulated all the ballots and made 
the final tally public, citing poor weather and communications, along with the sheer size 
of the country as reasons for the delay, although these claims did not quiet suspicion of 
ballot rigging (Belin and Orttung 1997).  
Furthermore, independent monitoring teams found that some parties, notably Our 
Home is Russia, clearly exceeded the limits on campaign expenditures set by the Central 
Election Commission and tracked by a financial auditing service that was set up to 
monitor campaign expenditures (Monitoring the Media Coverage of the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections Final Report 1996; McFaul and Petrov 2004: 42). Furthermore, 
media bias, especially on the partially state-owned Russian Public Television (ORT), was 
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revealed to favor Our Home is Russia; this was likely because ORT was controlled by 
Boris Berezovsky, the unofficial chief financial officer of Our Home is Russia and a 
member of President Yeltsin‘s inner circle who would later finance his reelection 
campaign in 1996 (Monitoring the Media Coverage of the 1995 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections Final Report 1996). A full 30% of editorial time on ORT was dedicated to Our 
Home is Russia, while the liberal Yabloko party received only one percent (Ibid). 
According to those working in conjunction with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 
―there were some problems attaining the standard of impartiality in media coverage on 
the regional and local levels‖ (OSCE 1996: 6).  
In addition to media bias, suspiciously high voter turnout also suggests imperfect 
competition in the 1995 electoral contest. McFaul and Petrov argue, ―pockets of 
falsification, including massive irregularities in Chechnya, tainted the electoral results‖ 
(McFaul and Petrov, 2004: 42). Such pockets manifested more directly in the raion-level 
electoral data available from this election. Table 4.1 shows the voter turnout threshold 
used to gauge suspected electoral manipulation and the amount of raions exceeding that 
threshold. Raion-level national turnout in 1995 was 67.21% and the corresponding 
standard deviation was 9.27. Accordingly, approximately 15% of raions met the criteria 
set in the mid-1990s.  
 
Table 4.1: Manipulated Raions in 1995 
Voter Turnout Threshold 
(1 Standard Deviation Above 
Raion-level National Turnout) 
Number Manipulated Raions % Total Raions 
76.48 397 14.99 
 
Roughly 23% of those raions were located in ethnic republics; approximately 44% were 
located in majority-Muslim regions, 14% were located in the Caucasus, and 20% were 
located in resource regions. Compared to western standards for free and fair elections, 
these considerations put in perspective the actual level of competitiveness in Russia‘s 
most competitive election, but also temper claims arguing, ―in December 1995 the level 
of electoral falsification was […] extremely high‖ (Wilson 2005: 76).  
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Analysis 
 The investigation of political parties‘ performance in the 1995 election to the 
State Duma includes those parties that crossed the threshold for representation: the 
KPRF, LDPR, Yabloko and the party of power, Our Home is Russia. Table 4.2 details the 
two stronghold thresholds for each party under consideration. 
 
Table 4.2: Measuring the Dependent Variable: Party Strongholds in 1995 
 1 standard 
deviation above 
party‘s raion-level 
national average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
2 standard 
deviations above 
party‘s raion-level 
national average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
KPRF 37.52 367 14.03 50.14 113 4.32 
LDPR 19.70 371 14.19 26.65 68 2.60 
Yabloko 8.94 389 14.88 13.24 183 7.00 
Our Home 
is Russia 
18.66 268 10.25 27.61 101 3.86 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of each party‘s vote shares, providing a visual sense of 
where the two stronghold thresholds are set. Each distribution exhibits irregularity to 
some extent. Compared to the other parties, the KPRF‘s vote share distribution 
demonstrated the most spread, with a standard deviation of 12.62. There is a soft bump in 
the Communists vote share at just past 60%, which may offer an indication of electoral 
manipulation, given that such vote shares are more than double the party‘s raion-level 
national average of approximately 25% and the party possessed the wherewithal 
necessary to engage in electoral malfeasance to augment its vote share. The LDPR‘s 
distribution was nearly twice as clustered around the mean than the Communists‘, as the 
standard deviation was 6.95. There is a peculiar bump or step in the nationalists‘ 
distribution between zero percent and approximately five percent that resembles the 
mirror opposite of Our Home is Russia‘s distribution. Although a more sophisticated 
analysis, e.g. flow of votes, may be required to determine precisely which parties were 
denied votes in favor of others when electoral manipulation was practiced, it seems 
plausible that Our Home is Russia benefitted at the expense of the nationalists, if the 
similar ―steps‖ in both parties‘ distributions were not the result of random or uncorrelated 
 106 
factors, and the distributions from the 1993 snap election did not reveal similar steps in 
the party of power and the nationalists‘ distributions. In contrast to the Communists and 
nationalists, the distribution of Yabloko‘s vote share was significantly more tightly 
clustered around its raion-level national average as evidenced by the standard deviation 
of 4.30. Interestingly, Yabloko‘s distribution exhibits an elongated right tail and a 
conspicuous bump, at around a 15% vote share, which looks vaguely similar to United 
Russia‘s distributions in the 2000s, albeit to a markedly lesser degree. The bump in 
Yabloko support, however, was the product of the party‘s solid showing in the federal 
cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, rather than suspected electoral manipulation. 
Finally, Our Home is Russia‘s distribution exhibited a fair amount of dispersion with a 
standard deviation of 8.95. Our Home‘s distribution reveals a suspicious bump in the 
right tail, large enough to produce a distinct local maximum, that hovers around 20% vote 
share, which was, perhaps not coincidentally, precisely double the party‘s raion-level 
national mean.  
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Parties‘ Vote Shares in 1995 
 
See Appendix Tables 1-24 (pages 472-519) for Multilevel Model Results. 
Ethnicity and Opposition Parties 
The multilevel models specified for the 1995 legislative election produce several 
expected and unexpected results and showcase opposition parties‘ unique pockets of 
support with the potential to develop and expand in future contests. Although few 
opposition parties are expected to be particularly attractive to ethnic minorities, I find 
ethnicity is an important determinant of party strongholds for various parties across both 
measures of the dependent variable. The KRPF captured sizable minority support: the 
percent minority covariate increased the odds of a stronghold by one to four percent in 
the lower models, and by three to five percent in the models specified using the higher 
threshold. In the models with refined measures of raion-level ethnic composition, the 
percent other minority variable increased the odds of a KPRF stronghold by three to four 
percent in the lower threshold models, and by one to roughly three percent in those with 
the higher threshold. Save for one lower threshold model, in which the odds diminished 
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by two percent, the titular minority variable did not exercise a systematic effect on the 
occurrence of Communist strongholds. These results indicate that primarily other 
minorities drove the KPRF‘s electoral support from minorities rather than titular 
minorities that comprised a constituency already captured to some extent by the party of 
power. Notably distinct from Yabloko, however, enthusiasm for the Communists drawn 
from other minorities did not come from those of Indo-European heritage, but rather non-
titular ethnic groups that reside in ethnic republics, particularly those regions in the 
Caucasus. The consistent finding that KPRF strongholds were defined along the ethnic 
Russian, non-Russian cleavage in the mid-1990s has not been firmly established in 
existing survey-based research (Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler 1997; Colton and McFaul 
2003; Hale 2006; Cf. White, Wyman and Oates 1997). Figure 4.3 showcases the inflation 
of the KPRF‘s vote share with additional non-Russian and other Russian minorities, as 
well as stability across varying proportions of titular minorities. Despite the lack of 
statistical significance identified in the model results from increases in titular minorities, 
the corresponding scatterplot shows a fair share of purely titular minority raions that 
registered abundant support for the party. Interestingly, the raions populated almost 
entirely by other minorities that voted for the KPRF at levels upwards of three times the 
party‘s national showing were all located in Dagestan, which houses a sizable population 
of non-titular ethnic minorities from at least half a dozen different ethnic groups. 
Together, these raions form a distinct cluster in the scatterplot detailing other minorities‘ 
support for the party. The few predominantly non-Russian and titular minority raions that 
collected in the lower right quadrant of the scatterplot, registering little or no support for 
the Communists, were found in the ethnic republics of Tuva, Ingushetia, and Chechnya. 
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Figure 4.3: Non-Russian Minorities and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 breaks down the percentage of KPRF strongholds by regional context and 
ethnic composition at the raion level, distinguishing between majority-Russian and 
majority-minority raions. For each dyad, the total number of raions in a given regional 
context is indicated. The denominator for each red and blue bar, however, is not the total 
number of raions in a given regional environment, but rather the number of majority-
Russian raions and majority-minority raions, respectively, in that specific regional 
context. The remainder of the bar charts breaking down the percentages of each party‘s 
strongholds by ethnicity, as well as urban-rural, was constructed likewise. Clearly, of the 
majority-minority and majority-Russian raions that were KPRF strongholds in each 
regional context, the party captured a higher percentage of strongholds in the former than 
the latter.  Of all majority-minority raions across the country, the Communists enjoyed 
stronghold level support in roughly one-quarter; of the majority-Russian raions, the 
KPRF had strongholds in approximately 15%. One minor exception to the ethnic 
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minority pattern of support is found in resource regions according to the higher threshold, 
in which the KPRF‘s only strongholds were located in majority-Russian raions. In other 
words, with the shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold, the balance in percentages 
between ethnic minority and ethnic Russian strongholds in resource regions switched in 
favor majority-Russian raions. There is a notable spike in the Caucasus: of majority-
minority raions in those regions, nearly 80% churned out high vote shares for the 
Communists. Close to 50% of majority-minority raions in poorer regions were as 
enthusiastic as their counterparts in the Caucasus. Majority-Russian bastions of support in 
the Caucasus vanished when the stronghold threshold was raised.  
 
Figure 4.4: KPRF Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1995 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics from Table 4.3 indicate that ethnic minorities exercised a more 
neutral impact on KPRF support: the party‘s average in majority-minority raions was 
within only one percent of its national vote share. Furthermore, the party‘s average in 
ethnic republics was substandard, at almost two percent less than nationally.  
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Table 4.3: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the KPRF’s Electoral Performance in the 1995 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
24.90 
 
26.48 
 
24.14 
 
29.08 23.13 
 
30.50 
 
33.20 
 
22.30 
 
18.28 
 
Min .274 
 
.274 
 
.274 .274 .831 
 
.831 
 
.831 
 
.831 
 
1.45 
 
Max 93.66 
 
93.66 
 
93.66 
 
79.48 85.34 
 
85.34 
 
85.34 
 
69.49 
 
50.16 
 
SD 12.62 
 
13.08 
 
13.38 
 
14.17 15.88 15.88 
 
17.33 
 
10.70 
 
8.98 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
Interestingly though, when the ethnic republic variable achieved standard levels of 
statistical significance, the shift from raions in Russian federal regions to raions in ethnic 
republics hiked the odds of a KPRF stronghold by 21 times in an upper threshold 
specification. Qualitative evidence gathered during interviews in Moscow corroborates 
this finding: one political analyst commented that the ―Communists never had any 
problems in the ethnic republics in the 1990s, especially in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, 
which voted for the Communists‖ in high numbers (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM 
Foundation 2011). Indeed, the KPRF harvested one-quarter and two-fifths of its 
strongholds in ethnic federal regions, as shown in Table 4.4. Regarding Table 4.4 below 
and the remainder of the tables in this and the subsequent chapters, it is important to note 
that the various regional contexts are not mutually exclusive (and therefore the 
percentages do not add up to 100), but rather indicate the relative share of a given party‘s 
strongholds in different types of regions. The Communists established a firm presence in 
ethnic republics when their only genuine competition in those areas was an ineffectual 
party of power.  
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Table 4.4: KPRF Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1995 
 
 
 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(367 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(113 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
91 24.80 
46 40.71 
Russian federal 
regions 
276 75.20 
67 59.29 
Muslim regions 64 17.44 38 33.63 
Caucasus regions 78 21.25 44 38.94 
Poorer Regions 254 69.21 83 73.45 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
11 3.00 
1 0.88 
Fraudulent raions 90 24.52 34 30.09 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
277 75.48 79 69.91 
 
One striking finding is the incredibly high odds of a stronghold in predominantly Muslim 
regions across the KPRF models. The odds ranged from as low as 164 to as high as more 
than 291 in the relaxed models and from 274 to as high as 2,102 in the strict 
specifications. These towering odds are corroborated through Table 4.3, which 
demonstrates that the KPRF‘s average in Muslim regions was more than six percent 
higher than the party‘s raion-level national mean. Nearly one-third and one-fifth of KPRF 
strongholds were located in Muslim regions, according to the higher and lower threshold 
measures of the dependent variable. Apparently, in ethnic republics and Muslim regions, 
region-level dynamics were operable and importantly distinct from those prevailing at the 
raion level: the titular minority covariate produced a negative effect when it reached 
standard levels of statistical significance but the regional parameters closely related to 
ethnicity exercised robust and positive effects. Future research may be able to disentangle 
the different effects produced in the statistical models by titular minority populations at 
the raion level and ethnic republic and Muslim region status at the regional level. 
Nevertheless, the Communists carved out pockets of support in raions and regions with 
sizable non-Russian populations, particularly those comprised of non-Indo European and 
non-titular ethnic minorities at the raion level.  
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The pattern of electoral support for the LDPR also followed ethnic lines in the 
mid-1990s, but in the direction opposite to that of the KPRF: the percent minority 
covariate was statistically significant and negative, diminishing the odds of an LDPR 
stronghold by two to seven percent in the relaxed models, and by three to six percent in 
the strict specifications. Furthermore, the percent other minority covariate also exerted a 
negative effect, dwindling the chances of an LDPR stronghold by roughly five percent in 
the relaxed models and by approximately six to seven percent in the strict ones. 
Surprisingly, the proportion of titular minorities did not systematically influence the 
occurrence of nationalist strongholds. The negative influence of ethnic minorities on the 
nationalist vote was expected because, rather than espousing a message of inclusion and 
tolerance, the LDPR stirred xenophobic and Russophilic sentiment in its campaign 
appeals and targeted those appeals specifically toward ethnic Russian constituencies. The 
multilevel model results indicate that the party succeeded in its mission of collecting 
pockets of support in raions with larger populations of ethnic Russians. Figure 4.5 clearly 
depicts the inverse relationship between the LDPR‘s vote share and the non-Russian, 
titular minority, and other minority population in a raion. One conspicuous outlier is 
evident in the scatterplot detailing ethnic minorities‘ support for the party: a Russian 
raion located in the Chita region, which borders Mongolia and China, registered a vote 
share for the LPDR of, astonishingly, almost 80%. An additional exception is found in 
the scatterplot concerning titular minorities‘, one more raion reporting a nearly 80% vote 
share for the party. This most enthusiastic raion was, like the previous outlier just 
mentioned, located close to the Russian border with Mongolia, but had a population 
dominated by titular minorities rather than ethnic Russians. The dense grouping of raions 
that were populated entirely by ethnic minorities and registered no support for the 
nationalists was found almost exclusively in Chechnya and Dagestan.  
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Figure 4.5: Non-Russian Minorities and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
 
From a different perspective, Figure 4.6 showcases the balance in percentages between 
LDPR strongholds in majority-minority and majority-Russian raions in different regional 
contexts. Unlike the KPRF, the pattern of support for the LDPR is overwhelmingly 
Russian, with only sporadic support drawn from ethnic minorities. The nationalists 
performed more poorly in majority-Russian raions than the Communists did in majority-
minority raions: of majority-Russian raions in all regions, the LDPR harvested 
strongholds in nearly 20%, while capturing roughly five percent of majority-minority 
raions. In the contexts where the LDPR harvested unusually high vote shares in both 
majority-minority and ethnic Russian areas, a vast imbalance in the percentages is 
pronounced and favored the latter. Nearly 20% of majority-Russian raions in poorer 
regions and more than 15% of those in the Caucasus channeled abnormally high vote 
shares to the nationalists. Of the raions that were LDPR strongholds in the Caucasus and 
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regions endowed with natural resources, the strongholds were found exclusively in ethnic 
Russian areas.  
 
Figure 4.6: LDPR Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1995 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Furthermore, descriptive statistics from Table 4.5 indicate that the party‘s average in 
majority-minority raions was nearly two percent less than its national showing. Raions 
located in ethnic republics and Muslim regions registered even less support, with average 
vote shares for the LDPR that were nearly 25% and an astonishing 75% below its 
national take.  Compared to the other raion and regional environments considered, 
Muslim regions delivered the ultra-nationalists the least amount of support by a large 
margin: the party‘s support was so low, in fact, that it did not even reach the threshold for 
legislative representation in the State Duma, set at a mere five percent.  
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Table 4.5: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the LDPR’s Electoral Performance in the 1995 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
12.75 
 
12.52 
 
11.04 
 
11.14 9.03 
 
3.71 
 
10.01 
 
12.26 
 
10.80 
 
Min 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 .524 
 
Max 78.27 
 
78.27 
 
78.27 
 
38.71 78.27 
 
22.67 
 
26.90 
 
38.31 
 
28.68 
 
SD 6.95 
 
7.37 
 
7.24 
 
7.47 7.58 
 
3.36 
 
7.19 
 
6.75 
 
6.00 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
The results from the lower threshold models corroborate the descriptive statistics: the 
odds of an LDPR stronghold in a raion located within an ethnic republic were one-
twentieth to one-tenth the value of the odds for raions located in Russian federal regions. 
As shown in Table 4.6, only about 15% and 9% of LDPR strongholds were located in 
ethnic regions by the relaxed and strict measure of stronghold, respectively. Mirroring the 
effects of ethnic composition at the raion level, the LDPR carved out areas of support in 
Russian federal regions as opposed to ethnic republics. A preponderance of Muslim 
inhabitants in a region did not produce statistically significant findings in any of the 
models, which is an unexpected, considering the LDPR‘s xenophobic and Russophilic 
rhetoric and evidence from the descriptive statistics in Table 4.5 suggesting the party 
performed dreadfully in those regions. Despite the lack of a negative effect, the LDPR 
had only one raion stronghold located in Muslim regions according to the lower measure 
and no strongholds according to the higher measure. 
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Table 4.6: LDPR Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1995 
 
 
 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(371 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(68 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
57 15.36 
6 8.82 
Russian federal 
regions 
314 84.64 
62 91.18 
Muslim regions 1 0.27 0 0 
Caucasus regions 23 6.20 1 1.47 
Poorer Regions 181 48.79 36 52.94 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
32 8.63 
2 2.94 
Fraudulent raions 54 14.56 9 13.24 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
317 85.44 59 86.76 
 
The contours of electoral support were thus congruent with the LDPR‘s ideological 
underpinnings in its early stages that capitalized on the Russian/non-Russian ethnic 
political cleavage by completely orienting the party toward the ethnic Russian 
constituency. Paralleling the state of the current literature on the ethnic bases of the 
KPRF, the majority of existing research has also not yet identified the ethnic Russian 
contour of LDPR strongholds, e.g. Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler (1997) and Hale 
(2006) (Cf. White, Wyman and Oates 1997). Along the dimension of ethnicity, the first 
and second place finishers in the 1995 contest, i.e. the Communists and nationalists, 
focused their efforts on completely different constituencies, but other players challenged 
both in their respective niches.  
Unexpectedly, the percent minority covariate failed to meet standard measures of 
statistical significance in all of the models specified for Yabloko. The conventional 
wisdom, established through survey-oriented research, about the nature of Yabloko‘s 
constituency holds that it is comprised primarily of ethnic Russians (White, Wyman and 
Oates 1997). However, the absence of a systematic effect across the models suggests a 
revision of the common understanding is warranted. The percent titular minority and 
other minority covariates exercised opposite effects on Yabloko strongholds: higher 
densities of titular minorities shrunk the odds by six percent in a lower threshold model, 
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while a higher proportion of other minorities augmented the odds by seven percent in one 
strict specification. Yabloko was thus the only party in the core party troika to experience 
any kind of effect from titular minorities. Although the Communists also captured 
electoral windfalls from raions with large other minority populations, Yabloko‘s 
constituency of other minority supporters was likely drawn primarily from Indo-
European groups rather than non-titular ethnic groups, as was the case for the KPRF, 
because of the party‘s liberal orientation. When, in Figure 4.7, vote share is employed as 
a continuous variable rather than dichotomous as in the statistical models, an inverse 
association between Yabloko‘s vote share and the proportion of non-Russians and other 
minorities is evident, mirroring that of the LDPR. Yabloko‘s fanatical raions, located 
primarily in the upper left quadrant, were nearly all located in ethnic Russian areas, save 
for one mostly titular minority raion that was geographically proximate to the location of 
the LDPR‘s outlier raions. Additionally, nearly all of these most zealous raions were 
found in Moscow city, Rostov Oblast on the Russian border with Ukraine, and Nizhny 
Novgorod in Western Russia and bisected by the Volga River. The conspicuous outlier in 
the scatterplot concerning titular minorities, a majority titular minority raion that recorded 
a vote share for Yabloko nearly five times higher than its raion-level national average of 
4.64%, was located in Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug within Chita Oblast on the 
Mongolia.  
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Figure 4.7: Non-Russian Minorities and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
 
Like the scatterplots, Figure 4.8 offers a picture of Yabloko strongholds that diverges 
from the statistical findings but is congruent with the extant literature suggesting that the 
liberal party performed better in predominantly Russian areas. Of the majority-minority 
and majority-Russian raions in each regional environment, there is an unmistakably 
Russian pattern of support, similar to that for the LDPR. Approximately 10% of majority-
Russian raions were bastions of support for the liberal party while a minuscule percent of 
majority-minority raions registered similar vote totals for the party. Unexpectedly, nearly 
20% of majority-Russian raions in predominantly Muslim regions and roughly 10% of 
these raions in the Caucasus were liberal zealots. With regard to the lower threshold, 
Yabloko‘s only strongholds in Muslim regions and those located in the Caucasus were in 
majority-Russian raions. With the shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold, 
strongholds in ethnic and Muslim regions of either type vanished.  
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Figure 4.8: Yabloko Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1995 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Although the scatterplots and bar charts reveal ethnic Russian contours of Yabloko‘s 
support, the party‘s average in majority-minority areas was, in fact, slightly higher than 
nationally, as shown in Table 4.7. At the regional level, the shift from raions located in 
Russian federal regions to those located in ethnic republics sank the odds of a stronghold 
by more than 90% in one lower threshold model. Yabloko‘s average showing in ethnic 
republics was approximately two percent less than its national vote share.  
 
Table 4.7: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Yabloko’s Electoral Performance in the 1995 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
4.64 3.49 
 
4.85 
 
1.61 2.68 
 
2.02 
 
3.20 5.50 3.60 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .295 
 
Max 25.62 
 
22.94 
 
22.94 
 
11.93 22.94 
 
11.91 
 
15.51 
 
25.62 
 
16.54 
 
SD 4.30 
 
4.06 
 
4.56 
 
1.52 2.68 
 
2.57 
 
3.33 
 
4.90 
 
2.94 
 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
Table 4.8 reveals that few of the party‘s strongholds were found in ethnic regions, 
approximately five and one percent according to the relaxed and strict measure, 
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respectively. Raions in Muslim regions recorded even more limited support on average, 
less than half of Yabloko‘s national take. Furthermore, only roughly three percent of 
Yabloko‘s bastions were housed in Muslim regions according to the lower threshold and 
none of these bastions recorded support high enough to surpass the higher threshold. 
Despite Yabloko‘s poor showing in Muslim regions as evident from the descriptive 
statistics, the Muslim region variable did not exert a systematic effect on the occurrence 
of Yabloko strongholds.  
 
Table 4.8: Yabloko Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1995 
 
 
 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(389 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(183 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
18 4.63 
2 1.09 
Russian federal 
regions 
371 95.37 
181 98.91 
Muslim regions 10 2.57 0 0 
Caucasus regions 22 5.66 6 3.28 
Poorer Regions 81 20.82 21 11.48 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
21 5.40 
4 2.19 
Fraudulent raions 4 1.03 0 0 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
385 98.97 183 100 
 
Prioritizing the results from the more systematic statistical analysis, it appears that 
electoral support for the archetypal liberal party was not driven primarily by ethnic 
cleavages as generally expected. 
The Urban-rural Divide and Opposition Parties 
The statistical results indicate that all members of the core party troika 
successfully captured constituencies defined by the urban-rural divide in Russian politics 
in the mid-1990s. In addition to minority populations, the KPRF displayed the contours 
of a party that appealed to the specific constituency of rural residents: a percent increase 
in the rural covariate resulted in a statistically significant increase by one to two percent 
in the odds of a raion being a KPRF stronghold across the majority of specifications 
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using both thresholds. Furthermore, the party‘s average in rural raions was roughly two 
percent higher than nationally, as shown in Table 4.3 above. Figure 4.9 clearly shows that 
additional rural residents elevated the KPRF‘s vote share. The most zealous ―red raions‖ 
were located exclusively in republics and oblasts, such as Dagestan, North Ossetia, 
Ulyanovsk Oblast in the Volga Federal District, and Kemerovo Oblast in southwestern 
Siberia. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of these devoted raions were found in the 
countryside, with a few urban exceptions in Dagestan and Kemerovo. As mentioned, the 
number three spot on the KPRF list was Aman Tuleev, the head of the legislature in 
Kemerovo, which explains the party‘s solid performance in the region.  
 
Figure 4.9: Rural Inhabitants and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
The rural base of the KPRF in the mid-1990s is apparent in Figure 4.10. Nearly 20% of 
all majority-rural raions delivered high levels of support to the Communists, while half 
that percentage of mostly urban raions registered comparable enthusiasm. A higher 
percentage of strongholds were found in majority-rural raions in all but two regional 
contexts considered. Muslim regions and regions with abundant natural resources 
revealed a higher percentage of KPRF strongholds in urban raions than those in the 
countryside, but the balance between urban and rural was relatively even in the case of 
Muslim regions. In Muslim regions, the Communists carved out strongholds in one-third 
of majority-urban and close to 30% of mostly rural raions. In the Caucasus, close to 40% 
of raions in the countryside were devoted to the Communists, while approximately 30% 
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of their counterparts in poorer regions showed similar levels of enthusiasm. With the shift 
from relaxed to strict threshold, the balance between urban and rural strongholds shifts to 
favor rural raions in Muslim regions. In contrast, rural strongholds evaporated entirely in 
resource regions, leaving only urban bastions of support. The party‘s performance in 
ethnic republics and Muslim regions was more uniform from the cities to the countryside 
than in the other contexts considered.  
 
Figure 4.10: KPRF Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 1995 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Yabloko‘s pattern of electoral support was also critically shaped by the urban-
rural cleavage in Russian society but in the direction opposite to that of the KPRF: the 
percent rural covariate was statistically significant and negative across all of the models 
specified for Yabloko, consistently diminishing the odds of a stronghold by roughly six to 
ten percent, contingent on the model. As evident in Figure 4.11, Yabloko‘s vote share 
precipitously declined as rural residency expanded. Predictably, the majority of raions 
that were ardent supporters of the liberal party were found in urban centers in the same 
areas as those outliers from the ethnicity scatterplots, with two exceptions, one partly 
rural and the other entirely so, located in Rostov Oblast and Agin-Buryat Autonomous 
Okrug.  
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Figure 14.11: Rural Inhabitants and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.12, Yabloko‘s pattern of support was distinctly urban and appears 
significantly more skewed toward urban areas across all regional contexts than the 
KPRF‘s pattern was toward the countryside. Of Russia‘s most urban raions, the liberal 
party harvested strongholds in more than 20%, but captured an infinitesimal percentage 
of their rural counterparts. According to the lower threshold, none of Yabloko‘s 
strongholds were found in rural areas nested within Muslim and Caucasus regions, likely 
because the countryside in these regions was largely already spoken by the KPRF and 
Our Home is Russia (and the LDPR to a lesser degree). With the countryside generally 
split between the resurgent KPRF and the party of power and their rival political 
machines, the more fragile liberal party was simply squeezed out by more formidable 
opponents. For the same reason, it is surprising that Yabloko was able to make any 
inroads, even in the urban centers that typically form the party‘s backbone, in these areas. 
Indeed, Yabloko carved out strongholds in more than 20% of urban raions in the 
Caucasus and more than 15% in Muslim regions. According to strict measure, Yabloko‘s 
support came exclusively from urban centers in the Caucasus and resource regions.  
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Figure 4.12: Yabloko Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 
1995 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Yabloko‘s average in rural raions was approximately one percent lower than nationally, 
as shown in Table 4.7. This finding strongly corroborates the conventional wisdom that 
Yabloko‘s constituency is geographically anchored in Russia‘s biggest cities rather than 
the countryside.  
LDPR strongholds were notably distinct compared to KPRF and Yabloko 
strongholds because they were not as strongly defined on this dimension in terms of the 
magnitude of the statistical effect. The odds of an LDPR stronghold were slightly higher 
in more rural areas, but less than one percent, in the minority of the lower threshold 
models and were not statistically significant across the higher specifications. This finding 
provides some corroboration to survey-based scholarship suggesting the party performed 
well in the countryside, yet also indicates, based on the incredibly small effect size, that 
support for the party from the cities to the countryside was perhaps more balanced than 
originally presumed (Wyman 1996; Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler 1997; White, 
Wyman and Oates 1997; Cf. Clem and Craumer 1998). Figure 4.13 showcases the 
relatively balanced effect that increased rurality exercised on LDPR support. The one 
especially enthusiastic urban outlier was located in Chita Oblast while the two aberrations 
in the countryside were located in Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug, which was formerly 
surrounded by Chita Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast located in western European Russia, 
bordering both Belarus and Ukraine. 
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Figure 4.13: Rural Inhabitants and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
The bar charts in Figure 4.14 showcase the comparatively varied effect of rurality on 
LDPR strongholds: the pattern of support is decidedly mixed between majority-urban and 
majority-rural raions, corroborating to some extent the weak effect size associated with 
this variable in the statistical results. The nationalists gained strongholds in roughly 16% 
of all majority-rural raions and just less than 14% of all majority-urban raions. In ethnic 
republics, poorer regions and those with large resource endowments by the relaxed 
measure, a higher percentage of LDPR strongholds were found in urban areas, while 
Muslim regions and those in the Caucasus revealed the reverse. Of urban and rural raions 
in poorer regions, more than 15% delivered comparatively large vote shares to the 
nationalists. With the shift from the relaxed to the strict measure, the balance between the 
cities and the countryside veered in favor of rural zones in ethnic republics, while the 
opposite occurred the Caucasus. Overall, with regard to percentages, the LDPR captured 
relatively balanced support between the cities and countryside, favoring rural areas only 
slightly.  
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Figure 4.14: LDPR Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 1995 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics from Table 4.5 reveal that the LDPR‘s average level of support in 
majority-rural raions was within one-half percent of its raion-level national showing. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that the countryside was not a sure win for the LDPR 
in 1995 and that the party may have been more versatile in moving from the cities to the 
countryside than Yabloko and, to a lesser degree, the KPRF as well.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and Opposition Parties 
The level-2 variables accounting for the remaining contexts considered produced 
diverse results. Alongside the positive effect of ethnic and Muslim regions, location in 
the Caucasus also boosted the odds of a KPRF stronghold across all but one model, to 
between 19 and 50 in the relaxed models, and to 61 and 196 in the strict specifications. 
The KPRF‘s average in Caucasian raions was more than eight percent higher than its 
raion-level national average. Moreover, over 20% and almost 40% of the party‘s 
strongholds were located in the Caucasus region, according to the lower and higher 
threshold. Thus, an area literally at war with the government and, by extension, the party 
of power at the time of the election electorally sustained the KPRF. Antipodal to the 
KPRF, Caucasus location did not produce statistically significant results for the Yabloko 
and the LDPR. Descriptive statistics show a slight decline in support based on this 
determinant: Yabloko‘s average in raions located in the Caucasus was roughly one and a 
half percent less than nationally and the LDPR‘s was approximately three percent less. 
Yet only about three to five percent of Yabloko strongholds and between one and six 
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percent of LDPR strongholds were located in the Caucasus, depending on the stronghold 
measure. 
Turning to the variables that together create a measure of socioeconomic welfare, 
a one unit increase in economic development, as measured by gross regional product, 
damaged the odds of a KPRF stronghold by approximately 70% in three of the models 
across both measurements of the dependent variable. The vast majority of KPRF 
strongholds (69% and 73%, by the lower and higher threshold, respectively) were located 
in poorer regions, i.e. regions with gross regional products below the median. 
Furthermore, the KPRF‘s average in economically developed areas, i.e. regions with 
gross regional products above the median, was less than two percent below nationally. 
Higher levels of gross regional product also reduced the odds of an LDPR stronghold by 
more than 50% in one model. Yet the LDPR‘s average in economically developed 
regions was within one percent of its national showing and distribution of the party‘s 
strongholds was split relatively evenly between poorer regions and those more well off. 
While the KPRF and LDPR suffered in wealthier areas, in one-third of the models, 
Yabloko benefitted from an increase in this variable with odds of approximately two. 
Save for majority-minority raions, wealthier regions were the only other raion- or region-
level context that registered support for the party above its national showing, returning a 
vote share for the party that was almost one percent higher. Indeed, few Yabloko 
strongholds (21% and 11% by the lower and higher measure, accordingly) were housed 
in economically disadvantaged regions. Interestingly, the effect produced from 
distinguishing the status of a region‘s economy as resource-dependent generated results 
that far from simply mirrored the findings from increases in gross regional product.  
Unlike distinctions between levels of gross regional product, the resource region 
variable did not furnish any statistically significant results for the KPRF or Yabloko. 
Despite the lack of a systematic effect in the statistical models, the KPRF‘s average in 
resource regions was almost seven percent less than its national vote share and less than 
three percent of KPRF strongholds were found in these areas by both stronghold 
measures. Although Yabloko fared well in economically developed regions, surprisingly, 
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the party‘s average in resource regions was less than one percent below its national 
showing and only five and two percent of the party‘s bastions were located there. In one 
upper threshold model, the shift from non-resource region to resource-dependence 
produced a statistically significant and negative effect on the likelihood of an LDPR 
stronghold, reducing the odds by approximately 80%. Furthermore, the LDPR‘s average 
in resource-rich regions was below its national level but the LDPR did not fare as poorly 
as the KPRF in these areas, with average support hovering at less than two percent under 
its national level. Roughly nine and three percent of the LDPR‘s strongholds were nested 
within resource-dependent regions. Thus, the ultra-nationalist party performed better in 
regions with more diversified economies.  
Electoral Manipulation and Opposition Parties 
Finally, and as expected due to the competitiveness of the election, the 
dichotomous variable capturing suspected electoral manipulation did not systematically 
affect the occurrence of strongholds in the majority of the models specified for opposition 
parties. When the variable did achieve standard levels of statistical significance, however, 
the impact on opposition party strongholds varied. For example, the influence of 
abnormally high turnout on the odds of a KPRF stronghold was checkered: the shift from 
the non-manipulated class to the fraudulent category decreased the odds of a stronghold 
by approximately 40% in the lower threshold models, but increased the odds by one to 
over two times in the stricter models. An ex ante estimate of electoral manipulation‘s 
effect on the occurrence of KPRF strongholds in the mid-1990s would have expected 
either no systematic effect, because fraud had not yet been transformed into an efficient 
mechanism for producing high vote shares for a single party as later became the case in 
the 2000s under United Russia, or would have predicted that electoral manipulation 
would boost the odds of a stronghold, as found in the strict threshold models, because the 
KPRF boasted the most robust organizational infrastructure that could be leveraged to 
engage in electoral manipulation on the party‘s behalf. Thus, the finding that abnormally 
high voter turnout actually dampened the odds of a lower-level KPRF stronghold is 
puzzling and demands further investigation in the future. The results from the strict 
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specifications, however, conform to expectation more closely and corroborate previous 
research indicating that increasing turnout benefitted the Communists (Belin and Orttung 
1997: 136; Clem and Craumer 1997). Indeed, after the 1995 election, Yeltsin‘s cronies 
argued that the KPRF (and LDPR) engaged in electoral manipulation by using mobile 
ballot boxes to gather votes illegally, but the administration provided little in the way of 
proof, citing only a geographical analysis that showed opposition parties performed better 
in regions that had higher numbers of mobile votes (Ibid). Despite the inconsistent 
findings offered by the model results, other sources of data detailing the relationship 
between KPRF performance and high turnout areas help elucidate the connection and 
present a more homogenous picture. Approximately 25% and 30% of KPRF strongholds 
were located in areas with suspiciously high turnout, according to the lower and higher 
thresholds of the dependent variable. Furthermore, the party received an average vote 
share in fraudulent raions that was more than four percent higher than its national take. 
Furthermore, Figure 4.15 shows that the KPRF‘s vote share increased with higher levels 
of turnout. The raions situated at the nexus between unrealistically high political 
participation and high vote shares for the KPRF were nearly all nested within ethnic 
republics in the Caucasus, with a few others found in Kemerovo Oblast in western 
Siberia. The scarcity of raions populating the upper right quadrant is surprising, given 
that the KPRF‘s organizational infrastructure far outmatched all other parties and it 
benefitted from abnormally high turnout according to the results from the strict threshold 
models. Yet the KPRF tangled head-to-head with the Kremlin-backed Our Home is 
Russia in these high turnout zones, making a clean sweep far from a foregone conclusion.  
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Figure 4.15: Voter Turnout and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
Referenced above and depicted in Figure 4.16, a healthy share of fraudulent raions, 
indeed more than 20%, were bastions of support for the KRPF by the relaxed measure 
and still a fair share according to the strict threshold. As the vote share for the KPRF 
increased with the shift from the lower to the higher threshold, a higher percentage of 
KRPF strongholds were found in fraudulent raions. Even in the context of a competitive 
election, certain parties benefitted disproportionately from abnormally high turnout and it 
was precisely those parties that either had robust regional networks and grassroots 
operations at the sub-regional level, or, as will be discussed later, were well equipped 
through close ties to the Kremlin.  
 
Figure 4.16: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are KPRF Strongholds vs. Percent KPRF 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1995 
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In contrast to the KPRF, the influence of electoral manipulation on the trajectories of the 
two remaining opposition parties was more consistent across the statistical results and 
more descriptive data points. The odds of a Yabloko stronghold diminished substantially 
in the relaxed models, approximately 70 to 75%, with the shift from the non-manipulated 
category to the manipulated class. Indeed, only approximately one percent of Yabloko 
lower-threshold strongholds were located in raions coded positively for suspected 
electoral manipulation and the party had no strongholds in these raions when the higher 
threshold was employed. Moreover, Yabloko‘s vote share in high turnout raions was 
approximately three percent less than its national take. Figure 4.17 provides additional 
evidence of the inverse relationship between Yabloko‘s vote share and turnout levels, 
which is the reverse of that of the KPRF, except that Yabloko‘s electoral fortunes 
plummeted more steeply than the KPRF‘s surged. Thus, the archetypal liberal party‘s 
vote share swelled when voter turnout was sub-average or hovered more closely around 
the national mean.  
 
Figure 4.17: Voter Turnout and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
From a different angle, Figure 4.18 reveals the extent that Yabloko foundered in raions 
suspected for electoral malfeasance. As mentioned, the share of Yabloko strongholds in 
fraudulent raions was exceedingly rare by both measures, and, of fraudulent raions, 
Yabloko earned strongholds in a mere one percent. The smallest party of the core party 
troika was incapable of establishing a presence akin to the Communists in these raions 
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and was simply outmatched when the electoral arena was structured around electoral 
malfeasance rather than genuine multiparty contestation. 
 
Figure 4.18: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Yabloko Strongholds vs. Percent 
Yabloko Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1995 
 
 
While the odds of Yabloko‘s electoral success were damaged substantially by suspected 
electoral fraud, this variable did not reach standard levels of statistical significance in any 
of the models specified for the LDPR. It may have been expected that the LDPR would 
capture electoral windfalls in high turnout zones since it was the runaway winner in the 
1993 snap elections and came in second in 1995. However, unlike the KPRF and Our 
Home is Russia, the LDPR relied neither on Kremlin-backing nor a robust web of 
regional and sub-regional supporters but the charismatic appeal of its leader, Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky. Therefore, the LDPR simply lacked the resources necessary to turn electoral 
manipulation toward its own partisan ends. The finding of a lack of a systematic effect 
diverges from prior scholarship suggesting that higher turnout benefitted the LDPR, but 
confirms other research indicating that there was ―no noticeable correlation between 
turnout and support for the nationalists‖ (Belin and Orttung 1997: 136; Clem and 
Craumer 1997; Cf. Wilson 2005). Descriptive statistics indicate that LDPR support was 
affected only slightly, a roughly one percent decline, by high levels of turnout. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.19, the LDPR was neither discernibly helped nor harmed in high 
turnout zones. Indeed, the party‘s vote share remained relatively stable across all turnout 
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levels, especially compared to the electoral trajectories of the KPRF and Yabloko.  As 
mentioned, the notable outliers were located in Chita Oblast, Agin-Buryat Autonomous 
Okrug, and Bryansk Oblast; all three raions registering fanatical support for the ultra-
nationalists were in the range of average turnout.  
 
Figure 4.19: Voter Turnout and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
Especially when compared to Yabloko, Figure 4.20 suggests that the nationalists fared 
decently well in manipulated raions. Despite the lack of a statistical effect, the LDPR 
seemed to enjoy comparatively robust support in raions with abnormal levels of political 
participation: approximately 15% of nationalist strongholds were found in fraudulent 
raions by the lower threshold and the percentage did not contract substantially with the 
increase in threshold, leveling off at about 13%. Of the total number of fraudulent raions, 
the nationalists secured stronghold level support in more than one-tenth, but the LDPR‘s 
presence waned noticeably with the ramping up of the stronghold threshold.  
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Figure 4.20: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are LDPR Strongholds vs. Percent LDPR 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1995 
 
 
Compared to the liberal Yabloko, the nationalists appeared better able to withstand the 
potential distortions in party vote shares created by electoral manipulation. These 
findings provide early evidence that party of power strategies, namely electoral 
manipulation, affect opposition parties unevenly and, possibly, that specific types of 
parties are disproportionately impacted. Analyses of future legislative elections will show 
whether these patterns crystallize or collapse.  
 Overall, the results pinpoint the social and geographic loci of electoral support for 
various opposition parties in the absence of a successful dominant party and identify the 
likely bases for new and continued support in subsequent elections. The KPRF was 
largely an appeals-based party with genuine geographic strengths, particularly in areas 
with sizable ethnic minority populations, rural areas, ethnic republics, Muslim regions 
and those located in the Caucasus. The LDPR also captured an identifiable electorate 
based on ideological appeals, relying on a core constituency of geographically 
concentrated ethnic Russians, those living in poorer regions and Russian federal regions, 
and the countryside to a limited extent. Yabloko, the defining liberal party in post-
communist Russia, secured a constituency located in urban centers and in those regions 
with higher levels of socioeconomic welfare.  
Ethnicity and the Party of Power 
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The multilevel models produced striking results with regard to the party of power, 
Our Home is Russia. The findings showcase the party of power‘s basis in minority 
politics. Unit increases in the percent minority covariate lifted the odds of an Our Home 
is Russia stronghold by three to four percent in the lower threshold models and by 
approximately three percent in the stricter models. Similarly, a one percent increase in 
titular minorities augmented the odds of a stronghold by one to three percent across the 
models using both measures of party stronghold. Other minorities seemed to exercise a 
more limited effect, with unit increases lifting the odds of a stronghold by three percent in 
one lower threshold model but failing to achieve statistical significance in any of the 
strict specifications. Figure 4.21 shows the unambiguously positive relationship between 
support for the party of power and concentrations of ethnic minorities at the raion level. 
Especially in the first two scatterplots concerning ethnic minorities and titular minorities, 
there are quite a few raions occupying the upper right quadrant, where electoral windfalls 
for Our Home is Russia are concentrated and comparatively fewer in the upper left, 
ethnic Russian, quadrant. Those raions in the upper right quadrant were primarily located 
in ethnic republics, many predominantly Muslim regions, and numerous in the Caucasus, 
such as Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Tuva, Dagestan, Kalmykya, Ingushetia, and Mari El in 
the Volga district.  
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Figure 4.21: Non-Russian Minorities and Our Home is Russia‘s Vote Share in 
1995 
 
 
 
The party of power thus stood apart from the three opposition parties considered in 
capturing high levels of support from ethnic non-Russians, especially titular minorities. 
Figure 4.22 corroborates these findings and shows a clear pattern of ethnic minority 
support for Our Home is Russia across all regional contexts considered. Our Home is 
Russia harvested high levels of support in roughly one-third of all majority-minority 
raions, but less than five percent of their majority-Russian counterparts. In each setting, 
but to a somewhat more limited degree in Muslim regions, the balance was tilted heavily 
towards majority-minority raions rather than majority-Russian raions and this pattern 
endured across thresholds. Indeed, in the Caucasus, Our Home is Russia did not capture 
any bastions of support in majority-Russian areas according to either stronghold measure. 
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However, in ethnic republics and Muslim regions, the party of power captured a fair 
percentage of strongholds in ethnic Russian areas.  Astonishingly, approximately 50% of 
majority-minority raions in Muslim regions registered strong support for the party of 
power and more than 40% of their counterparts in the Caucasus and resource-dependent 
regions reported similar zealousness. The bar charts concerning the party of power 
resemble those detailing the ethnic breakdown of the KPRF‘s strongholds more closely 
than the other opposition parties‘, but the KPRF‘s support did not tilt as heavily toward 
majority-minority raions as Our Home is Russia‘s.  
 
Figure 4.22: Our Home is Russia Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional 
Contexts in 1995 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Table 4.9 indicates that Our Home is Russia harvested nearly two percent more votes, on 
average, in majority-minority raions than across the whole country‘s expanse. In addition 
to the boost received from concentrations of ethnic minorities at the raion level, Our 
Home is Russia captured electoral windfalls in ethnic republics and Muslim regions. 
Descriptive statistics reveal that Our Home is Russia‘s average support in these areas was 
an astonishing seven percent higher than its national showing in the case of ethnic 
republics and reached its peak in Muslim regions, which registered support that was more 
than double the party of power‘s countywide take.   
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Table 4.9: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Our Home is Russia’s Electoral Performance in 
the 1995 Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
9.71 9.94 
 
11.64 
 
12.02 16.81 
 
23.05 12.11 
 
10.84 
 
14.93 
Min .339 .396 
 
.339 .873 .396 .396 .396 .608 
 
1.36 
 
Max 79.44 79.44 
 
79.44 
 
79.44 79.44 79.44 79.44 79.44 
 
77.97 
 
SD 8.95 10.57 
 
10.45 
 
15.52 15.02 17.73 13.19 9.59 
 
12.87 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
Results from the statistical models shed more systematic light on the relationship between 
Our Home is Russia strongholds and ethnic context at the regional level. The most 
striking result was the consistent and sizable increase in the odds of a party of power 
stronghold for raions located in ethnic regions: a shift from the reference group to the 
indicator group of the ethnic region variable increased the odds to between 16 and 49 in 
the case of the lower threshold models, and to between 75 and 659 in the higher threshold 
models. Incredibly, as shown in Table 4.10, over 97% and about two-thirds of Our Home 
strongholds were located in raions within ethnic regions, according to the higher and 
lower threshold of stronghold, respectively.  
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Table 4.10: Our Home is Russia Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1995 
 
 
 
# of Our Home is 
Russia Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(268 Total) 
% of Our Home is 
Russia Strongholds 
# of Our Home is 
Russia Strongholds 
(Higher Threshold) 
(101 Total) 
% of Our Home is 
Russia Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
177 66.04 
98 97.03 
Russian federal 
regions 
91 33.96 
3 2.97 
Muslim regions 106 39.55 59 58.42 
Caucasus 
regions 
42 15.67 
23 22.77 
Poorer Regions 82 30.60 42 41.58 
Natural 
Resource 
Regions 
90 33.58 
48 47.52 
Fraudulent 
raions 
70 26.12 47 46.53 
Non-
Fraudulent 
raions 
198 73.88 54 53.47 
 
These findings contrast with evidence gleaned from in-depth interviews with Russian 
political analysts, who argued that Yeltsin and Our Home is Russia were ―never popular 
in the North Caucasus and the ethnic republics and so on‖ (Senior Political Analyst at 
INDEM Foundation 2011). In addition to ethnic republics, the party of power benefited 
electorally in Muslim regions across all but one models, with odds as low as 16 and as 
high as 99 in the relaxed models, and as low as 40 and as high as 83 in the strict models. 
Approximately 40% and nearly 60% of the party‘s strongholds were located in Muslim 
regions by the lower and higher threshold, accordingly. The party of power thus 
competed head-to-head with the KPRF for support in Muslim regions. These data 
demonstrate Our Home is Russia‘s electoral footholds in areas with geographically 
concentrated minorities, especially titular minorities organized around ethnic networks 
that can be leveraged to mobilize the vote for a party through patronage-based exchanges. 
The finding that the party of power‘s social base was grounded in communities with 
significant minority populations diverges from existing scholarship suggesting that this 
cleavage did exercise an influence on Our Home is Russia‘s support (Rose, Tikhomirov, 
and Mishler 1997; Colton 2003; Cf. White, Wyman and Oates 1997). 
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The Urban-rural Divide and the Party of Power 
 Compared to ethnic minorities, the effect of rurality on Our Home is Russia 
strongholds produced more mixed results: with unit increases in the rural population, the 
odds of a party of power stronghold diminished by approximately two percent in some 
lower threshold models but increased by a slight amount to one percent in others. The 
strict specifications generated consistent results, lifting the odds by one to two percent in 
the models for which the variable achieved statistical significance. Although the finding 
is inconsistent, the result that Our Home received a boost of any kind from rural areas in 
some models diverges from existing research that indicated the party of power‘s support 
was limited to large cities (Wyman 1996; White, Wyman and Oates 1997; Wyman 1997; 
Belin and Orttung 1997; Clem and Craumer 1998; Colton and McFaul 2003). Descriptive 
statistics from Table 4.9 show that Our Home is Russia‘s average in predominantly rural 
raions was slightly higher than its average showing, albeit still within one percent. Figure 
23 shows remarkable stability in the party of power‘s vote share with movement from 
city centers to the countryside. The fair number of stray raions in more rural areas and a 
few in urban centers that recorded high vote shares for the party were all located in ethnic 
republics, Muslim regions and the Caucasus.  
 
Figure 4.23: Rural Inhabitants and Our Home is Russia‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
Assessing the rural dimension of support detailed in the scatterplots, Our Home is Russia 
resembled the ultra-nationalist LDPR more closely than the KPRF and Yabloko, which 
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more unambiguously captured support in the countryside and urban centers, respectively. 
Although Our Home is Russia harvested some rural support, it faced a steep uphill battle 
to even begin to displace the KPRF from its heartland in the countryside. In some 
contrast to the model results and Figure 4.23, the bar charts in Figure 4.24 reveal a 
pattern of rural support across stronghold thresholds. Approximately 10% of all mostly 
rural raions were Our Home strongholds, while roughly half that percent of mostly urban 
raions showed similar zealousness. Strikingly, in Muslim regions, more than 50% of rural 
raions and more than 40% of their urban counterparts were party of power bastions of 
support. Figure 4.24 also reveals that a significant share of support was drawn from urban 
areas, contingent on regional context. For example, the balance between strongholds in 
the city and countryside was more even in resource regions compared to that in the 
Caucasus or economically disadvantaged regions. Moving from the relaxed to the strict 
threshold, however, Our Home is Russia strongholds became more rural, as the 
percentage of strongholds in urban centers dropped disproportionately.  
 
Figure 4.24: Our Home is Russia Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional 
Contexts in 1995 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and the Party of Power 
Variables distinguishing different regional environments generated inconsistent 
results across stronghold thresholds. For example, with the shift from raions located 
outside of the Caucasus to those within, the odds of an Our Home is Russia stronghold 
plummeted significantly in one lower threshold model but hiked to between 34 and 99 
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times in the strict specifications. Ex ante, it could be expected that raions located in the 
Caucasus would severely damage the odds of a party of power stronghold because of the 
intractable conflict the central government fought in Chechnya on the one hand, but, on 
the other hand, raions in this area might have become bastions of support for Our Home 
is Russia due to numerous bilateral treaties concluded between many of these regions and 
the federal government but also if the party of power wanted to make a show of strength 
in the area, perhaps using electoral malfeasance, to deter similar separatist-type activities. 
Descriptive statistics help clarify the relationship somewhat. Table 4.9 indicates that the 
party of power‘s average showing in the Caucasus was more than two percent higher than 
its national vote share and Table 4.10 shows that approximately 15% and 22% of the 
party‘s bastions of support were found in the area. Mirroring the situation in the 
countryside, two rival parties carved up the Caucasus in 1995, the KPRF and Our Home 
is Russia, while other opposition parties looked to gain footholds in areas where a larger 
slice of the electoral pie still remained.  
Socioeconomic distinctions also exerted varying impacts on the occurrence of Our 
Home is Russia strongholds. Unit increases in gross regional product did not produce 
statistically significant effects in the relaxed models but consistently diminished the odds 
by between 66% and 82% in the strict specifications. Yet regions with gross regional 
products above the median level recorded support for the party that was more than one 
percent higher than its national showing. Our Home is Russia thus closely resembled the 
KPRF and LDPR on this dimension, as the reds and browns suffered to similar degrees in 
wealthier regions. Raions located in regions with resource-dependent economies hiked 
the odds of a stronghold by between 34 to 53 times across the lower threshold models but 
failed to achieve statistical significance in the upper threshold models. Our Home is 
Russia harvested an average vote share in these regions that was more than five percent 
higher than its countrywide take. Moreover, approximately one-third and nearly one-half 
of party of power strongholds were found in these areas, according to the lower and 
higher threshold, respectively. The finding that the party of power performed well in 
resource-rich regions seems to partially substantiate previous research indicating that Our 
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Home‘s drew support from regions rich in raw materials (Belin and Orttung 1997: 122). 
The contours of Our Home is Russia‘s support were more clearly and consistently 
articulated on this dimension than the LDPR‘s, the only opposition party for which this 
regional economic distinction produced statistically significant results. Our Home is 
Russia thus stood out with respect to the core party troika in that it was the only party to 
capture electoral windfalls in raions situated in resource-rich regions.   
Electoral Manipulation and the Party of Power 
Surprisingly, given the competitiveness of the election and the comparative 
impotence of the party, Our Home is Russia benefitted from suspiciously high levels of 
voter turnout that provide an indication of electoral malfeasance. Except for two lower 
threshold models, the shift from the non-manipulated class to the fraudulent category 
amplified the odds of an Our Home stronghold by 70% to two times in the relaxed 
models and the odds of a stronghold hiked by two to three times in all of the stricter 
models. Although some degree of electoral malfeasance was expected based on anecdotal 
accounts provided in election observation reports, the consistency of these findings is 
startling. Furthermore, Our Home‘s average in raions coded positively for fraud, was 
more than two percent higher than its national vote share and roughly one-quarter and 
nearly one-half of the party‘s strongholds were located in manipulated raions, according 
to the lower and higher threshold, respectively. Figure 4.25 reveals a discernible boost in 
Our Home is Russia‘s vote share as voter participation increased.  A considerable number 
of raions are located in the upper right quadrant of the scatterplot, at the intersection of 
high vote share for the party of power and high turnout, which were nearly all found in 
ethnic republics, predominantly Muslim regions, and the Caucasus. Ten raions recorded 
Our Home support between 60 and 70%, of which 70% were found in Tatarstan and 10% 
in each Chechnya, Dagestan, Kalmykya and Tuva. Five raions returned a vote share 
exceeding 70%, 60% of which were located in Chechnya, and 20% in each Tuva and 
Tatarstan. Many of these zealous Our Home supporters also reported turnout figures that 
exceeded the threshold for suspected electoral manipulation but there were also a few 
particularly enthusiastic stray raions recording average or below-average turnout.  
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Figure 4.25: Voter Turnout and Our Home is Russia‘s Vote Share in 1995 
 
 
Figure 4.26 shows that a relatively high percentage of Our Home is Russia strongholds 
were located in manipulated raions, more than one-quarter by the relaxed threshold and 
still more than 10% by the strict measure. Unlike the KPRF, the party of power had fewer 
strongholds in fraudulent raions according to the lower threshold than the higher 
measure. In other words, the percentage of Our Home‘s strongholds in manipulated 
raions diminished with the higher threshold, whereas the percentage of the KPRF‘s 
strongholds rose with the threshold increase. Combined with the statistical results, these 
findings indicate that even a comparatively weak party of power contesting the most 
competitive legislative election benefitted from abnormally high turnout. Moreover, 
nearly 20% of fraudulent raions were also Our Home is Russia bastions of support by the 
lower threshold and over 10% by the higher measure. In the mid-1990s it appears that the 
KPRF and the party of power carved up fraudulent raions rather than a single party 
completely dominating high turnout areas, as soon emerged as a hallmark of legislative 
elections in the 2000s and 2010s under United Russia.  
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Figure 4.26: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Our Home is Russia Strongholds vs. 
Percent Our Home is Russia Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1995 
 
 
The relationship between party of power strongholds and electoral manipulation in 1995 
provides a baseline for later comparison with the considerably more successful United 
Russia and the significantly more pervasive fraud in the 2000s. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I laid some of the theoretical and empirical groundwork for an 
explanation of dominant party strength and opposition party weakness by pinpointing the 
distinct strongholds of political parties in a ―normal‖ competitive legislative election in 
post-communist Russia. Our Home is Russia rarely dominated any of the areas that 
became the hallmarks of party dominance in the 2000s and 2010s under United Russia: 
the utterly ineffective party of power competed head-to-head with opposition parties in 
areas holding the potential for electoral windfalls, namely majority-minority raions, 
ethnic republics, Muslim regions, the countryside and raions with exceptionally high 
voter turnout. Our Home was patently incapable, and unwilling to boot, of driving 
opposition parties out from its pockets of support and opposition parties, especially the 
Communists and nationalists, bled the party of power dry as a result. Nevertheless, Our 
Home is Russia had the same overall profile as United Russia in the 2000s, performing 
better in areas with geographically concentrated minorities at the raion and regional level, 
rural areas, and raions suspected for electoral manipulation. Our Home is Russia was 
simply less institutionalized than its successor and lacked a charismatic leader, like 
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Vladimir Putin, who was also willing to invest wholesale in party building and winning 
Duma races. Ironically, the competitiveness of the election also produced competitive 
electoral manipulation, as the KPRF and Our Home is Russia both leveraged their unique 
resource endowments, organizational and financial, respectively, to secure high vote 
shares in raions with unusually high political participation. Therefore, Our Home‘s 
failures as a party of power were manifest from various sources. An examination of later 
parliamentary elections, i.e. 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011, uncovers how United Russia‘s 
remarkable success as a dominant party was built, to an extent, on the weaker pockets of 
support carved out by Our Home is Russia in the mid-1990s, as well as how a successful 
dominant party potentially squeezes out other political parties by co-opting their core 
constituencies.  
Evidence from the 1995 election makes clear that the core party troika enjoyed 
identifiable pockets of support with the potential to develop into a critical mass of support 
in subsequent elections: the KPRF had genuine geographic strengths in areas with dense 
populations of ethnic minorities, the countryside, ethnic republics, Muslim regions and 
those located in the Caucasus; the LDPR relied on a core constituency of ethnic Russians, 
those living in economically disadvantaged regions and Russian federal regions, and the 
countryside to a limited extent; finally, Yabloko harvested support from urban centers 
and in those regions with higher levels of socioeconomic welfare. However, these parties 
all had relatively narrow constituencies and were niche parties, in general but also in 
relation to each other. For example, Yabloko was only highly competitive in the two 
federal cities and the LDPR harvested the most votes from a minor segment of ethnic 
Russians who possessed a siege mentality. The KPRF had a broader constituency, but 
one still confined to the countryside and non-Russian federal regions. The Communists 
were the most successful in 1995 as a result of their broader constituency yet also 
commanded a powerful political machine inherited, at least in part, by its CPSU 
predecessor. The KPRF‘s powerhouse political machine thus compensated effectively for 
the party‘s weakness in attracting truly broad-based political support.  
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At the national level, the election in 1995 was a normal competitive election, but 
at the raion level, the patterns of opposition party and party of power support were 
similar, albeit to different magnitudes, as later elections under United Russia. Thus, the 
conditions for party dominance were present as early as 1995 but additional factors were 
necessary for a party akin to United Russia to manifest. The more important difference 
between 1995 and later elections, including even 1999, was the chaotic nature of electoral 
politics. The contest resembled nothing less than a free for all: in the absence of a 
successful dominant party, the party system was not defined by a few large parties but 
was rather highly fragmented and, as a consequence, nearly 50% of votes were cast for 
parties that did not cross the threshold for representation. Therefore, there was a 
significant floating electorate dissatisfied with the existing supply of parties that was 
waiting to be scooped up by new, and presumably less niche, parties with the potential to 
achieve major party status.  
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Chapter 5: The 1999 Parliamentary Election: An Opportunity for Opposition Party 
Fortification and a Battleground for Competing Parties of Power in a Transitional 
Election 
 The last parliamentary election of the decade was transitional, bridging the era of 
the first post-communist president with that of the second. The election also straddled the 
line between democracy and authoritarianism in Russia because it was the first in which a 
party publicly supported by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Unity, sought votes. The 
1999 contest facilitates an evaluation of how opposition parties fared in a macro electoral 
environment notably distinct from the mid-1990s, but one that was broadly similar with 
regard to system level competitiveness. At the end of the decade, opposition parties had 
an opportunity to fortify strongholds constructed in the mid-1990s and make inroads in 
new areas to expand their budding political constituencies. However, two new potential 
parties of power, one with solid Kremlin backing and the other rooted in some of 
Russia‟s most powerful regions, jockeyed for control of the legislature and reshaped the 
electoral environment from four years prior when opposition parties enjoyed their best 
chance at electoral success due to the absence of an effective party of power. The two 
party of power hopefuls, Unity and Fatherland-All Russia, challenged each other but also 
opposition parties that endeavored to preserve and even expand their constituencies 
amidst increased competition from viable contenders. In retrospect, the 1999 election was 
especially critical for opposition parties because it was effectively their final opportunity 
to fortify their respective constituencies in the context of a relatively competitive political 
system, before the political system contracted sharply with the rise of a remarkably 
successful party of power in the 2000s.  
The outcome of the contest was far from a foregone conclusion, as the runaway 
winner from 1995, the KPRF, was still alive and well after nearly a decade of post-
communism, and the two dueling parties of power were considered heavyweights in the 
electoral arena due to their vast networks of highly placed administrators at the regional 
and federal level, and the accompanying stocks of administrative resources. There were 
reasons to believe that the KPRF‟s upward electoral trajectory would continue in 1999: it 
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was the only major political party that increased its vote share from the 1993 snap 
elections to the 1995 contest. Especially when compared to the Unity and Fatherland-All 
Russia upstarts, the KPRF‟s organizational membership and infrastructural might was 
superior, at least in the so-called red belt, giving it an edge against the two widely 
perceived frontrunners. Thus, the composition of the Duma and the course of Russian 
electoral politics more broadly were uncertain in 1999.  
The 1999 Legislative Election in Context  
The 1999 parliamentary election was the third contest conducted in the transition 
milieu of post-communist Russia. Although it was only the second election held 
according to the schedule set forth in the constitution, the fact that it was the third 
national parliamentary election in one decade is significant intrinsically (Marsh 2002). 
First, the State Duma elected in 1999 was etched into Russian history as the longest 
lasting democratically elected legislative organ at the time, but the election proceeded 
almost prosaically, which was itself remarkable  (McFaul and Petrov 1999).  
Second, Yeltsin‟s dismissal of the legislature in October 1993 cast long shadows 
over the Russian polity throughout the 1990s, as many feared that executive caprice vis-
à-vis the legislature and resultant instability would become ossified facets of Russian 
politics (Marsh 2002). Thus, when the parliamentary election in 1999 proceeded without 
undue executive interference, it signaled to the populace and political elites alike that the 
1995 elections were not a mere perforation in the country‟s usually turbulent politics, but 
instead the first elections occurring in the context of political normalcy.  
Third, and related, with each election that facilitated a peaceful reorganization of 
political power within the legislature, Russia‟s nascent democracy was institutionalized 
and it was confirmed that democracy was “the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991: 
26). Political actors again proved their commitment to democratic governance in the late 
1990s when they opted to “pay campaign consultants rather than forming militias” 
(McFaul and Petrov 1999: 3). In contrast to the 1993 snap election and the 1995 contest, 
the last legislative election of the decade was not marked by a tenacious struggle over the 
rules of the game or the political status quo, mostly because the KPRF moderated its 
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platform significantly and inched away from its position as the intractable nonsystemic 
opposition (Colton 1999). Indeed, the election settled conclusively the concern that the 
negotiated settlement arrived at during the transition would be overturned by the 
ideological successors of the obsolete Communist system via democratic elections (Ibid). 
Another indication that the rules of the game were more fully entrenched in the 1999 
election became evident only in the aftermath of the poll: the results produced one of the 
most resounding defeats in Russia‟s democratic history, that of one of the two potential 
parties of power, but the vanquished did not form militias to upend the outcome and seize 
political control, an option that may have been viable only a few years prior. In short, the 
aftermath of the contest proved that elections had become the only game in town, a 
crucial stepping stone for the development of democracy. Thus, Russia‟s democracy, 
albeit still fragile and imperfect, performed properly in 1999 (Ibid). Finally, the 1999 
election effectively linked the first post-communist era, guided by President Yeltsin and 
the reformers, with the second, controlled by President Putin/Medvedev and those 
attracted to more authoritarian forms of governance.  
 In the years immediately preceding the 1999 contest, the Russian government was 
destabilized by a series of high-level dismissals by President Yeltsin that produced a 
revolving door of Prime Ministers and created widespread uncertainty about the future of 
executive leadership. In his second term, President Yeltsin dismissed and appointed anew 
four Prime Ministers, each sparking executive-legislative battles during the confirmation 
process. In the late summer of 1999, President Yeltsin appointed, and the legislature 
confirmed, the fifth Prime Minister of his second term, Vladimir Putin. Alongside 
frequent cabinet-level shake-ups, President Yeltsin faced five impeachment charges in 
May 1999 by the opposition-controlled legislature: instigating the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991; using force inappropriately against the legislature in 1993; initiating the 
first war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s; subjecting the Russian people to genocide based 
on social and economic policies; finally, ruining the military (Dougherty 1999). None of 
the charges received the necessary two-thirds support in the Duma to trigger 
impeachment proceedings.  
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 On the economic front, the 1998 financial crisis complicated domestic politics and 
resulted in the ruble losing 80% of its value and the government defaulting on domestic 
debt and ceasing payment to foreign creditors (Colton and McFaul 2003). The majority of 
Russia‟s private banks closed as a result of the default, leaving both financial institutions 
and millions of everyday Russians perilously close to bankruptcy, including none other 
than Mikhail Gorbachev and the director of St. Petersburg‟s Marinsky Opera (Goldman 
2008: 14, 93). The government‟s own officially reported GDP and crude oil production 
for 1998 revealed at least a 40% drop from 1991 (Goldman 2008: 74). Oil prices just two 
years before the crisis hit nearly $26 a barrel, but hovered around $15 a barrel in 1998, 
which took a heavy toll on the cash-strapped Russian economy (Goldman 2008: 72). In 
the span of one year, the Russian stock market essentially collapsed: the Russian Trading 
System index that had recorded a jaw-dropping high of 571 in October 1997 fell to 39 in 
October 1998, approximately three months after the devaluation (Goldman 2008: 76).  
 Prior to the crisis, the Russian economy experienced its first year of positive 
growth, albeit minimal at 0.8%, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union but a series 
of speculative attacks on the ruble and falling oil prices wiped out previous economic 
gains, leaving the economy with a 4.9% deficit in real output by the end of 1998 (Chiodo 
and Owyang 2002). Inflation increased from 11% in 1997 to over 84% in 1998, severely 
hurting those subsisting on fixed incomes, such as pensioners (Cooper 2009). In 
December 1999, one needed an astonishing 1.6 million rubles to purchase what only 100 
rubles would have purchased in the same month in 1990 (Goldman 2008: 74). 
Unemployment and absolute poverty, measured by the national subsistence level, also 
rose precipitously: unemployment increased from 9.7% in 1996 to 13.3% in 1998 and 
absolute poverty shifted upwards, from 51% in 1996 to 62% in 1998 (World Bank, World 
Development Indicators; Denisova 2012). The proportion of Russians living below the 
poverty line skyrocketed from 21% in 1997 to one-third in 1998, an unfortunate record 
(Goldman 2008: 94). The effect of the 1998 financial crisis on the Russian population 
was widespread as some 80% of the population experienced a decrease in living 
standards. In this period, per capita income in Russia fell below Portugal, which was the 
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poorest European Union country at the time (Goldman 2008: 96). Compounding the 
already dire situation, those Russians holding government bonds were unable to cash 
them in when they matured, instead receiving yet another government bond as a 
replacement, which prevented bondholders from buffering themselves from the hard 
times (Goldman 2008: 74). Ultimately, the crisis severely undermined Russia‟s currency, 
compromised investor confidence for years to follow, diminished living standards across 
wide swaths of society, and forced the last reformers from office (Shleifer and Treisman 
2000).  
Yet, by the time of the election to the State Duma, the economy had begun to 
show signs of improvement: domestic demand for Russian-made products increased as a 
result of the ruble devaluation, which had made foreign imports more expensive for 
Russian consumers to buy and sheltered Russian producers from increased international 
competition, inefficient industries that had limped along throughout the 1990s acquired 
newfound competitiveness or were finally dispatched, and international demand for 
energy reached new heights. Despite indications that the economy had begun to recover 
under Prime Minister Primakov‟s watch, the rapid recovery in the wake of the 1998 
financial crisis was credited to Prime Minister Putin by all accounts, allowing the 
Kremlin‟s pick in the legislative contest to benefit by association.  
 Against the backdrop of recurrent executive-legislative struggles and economic 
crisis and initial recovery, the second conflict in Chechnya framed the 1999 election as a 
national security emergency. In late August, Prime Minister Putin revealed his penchant 
for strong-arm tactics with regard to domestic politics and reopened military operations in 
the Caucasus region after a three-year armistice in response to the invasion of Dagestan 
by neighboring Chechen separatists to support a regional Islamic separatist movement. 
Also fueling the resurgence of hostilities were frequent border clashes and terrorist 
attacks on Moscow apartment buildings and in Volgodonsk in the south that claimed 300 
lives and were attributed to Chechen separatists, albeit with little in the way of evidence 
of the Chechen‟s culpability. The inland expansion of violence previously contained in 
the Caucasus caused an epidemic of hysteria and furnished a pretext for war with 
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widespread public support. Had Putin not been Prime Minister at the time, it is unlikely 
that the overwhelming public approval would have materialized, either with regard to the 
Second Chechen War or the Kremlin‟s party in the legislative election. Putin exercised 
strong leadership when the system of Russian federalism was again in crisis and 
prosecuted the conflict with surgical precision, ultimately subduing the breakaway 
republic and installing a pro-Russian government in Chechnya. Widespread public 
support for the central government‟s reassertion of its authority over the Caucasus 
allowed pro-government groups to capitalize politically on the security situation in the 
legislative elections.  
 While the 1995 election was framed as a referendum on communism and 
President Yeltsin‘s vision for Russia‘s continuing political and economic transition, the 
1999 legislative elections ―afforded an opportunity to pull off a transition within the 
Russian transition‖ by successfully managing the shift from the Yeltsin to the Putin eras 
and the associated shifts in political and economic policies (Colton and McFaul 2003: 3). 
Indeed, the 1999 election, and the presidential election shortly after, would define 
Russian politics for years to come. President Yeltsin capitalized on Vladimir Putin‘s 
confirmation as Prime Minister and his skyrocketing popularity, credited to his key role 
in the conflict with Chechnya, to announce his wish for Putin to succeed him as president 
in 2000. Despite Yeltsin‘s personal commitment to democracy, his final act as president 
was to essentially anoint Prime Minister Putin as the heir apparent rather than allowing 
the presidential turnover to occur organically as the result of free and fair competition. 
Widespread anticipation surrounding the forthcoming change in presidential leadership in 
2000 shaped the legislative election preceding it as a contest analogous to a presidential 
primary in the U.S. and a chance for political parties to stake out their places in the 
legislature before the impending presidential succession.  
The electoral rules governing the 1999 election to the Duma maintained the same, 
equal division of seats allocated by a proportional representation and single-mandate 
formula as obtained in 1995 and also preserved the five percent threshold for legislative 
representation. Political parties were again able to secure their position in the national 
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proportional representation tier of the election by submitting 200,000 petitions endorsed 
by eligible voters, but the required geographic distribution of those petitions expanded: in 
the 1995 election, no more than 15% of signatories could be residents of the same region 
or republic; in 1999, this condition was reduced to seven percent. The complete party list 
was subject to disqualification if 15% or more signatures on the registration petitions 
were defective. The federal law governing the election was also different from its 
predecessor in that it allowed political parties to gain ballot access by financial means, 
which required a cash deposit of approximately 2.087 million rubles ($82,000) or 
―25,000 times the minimum wage‖ (Colton and McFaul 2003; Marsh 2002: 87). The 
majority of registered parties opted for the financial deposit track while ten others 
pursued the petition-signatures path to ballot access, and two exceptionally risk-adverse 
parties elected both (Colton and McFaul 2003).  
Although ballot access was relaxed with the introduction of the financial route, 
other new laws attempted to dissuade extremist parties and organizations from taking part 
in the election. Indeed, the Central Election Commission was granted substantially more 
autonomy in officially conducting the election with the implied understanding that it 
would use its increased agency to rationalize the party system by way of hindering entry 
(Brudny 2001). Adopting electoral reforms aimed at consolidating the party system 
before the 1999 election occurred was especially important, given that 43 parties 
competed in the 1995 election and party fragmentation was an enduring concern. For 
example, a new law passed prior to the comprehensive June 1999 federal law again 
extended the waiting period for enrollment with the Ministry of Justice: in 1993, parties 
and organizations planning to seek votes in the election were able to enroll with the 
Ministry of Justice with no waiting period imposed; those parties active in the 1995 
election faced a 6 month waiting period in order to participate in the contest; in 1999, the 
waiting period was increased to one year before election day (Colton and McFaul 2003). 
The increased waiting period between party registration and the election was intended to 
deter late forming electoral projects and alliances. Furthermore, parties and organizations 
that qualified for the proportional representation ballot through the cash deposit forfeited 
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the sum if they received less than three percent of the popular vote, and were required to 
recompense the government for free airtime on television and radio allocated to the party 
during the electoral cycle if they received less than two percent (Ibid). These new 
punitive provisions may have bankrupted some of the smaller parties and electoral blocs, 
but, if not, would likely deter them from contesting future legislative elections (Marsh 
2002). Finally, the preservation of the five percent threshold for representation was also 
aimed at discouraging smaller parties from participating (Brudny 2001).  
The package of electoral laws framing the contest produced mixed results: the 
number of parties and electoral blocs competing decreased from 43 in 1995 to 26 in 1999, 
but newcomers were able to enter the political fray more easily in 1999 because it was 
possible to pay for ballot access and avoid the burdensome task of collecting signatures 
across the territory. Political parties representing each contour of the four-fold ideological 
taxonomy, i.e. communist left, nationalist right, liberal-democratic and pro-government 
centrist, decreased overall with the exception that pro-government parties doubled to two 
in 1999. Among the 26 parties competing, a constant troika of parties that had competed 
since the 1993 election and received representation in every Duma reinforced the core of 
the Russian party system: the communist KPRF, nationalist LDPR competing under a 
different appellation, and liberal Yabloko. Additionally, two parties jockeyed for the role 
of party of power, Unity and Fatherland-All Russia.  
The KPRF continued to represent the communist-agrarian left and was the only 
party competing in election that enjoyed growing support since 1993: the party received 
approximately 12% of the popular vote in the 1993 snap election and about 22% in 1995. 
Ultimately, the 1999 election results continued this trend when the KPRF received 
approximately 24%. The KPRF viewed the election as an opportunity to remain a major 
force in the process of legislative decision-making and to finally monopolize the left-
wing electorate (Brudny 2001). Despite mounting support in the two prior elections, 
KPRF leadership altered the party‘s ideological platform for the 1999 contest so 
significantly that it amounted to a ―truly radical transformation‖ (Dmitriev 1999). 
Unexpectedly, the party abandoned its commitment to a state-controlled economy and 
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shifted to a moderate market-oriented stance, acknowledging the importance of 
protecting private property and the role of marketplace competition (Oates 2000; Colton 
and McFaul 2003). With the KPRF‘s ideological moderation, especially on economic 
questions, Russia‘s last threat to the post-communist status quo was effectively removed. 
Ideological refinements were aimed at attracting new demographic constituencies to its 
cause, particularly those residing in more urban areas that were drawn to moderate policy 
positions. Ultimately, attention paid to moderating its position on key economic questions 
caused the KPRF to fritter away a critical opportunity to capitalize on the recent financial 
catastrophe that severely impacted their core constituency of the rural poor.  
The KPRF did not, however, abandon its support of collective ownership and also 
preserved its position on state ownership of natural monopolies and operations requiring 
permanent restructuring (Colton and McFaul 2003). Furthermore, the party clung to the 
common themes of the Soviet period, industrial successes, and populist messages 
concentrating on mandatory price reductions of food, transport and energy (Ibid). 
Appealing to ethnic Russians on the foreign policy front, the KPRF espoused nationalist 
themes by denouncing the United States for conspiring against Russia, recommending 
bringing allies in the Middle East, e.g. Iran, Iraq and Libya, closer to Russia, and 
criticizing one of the leaders of the Fatherland-All Russia party for acting as an 
―accomplice‖ to the ―team of traitors and gravediggers of the Soviet state‖ (Colton and 
McFaul: 117). The party conceptualized Russia‘s restoration as the ―unification of 
Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to form a solid federal state‖ but insisted that the process 
occur peacefully (Chernyakhovsky 1999). On the issue of Chechnya, the party failed to 
articulate a consistent stance, at once brutally criticizing the Yeltsin administration and 
agreeing with Prime Minster Putin‘s handling of the situation and repudiating Chechen 
independence (Colton and McFaul 2003).  
In a replay of the 1995 election, the KPRF again finished first in the party-list tier 
in 1999 with over 23% of the popular vote. Thus, Zhirinovsky‘s statement shortly after 
the 1995 legislative elections was proven wrong four years later: the KPRF‘s victory in 
1995 was not the party‘s ―swan song‖ but rather just the first act in the KPRF‘s two-act 
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tour de force in the 1990s (Belin and Orttung 1997: 161). The KPRF‘s showing in 1999 
led many who had previously assumed the party was on the decline due to its aging 
constituency to question such presumptions (Clark 2006).  
On the far right of the political spectrum, the ultra-nationalist LDPR was denied 
registration because two of its top three leaders failed to adhere to financial disclosure 
requirements and were ultimately charged with money laundering. In addition to these 
leading figures, other candidates on the LDPR‘s list had established ties to organized 
crime, including one individual wanted for contract murder (Hale 2006). The Central 
Election Commission denied the LDPR‘s registration pursuant to a regulation stipulating 
that the disqualification of any of a party‘s top three candidates would cause the party 
itself to be disqualified. The party quickly regrouped and was re-registered formally as 
the Zhirinovsky Bloc, but expended a considerable amount of time and resources 
explaining the name change in various advertising slots on mass media (Ibid).  
Despite the initial registration setback, the Zhirinovsky Bloc (hereafter, LDPR) 
pushed ahead with its legislative campaign oriented almost exclusively around its 
colorful leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The party tapped into its extensive regional 
organizational network, second only to the KPRF‘s, and encouraged rank-and-file party 
members to graffiti the party‘s acronym anywhere publicly visible with spray paint 
supplied by the party itself (Lyagushkin 1999). The LDPR‘s platform articulated specific 
policies previously unmentioned by other parties, such as amnesty for economic 
criminals (a thinly-veiled attempt to protect its disqualified party-list candidates and other 
close affiliates) and government monopoly of sugar, alcohol and tobacco commodities 
(Ibid). In a similar fashion to the KPRF, the LDPR also moved closer to the political 
center by moderating its ideological message on specific issues: the party lightened its 
previously staunch anti-Semitism and expansionist foreign policy aims while preserving 
its brand of ethnic-Russian nationalism, which now appealed to the Russian mainstream 
because of the renewed conflict with Chechnya. However, the party was not able to profit 
off nationalist themes and exploit the situation in Chechnya effectively, since it was 
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largely directed by Prime Minister Putin and benefited the new potential party of power 
Unity by association.  
Ultimately, the LDPR‘s new ideological positioning did not increase its 
popularity in the electorate and some believed that the party resembled ―a waning force at 
the end of this electoral cycle‖ (Colton and McFaul 2003: 13). Compared to the other two 
core parties competing in 1999, i.e. the KPRF and Yabloko, the LDPR had the murkiest 
ideological definition and changed its ideological orientation at a breakneck pace, which 
may explain the party‘s precipitous decline throughout the 1990s while the other two 
maintained or even expanded their base of support in the electorate (McFaul 2000). The 
LDPR‘s electoral trajectory in the 1990s is the mirror opposite of the KPRF‘s: the LDPR 
unexpectedly won the 1993 snap election with more than 22% of the popular vote, its 
vote share was subsequently halved in the 1995 contest, and halved yet again in 1999, 
leaving the party with a vote share of approximately 6%.  
The democratic-reformist niche was again occupied by Yabloko, but, like the 
LDPR, faced some initial difficulties involving the Central Election Commission‘s 
arbitrary enforcement of electoral rules and regulations. While the Central Election 
Commission overlooked Grigory Yavlinsky‘s failure to disclose approximately $3,000 in 
income and allowed him to head Yabloko‘s list, the agency disqualified the Minister of 
Federal and Nationality Affairs for failing to disclose a parking space in Moscow from 
his enumeration of personal assets (Colton and McFaul 2003).  
Yabloko was the only liberal political party not connected to the government to 
gain Duma representation in every legislative election since 1993 and party leadership 
believed that its tried-and-true policy platform would again bear electoral fruit in 1999, 
establishing the party as one pillar in the emerging tripartite multiparty system as co-
constituted by the KPRF and the party of power (McFaul 1997; Kuzmin and 
Ovchinnikov 1999; Hale 2004). Whereas the KPRF and LDPR moderated their 
ideological orientations, albeit not always to the party‘s benefit, Yabloko‘s platform was 
virtually unchanged from previous elections and reflected a continuing commitment to 
reformist ideology and rigid defense of principle, which the party‘s leadership thought a 
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virtue. The party spiced up its well-worn bundle of socially conscious policies by calling 
for a ban on government media ownership and tried to tap into popular economic 
discontent by insisting on pay increases for a variety of groups, such as pensioners, 
soldiers and students. On economic questions, Yabloko vowed to reduce taxes and create 
free trade zones to attract foreign investment back to the country after the steep fall off in 
investor confidence after the 1998 financial crisis (Colton and McFaul 2003). In contrast 
to the KPRF and LDPR, Yabloko staked out an ill-defined, often contradictory, and 
ultimately unpopular position on Chechnya: the party‘s conference in September 
supported a limited military operation against terrorists in the region, but in November, 
Yavlinsky went off script by insisting on an immediate halt to the Russian military 
offensive and renewed negotiations with the Chechen president (Ibid). Yavlinsky‘s 
oppositionist comments against the conflict damaged Yabloko‘s chances in the election 
acutely, given that opinion polls indicated approval of the conflict at 70% (Marsh 2002: 
87; Oates 2000). The head of Yabloko‘s campaign argued that Yavlinsky‘s unilateral 
policy declarations on Chechnya cost the party ―half of its supporters‖ in the 1999 
election (Colton and McFaul 2003: 151). Aside from going against the public grain on 
the issue, Yabloko‘s position on Chechnya was incongruous with its longstanding 
defense of civil liberties and human rights, leading to widespread confusion that cast a 
long shadow over the party well into the 2000s (Hale 2006).  
Before fissures in the leadership regarding policy toward Chechnya became 
visible in autumn, polling predicted a party vote share of 12-15% in the election (Colton 
and McFaul 2003). Even these predictions signified a sea change from a few years prior, 
when Western observers anticipated that Yabloko would capture most of the 25-30% of 
the democratic electorate (McFaul 1997). The actual result did not fulfill expectations: 
although the party cleared the 5% representation threshold safely, it lost approximately 
one percent from their 1995 showing, which itself was a decline from two years earlier in 
the snap election. Yabloko‘s declining electoral trajectory throughout the 1990s broadly 
parallels that of the LDPR, but support for the liberal party weakened more gradually and 
it was significantly more vulnerable to total electoral defeat in the 2000s because of its 
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lower level of voter support at the outset of competitive elections.  Thus, Yabloko 
forfeited an opportunity to firm up its ―democratic opposition‖ nook in the party system 
in 1999 and the party‘s prospects for becoming a permanent player in the parliament 
withered (Kuzmin and Ovchinnikov 1999).  
A tenderfoot pro-government potential party of power emerged only a few 
months prior to the 1999 election and set out to corner that ideological space left gaping 
after Our Home is Russia‘s poor performance in the 1995 elections. As yesterday‘s party 
of power became a footnote, just as Russia‘s Choice had even before, a new electoral 
bloc named Unity stepped into the breach, hoping to capture the segment of the electorate 
that ―always prefer[s] to vote for the active federal executive power and its nominees 
[and] want[s] to maintain the status quo‖ (Myagkov and Ordeshook 2001; Petrov and 
Makarkin 1999: 123). Unity was initially formed to compete directly with the other 
potential party of power that formed a only few months before Unity, i.e. Fatherland-All 
Russia, and did so by adopting Fatherland‘s primary campaign message of political 
pragmatism as its own and co-opting regional governors and other political luminaries 
keen to bandwagon with the most likely victors in the legislative and presidential 
elections (Colton 1999).  
While other political parties and electoral blocs positioned themselves as the 
political opposition to the Kremlin, Unity pledged its support for government policy and 
made clear its intent to uphold the status quo (Colton and McFaul 2003). From the outset 
of Unity‘s campaign, the fledgling party aligned itself with the immensely popular Prime 
Minister Putin, an overture shortly returned in no uncertain terms by the Prime Minister 
himself when he commented that he would personally vote for Unity in the upcoming 
election. Unity departed from timeworn party of power strategies when it stacked its 
party list with political novices impervious to political attacks about prior policies, such 
as Sergei Shoigu and Aleksandr Karelin, the Minister of Emergency Situations and a 
medaled Olympian in Greco-Roman wrestling, respectively, who had never contested 
elected positions (Marsh 2002). Of paramount importance was that Russian voters did not 
identify those topping the Unity list as politicians (Petrov and Makarkin 1999).  
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In framing itself as youth-oriented, Unity hoped to capture new voters and those 
sans partisan loyalty to any parties in the tried-and-true troika (Marsh 2002). Unity 
avoided wading too deep into ideological waters and acted upon its commitment to 
pragmatism rather conspicuously by refusing to deliver a policy platform, a risky political 
move but one that paid electoral dividends by capturing the support of voters tired with 
politics as usual  (Colton 1999). The party eventually touted a policy package that was 
generally liberal and interspersed with populist messages about cracking down on 
corruption that allowed Unity to showcase Aleksandr Gurov‘s role as the former leader of 
the organized crime division of the Soviet Union‘s police ministry (Colton and McFaul 
2003). Although Unity‘s stance on Chechnya was patently nationalist based on Putin and 
Shoigu‘s close involvement in managing the conflict, Unity articulated a more 
multicultural brand of nationalism compared to that of the LDPR that was based on civic 
Russian, rather than ethnic Russian, patriotism (Colton and McFaul 2003). Indeed, 
support for Unity was geographically dispersed across Russia‘s regions, likely due to the 
prominence of ethnic minority figures atop the party list, e.g. Shoigu is from the ethnic 
republic of Tuva, located on the Mongolian border (Marsh 2002). Unity boasted support 
from 13 individuals atop regional government structures, who could influence the vote of 
approximately 13% of the population, covering the regions of Kalmykya, Tuva, 
Chukotka, Tver, Rostov, Kursk, Kaliningrad, Primorye, Omsk, Khabarovsk, and 
Leningrad Oblast (Brudny 2001). Hence, Unity sharply distinguished itself from previous 
Kremlin party projects by the composition of its leadership, i.e. those atop the Unity list 
were not from the capital and its active ties to the regions, especially those with 
majorities of federally-recognized titular minorities. Unity was, like its party-of-power 
predecessors, well-funded by private individuals and major corporations, such as 
Gazprom, Lukoil and Sibneft, and benefitted from government largesse based on the 
party‘s cozy relationship with the state, as channeled through Prime Minister Putin.  
The energetic potential party of power set a goal of capturing 10% of the popular 
vote in the election, which many thought overly aggressive based on its late entry into the 
political fray, but the party ―spr[a]ng from political nonexistence‖ to more than double its 
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goal in the final election tally and finished just one percent behind the KPRF victors 
(Hale et al. 2003: 291). Unity‘s success was surprising, as ―nobody thought that the 
Kremlin [was] able to create something that could have any success in elections. This 
success was very, very unexpected for everybody‖ (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM 
Foundation 2011). 
Finally, Fatherland-All Russia competed with Unity for the party of power prize 
and provided the initial impetus for Unity‟s formation, which was designed to siphon 
votes off its anti-Kremlin counterpart. Although the party was formed only four and a 
half months before the election, it earned the party of power appellation out of the gate 
because of its resemblance to previous pro-regime startups, including its connections to 
the state apparatus through senior politicians, endorsements by celebrities, notably 
Mikhail Kalashnikov of weaponry fame, an astronaut, a filmmaker, and an Arctic 
explorer, and the backing of major corporations and conglomerates, such as Gazprom, 
Lukoil and Sistema (Colton and McFaul 2003). Additionally, Fatherland‟s platform in 
1999, highlighting “a strong state and great-power grandeur,” employed slogans almost 
directly lifted from Our Home is Russia‟s manifesto, reinforcing Fatherland‟s likeness to 
previous parties of power (Makarenko 1999: 67).  
Fatherland-All Russia offered an alternative potential party of power to Unity and 
distinguished itself by opposing the Kremlin, recruiting leaders with long tenures in 
government, and cultivating support from the governors of regional economic 
powerhouses who could deliver the vote by leveraging vast tracts of administrative 
resources at their disposal. A troika of experienced politicians, Moscow Mayor Yury 
Luzhkov, former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, and the governor of St. Petersburg, 
Vladimir Yakovlev, headed the party and were together considered the most reliable 
group to act as the “builders of a post-Yeltsin regime” (Makarenko 1999: 72). Dozens of 
regional governors and presidents, who could influence the vote of roughly 37% of 
registered voters, supported the Fatherland-All Russia alliance, including the leaders of 
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Karelia, Mordovia, Ingushetia, Udmurtia, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
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Khanty-Mansi, Irkursk Chelyabinsk, Kirov, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, 
and Yaroslavl (Brudny 2001).  
After factions emerged within various parties and electoral blocs, notably the 
Agrarian Party and Women of Russia, Fatherland-All Russia temporarily absorbed the 
orphaned groups without ideological restraints in an attempt to court the favor of left-
leaning constituencies, but consequently the movement soon resembled an incoherent 
conglomerate rather than a logical political alliance. Adding to the incoherence was the 
party‟s notion of “principled polycentrism,” which prevented any one regional leader 
from becoming the party‟s head but equally frustrated attempts to find common ground 
among the diverse group (Makarenko 1999: 64). Unlike Unity that benefited from a 
plugged-in Kremlin patron and close ties to the federal government, Fatherland‟s strength 
lay in its links to those holding the most powerful positions in provincial government and 
relied heavily on administrative resources at the regional level to keep the movement 
afloat (Colton and McFaul 2003). Fatherland enjoyed free airtime on regional media 
outlets, favorable coverage by local commentators, and access to regional administrative 
structures in the form of office space and printing presses, which could be obscured in the 
local budget (Ibid).  
The party campaigned with moderate, non-ideological orientations that 
championed a market economy with significant social spending and policies governed by 
pragmatism rather than political ideology. Nevertheless, the campaign depended almost 
entirely on capturing votes based on their leader‟s popularity and government experience, 
but was caught unaware when Unity and the pro-Kremlin media launched a full-scale 
attack on Fatherland, especially Mayor Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Primakov. 
Among the accusations leveled against Fatherland‟s leadership during the campaign were 
that Primakov was literally unfit to govern due to his advanced age and recent hip surgery 
and was likened to the inept Leonid Brezhnev, Luzhkov was corrupt and embezzled 
government money to build himself a luxury estate in the countryside outside Moscow, 
Fatherland‟s leaders were in cahoots with the West to undermine Russia and force out 
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Prime Minister Putin, and, still further, its leaders were plain ugly  (Colton and McFaul 
2003; Ryabov and Cherkasov 1999).  
The onslaught achieved its goal and Fatherland stood by idly, fully capable of 
mounting a counteroffensive but inexplicably unwilling to do so, as its popular standing 
plummeted to less than half its original support (Hale 2006). The media blitz exposed 
Fatherland‟s greatest vulnerability: the allure of the party leaders was tied inextricably 
with that of the party itself, hence the savage political kneecappings of Luzhkov and 
Primakov destroyed support for the party more generally, on top of shattering their own 
individual reputations irreparably (Colton 1999). Additionally, Fatherland‘s recruitment 
of dozens of regional governors may have contributed to its poor performance at the 
polls: according to one politician not affiliated with the party, ―Fatherland didn‘t work 
because it was an administrative party with various interests. The governors that were 
part of it had their own goals‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). 
Opinion polls conducted in mid-November revealed Fatherland support at approximately 
20% of those intending to vote, but it ultimately captured only 13% of the popular vote, a 
catastrophic result at best for a party once labeled the new party of power in Russian 
politics (McFaul 2000).  
 The 1999 legislative election differed significantly from the 1995 contest because 
two competing potential parties of power that jockeyed for dominance on the national 
stage largely overshadowed various ideological contours of the party system. Indeed, the 
electoral cycle epitomized the notion that “democracy is civil war fought by nonviolent 
means” and the fierce battle waged between Unity and Fatherland-All Russia frequently 
caught opposition parties in the crosshairs (Hale 1999: 5). Often, opposition parties‟ 
signature themes were effectively absorbed by either Unity or Fatherland-All Russia. For 
example, Unity was better positioned to capitalize on the nationalist sentiment that 
historically anchored the LDPR‟s political platform: the renewed conflict with Chechnya 
showcased Sergei Shoigu‟s managerial capacities as the Minister of Emergency 
Situations and Prime Minister Putin‟s toughness on regional secessionist movements and 
ethnic-based terrorism that threatened the territorial integrity of the country and 
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jeopardized the safety of millions of Russian citizens (Brudny 2001). Similarly, 
Fatherland-All Russia encroached on the KPRF‟s well-established ideological space 
when its leadership suggested that the party would consider renationalizing private 
enterprises if they were stagnating or it was discovered that the initial privatizations 
proceeded illegally (Colton and McFaul 2003). However, Unity‟s more compelling claim 
to nationalist themes was likely a product of coincidence based on the timing of border 
skirmishes and terrorist attacks rather than a deliberate attempt to sap the LDPR of 
support, given that Unity did not perceive the LDPR as a credible threat to their electoral 
success. In contrast, Fatherland attempted to co-opt a key KPRF issue because the 
potential party of power, ultimately mistakenly, considered the communists to be its 
principal opposition (Ibid).  
The emergence of twin competitors with the ability to strategically exploit other‟s 
trademark messages produced a conspicuous convergence towards the center of the 
political spectrum, which made cleavage issues more difficult to identify (McFaul 2000). 
In the mid-1990s, parties differentiated themselves on economic questions, including the 
nature of the economy itself and the proposed pace of future reforms, foreign policy 
strategies, namely orientation towards the West or reconstitution of the Soviet Union, and 
the first war in Chechnya. By 1999, however, most parties agreed on the preservation of a 
market economy and the protection of private property, and continuing Russian military 
operations in the Caucasus, except for Yabloko, which was the only party to stake out a 
distinctive position on the issue. As a case in point, the KPRF‟s economic platform in 
1995 rested on reversing widespread privatization with the long-term goal of wholesale 
renationalization, but, by the late 1990s, the party acted as a moderate advocate for the 
free market and offered ideas concerning the enforcement of property rights (Dmitriev 
1999).  
 The 1999 parliamentary election produced expected and unexpected outcomes. As 
in 1995, the KPRF clinched first place with over 24% of the popular vote, again casting 
doubt upon those predictions of the party‟s imminent extinction, but the party in fact 
accomplished little more than retaining its core electorate from previous elections (Colton 
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1999). Also fulfilling expectations, the LDPR and Yabloko crossed the threshold for 
representation, albeit with dwindling support. Especially for Yabloko, 1999 was a 
considerable setback because the party tried to capitalize on the time offered in the off-
election years by fortifying the party at the local level, yet its showing was substandard 
(Ibid). While the core troika of the party system received enough support to remain intact, 
two parties that had not existed six months prior and were liable to “disappear into the 
dustbin of history before the next scheduled elections‖ captured nearly two-fifths of the 
votes (Brudny 2001: 177). Undoubtedly, the most striking result of the poll was the 
outcome of the battle between competing potential parties of power. Unity‟s 
unanticipated triumph and Fatherland‟s near-total annihilation thoroughly reoriented the 
gravitational pull of the party system around the new party of power, with Prime Minister 
Putin at the center.  
The 1999 Legislative Election as a Competitive Election 
Similar to the 1995 parliamentary election, the 1999 election will be treated as a 
competitive election because the contest was “widely viewed […] as free and fair” (The 
1999 Election to the Russian State Duma: Findings and Recommendations 2000). The 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe‘s (OSCE) Election Observation 
Mission report concluded that the third election since the culmination of one-party rule in 
Russia was ―competitive and pluralistic‖ (International Election Observation Mission 
1999). The International Foundation for Election Systems reported that the legislative 
elections were conducted in a ―manner in which the will of the voters was confirmed‖ 
and that, on the day of the election itself, ―the election process worked‖ (The 1999 
Election to the Russian State Duma: Findings and Recommendations 2000). As in the 
1995 elections, numerous political parties and blocs competed in the contest, offering 
voters a diverse menu of options to select from on December 19. Among the dozens of 
new parties and electoral blocs, three parties competed for the third time, which indicates 
further consolidation of Russia‘s multiparty democracy. Voter turnout of approximately 
60% was roughly equal to that in the 1995 contest and suggests continued and 
widespread commitment to procedural democracy, although domestic and international 
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interlocutors attributed high turnout to the conspicuous presence of election monitors in 
the vast majority of polling stations (International Election Observation Mission 1999).  
Figure 5.1 provides an indication that the 1999 contest was competitive, as the 
distribution of voter turnout was more similar to that four years prior than four years 
later. Interestingly though, the right tail of the distribution became discernibly fatter in 
the late-1990s, suggesting methods of manipulation were practiced, such as ballot-box 
stuffing or the illicit changing of results protocols that were detailed in election 
observation reports. The fatter right tail would become even more pronounced in future 
elections and would emerge as one of the most conspicuous hallmarks of elections under 
United Russia. Nevertheless, the distribution of turnout suggests that the 1999 election 
was generally competitive because it lacked the suspicious bumps at high rates of 
political participation that became common in the 2000s and 2010s.  
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Voter Turnout in 1999 
 
 
The legal framework governing the 1999 electoral cycle was an improvement 
over that in place during the 1995 cycle and was generally consistent with international 
standards. Overall, the election law ensured equal entry for political parties, electoral 
blocs and single-mandate candidates, and established equitable competition via campaign 
finance regulations and rules governing media access (International Election Observation 
Mission 1999). For example, new ballot access laws were introduced, requiring financial 
and criminal history disclosures; the work of the Central Election Commission was 
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conducted publicly; and visible protocols were posted at polling places (The 1999 
Election to the Russian State Duma: Findings and Recommendations 2000). 
Additionally, new laws implemented by the Central Election Commission endeavored to 
diminish the degree and extent of media bias, conspicuous in the 1995 electoral cycle, by 
preventing the mass media itself from campaigning on behalf of individual candidates, 
political parties, or electoral blocs (International Election Observation Mission 1999). 
The Central Electoral Commission, under new leadership, fulfilled its regulatory 
responsibilities during the election with significantly more autonomy than it enjoyed 
during the 1995 cycle, when the agency was largely under the Kremlin‘s control (McFaul 
2000).  
Despite the improved legal framework governing the 1999 electoral cycle, the 
contest fell short of free and fair due to inappropriate intervention by executive 
authorities, severely biased media coverage, and suspected electoral manipulation. The 
1999 election failed to achieve fully free and fair status because executive authorities 
obstructed political competition using myriad methods, including preventing opposition 
parties and candidates from holding public meetings, levying extraordinary 
administrative fines, and initiating ultimately meritless criminal investigations 
(International Election Observation Mission 1999).  
The influence of central authorities was particularly pervasive and conspicuous in 
state-controlled media that was leveraged to engage in politically-motivated election 
coverage. For example, majority state-owned ORT and fully state-owned RTR channels 
focused on Unity‘s campaign, providing the party with 28% and 24% of the campaign 
coverage, respectively (Oates 2000). ORT also honed coverage around government 
authorities that played visible roles in Unity: Prime Minister Putin received 42% and 
Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu received 19% (Oates 2000). In sharp 
contrast, Unity‘s competitor for party of power status, Fatherland-All Russia, received 
considerable airtime as well, but the content of the media exposure was negative and 
reflected a partisan operation to discredit OVR by introducing ―a level of personal 
invective never before witnessed in a Russian campaign (Colton and McFaul 2003: 36). 
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Meanwhile, the KPRF was mostly ignored by the mass media, indicating at once pro-
government bias and indifference to the party (Oates 2000; Colton and McFaul 2003). 
The European Institute on the Media reported, with regard to the role of the media, 
―voters were not given the information necessary to make proper decisions‖ (Russian 
Election Watch No. 6, 2000). Indeed, the chairman of the Central Election Commission 
concurred, stating that he ―cannot claim that the electioneering, including media 
campaigning, was fair‖ and, further, that the agency had received an ―abundance of 
complaints‖ (Ibid). Furthermore, although election rules required state-controlled 
television and radio to grant all political parties free time-slots during prime time, these 
rules were not followed or enforced (Oates 2000). Some parties opted not to use their 
allocated time once the Central Election Commission announced that parties that did 
receive at least two percent of the popular vote would be required to reimburse the media 
outlets (Ibid). 
Electoral manipulation also calls into question the competitiveness of the 1999 
contest: there is ―considerable circumstantial evidence‖ that regional governors and local 
authorities engaged in electoral malfeasance, such as falsifying election results or 
coercing voters to support specific political parties or single-mandate candidates (McFaul 
2000: 8; Colton 1999). Table 5.1 furnishes more systematic evidence of manipulation 
pointing to artificially inflated voter turnout. Raion-level national turnout in the final 
contest of the 1990s was 63.91% and the corresponding standard deviation was 9.22. 
Thus, the distribution of voter turnout was slightly more tightly clustered around the 
mean in 1999 than was the case in 1995, when the standard deviation was 9.27, which 
accounts for the minor dip in the percentage of fraudulent raions in the late-1990s. Nearly 
13% of raions reported voter turnout that exceeded the threshold set in 1999.  
 
Table 5.1: Manipulated Raions in 1999 
Voter Turnout Threshold 
(1 Standard Deviation Above 
Raion-level National Turnout) 
Number Manipulated Raions % Total Raions 
73.14 347 12.77 
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More than one-third of the raions coded positively for suspected electoral fraud were 
located in the ethnic republics, which have well-documented histories of machine politics 
and widespread electoral malfeasance (e.g. Hale, 2003, Reisinger and Moraski, 2002, 
2008, Myagkov and Ordeshook, 2008, Mebane and Kalinin, 2009, 2010, Golosov, 2011). 
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds were located in majority-Muslim regions, roughly 19% in 
the Caucasus, and about 25% in resource-dependent regions. Four years earlier, just 
fewer than 15% of raions reported turnout that indicated possible electoral manipulation. 
Approximately 23% of these raions were located in ethnic republics, roughly 44% in 
majority-Muslim regions, 14% in the Caucasus, and 20% in resource regions. These 
percentages provide a rough gauge of electoral competitiveness in the 1995 and 1999 
elections and showcase a gradual expansion of electoral manipulation, especially in 
various regional contexts, i.e. ethnic regions, Muslim regions, location in the Caucasus, 
and those regions with resource-dependent economies. Data from the 1999 election 
reveal the slow contraction of free and fair political competition in legislative elections, 
even before a successful dominant party emerged and subsequently consolidated. 
Analysis  
 While the analysis of the 1995 parliamentary election included all four parties that 
crossed the threshold for representation, the investigation of the 1999 election is limited 
to the three parties forming the core party system troika and the two potential parties of 
power, Fatherland-All Russia and Unity. The Union of Right Forces is therefore excluded 
for consistency across elections. Compared to Table 2 from the 1995 election, Table 5.2 
below shows that the KPRF and Yabloko both gained lower level strongholds but the 
number of higher-level bastions dipped and the LDPR experienced the opposite 
trajectory, capturing two additional higher-level pockets of support while numerous 
lower level strongholds were shaved off.  
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Table 5.2: Measuring the Dependent Variable: Party Strongholds in 1999 
 1 standard 
deviation above 
party‘s raion-level 
national average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
2 standard 
deviations above 
party‘s raion-level 
national average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
KPRF 36.80 442 16.26 47.59 83 3.05 
LDPR 9.93 391 14.39 13.03 66 2.43 
Yabloko 7.63 474 17.45 11.07 128 4.71 
Fatherland-
All Russia 
26.18 332 12.23 40.86 180 6.63 
Unity 37.98 403 14.83 49.49 44 1.62 
 
Figure 5.2 details the distribution of each party‘s vote share and facilitates the 
identification of stronghold thresholds for each party. Compared to the previous election, 
the distribution of each opposition parties‘ vote share was noticeably more clustered 
around their respective raion-level national means: the standard deviation of the KPRF‘s 
distribution narrowed from 12.62 in 1995 to 10.79 in 1999; that of the LDPR diminished 
from 6.95 to 3.10, and Yabloko‘s contracted from 4.30 to 3.44. The distributions 
pertaining to the two new potential parties of power, Unity and Fatherland-All Russia, 
demonstrated considerably more dispersion with standard deviations of 11.51 and 14.68, 
respectively, than those in the core party troika in 1999 as well as Our Home is Russia 
four years earlier. With regards to the distribution of the Communists‘ vote share, there is 
a noticeable dip at the top of the distribution at the mean level of voter support. 
Resembling the shape of the distribution from the previous election, a bump appeared in 
the left tail of the nationalists‘ distribution around the null vote share, but was less 
pronounced than in 1995. Yabloko‘s distribution again revealed an elongated right tail 
and a bump at just less than twice the party‘s raion-level national average due to 
enthusiastic support in the federal cities. The distribution of the Unity vote shows a 
conspicuous bump in the left tail at around 10%, or less than half of the party‘s national 
mean. Based on Unity‘s close relationship with the Kremlin, any irregularities in the 
distribution of the potential party of power‘s vote share would be expected to be in the 
right tail, where electoral windfalls are concentrated. Fatherland‘s distribution conforms 
more to expectation because, although the distribution lacks a fat right tail, the elongated 
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tail shows a distinct peak is evident at approximately 40%, or more than triple the party‘s 
countrywide mean. The prominence of the bump, coupled with the fact that Fatherland 
presided over an extensive network of regional elites, particularly in the ethnic republics 
that controlled patronage-based political machines, suggests that the party‘s vote share 
was artificially augmented.  
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Parties‘ Vote Shares in 1999 
 
 
 
See Appendix Tables 25-54 (pages 520-579) for Multilevel Model Results. 
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Ethnicity and Opposition Parties 
Compared to the 1995 legislative election, the results from the 1999 contest reveal 
both continuity and change in the electoral trajectories of opposition parties subject to 
investigation. The KPRF benefitted from increases in the non-Russian population across 
nearly all models in the mid-1990s, and the trend more or less continued into the late 
1990s: the percent minority covariate achieved conventional levels of statistical 
significance in one lower threshold model and across all upper threshold models, hiking 
the odds by four to more than seven percent. The magnitude of the positive effect caused 
by denser populations of ethnic non-Russians was greater in 1999 than 1995, suggesting 
that the KPRF made deeper inroads in this constituency with more practice in the 
electoral arena under its belt, even despite the fact that two potential parties of power, 
both with extensive ties to ethnic minority communities across Russia‘s regions, 
competed for the very same pockets of support. Models utilizing the more refined 
measures of ethnic composition show that the statistically significant and positive effect 
of other minorities was mostly preserved. With a one percent increase in the other 
minority population, the odds lifted by one to two percent across the lower threshold 
models and by four to six percent in the upper threshold models.  Investigation into the 
KPRF‘s pockets of support drawn from other minorities reveals that the party performed 
well in raions located in ethnic republics with multitudinous and non-titular ethnic 
groups, such as the Avars, Dargins, Lazgins, Laks and Tabasarans that comprise nearly 
three-quarters of the population of Dagestan, rather than in raions with other minority 
populations of Indo-European heritage. Additional titular minorities in a raion did not 
achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in the mid-1990s, but decreased the 
odds of a stronghold by two percent in a relaxed model in 1999. As in 1995, the finding 
that KPRF strongholds were again defined to any extent by the ethnic Russian, non-
Russian cleavage differs from the extant scholarship on the 1999 election, in which this 
distinction was not statistically significant (Colton and McFaul 2003; Hale 2006). In 
some contrast to the model results, Figure 5.3 showcases the relatively stable association 
between support for the KPRF and non-Russian and titular minority inhabitants, and the 
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slight rise in the party‘s vote share with higher proportions of other minorities. The 
especially enthusiastic raions included a mix of predominantly Russian and non-Russian 
raions, that were mainly located in the republics of Dagestan, North Ossetia and Adygea, 
and the oblasts and krais of Bryanskaya, Orlovskaya, Krasnodar and Altai, but the highest 
levels of support were drawn exclusively from ethnic republics. 
 
Figure 5.3: Non-Russian Minorities and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
 
Like four years prior, the distribution of KPRF strongholds followed ethnic minority lines 
in 1999, as evident in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.4 breaks down the percentage of KPRF 
strongholds by regional context and ethnic composition at the raion level, distinguishing 
between majority-Russian and majority-minority raions. For each dyad, the total number 
of raions in a given regional context is indicated. The denominator for each red and blue 
bar is the number of majority-Russian raions and majority-minority raions, respectively, 
that are in that specific regional context, rather than the total number of raions in a given 
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regional environment. Of all majority-minority raions, the Communists captured 
stronghold level support in roughly 25%, closely mirroring the findings from 1995. The 
KPRF largely preserved strongholds in majority-minority raions and there is also 
evidence that the Communists gained ground in majority-Russian raions: the proportion 
of party strongholds in these raions increased from the previous election, from roughly 
15% to nearly 20%. Mirroring the bar charts from 1995, there is a conspicuous spike in 
the Caucasus for both types of raions: astonishingly, more than 60% of majority-minority 
and more than 40% of majority-Russian raions in the Caucasus were KPRF strongholds. 
In terms of percentages, the party performed better in majority-minority raions than 
majority-Russian raions in all regional environments, with the exception of resource-
abundant regions. This pattern largely held across stronghold thresholds, save for the fact 
that the KPRF lost all higher-level stronghold support in both majority-minority and 
majority-Russian raions in resource-rich regions. 
 
Figure 5.4: KPRF Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Interestingly, Table 5.3 indicates that the KPRF‘s average showing in majority-minority 
raions was slightly lower than its national mean, albeit within two percent.  
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Table 5.3: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the KPRF’s Electoral Performance in the 1999 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
26.01 27.29 24.33 
 
26.97 23.83 24.98 31.71 24.42 19.92 
Min 
 
.060 .060 .060 .060 .060 .060 .060 .060 .060 
Max 76.26 76.26 76.26 
 
72.55 76.26 76.26 76.26 58.12 45.17 
SD 10.79 11.89 11.50 13.61 12.32 13.51 13.04 10.17 8.39 
 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
While the shift from raions located in Russian federal regions to those located in ethnic 
republics produced electoral windfalls for the KPRF in 1995, hiking the odds of a 
stronghold by more than 20 times, this variable did not reach standard levels of statistical 
significance in the late 1990s. The KPRF harvested less support on average in ethnic 
republics, with less than two percent under its national vote share. However, as shown in 
Table 5.4, a fair share of KPRF bastions were found in these areas: nearly one-fifth and 
more than one-third, according to the lower and higher threshold, respectively.  
 
Table 5.4: KPRF Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1999 
 
 
 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(442 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(83 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
84 19.13 
28 33.73 
Russian federal 
regions 
355 80.87 
55 66.27 
Muslim regions 44 10.02 19 22.89 
Caucasus regions 102 23.23 34 40.96 
Poorer Regions 244 55.20 64 77.11 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
17 3.87 
0 0 
Fraudulent raions 81 18.33 30 36.14 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
361 81.67 53 63.86 
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While KPRF strongholds were not systematically affected by ethnic republic status, a 
shift from the reference to the indicator group of the Muslim region variable again hiked 
the odds of a stronghold significantly in 1999, by between 34 and 154 times in the higher 
threshold models. Although the relationship was robust and positive in the late 1990s, the 
magnitude of the effect withered compared to the results from the mid-1990s, when the 
odds ballooned to between 164 and 2,102. The descriptive statistics offer a slightly 
different picture of KPRF support in predominantly Muslim regions from the mid- to the 
late-1990s. Compared to the 1995 election, average support in Muslim regions dropped 
more significantly than the other parameters measuring minority support, i.e. majority-
minority raions and ethnic republics: the KPRF‘s mean in Muslim regions was six 
percent higher than the party‘s raion-level national average in 1995 but was one percent 
lower four years later. Of the KPRF‘s strongholds, roughly 10% and 23% percent were 
found in these regions. Although there was a discernible dip in the proportion of KPRF 
strongholds found in both ethnic republics and Muslim regions, the party more or less 
preserved its position in ethnic minority areas at the raion and regional level, despite the 
emergence of two potential parties of power that were each shored up by dozens of 
regional governors in ethnic republics, including Muslim regions, and could mobilize 
ethnic networks to achieve partisan ends. In 1999, the KPRF proved that it could 
withstand dramatic changes to the party system that crowded the market with tenacious 
challengers, particularly in precisely those areas where electoral windfalls were perhaps 
most likely, i.e. areas with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities.  
The contours of support for the LDPR also retained core characteristics from the 
mid-1990s in the late 1990s with regards to minority populations, as ethnic Russian rather 
than ethnic minority support again defined nationalist strongholds. Unit increases in all 
three measures of ethnic minority composition at the raion level consistently damaged the 
odds of an LDPR stronghold in the lower threshold models: the percent non-Russian 
covariate shrunk the odds by three to five percent; the percent titular minority variable 
diminished the odds by two to five percent; finally, the other minority covariate 
depressed the odds by four to seven percent. Higher densities of titular minorities did not 
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exercise a systematic effect on the occurrence of nationalist strongholds in the mid-
1990s, but the presence of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia clearly damaged the LDPR‘s 
prospects among these groups. Figure 5.5 visually confirms that the party‘s vote share 
plummeted with additional minority inhabitants of any type and looks strikingly similar 
to scatterplots pertaining to the previous election. Additionally, the most ardent 
supporters of the ultra-nationalists were found chiefly in majority-Russian raions located 
almost exclusively in oblasts, such as Chita, Murmanskaya, Madaganskaya, 
Novosibirskaya and Sakhalinskaya, and one krai, Krasnoyarsk. The most enthusiastic 
majority-minority raion, seen in the scatterplot concerning titular minorities, was located 
in Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, in European Russia on the western slope of the 
Ural Mountains.  
 
Figure 5.5: Non-Russian Minorities and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 1999 
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Figure 5.6 confirms that there was a severe disparity between the percentage of LDPR 
strongholds in majority-Russian and majority-minority raions in each regional setting. 
Figure 6 indicates that the LDPR expanded its support in majority-Russian raions but lost 
ground in majority-minority areas: while the nationalists captured strongholds in roughly 
20% of majority-Russian raions in 1995, the LDPR‘s share increased to over 20% in 
1999; on the other hand, of all majority-minority raions, the LDPR had strongholds in 
roughly five percent in 1995 but its share dwindled to half that by late in the 1990s. More 
than one-third of majority-Russian raions situated in poorer regions and more than one-
quarter of those in resource-dependent regions were nationalist strongholds. According to 
the relaxed threshold, the LDPR‘s bastions of support were found only in majority-
Russian raions in the Caucasus.  According to the strict threshold, strongholds were only 
located in majority-Russian raions in economically disadvantaged regions, but, curiously, 
were found exclusively in majority-minority raions in ethnic republics.  
 
Figure 5.6: LDPR Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Furthermore, the nationalist‘s average in majority-minority raions was less than its raion-
level national mean, as shown in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the LDPR’s Electoral Performance in the 1999 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
6.83 6.70 6.30 4.76 5.17 3.48 5.05 6.43 6.61 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 25.31 25.28 25.31 
 
25.31 25.28 25.28 25.28 25.28 25.31 
SD 
 
3.10 3.30 3.15 3.99 3.59 3.37 3.47 2.90 3.57 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
These findings are unexpected to at least some extent, considering the LDPR made a 
concerted effort to moderate its ideological platform during the 1999 campaign, 
especially by dampening anti-Semitic and Russophilic rhetoric and softening its fiery 
brand of nationalism. Yet the LDPR also suffered from concentrations of ethnic 
minorities in the mid-1990s, indicating continuity in LDPR strongholds on this dimension 
across time. Although the minority covariates were also statistically significant and 
negative in the 1995 models, this finding that reinforces the ethnic Russian contours of 
LDPR strongholds in 1999 diverges from previous survey research that found this 
cleavage was not statistically significant in the last legislative election of the decade 
(Hale 2006). Further confirmation of the LDPR‘s failure in ethnic contexts is available 
from the regional variables. In a strict model, the value for raions nested within ethnic 
republics was merely two percent the value of the odds for raions located elsewhere. 
According to Table 5.5, the party‘s average in ethnic republics was nearly two percent 
below its national vote share and, per Table 5.6, only four and thirteen percent of LDPR 
strongholds were located in ethnic republics according to the higher and lower threshold, 
respectively. The LDPR thus experienced a slight dip from the previous contest in the 
proportion of its strongholds that were found in ethnic republics, most likely attributable 
to the accession of Fatherland-All Russia and Unity.  
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Table 5.6: LDPR Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1999 
 
 
 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(391 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(66 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
50 13.26 
3 4.84 
Russian federal 
regions 
327 86.74 
59 95.16 
Muslim regions 0 0 0 0 
Caucasus regions 7 1.86 1 1.61 
Poorer Regions 213 54.48 44 66.67 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
77 20.42 
3 4.84 
Fraudulent raions 35 8.95 11 16.67 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
356 91.05 55 83.33 
 
Although the distinction between raions in predominantly Muslim regions and those in 
other locales did not systematically affect the occurrence of LDPR strongholds, 
descriptive statistics evince weak support among ethnic constituencies. The LDPR‘s 
average in Muslim regions was even more dismal than in ethnic republics, as Muslim 
regions recorded a full three percent less than the party‘s national showing. Closely 
mirroring the party‘s feeble showing in Muslim regions in 1995, the LDPR had no 
strongholds in regions with a preponderance of Muslims according to both measures of 
the dependent variable. Thus, the LDPR forged strongholds mainly in areas with 
concentrations of ethnic Russians in the mid- to late-1990s and tried to distinguish itself 
as the political party best suited to represent this constituency, while also struggling to 
broaden its appeal to ethnic minorities by fine-tuning its rhetoric.  
Paralleling the LDPR‘s electoral rout in areas with higher compositions of ethnic 
minorities, Yabloko suffered consistently with unit increases in each of the three minority 
covariates using both measures of party strongholds. In the mid-1990s, these variables 
did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, contrary to the findings of 
large-scale survey research that underscored the systematic connection linking ethnic 
Russian support to Yabloko‘s success (White, Wyman and Oates 1997). By late in the 
decade, however, the percent minority variable significantly diminished the odds of a 
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Yabloko stronghold and consistently so, from four to five percent in the lower threshold 
models, and from seven to thirty percent in the upper threshold specifications. Increases 
in titular minorities also caused Yabloko to fare poorly; this covariate decreased the odds 
by roughly four percent in the relaxed models and by roughly thirteen percent according 
to one higher threshold specification. Finally, other minority populations, a category that 
includes Indo-Europeans, may be expected to support the archetypal liberal party in 
Russia because of familial connections to the West and possibly past experience with 
more liberal forms of governance as well. However, a one percent increase in other 
minorities reduced the odds of a Yabloko stronghold by five to eight percent and by 17 to 
27%, with the relaxed and strict party stronghold measures. Yabloko‘s electoral fortunes 
were buoyed by larger concentrations of other minorities in the previous election but the 
winds shifted precipitously in 1999. By the end of the 1990s, the liberal party could no 
longer rely on high levels of support from any group other than ethnic Russians. Previous 
research demonstrated that Yabloko‘s bastions of support were located in ethnic Russian 
areas in the context of the 1995 contest, while other scholarship found that ethnic 
cleavages did not exert a systematic effect on Yabloko support in the context of the 1999 
election (Colton and McFaul 2003; Hale 2006). Therefore, these findings offer a different 
depiction of the ethnic bases of the liberal party. Figure 5.7 substantiates the statistical 
results and showcases the similarities between the liberals and the far right nationalists: 
like the LDPR, Yabloko‘s vote share plummeted with additional non-Russian residents of 
any kind. The most fanatical raions were located in the federal cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg and oblasts and krais, such as Omsk, Rostov, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, 
Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Primorski. Interestingly, the geographic distribution 
Yabloko‘s most enthusiastic raions was not clustered in those majority-Russian raions 
located in European Russia, but rather revealed a wider diffusion of support across the 
country‘s expanse. 
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Figure 5.7: Non-Russian Minorities and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 sketches the ethnic Russian outlines of Yabloko‘s support: of the majority-
minority and majority-Russian raions in each regional setting, the balance decisively 
favored majority-Russian raions across both thresholds. Of all majority-minority and 
majority-Russian raions, Yabloko‘s percentage of strongholds in both contexts was 
essentially identical to the mid-1990s. Surprisingly, given the party market crowded with 
strong competitors, Yabloko enjoyed a small percentage of strongholds in majority-
minority raions in ethnic republics, Muslim regions, and those in the Caucasus. In the 
Caucasus and resource-dependent regions, slightly less than one-quarter and roughly 20% 
of majority-Russian raions were liberal zealots. In resource-rich regions, however, the 
party‘s only bastions of support were found in majority-Russian raions according to the 
relaxed threshold. With the shift to the strict threshold, Yabloko‘s already small share of 
majority-minority strongholds evaporated entirely. Compared to the charts regarding 
1995, an additional peak emerged in resource regions in 1999.  
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Figure 5.8: Yabloko Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The party‘s average in majority-minority raions was slightly higher than nationally, as 
shown in Table 5.7, but Yabloko fared worse in ethnic regional contexts: its mean in 
ethnic republics and Muslim regions were one to roughly one and a half percent lower 
than its raion-level national average. 
 
Table 5.7: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Yabloko’s Electoral Performance in the 1999 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
4.19 3.16 4.29 
 
1.31 3.10 2.95 3.66 4.79 4.27 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .070 .070 
Max 19.29 15.36 19.29 
 
13.89 15.82 14.59 14.59 19.29 17.33 
SD 
 
3.44 2.96 3.56 1.48 3.17 3.32 3.24 3.70 3.70 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
In the statistical results, the value for raions nested within ethnic republics were one-tenth 
to one-twentieth the value of the odds for those located elsewhere according to the 
relaxed threshold and the value according to the strict threshold was minuscule. Four 
years earlier, ethnic republic status also sank the odds considerably, but the magnitude of 
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the effect was larger in 1999, plunging the odds to even greater depths. Interestingly 
though, across stronghold measures, a higher proportion of Yabloko‘s strongholds were 
found in ethnic republics, roughly nine percent, in 1999 than in 1995, as shown in Table 
5.8. In general, Yabloko preserved its constituency rooted in Russian federal regions, 
which became more and more essential to the party‘s survival since it was almost 
completely frozen out of the ethnic republics once Fatherland-All Russia and Unity 
entered the political scene. While Yabloko suffered more acutely in ethnic republics in 
the late 1990s according to the statistical results, location in predominantly Muslim 
regions again did not exercise a systematic effect on the occurrence of Yabloko 
strongholds. Few bastions of support were found in Muslim regions, merely two percent 
at the most, according to both thresholds.  
 
Table 5.8: Yabloko Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1999 
 
 
 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(474 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(128 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
44 9.82 
12 9.84 
Russian federal 
regions 
404 90.18 
110 90.16 
Muslim regions 9 2.01 2 1.64 
Caucasus regions 16 3.57 5 4.10 
Poorer Regions 96 20.25 27 21.89 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
65 14.51 
24 19.67 
Fraudulent raions 3 0.63 2 1.56 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
471 99.37 126 98.44 
 
Yabloko and the LDPR championed divergent policy platforms and occupied different 
ideological niches, but the contours of their support were both defined crucially by ethnic 
Russians in the late 1990s. Thus, the core party troika generally consolidated their 
distinct pockets of support on different sides, in some cases, of the ethnic Russian, non-
Russian cleavage. 
The Urban-rural Divide and Opposition Parties  
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 Opposition parties fortified electoral gains captured in the mid-1990s by making 
deeper inroads in the countryside or urban centers, in Yabloko‘s case, in the late 1990s. 
In 1995, a unit increase in rural residents augmented the odds of a KPRF stronghold by 
one to two percent across the board; in 1999, the odds lifted approximately two to three 
percent across all lower threshold models, and roughly two to four percent in the upper 
threshold specifications. Thus, the magnitude of the positive effect of rural areas was 
greater than in the previous election, indicating that the Communists entrenched 
themselves more firmly in rural communities. In majority-rural areas, the KPRF‘s mean 
was more than one percent higher than its countrywide showing. Figure 5.9 corroborates 
these findings by illustrating the steep incline in the KPRF‘s vote share as ruralness at the 
raion level increased. The preponderance of zealous raions were found in mostly rural 
areas in Dagestan, North Ossetia, Adygea, Orlovskaya, Bryanskaya, Ulyanovskaya, 
Lipyetskaya, and Altai.  
 
Figure 5.9: Rural Inhabitants and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
A notably higher percentage of the KPRF‘s strongholds were found in the countryside 
rather than urban raions across both thresholds, as evident in Figure 5.10. Compared to 
the mid-1990s, the Communists markedly expanded their support in majority-rural raions 
but enthusiasm for the party waned in majority-urban areas: nearly 20% of majority-rural 
raions were KPRF strongholds in 1995 but by the late 1990s, the percentage jumped 
closer to 30%; in contrast, of mostly urban raions, the KPRF enjoyed high levels of 
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support in roughly 10% in the mid-1990s but the party‘s share dropped noticeably below 
that level in 1999. The rural pattern of support held across thresholds, with the exception 
that all strongholds in resource-rich regions dried up when the strict threshold was 
employed. In the Caucasus, the KPRF captured strongholds in nearly 60% of rural raions 
and more than 20% of urban raions. Roughly one-third of countryside raions in poorer 
regions were Communist enthusiasts. Compared to the mid-1990s, when the KPRF 
harvested a higher percentage of urban than rural strongholds in Muslim and resource-
abundant regions, the KPRF‘s pattern of support followed rural lines without exception in 
the late-1990s.  
 
Figure 5.10: KPRF Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The party managed to lock down the rural constituency more securely in the late 1990s, 
despite enduring new competition in the countryside with the LDPR and the two potential 
parties of power. The KPRF‘s robust performance in the countryside was far from a 
foregone conclusion since the Fatherland-All Russia coalition absorbed most of the 
Agrarian Party‘s leadership and members prior to the election, which attracted left-
leaning rural voters to the new party project (Marsh 2002). Yet the KPRF likely 
benefitted from the fact that it had served as the standard-bearer for rural interests in the 
legislature since the collapse of Communism, while the other parties competing for the 
rural vote, notably Unity and Fatherland-All Russia, were tenderfoots. 
 189 
As the KPRF fortified its already robust rural constituency, the LDPR made new 
electoral inroads in the Russian countryside. The rural covariate exercised a 
comparatively slight positive effect in the mid-1990s, but, in the late 1990s, lifted the 
odds by one to two percent nearly across the board in the lower threshold models and by 
up to one percent in the upper threshold specifications. The strengthening rural contours 
of LDPR support contrasts with findings from prior research on the 1999 election that 
indicated community size did not have a systematic effect on the party‘s electoral support 
(Hale 2006). In rural areas, the LDPR‘s average was within one-half percent of its raion-
level national mean. Although somewhat more difficult to discern visually, Figure 5.11 
displays the positive relationship between the party‘s vote share and greater degrees of 
rurality. The most passionate countryside raions were located in Chita, Krasnoyarsk, 
Novosibirskaya, and Komi-Permyat Autonomous Okrug, and the urban enthusiasts were 
found in Tverskaya, Murmanskaya, Amurskaya, Sakhalinskaya and Kurganskaya.  
 
Figure 5.11: Rural Inhabitants and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Overall, Figure 5.12 showcases the rural pattern of the LDPR‘s support. Of majority-rural 
raions, the nationalists captured a higher percentage of strongholds in these areas in 1999 
than in the previous election, although the improvement was slight. In contrast, of raions 
situated in mostly urban environments, the percentage of LDPR bastions of support 
dipped by a small amount. A few exceptions are evident in ethnic republics according to 
the relaxed threshold and poorer regions according to the strict threshold. Surprisingly, 
 190 
with the shift from the lower to the higher stronghold measure, the balance in percentages 
between strongholds in the countryside and urban centers in economically disadvantaged 
regions tilted in favor of urban raions. Nevertheless, of urban raions in poorer regions, the 
LDPR captured strongholds in nearly 20%, a higher percentage than in any other regional 
context. Almost one-quarter of rural raions in resource-dependent regions reported high 
vote shares for the nationalists. Raising the stronghold threshold resulted in urban support 
in the Caucasus to evaporate. From the mid- to late-1990s, the balance shifted from 
predominantly urban strongholds to mostly rural bastions in poorer and resource-rich 
regions and the small percentage of strongholds in Muslim regions that the LDPR 
captured in 1995 was wiped out in the 1999 contest.  
 
Figure 5.12: LDPR Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The LDPR‘s electoral trajectory thus showed signs that the party was rooting itself more 
firmly in the countryside and emerged as a genuine contender for this constituency with 
the potential to jeopardize the KPRF‘s hold on its most staunch supporters. The fact that 
multiple parties, including two new potential parties of power, competed for support from 
the countryside resulted in the fragmentation of the rural vote across numerous parties 
representing the opposition and the Kremlin alike, rather than a winnowing effect where 
one party, the most likely contenders being Unity or Fatherland-All Russia, dominated at 
the expense of others. The countryside was up for grabs in the late 1990s and multiple 
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parties, including the Communists and nationalists, walked away with a piece of the 
action.  
In contrast to the reds and browns, Yabloko‘s situation in rural areas was as 
desperate in the late 1990s as four years earlier: the rural variable decreased the odds of a 
stronghold by three to eight percent across the lower threshold models and by nine to 
15% when the stricter threshold was employed. Compared to 1995 and contingent on the 
model, the magnitude of the negative effect was substantially larger. The liberal party 
continued to carve out a unique niche in urban centers, where the party market was less 
crowded, devoid of the Communists, nationalists, and the two potential parties of power. 
Yabloko‘s average in rural areas was more than one percent less than its national take. 
Figure 5.13 reveals the extreme deterioration in support for Yabloko brought about by 
additional rural inhabitants. Unsurprisingly, the keenest raions were completely urban 
and found in the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and regions located in 
European Russia, such as Rostov Oblast. The most ardent supporters in the countryside 
were found in Tomsk Oblast in the West Siberian Plain and Irkutsk Oblast in 
southeastern Siberia.  
 
Figure 5.13: Rural Inhabitants and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Yabloko‘s urban base of support is also conspicuous in Figure 5.14 and appears 
remarkably similar to the charts pertaining to 1995. Again, there was a stark imbalance in 
the percentage of urban and rural enthusiasm for the liberals that tilted heavily toward 
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urban centers. Yabloko made considerable gains in urban raions in 1999 compared to 
1995: of these raions, Yabloko harvested strongholds in more than 20% in the mid-1990s 
but the party‘s share skyrocketed to more than 25% late in the decade. On the other hand, 
of majority-rural raions, the share of Yabloko strongholds was as infinitesimal as it was 
in 1995. Yabloko captured the highest share of majority-rural raions in resource-abundant 
and poorer regions, albeit the latter to a lesser degree. More than one-third of mostly 
urban raions in resource-dependent regions were Yabloko strongholds, the highest share 
of any regional environment by a large margin. The liberals failed to garner any support 
from predominantly rural raions in Muslim regions or those located in the Caucasus. 
With the shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold, the percentage of Yabloko 
strongholds became even more urban: in ethnic republics, Muslim regions, and regions in 
the Caucasus, Yabloko failed to capture any stronghold-level support from the 
countryside.  
 
Figure 5.14: Yabloko Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 
1999 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Thus, Yabloko‘s tentacles penetrated urban areas more thoroughly across the 1990s, 
likely because electoral competition in cities was fairer than in the countryside. The 
fragile liberal party benefitted when it was allowed to compete in a comparatively fair 
fight, as Yabloko did not enjoy the vast resource endowments necessary to engage in 
electoral manipulation on its behalf and, in any case, the party was committed to free and 
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fair elections. Recognizing that it did not have a chance in rural areas, Yabloko doubled-
down on its efforts to capture votes in the cities. 
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and Opposition Parties  
 Variables differentiating additional regional environments produced results 
broadly consistent with the 1995 findings. With regards to location in the Caucasus, the 
KPRF again received an immense electoral boost, with odds of a stronghold hiking to 
between 16 and 124 in the relaxed models and between 35 and 251 times in the stricter 
models. Depending on the model, the magnitude of the positive effect was significantly 
larger in 1999 than 1995. About 40% KPRF strongholds were located in the Caucasus 
according to the stricter measure, and nearly 25% by the relaxed threshold. Furthermore, 
the party‘s average in raions located in the Caucasus was nearly six percent higher than 
nationally. These results square with the findings concerning other minorities, as the 
Communists performed well in areas with sizable populations of non-titular ethnic 
minorities, many of which are located in the Caucasus. The KPRF protected strongholds 
first built in the mid-1990s against the two potential parties of power that competed to 
gain electoral footholds in the area. In a repeat of the mid-1990s, when the Kremlin 
waged a brutal military campaign in Chechnya and parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia, the 
Communists also likely scored in the Caucasus at least to some extent because of a 
protest vote against the central government, which reopened hostilities in Chechnya in 
September 1999. For those in the war-torn Caucasus, the KPRF was a logical choice 
since it had retained its position as the most formidable opposition to the Kremlin 
throughout the 1990s. Moreover, the robust Communist presence in the legislature in the 
mid- to late-1990s gave the party access to resources that could be passed along to voters 
in areas with clear grievances against the Kremlin, i.e. those looking to cast protest votes. 
Whether or not the KPRF would be able to preserve its presence in the Caucasus in future 
elections if the area reconciled with the central government remained an open question. 
In contrast to the Communists, the values for raions located in the Caucasus were 
one percent or less the value of the odds for raions located elsewhere for the nationalists. 
In the previous election, this variable failed to reach statistical significance. Indeed, only 
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one percent of LDPR strongholds were located in the area according to the higher 
measure, and less than two percent by the lower threshold. Descriptive statistics 
corroborate the LDPR‘s failure in Caucasian raions: the party‘s average was almost two 
percent lower than nationally. The LDPR‘s conspicuous vulnerability in the Caucasus 
was expected due to the preponderance of non-Russian ethnic groups, especially titular 
minorities, which were derided in the party‘s xenophobic rhetoric. Thus, the fact that the 
party was not irreparably debilitated in the Caucasus in the mid-1990s is striking by 
comparison. In contrast to the LDPR, location in the Caucasus produced the same effect 
across the 1990s for Yabloko. As in 1995, the variable did not reach statistical 
significance in the multilevel models, but Yabloko‘s average was once more slightly 
lower than nationally. Merely four percent of the party‘s strongholds were located in the 
area. Unlike dynamics prevailing in the countryside, the KPRF enjoyed a unique 
advantage vis-à-vis the nationalists and liberals in the Caucasus and carved out a deeper 
niche for itself in the area from the mid- to the late-1990s, while the LDPR made new 
inroads in regions located outside the powder keg of Russia.  
 The variables assessing socioeconomic welfare utilizing gross regional product 
and resource wealth reveal that opposition parties‘ trajectories in the late 1990s closely 
mirrored those in the middle of the decade, and provide evidence of the consolidation of 
unique pockets of support. Like four years earlier, the KPRF suffered based on a one-unit 
increase in gross regional product, but the magnitude of the effect was greater in the strict 
specifications in 1999 than 1995. The odds of a KPRF stronghold plummeted 70% or 
more across the lower threshold models and by roughly 98% in an upper threshold 
specification. As anticipated, the majority of the party‘s strongholds, 55% and 77% by 
the lower and higher measure, respectively, were housed in economically disadvantaged 
areas. Furthermore, the party‘s average in regions above the median level of gross 
regional product was approximately one and a half percent less than its raion-level 
national average, comparable to the disparity in 1995. The results reinforce the traditional 
picture of the KPRF as a party that performed better under conditions of economic 
deprivation and confirm that a relatively stable constituency was developing in support of 
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the Communists. Clearly, the Communists benefitted from the misery of the market and 
the government‘s inability to pay wage arrears in the immediate wake of the 1998 
economic crisis and ruble devaluation. The lifeblood of the Communists throughout the 
1990s was in many ways economic problems that continued to dog Russia nearly a 
decade after the collapse of Communism. The party continued to draw high levels of 
support from areas that lost the most in the still transitional environment of the late 
1990s. Without the economic crisis that brought many of the government‘s missteps to 
the forefront of the public mind, the Communists may have fared much worse in poorer 
areas in 1999, providing substance to claims that the party was withering after the path to 
the market was not abandoned in favor of a reassertion of state involvement in the mid-
1990s.  
Paralleling the KPRF, economic advancement also caused the LDPR to fall short, 
compared not only to other parties in the late 1990s but to the party‘s own performance in 
the previous election. With increasing levels of gross regional product, the odds of an 
LDPR stronghold plunged more than 50% in 1995 but fell even farther four years later, a 
full 90% drop in an upper threshold model. Over half and two-thirds of the party‘s 
strongholds were located in poorer regions, according to the relaxed and stricter measure. 
However, the LDPR‘s average in economically developed regions was once more almost 
on par with its countryside showing. Opposition parties on the far left and the far right of 
the political spectrum both competed for the same pockets of support in regions that were 
economically disadvantaged and each showed signs of consolidating that support over 
time.  
The trajectory of final member of the core party troika also roughly followed the 
lines established in the mid-1990s, but in the direction opposite to that followed by the 
Communists and nationalists. Yabloko again received a sizable boost as economic 
development progressed, with odds lifting by approximately 70 to 75%, but the 
magnitude of the positive effect was considerably less than four years prior, when odds 
ballooned to two. The party‘s mean in economically developed regions was again higher 
than its national yield. In fact, in federal subjects with gross regional products larger than 
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the median, Yabloko‘s performance was the best out of any raion or regional 
environment considered. The party had few strongholds in less well-off regions, roughly 
one-fifth across both measures. As was true in the mid-1990s, the fact that Yabloko did 
not succeed to a greater degree in wealthier regions is surprising because the party faced 
very little competition in these areas, as evidenced by the statistical results for the other 
parties, including the two potential parties of power, Fatherland-All Russia and Unity. 
The liberals might have enjoyed a distinct edge in wealthier regions throughout the 
1990s, but Yabloko seemingly did not double-down on efforts in these areas to ensure 
that it harvested more support relative to its performance in 1995. This was perhaps a 
strategic error in Yabloko‘s campaign, if the leadership believed that wealthier areas were 
already locked down sufficiently and decided to focus the party‘s attention elsewhere.  
With regard to the other measure of socioeconomic welfare, the KPRF fared 
extremely poorly in resource regions: the shift from raions located in regions with 
diversified economies to those located in resource-dependent regions caused the odds to 
plummet tremendously. Four years prior, this distinction did not exercise a systematic 
effect. The KPRF had no strongholds in resource regions by the higher measure of party 
stronghold, and less than four percent by the relaxed measure. Descriptive statistics 
indicate that the party‘s average in resource regions was less than six percent below its 
national showing, a modest improvement compared to the approximately seven percent 
drop four years prior. These results generally corroborate those concerning economic 
development and paint a clear picture of the KPRF as a party with genuine strengths 
emerging in areas with lackluster regional economies and those comparatively more 
diversified. Unlike the Communists, a region‘s reliance on natural resources did not reach 
statistical significance in any of the models for the ultra-nationalists, as was the case in 
the mid-1990s. Only four percent of the party‘s strongholds were located in resource 
regions according to the higher threshold, and one-fifth according to the lower threshold. 
The LDPR‘s average in resource regions was slightly higher than that in economically 
developed regions, albeit still lower than its national showing. As was the case in 1995, 
the finding that the nationalists were not negatively impacted based on resource wealth is 
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surprising, given their long-standing appeals to those suffering serious deprivation. In 
contrast to the Communists and nationalists, the liberal Yabloko excelled in resource 
regions: the odds of a stronghold were amplified by three times at the lowest, and by 
more than five times at the highest. Approximately 20% and 15% of the party‘s 
strongholds were situated in resource regions by the higher and lower threshold, 
respectively. By the end of the decade, Yabloko had firmly distinguished itself from the 
other two leading opposition parties by establishing a reliable pocket of support in 
economically advantaged areas, both with regards to gross regional product and natural 
resource wealth.  
Electoral Manipulation and Opposition Parties 
 The fraud variable produced striking results for opposition parties competing in 
1999. In the 1995 election, the KPRF benefitted from high levels of turnout in some 
models but was harmed in others; at the end of the decade, inflated turnout had a robust 
and positive effect in the upper threshold specifications, roughly doubling the odds. 
Furthermore, more than one-third of the KPRF‘s strongholds were located in raions 
suspected for electoral manipulation by the higher measure, and almost one-fifth by the 
lower measure. The KPRF‘s average vote share in fraudulent raions was approximately 
one percent higher than its national take. Closely mirroring the figure from 1995, Figure 
5.15 again shows that the KPRF‘s vote share grew as turnout increased, albeit not as 
sharply as four years prior. The raions in the upper right quadrant, at the nexus of high 
turnout and high KPRF support, were located almost exclusively in Dagestan, Altai and 
Orlov. The relationship between voter turnout and the KPRF‘s vote share in 1999 showed 
a less steep incline than was evident four years earlier.  
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Figure 5.15: Voter Turnout and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Figure 5.16 shows that a sizable share of KPRF strongholds was found in fraudulent 
raions in the late 1990s and the percentage increased with the shift in thresholds, as was 
the case in the mid-1990s. Compared to the previous election, the KPRF captured 
roughly six percent fewer strongholds in manipulated raions according to the lower 
threshold but approximately six percent more according to the higher threshold. Thus, the 
percentage of KPRF strongholds in manipulated areas was less balanced across 
thresholds in 1999 than 1995, but in both elections, the very highest levels of KPRF 
support were firmly rooted in fraudulent areas. Of the raions suspected for electoral 
manipulation, the KPRF harvested bastions of support in nearly 25% and almost 10%, by 
the lower and higher measure, closely mirroring 1995. That the percent of fraudulent 
raions that were KPRF strongholds changed only slightly from 1995 to 1999 suggests 
that the KPRF largely preserved its zones of dominance in fraudulent raions and 
effectively withstood dramatic changes to the party system involving the disappearance 
of a weak party of power and the appearance of two more formidable challengers in its 
stead, each trying not only to beat the other but also the KPRF, the winner of the previous 
Duma contest. 
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Figure 5.16: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are KPRF Strongholds vs. Percent KPRF 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1999 
 
 
The distinction between non-manipulated and fraudulent raions did not systematically 
influence the occurrence of LDPR strongholds in the mid-1990s, but the party made new 
inroads in these zones in 1999. Like the KPRF, the LDPR excelled in raions with inflated 
turnout levels: the odds of a stronghold were amplified by two to three times in the strict 
specifications. Interestingly, the party‘s vote share in fraudulent raions was 
approximately two percent less than its national showing. When these variables were 
leveraged in their continuous forms, without controlling for the other variables and 
treated as dichotomous variables, as they were in the statistical models, the association 
between voter turnout and the LDPR‘s vote share appears to be negative, as shown in 
Figure 5.17. Nevertheless, a considerable number of higher turnout raions reported vote 
shares for the LDPR in excess of about 10%, which is the lower threshold for LDPR 
strongholds in 1999. The one conspicuous high turnout raion that recorded fanatical 
support for the nationalists was found in Arkhangelsk Oblast in northwestern Russia on 
the White Sea.  
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Figure 5.17: Voter Turnout and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Figure 5.18 shows that, compared to the KPRF, the LDPR enjoyed considerably fewer 
strongholds in fraudulent raions according to both thresholds. Yet a fair share of the 
LDPR‘s strongholds were found in manipulated raions, roughly nine percent by the 
relaxed measure and roughly 17% by the strict threshold. Of manipulated raions, 
approximately 10% and only about three percent were bastions of support for the 
nationalists by the lower and higher measure.  
 
Figure 5.18: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are LDPR Strongholds vs. Percent LDPR 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1999 
 
 
Despite these findings, it seems dubious that the LDPR was capable of engaging in 
electoral manipulation itself because the party lacked the strong infrastructure, regional 
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networks, and resources necessary to carry out malfeasance on a large scale. When the 
nationalists benefitted, in fact, from fraud, it is more plausible that other parties engaging 
in nefarious practices themselves transferred some votes to the nationalists, a party that 
was more Kremlin-friendly at the time than the intractable Communists, to give the 
appearance of genuine multiparty competition while denying the real competition, i.e. the 
KRPF, votes. There is evidence that precisely this occurred in previous elections, most 
notably the 1993 snap elections: electoral malfeasance committed by the Kremlin 
benefitted the LDPR to the tune of an extra six million votes, which signaled ―covert 
official approval for the LDPR‖ (Wilson 2005: 75-76). Yet, it is notable that both the 
Communists and nationalists received a boost in the statistical models from abnormally 
high turnout in the late 1990s, even if they did not benefit equally from electoral 
manipulation. The results, including the positive and robust findings concerning 
Fatherland-All Russia and Unity discussed subsequently, demonstrate the ―full pluralism 
of falsification,‖ meaning that ―every party that ha[d] any support among those holding 
power anywhere […] engage[d] in it‖ (Fish 2005: 53). Significantly though, the 
―pluralism of falsification does not wash out the effects of falsification‖ and the ―chance 
that [all parties] benefitted equally are remote‖ (Ibid).  
In this respect, the bar charts in Figures 16 and 18 are more informative than the 
statistical results because, while the model results illustrate that both the KPRF and 
LDPR benefitted from electoral manipulation, the bar charts facilitate comparison 
between the two parties in terms of the relative impact of electoral manipulation. The 
relative influence of electoral malfeasance on Communist versus nationalist strongholds 
suggests that the opposition parties that benefitted from nefarious practices did not profit 
equally. As the weakest of the core party troika, the liberal Yabloko was hurt by high 
turnout in the 1995 election, when the odds of a stronghold plummeted drastically by 
approximately 70 to 75% with the shift from the non-manipulated category to the 
manipulated class. Surprisingly, in 1999, this variable did not exercise a systematic effect 
on liberal strongholds across-the-board. Yet few Yabloko strongholds, indeed less than 
two percent, were situated in fraudulent raions and the liberal party‘s average vote share 
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in these zones was roughly three percent less than its national performance. Mirroring the 
relationship between Yabloko‘s vote share and turnout levels in 1995, Figure 5.19 again 
showcases a steep inverse association in 1999. The one raion combining unusually high 
participation and aberrational support for the liberal party was located in Krasnodar Krai 
on the Black Sea coast and across the Strait of Kerch from Crimea.   
 
Figure 5.19: Voter Turnout and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Figure 5.20 throws into sharper relief the distinction between Yabloko and the 
Communists and nationalists: Yabloko‘s share of strongholds in fraudulent raions was, by 
a large margin, the lowest of any of the core party troika by the relaxed measure, but 
Yabloko bested the LDPR according to the strict threshold. In an interesting parallel to 
the Communists, the percentage of liberal strongholds in these raions increased with the 
shift from the lower to the higher threshold. Of the total number of fraudulent raions, 
Yabloko enjoyed the fewest strongholds of any party, with less than one percent 
according to both thresholds.  
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Figure 5.20: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Yabloko Strongholds vs. Percent 
Yabloko Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1999 
 
 
Yabloko distinguished itself from the other two members of the core party troika because 
high levels of voter turnout did not exert a robust and positive affect on the occurrence of 
its strongholds, a finding that conformed to expectations. In comparison, the fact that the 
Communists and nationalists experienced more rather than less electoral success in 
fraudulent areas is striking, as conventional wisdom suggests that opposition parties were 
most well positioned to succeed when free and fair competition prevailed at the local 
level.  
Across the 1990s, opposition parties fortified existing strongholds and endeavored 
to expand their constituencies with mixed results. The KPRF continued its rural reign and 
preserved pockets of support in raions with larger populations of ethnic non-Russians, 
particularly other minorities, those located in the Caucasus, economically disadvantaged 
regions and those with diversified regional economies, but may have wavered to some 
degree in Muslim regions, as evidenced by the weaker magnitude of the effect compared 
to 1995. The LDPR tried but failed to expand its constituency by softening its 
xenophobic and Russophilic rhetoric, floundering yet again in raions with high 
concentrations of ethnic minorities. However, the party extended its tentacles deeper into 
the countryside and in areas outside of the Caucasus for the first time. Although Yabloko 
was the weakest of the core party troika in both 1995 and 1999, the party established 
unique and concrete, albeit small, pockets of support that kept it afloat amid shifts in the 
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party system. The liberal party shored up its strongholds anchored in urban raions, 
economically privileged and Russian federal regions and primed fresh pockets of support 
in ethnic Russian raions and those with regional economies dependent on natural 
resources. In the late-1990s, pockets of support both emerged and crystallized for each 
opposition party, despite the emergence of two competing parties of power with the 
capacity to jeopardize their core constituencies.  
Ethnicity and the Potential Party of Power (Fatherland-All Russia) 
 The electoral outcomes of the two potential parties of power, Fatherland-All 
Russia and Unity, showcase divergent pockets of support and forecast the contours of the 
far-reaching electoral base backing the dominant party after the two parties merged in the 
early 2000s. The pre-election favorite to become the new party of power, Fatherland-All 
Russia, captured significant support from minority constituencies. The percent minority 
covariate lifted the odds of a stronghold by two to four percent across thresholds. 
Furthermore, the percent titular refinement of the ethnic composition variable augmented 
the odds by two to three percent. Considerable minority support, especially from titular 
minorities, can be attributed to the party‘s numerous ties to the regions of Russia, 
especially ethnic republics notorious for political machines with the capacity to devastate 
challengers. The parameter gauging raion-level population of other minorities also raised 
the odds by approximately two percent in the lower threshold models but failed to 
achieve statistical significance using the higher threshold. Further investigation revealed 
that the raions with high concentrations of other minorities that recorded high support for 
Fatherland were not those populated by Indo-European groups, but rather small non-
titular ethnic groups because such raions were located in Dagestan and Bashkortostan. 
Figure 5.21 highlights the precipitous incline in Fatherland‘s vote share with more non-
Russian inhabitants of any sort and reveals numerous raions located in the upper right 
quadrant. The raions recording the highest support for Fatherland were located chiefly in 
ethnic republics, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan and Mari El, and the two 
federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. These areas flocked to Fatherland because, 
as mentioned, the party‘s leaders included the Mayor of Moscow and the governor of St. 
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Petersburg, ensuring support from the two largest cities in Russia, and the presidents of 
the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Ingushetia, guaranteeing votes from the 
provinces. The most fanatical raion, registering a vote share for Fatherland of over 95%, 
was found in the republic of Ingushetia, sandwiched in between North Ossetia and 
Chechnya and bordering Georgia to the south.  
 
Figure 5.21: Non-Russian Minorities and Fatherland-All Russia‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
 
Figure 5.22 confirms the findings from the statistical models by exposing the 
unmistakably ethnic minority contours of the Fatherland vote. Of all majority-minority 
raions, nearly 40% delivered high levels of support to the hopeful party of power. 
However, a minuscule percentage of majority-Russian raions registered similar devotion. 
In each regional context, the party captured a disproportionate percentage of strongholds 
in majority-minority raions, but Fatherland also harvested a high percentage of support 
from majority-Russian raions located in ethnic republics and Muslim regions. Strikingly, 
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more than 70% of majority-minority raions in Muslim regions and roughly the same 
share in resource-dependent regions channeled immense support to Fatherland. The 
contours of Fatherland support on this dimension are roughly the reverse of the liberal 
Yabloko party. Surprisingly, Fatherland was able to maintain at least some strongholds in 
majority-Russian raions with the shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold.  
 
Figure 5.22: Fatherland-All Russia‘s Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional 
Contexts in 1999 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics showcase the positive effects of non-Russian populations and ethnic 
regional contexts on Fatherland‘s electoral fortunes. Fatherland‘s average in majority-
minority raions was more than three percent greater than its raion-level national average 
as shown in Table 5.9. The party gathered tremendous support from ethnic republics and 
Muslim regions: its mean showing was more than 10% greater and, astonishingly, nearly 
21% greater than its countrywide average, respectively.  
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Table 5.9: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Fatherland-All Russia’s Electoral Performance 
in the 1999 Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
11.50 13.00 14.74 
 
26.51 21.73 32.47 11.94 13.60 20.10 
Min 
 
1.00 1.11 1.17 1.00 1.00 1.73 1.11 1.11 1.11 
Max 99.53 99.53 99.53 
 
99.53 99.53 99.53 99.53 99.53 99.53 
SD 
 
14.68 17.28 17.14 27.06 22.44 25.33 13.36 17.14 24.28 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
 
The party thrived in ethnic republics: the shift from raions located in Russian federal 
regions to those in ethnic republics amplified the odds of a stronghold immensely, by 151 
to 248 times. Indeed, nearly two-thirds and almost 50% of Fatherland strongholds were 
located in ethnic republics, as indicated in Table 5.10. Similarly, but by a drastically 
greater degree, Fatherland flourished in Muslim contexts across the majority of models: 
the values for raions located in these regions were at least over one thousand times and at 
most more than six hundred thousand times the value for raions situated elsewhere. 
Roughly half and 40% were located in Muslim regions according to the stricter and 
relaxed measures, respectively.  
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These data strongly suggest that Fatherland largely supplanted Our Home is Russia in 
ethnic republics and Muslim regions in the late 1990s, but Fatherland managed to 
monopolize ethnic zones significantly more successfully than its anemic predecessor. 
With regards to opposition party trajectories in ethnic republics and Muslim regions, 
Fatherland‘s emergence was seemingly most consequential for the KPRF, which 
previously tangled with the comparatively incompetent Our Home is Russia for control of 
these areas. But Fatherland‘s deeper ties to Muslim regions, effectuated through the 
presidents of predominantly Muslim republics that formed part of Fatherland‘s 
leadership, crippled the KPRF‘s footholds in the area that had been carved out in the mid-
1990s to at least some extent.  
The Urban-rural Divide and the Potential Party of Power (Fatherland-All Russia) 
 In addition to raions with sizable populations of ethnic minorities, ethnic 
republics, and Muslim regions, Fatherland made inroads in the countryside and harvested 
high levels of support from yet another core constituency of the Communists. The odds 
of a Fatherland stronghold lifted by two to three percent in the relaxed models and by two 
to four percent in the strict specifications. Furthermore, its average in majority-rural 
raions was over one percent greater than its raion-level national average. Figure 5.23 
Table 5.10: Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1999 
 
 
 
# of Fatherland-All 
Russia Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(332 Total) 
% of Fatherland-All 
Russia Strongholds 
# of Fatherland-All 
Russia Strongholds 
(Higher Threshold) 
(180 Total) 
% of Fatherland-All 
Russia Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
159 50.16 
112 63.64 
Russian federal 
regions 
158 49.84 
64 36.36 
Muslim 
regions 
124 39.12 
89 50.57 
Caucasus 
regions 
32 10.09 
10 5.68 
Poorer Regions 61 18.37 27 15.00 
Natural 
Resource 
Regions 
107 33.75 
90 51.14 
Fraudulent 
raions 
137 41.27 
107 59.44 
Non-
Fraudulent 
raions 
195 58.73 
73 40.56 
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indicates the growth in Fatherland support with increased rurality. The preponderance of 
outlier raions were found in mostly rural areas, such as in Bashkortostan, Dagestan, 
Tatarstan, Ingushetia and Mari El, and a few urban centers located in the same regions 
and the two federal cities.  
 
Figure 5.23: Rural Inhabitants and Fatherland-All Russia‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
The balance of Fatherland‘s support clearly followed rural lines in 1999 and endured 
across thresholds, as shown in Figure 5.24. Of all rural raions, Fatherland enjoyed 
bastions of support in roughly 10%; of all urban raions, the contender for the party of 
power prize had strongholds in approximately five percent. Although the balance of 
support with regard to percentages was tilted toward the countryside in ethnic republics 
and Muslim regions, where Fatherland performed best, a healthy share of bastions were 
found in urban centers as well. In the case of Muslim regions, the percentage of urban 
raions that were Fatherland strongholds exceeded the party‘s share in these areas in any 
other regional setting by at least double. In these regions, almost 80% of rural raions and 
roughly half that percentage of urban raions churned out abnormally high vote shares for 
the Unity challenger. As was the case with majority-Russian and majority-minority 
contexts, Fatherland managed to retain at least some urban strongholds in each regional 
environment when the stronghold threshold was raised; urban strongholds in 
predominantly Muslim regions appeared to take the largest hit based on the shift.  
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Figure 5.24: Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional 
Contexts in 1999 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
In the previous election, the unsuccessful party of power, Our Home is Russia, 
experienced mixed electoral fortunes in rural zones, but Fatherland fixed a firmer grip on 
the countryside and harvested support where Our Home is Russia was largely unable. The 
robust rural contours of Fatherland strongholds deviates from prior scholarship reporting 
that the effect of rurality varied, either demonstrating that Fatherland performed best in 
bigger cities or found that community size did not exercise a systematic effect on the 
party‘s support (Colton and McFaul 2003; Hale 2006). Considering Fatherland was 
formed just months before the election and the countryside was historically the mainstay 
of the KPRF, Fatherland‘s performance in rural areas was remarkable. Undoubtedly, 
Fatherland‘s absorption of most of the Agrarian Party helped the aspiring party of power 
attract rural support and siphoned votes off the Communists.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and the Potential Party of 
Power (Fatherland-All Russia) 
 In addition to areas with larger populations of ethnic minorities and those situated 
in the countryside, Fatherland made inroads in Caucasian regions, capturing windfall 
support across the majority of models. The values for raions located in the area were at 
least 121 times and at most thirty thousand times higher than the value of the odds for 
raions situated outside. The magnitude of the positive effect on the occurrence of 
Fatherland strongholds was significantly greater than that of the Communists, the only 
other party that enjoyed an advantage in the Caucasus, in the lower threshold models and 
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in two-thirds of the strict specifications. Fatherland‘s average level of support in the 
Caucasus was greater, albeit within one percent, of its countrywide showing. The 
percentage of Fatherland strongholds in the Caucasus was roughly 10% and 
approximately six percent by the relaxed and strict threshold. Fatherland competed head-
to-head with the Communists for control of the Caucasus and the potential party of power 
carved out a substantial region of dominance. The fact that Fatherland was created just 
months before the election, while the KPRF had competed in every legislative election 
since 1993, and was able to harvest high levels of support in the Caucasus may have 
signaled the beginning of the end of the Communist presence there.  
While Fatherland profited electorally in the Caucasus, the party was shellacked by 
a one-unit increase in gross regional product as much as 93% and as little as 80% across 
both measures of stronghold, even though Fatherland‘s average in economically 
developed regions was approximately two percent higher than nationally. Interestingly, 
not as many Fatherland strongholds were found in poorer regions as might be expected 
given the statistical results, approximately 18% and 15% according to the relaxed and 
strict threshold. This finding closely mirrors that of the Communists and nationalists. 
Despite Fatherland‘s entrance into the electoral fray, the proportion of KPRF and LDPR 
strongholds in poorer regions remained largely intact from 1995 to 1999, suggesting that 
these two opposition parties were not immediately frozen out in areas housing one of 
their key constituencies. In contrast to distinctions based on gross regional product, a 
region‘s classification as resource-dependent did not produce statistically significant 
results in any of the models. While the statistical models lacked a systematic effect, 
descriptive statistics suggest that Fatherland performed well in regions endowed with 
natural resources: approximately one-third and more than half of Fatherland‘s 
strongholds were located in resource-rich regions, by the lower and higher threshold, 
accordingly, and the party of power contender secured a vote share that was astonishingly 
eight percent higher than its national share. Thus, with regards to the findings from the 
statistical models, Fatherland‘s electoral trajectory in economically developed regions 
and those endowed with natural resources roughly mirrored that of the LDPR.  
 212 
Electoral Manipulation and the Potential Party of Power (Fatherland-All Russia) 
 Even in a relatively competitive election, raions suspected for electoral 
manipulation were considerably more likely to be Fatherland strongholds, as was also 
true of the Communists and ultra-nationalists. With the shift from the non-manipulated 
category to the fraudulent class, the odds of a stronghold increased by seven to 14 times 
across all the relaxed models, and by 27 to 66 times across all the strict specifications. In 
1995, the party of power also captured support in high turnout zones, but the magnitude 
of the effect was substantially smaller than that found for Fatherland at the end of the 
decade. The strength and sign of the association between support for the hopeful party of 
power and suspected electoral malfeasance was anticipated to some extent prior to the 
election because many of the party‘s key advocates sat atop regional governments that 
delivered some of the most questionable figures from the previous presidential election, 
e.g. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Approximately 40% and nearly 60% of the party‘s 
strongholds were located in fraudulent raions, according to the relaxed and strict measure 
and the party‘s average showing in these areas was staggering: a full 15% higher than its 
national mean. The positive relationship between support for Fatherland and voter turnout 
is also evident in Figure 5.25. Numerous raions are located in the upper right quadrant of 
the scatterplot, where high vote shares for Fatherland coincided with high rates of 
political participation. As anticipated, these raions were located in the same ethnic 
republics that were mentioned previously with regard to the ethnic minority and rurality 
scatterplots. The dense cluster of raions located near the center of the scatterplot, 
reporting turnout close to the national average but vote shares for Fatherland around 40%, 
were virtually all located in Moscow.   
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Figure 5.25: Voter Turnout and Fatherland-All Russia‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5.26 shows that a substantial percentage of Fatherland strongholds 
across thresholds were found in areas suspected for electoral fraud and the percentage 
increased with the shift in thresholds. Almost 40% of Fatherland strongholds were 
located in manipulated raions according to the relaxed threshold but this percentage 
climbed to nearly 60% with the increase in thresholds. Significantly more of Fatherland‘s 
bastions were found in fraudulent raions compared to the Communists (roughly 18% and 
36%) and the nationalists (approximately 9% and less than one percent). Fatherland thus 
captured less support from non-manipulated raions than either of the two opposition 
parties that benefitted, albeit to varying degrees, from electoral malfeasance. Of 
fraudulent raions, Fatherland strongholds accounted for a sizable share, nearly 40% and 
roughly 30% according to the relaxed and strict threshold. Far fewer fraudulent raions 
were KPRF strongholds (roughly 23% and 9%, respectively) or LDPR bastions 
(approximately 10% and three percent). The forecasted victor of the election was not able 
to completely eradicate the steadfast KPRF presence, and the newfound LDPR footholds, 
in high turnout areas. Fatherland had a clear advantage in high turnout areas relative to 
the other parties that also performed well there, but these areas were still divided between 
multiple parties in 1999, unlike the situation that would quickly manifest in the 2000s 
when one party universally dominated high turnout areas at the expense of all other 
parties. 
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Figure 5.26: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds vs. 
Percent Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1999 
 
 
Ethnicity and the Potential Party of Power (Unity) 
 In contrast to the core party troika and Fatherland-All Russia, the statistical 
models for Unity produced few statistically significant and across-the-board findings. 
Previous research seeking to identify Unity‘s bases of support also produced exceedingly 
limited results, in one case finding that, except for rurality and age, ―no other social 
attributes wield[ed] significant influence over the Unity vote‖ (Colton and McFaul 2003: 
65). Other survey research corroborated the narrow contours of Unity‘s electorate, which 
were again based almost entirely on age and size of settlement (Hale 2006). Nevertheless, 
some new dimensions emerged as a result of more refined measures of ethnic 
composition. Although existing research reported that the Russian, non-Russian ethnic 
cleavage did not systematically influence support for Unity, the model results indicate 
that this dimension defined Unity strongholds (Colton and McFaul 2003; Hale 2006). 
With unit increases in the non-Russian population, Unity received a slight boost in a 
lower threshold model, but the magnitude of the effect became more positive and robust 
in the upper threshold specifications, lifting the odds of a stronghold by four to six 
percent. A parallel dynamic occurred vis-à-vis the covariate assessing titular minority 
populations: Unity gained negligibly in the relaxed models and considerably more so, 
between three and seven percent, in the strict specifications. Higher densities of other 
minorities did not reach standard levels of statistical significance in any of the models. 
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Considering Unity was formed just three months prior to the legislative election, the party 
maneuvered deftly to lock down ethnic minority communities, especially those 
comprised of titular minorities, recognizing that electoral windfalls could be captured by 
leveraging ethnic-based political machines to achieve partisan ends. When Unity‘s vote 
share and voter turnout was employed continuously, rather than dichotomously as in the 
statistical models, Figure 5.27 depicts slight dips in support for the hopeful party of 
power in raions with more concentrated ethnic minority populations. However, several 
raions populate the upper right quadrant at the intersection of electoral windfalls and 
geographically concentrated non-Russians, particularly titular minorities. The most 
zealous Unity supporters were concentrated in the republic of Tuva, certainly because 
Unity‘s official leader, Sergei Shoigu, hailed from the region. Other enthusiastic raions, 
including some that were almost purely ethnic Russian, were found in the republics of 
Dagestan, Kalmykya, and Komi, as well as the oblasts of Vologodskaya, Tverskaya, and 
Irkutskaya, and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, which is the most northeasterly region of 
Russia.  
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Figure 5.27: Non-Russian Minorities and Unity‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
 
Figure 5.28 largely corroborates the results from the statistical models and shows the 
general ethnic minority pattern of the Unity vote. Of all majority-minority and majority-
Russian raions, Unity captured strongholds in approximately 15% of each, although the 
party‘s share of majority-minority raions was slightly higher than majority-Russian areas. 
Of the majority-minority raions in the Caucasus and poorer regions, roughly 20% and 
almost 30%, respectively, churned out tremendous support for the Kremlin‘s pick. 
According to the relaxed threshold, in many regional contexts, such as ethnic republics, 
and, albeit to a lesser extent, poorer regions and those dependent on natural resources, the 
percentage of Unity strongholds was fairly balanced between majority-minority and 
majority-Russian raions. In resource-rich regions, in fact, Unity captured a higher share 
of strongholds in majority-Russian raions by the lower measure. With the shift in 
thresholds, the percentage of Unity strongholds became more firmly rooted in majority-
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minority raions, and Unity strongholds were found only in these areas in Muslim regions 
across both thresholds, and in the Caucasus by the strict measure.  
 
Figure 5.28: Unity‘s Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The two contenders battling for the party of power prize thus both captured support from 
non-Russian minorities, notably titular minorities, and Unity strongholds were as firmly 
articulated on this dimension as Fatherland‘s, per the statistical results. However, while 
Fatherland‘s average in majority-minority raions soared compared to its national mean, 
Unity‘s performance in these raions was below average, albeit within roughly one percent 
of its countryside showing, as displayed in Table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Unity’s Electoral Performance in the 1999 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
26.47 26.29 25.11 
 
23.27 25.19 19.55 27.10 23.80 23.27 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 84.12 84.12 84.12 
 
84.12 84.12 78.02 78.02 78.02 78.02 
SD 
 
11.51 12.35 12.70 14.85 15.29 12.59 10.41 11.00 11.85 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, 1.11. 
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The effect of ethnic regional contexts on the occurrence of Unity strongholds was 
decidedly mixed. Surprisingly, given the effect of ethnic minorities at the raion level and 
the party‘s close connections to numerous ethnic republics, exemplified by the Tuvan 
Sergei Shoigu serving as the party‘s leader, the ethnic region variable did not exercise a 
systematic effect on the occurrence of Unity strongholds in any of the models. According 
to the descriptive statistics, Unity‘s mean in ethnic republics closely mirrored the party‘s 
showing in majority-minority raions and was again within approximately one percent of 
its national average. Despite the lack of a statistical association between Unity 
strongholds and ethnic republic status, Table 5.12 indicates that the party established a 
respectable presence in the ethnic republics considering Unity was formed merely three 
months prior to the election: more than 60% of the party‘s bastions were located in these 
regions by the higher threshold and still roughly 25% by the relaxed measure.  
 
 
In contrast to distinctions between raions nested within ethnic republics and those 
situated in Russian federal regions, location in a Muslim region severely damaged the 
odds of a Unity stronghold in a lower threshold model. Unity‘s overall raion-level 
national average was almost 15% higher than Fatherland‘s, yet Unity proved woefully 
Table 5.12: Unity Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 1999 
 
 
 
# of  Unity 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(403 Total) 
% of  Unity 
Strongholds 
# of  Unity 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(44 Total) 
% of  Unity 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
99 25.32 
26 61.90 
Russian federal 
regions 
292 74.68 
16 38.10 
Muslim regions 15 3.84 2 4.76 
Caucasus regions 29 7.42 2 4.76 
Poorer Regions 251 62.28 34 77.27 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
47 12.02 
2 4.76 
Fraudulent raions 49 12.16 12 27.27 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
354 87.84 
32 72.73 
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incapable of weakening Fatherland‘s tenacious grip in Muslim regions and amassing 
strongholds of its own. Fatherland‘s average in Muslim regions was almost 21% higher 
than nationally; by comparison, Unity‘s was a full seven percent under, as indicated in 
Table 5.10. Merely 3% and 4% of Unity‘s strongholds were found in Muslim regions 
using the lower and higher measure, respectively. Compared to the other potential party 
of power and the KPRF, Unity‘s source of strength in ethnic minority constituencies 
operated solely at the raion level, as ethnic republic status failed to exert a systematic 
effect and raions in Muslim regions plunged the odds of a stronghold acutely. 
The Urban-rural Divide and the Potential Party of Power (Unity) 
 Broadly paralleling the electoral outcomes of the KPRF, LDPR and Fatherland-
All Russia in the countryside, Unity also captured rural support, albeit to the slightest 
degree of any of the aforementioned parties. The odds of a Unity stronghold increased by 
less than one percent with a unit increase in rural inhabitants in some lower threshold 
models. In rural areas, Unity seemed to be simply outmatched in a party market crowded 
with not only the tried-and-true KPRF, boasting the most well-established organizational 
networks and long-standing partisan attachments in the electorate, but also the LDPR, 
which cut deeper inroads in the countryside in the late-1990s, and the party startup, 
Fatherland-All Russia, backed by numerous provincial executives sitting atop robust 
patronage-based political machines. Yet Unity‘s average in predominantly rural areas 
closely approximated its raion-level national vote share. Notably distinct from the 
Communists and the liberal Yabloko and more akin to Fatherland, Unity‘s vote share was 
remarkably stable across various levels of rurality, as shown in Figure 5.29. The 
scatterplot depicts a relatively neutral association between the Unity vote and the 
proportion of rural inhabitants but also reveals that the preponderance of outliers 
recording the highest levels of support for the party was found in the countryside. The 
fanatical raions in the countryside were primarily located in Tuva, while the partially 
rural enthusiasts were mostly found in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.  
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Figure 5.29: Rural Inhabitants and Unity‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Figure 5.30 reveals that, of all the parties considered, the percentage of Unity strongholds 
was the most evenly dispersed between urban centers and the countryside in each 
regional context according to the lower threshold, suggesting that Unity lacked the 
genuine geographic strengths in either rural or urban areas that other parties enjoyed. Of 
all urban and rural raions, Unity harvested strongholds in just less than 15% in the former 
and just greater than 15% in the latter. Unity‘s pattern of support appears most similar to 
the LDPR, which also captured roughly balanced support. In economically disadvantaged 
regions, Unity enjoyed strongholds in slightly more than 20% of urban raions and nearly 
one-quarter of countryside raions. Surprisingly, in the Caucasus, Unity captured a higher 
percentage of strongholds in urban centers than rural areas. With the shift to the higher 
measure, the balance tilted in favor of rural raions in all regional contexts, save for 
resource-rich regions.  
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Figure 5.30: Unity Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 1999 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The extremely modest positive relationship identified in the statistical models qualifies 
previous research based on large-scale panel surveys claiming Unity made ―deep 
inroads‖ into rural communities, compared to its party of power predecessor (Colton and 
McFaul 2003: 64). In fact, Unity‘s minor boost from increased rurality was vaguely 
similar to Our Home is Russia‘s four years prior.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and the Potential Party of 
Power (Unity) 
 The sub-national indicators assessing various regional contexts produced few 
systematic effects on Unity strongholds. Location in the Caucasus did not reach statistical 
significance in any of the models. With the Kremlin, led by Prime Minister and self-
avowed Unity supporter Vladimir Putin, prosecuting another war with Chechnya at the 
time of the legislative election, the effect of Caucasus location was expected to be 
statistically significant and negative because voters in the area had the opportunity to 
punish the central government through the ballot box for its ruthless incursion into their 
homelands. Despite the lack of an effect statistically, Unity had no strongholds in the area 
by the higher measure, and merely seven percent by the lower one. Interestingly, Unity‘s 
average in Caucasus regions was actually slightly higher than nationally, but still less 
than one percent above. As in Muslim regions, Unity wrestled to unseat the KPRF from 
its entrenched position and seize Fatherland‘s newly acquired footholds in the Caucasus, 
but ultimately did not succeed in making meaningful inroads in this area.  
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With regard to the effects of socioeconomic welfare parameters on the Unity vote, 
gross regional product diminished the odds by roughly 50% in a lower threshold model. 
Descriptive statistics substantiate this finding, as the majority of the party‘s strongholds 
were housed in poorer regions, 62% by the relaxed measure and 77% by the stricter 
measure and Unity‘s average in economically developed regions was more than two 
percent less than its national showing. Counter-intuitively, regions with lower levels of 
economic development supported the Kremlin‘s party, even though the Kremlin directed 
the very economic reforms that may have caused those regions to suffer. In the wake of 
the 1998 financial crisis, those living in regions comparatively worse off did not punish 
the government for their plight. Paralleling dynamics prevailing in the countryside, 
economically disadvantaged regions emerged as a central battleground in 1999: the 
Communists, nationalists and both potential parties of power all competed for the support 
of those living under conditions of relative economic deprivation, while Yabloko enjoyed 
virtually free rein in wealthier regions. Resource-dependence, on the other hand, did not 
generate statistically significant results in the Unity models. Despite this finding, 
descriptive statistics indicate that Unity‘s performance in areas with natural resource 
endowments was poor: the party‘s average in resource-rich regions was approximately 
three percent less than its countrywide showing and less than 5% of strongholds were 
located in these regions according to the higher threshold, and approximately one-tenth 
by the lower measure. According to the descriptive statistics, Unity excelled in regions 
with diversified economies, rather than those reliant on abundant natural resource 
endowments.  
Electoral Manipulation and the Potential Party of Power (Unity) 
 Rounding out the ―full pluralism of falsification‖ that occurred in the 1999 
election, Unity benefitted from unusually high voter turnout alongside the Communists, 
nationalists, and the other party of power hopeful, Fatherland-All Russia  (Fish 2005: 53). 
The effect produced by the fraud variable on the occurrence of Unity‘s strongholds was 
contingent on the threshold specified: unusually high voter turnout exerted no systematic 
effect on Unity strongholds in the lower threshold models but consistently hiked the odds 
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by two to six times across the upper threshold specifications. The methodical influence of 
electoral manipulation on Unity strongholds substantiated opposition parties‘ fears that 
the Kremlin-backed party project engaged in electoral fraud to secure a solid showing in 
its first foray into electoral competition. Before the election, opposition party leaders 
alleged that regional and raion administrators were told that future regional funding from 
the central government would be tied to Unity‘s performance in the Duma contest  (Belin 
1999). The model results strongly suggest that the alleged malfeasance in Unity‘s favor 
ultimately manifested as anticipated. The finding that Unity benefitted from electoral 
manipulation runs counter to previous scholarship arguing that the Kremlin showed 
―uncharacteristic self-restraint‖ in 1999: there was ―little need for fraud‖ because Unity 
had already demolished Fatherland in a media blitz and ―Unity did relatively well 
anyway‖ (Wilson 2005: 77). Upwards of 25% of Unity strongholds were located in raions 
suspected for fraudulence by the higher measure, and more than one-tenth by the lower 
threshold. Unexpectedly, Unity‘s average in fraudulent areas was roughly three percent 
less than its national share. When Unity‘s vote share and voter turnout were both 
considered continuously, in contrast to the model specifications that leveraged those 
variables dichotomously, a slightly negative association emerged, as Figure 5.31 portrays. 
Compared to Fatherland and the KPRF, there are decidedly fewer raions in the upper 
right quadrant of Unity‘s scatterplot. Mirroring the KPRF and LDPR, Unity‘s scatterplot 
shows a large bubble in the middle, where voter turnout approximated the national mean 
but the Unity vote surpassed thresholds set for party strongholds. The cluster of raions in 
the lower right quadrant, where voter turnout was close to 100% and the Unity vote 
approached zero percent, were nearly all strongholds for Fatherland-All Russia and the 
residual raions were KPRF and/or LDPR pockets of support. The raions that registered 
political participation between roughly 60 and 80% and similar vote shares for Unity, 
forming a distinct cluster at the top of the scatterplot, were all found in Unity leader 
Sergei Shoigu‘s home region of Tuva.  
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Figure 5.31: Voter Turnout and Unity‘s Vote Share in 1999 
 
 
Consistent with the statistical findings, Figure 5.32 showcases the role of electoral 
manipulation in generating electoral windfalls for Unity. Of the four parties with 
strongholds in fraudulent areas, the percentage of Unity strongholds in high turnout zones 
was higher than only the LDPR: approximately 12% and 27% of Unity strongholds were 
found in these areas by the relaxed and the strict measure, while the KPRF had 18% and 
36% and Fatherland had 41% and nearly 60%, respectively. Paralleling the KPRF and 
Fatherland, the percentage of Unity strongholds in manipulated raions increased with the 
shift in thresholds. Of the raions suspected for electoral malfeasance, Unity again proved 
inferior to the KPRF and Fatherland, as the party had the second lowest percentage of 
strongholds, at 14% and 3% per the lower and higher threshold, compared to the KPRF 
with 23% and 8% and Fatherland with 39% and 30%. The share of manipulated raions 
that were Unity strongholds was thus roughly comparable to the LDPR, even though the 
nationalists were severely constrained by limited resources and relied instead on the 
charismatic appeal of the party‘s leader. Save for the LDPR, Unity dominated fraudulent 
areas to the most limited extent of the parties for which electoral manipulation exerted a 
systematic effect. Interestingly, of fraudulent raions, a higher percentage were Our Home 
is Russia strongholds in 1995 than Unity strongholds in 1999, as Our Home is Russia 
enjoyed stronghold-level support in nearly 18% and almost 14% of high turnout raions 
but Unity captured only 14% and 3%, as mentioned. Although these data suggest that the 
weak party of power, Our Home is Russia, dominated fraudulent areas in 1995 more 
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successfully than Unity did in 1999, Unity battled against two well-equipped challengers 
in the KPRF and Fatherland while Our Home faced off against only the KPRF in these 
areas in the mid-1990s. One indication that Unity was, in fact, more successful than Our 
Home in harvesting high levels of support under conditions of contracted competition is 
that, although a higher percentage of Our Home strongholds were found in manipulated 
raions according to the lower threshold, Unity captured a higher share than Our Home 
when the threshold was raised. In other words, unusually high turnout helped Unity 
achieve support at the highest levels, i.e. surpassing the strict threshold for party 
stronghold (two standard deviations above the party‘s raion-level national average), more 
than Our Home in the previous election. Furthermore, since Unity‘s raion-level national 
average bested Our Home is Russia‘s in 1995 by nearly 17%, Unity strongholds across 
thresholds indicated significantly higher levels of support in absolute terms than Our 
Home is Russia bastions.  
 
Figure 5.32: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Unity Strongholds vs. Percent Unity 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 1999 
 
 
When considered collectively, the results produced by the electoral manipulation 
variable suggest that electoral malfeasance played a key role in the relatively competitive 
legislative elections of the mid- and late-1990s alike, and also that such malfeasance 
benefitted multiple parties in each election. In each election, the parties that benefitted, 
with the exception of the LDPR, were precisely those parties with the most robust 
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organizational infrastructures and patronage endowments that could be leveraged to 
achieve partisan ends. Bracketing other notable differences, the 1999 election differed 
from the previous contest because more parties successfully penetrated high turnout 
areas; this was not purely because two potential parties of power emerged to replace the 
inept Our Home is Russia and carved out regions of dominance in these areas, but also 
because the LDPR, rather unexpectedly, made new inroads in manipulated raions. Even 
in the context of competitive contestation, electoral manipulation did not simply inflate 
voter turnout but also the electoral outcomes for specific parties. With a weak party of 
power present in 1995 and two potential parties of power competing in 1999, multiple 
parties were able to position themselves to capture electoral windfalls in high turnout 
raions, rather than one party universally dominating these areas.  
Conclusion 
 The final legislative election of the decade was a transitional one, bridging the 
Yeltsin and Putin eras and, accordingly, democracy and authoritarianism in post-
communist Russia. As was the case four years prior, the party system in 1999 was 
remarkably weak and fragmented, notwithstanding the fact that the number of parties in 
toto had diminished from 43 parties and electoral blocs in 1995 to 26 by the end of the 
decade. The 1999 election was witness to a fierce struggle between contending parties of 
power, the fortification of existing opposition party strongholds, and the construction of a 
few new pockets of support. Despite generally maintaining their vote shares from four 
years earlier, opposition parties were jolted out of place in some previous strongholds due 
to the emergence of Fatherland-All Russia and Unity. For example, the KRPF benefitted 
enormously in Muslim regions in the mid-1990s when its fiercest competitor was the 
ineffectual Our Home is Russia but was essentially run out of town by the brand-new 
Fatherland coalition in the 1999 election. Nevertheless, even with two new potential 
parties of power in the mix, one with substantial strength in Russia‘s regions and the 
other with backing from the Kremlin, opposition parties enjoyed their second best 
chances at success in 1999 because the contest was relatively free and fair. In the face of 
competitors with more broad-based appeal, namely Unity, however, opposition parties 
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generally failed to respond in kind by widening their own respective ideological 
platforms and niches in the electorate, instead electing to doggedly pursue relatively 
narrow segments of voters. The opposition thus retained important structural continuities 
across the 1990s, chiefly characterized by weakness and fragmentation.  
Once more, although to a lesser degree than was the case four years prior, the 
fragmented party system resulted in a significant share of wasted votes, i.e. more than 
16%, that were cast for parties that ultimately failed to cross the threshold for legislative 
representation. Russia‘s floating electorate had contracted, but approximately one-sixth 
of voters were still virtually up for grabs by major parties. The emergence of the party of 
power contender Unity, with its catchall appeals and amorphous ideology, undoubtedly 
spoke for a large portion of votes that would have otherwise been squandered. The fact 
that Unity‘s vote share closely approximated the KPRF‘s and Unity was created just three 
months before the election, rather than in the wake of communism‘s collapse in 1993 as 
was the case for the KPRF, was one indication that a sizable segment of the electorate 
had been waiting for a party to surface that better aligned with their own attitudes and 
beliefs. Because Unity emerged just before the election, the party‘s administrative 
capacity was not fully developed and therefore Kremlin political technologists were not 
able to produce the kind of overwhelming victory for the party of power that became a 
hallmark of the 2000s. By the end of the decade, the Kremlin had identified a window of 
opportunity to build a dominant party system by leveraging the weak and messy party 
system that prevailed throughout the 1990s to its advantage, but needed to bolster its 
capacity by merging with its rival in the 1999 election before party dominance could 
materialize. By the time of the 2003 legislative election, the Kremlin had achieved 
precisely that and a full-fledged dominant party emerged like a phoenix from the ashes of 
its failed party of power predecessors.  
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Chapter 6: The 2003 Parliamentary Election: The Birth of United Russia and the 
Emergence of a New, Uncompetitive Status Quo 
The 2003 legislative election was a watershed moment in Russian politics and 
party system development, as it marked the rise and initial consolidation of the dominant 
party, United Russia, and ushered in an ―era of legislative quiescence‖ (Wegren and 
Konitzer 2006: 678). With Unity and Fatherland-All Russia‘s merger in the early 2000s 
that created the monolithic United Russia, opposition parties faced a party of power that 
united strength in Russia‘s dozens of regions, many with impenetrable political machines 
that could be manipulated to devastate the opposition, with the political and economic 
clout of the Kremlin. Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the late 1990s, the most 
formidable opposition parties, such as the Communists and the nationalists, could no 
longer leverage the uncertainty as to which party of power would prevail in the election 
to their benefit.  
The birth of United Russia rationalized the party system and eliminated the 
divided loyalties that allowed multiple parties to muddle through in the previous contest: 
the loci of political power backed only one horse in 2003 rather than quinella betting, to 
at least some degree, on Unity and Fatherland-All Russia. For the first time in post-
communist Russian history, the Kremlin-backed party of power won the race for the 
Duma, quite a feat when compared to Our Home‘s abysmal showing in 1995 and 
Russia‘s Choice in the 1993 snap elections. United Russia not only beat the winner of the 
1995 and 1999 election, the KPRF, but also secured an impressive margin of victory, 
capturing a vote share that was 25% higher than the second-place Communists in the 
party list tier. The Communists‘ vote share was decimated from the previous election, 
plunging by half; in emasculating the party of power‘s primary opposition, United Russia 
succeeded where Our Home is Russia proved patently incapable in the mid-1990s. The 
overwhelming support for United Russia in 2003 was an unambiguous signal that the 
Russian experiment with democracy was over, even before it had a chance to fully 
materialize, and a return to authoritarianism was peeking over the horizon.  
The 2003 Legislative Election in Context  
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The political context in which the 2003 election occurred was more stable than 
four years prior, when presidential succession had not yet been accomplished and the 
conflict in Chechnya, coupled with numerous terrorist attacks, created widespread fear 
about internal security and regional separatist movements based in the Caucasus. With 
Yeltsin‘s unexpected resignation six months before the end of his second four-year term 
on December 31, 1999, Vladimir Putin took up the mantle of the Russian presidency as 
Yeltsin‘s hand-picked successor at the stroke of midnight. The presidential election in 
2000 was conducted earlier than scheduled, as stipulated by the Constitution, and Putin 
captured approximately 52% of the vote in the first round of the March contest, almost 
25% more than his most formidable opponent, KPRF leader Zyuganov.  
Putin‘s election as president marked not only the first successful presidential 
succession in Russia‘s short democratic history, but also the beginning of a program to 
radically reshape Russia‘s political system into a managed democracy. President Putin 
moved quickly to consolidate his power by reigning in the regional governors and 
reshaping center-periphery relations, increasing government control of independent 
media, and challenging the country‘s business elite. Putin leveraged the invasion of 
Dagestan by Chechen militants and the string of apartment bombings just one month 
before as justification for increased centralization in center-periphery relations and, ―by 
doing so, he put an end to dreams of any other secessionist malcontents in the regions 
who might have entertained similar notions of establishing an independent country‖ 
(Goldman 2008: 95). The 1999 elections afforded President Putin a pliant and non-
Communist Duma to carry out his comprehensive economic and political reforms, 
including a tax code overhaul, banking reform, changes pertaining to the constitution of 
the upper house of the legislature, centralization of power in center-periphery relations, 
and the reform of political parties. President Putin gradually muzzled the independent 
media by ordering the selective prosecution of media moguls, such as the owner of the 
Media-MOST group, and subsequently placing media outlets in the hands of state-
controlled corporations, such as the gas monopoly Gazprom. In 2003, Freedom House‘s 
Freedom of the Press report assessed Russia as ―not free‖ for the first time in post-Soviet 
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history, a notable decline from the ―partly free‖ rating the country received in 2002 
(Freedom House 2003: 3, 6). Russia‘s overall status was fixed at ―partly free‖ in the 
period between the 2000 election of President Putin and the 2003 legislative elections 
(Freedom House 2001-2004). Putin‘s various reforms and political endeavors showed 
that ―democracy as practiced by Putin is partly about practical problem solving, but it is 
also about eliminating external checks on the power of the state and the leader without 
scrapping the constitutional framework bequeathed by Yeltsin‖ (Colton and McFaul 
2005: 25). The 2003 contest was thus the first legislative election to be held in the context 
of unambiguous democratic contraction in a variety of spheres.  
On the economic front, Russia had bounced back impressively from the crippling 
financial crisis in the late 1990s due almost exclusively to record-setting world oil prices 
that funded robust economic growth. The price of Ural crude skyrocketed from $15.2 per 
barrel on average in 1999 to $27.2 in 2003, reaching a high of more than double the 
average in 1999, $33 a barrel (World Bank 2005: 16; Goldman 2008: 77). Demand for oil 
and gas was driven by India and China in large part; for example, from 2001 to 2005, 
China accounted for ―30-40% of the increase in oil consumption‖ (Goldman 2008: 79). 
The production of petroleum ballooned in Russia, increasing by 6% in 2000 and 11% by 
2003 (Goldman 2008: 80). With an estimated 40% of the Russian central government‘s 
budget coming from oil and natural gas production, the federal budget and the economy 
at large benefitted from a protracted windfall (Hale et al. 2004; World Bank 2005: 8). 
The economy grew by ―a cumulative 38 percent in the five years from the 1998 financial 
meltdown to the end of 2003‖ and inflation declined to approximately 12% in 2003 
(World Bank 2005: 5). Indeed, in 2003 the federal budget ran a surplus for the fourth 
consecutive year; that year, the surplus stood at 8.1% (Ibid). Real GDP growth in 2003 
increased more than seven percent from the previous year, far exceeding forecasts of 
between 3.9 and 4.5% (OECD 2004). Furthermore, average real wages increased by 
almost 10% and real personal disposable income increased by more than 13% (Cooper 
2009). The unemployment rate improved considerably since four years prior, declining 
from 13% to 8.2% (World Bank, World Development Indicators).  
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Yet many experts worried that the “overdependence on natural-resource exports 
(a situation where 1 percent of the workforce creates almost one-fifth of GDP)” that 
helped sustain annual growth of above five percent made the country highly vulnerable to 
international price changes (World Bank 2005: vii). The degree to which the Russian 
economy was dependent on natural resources is staggering: in 2003, approximately 80% 
of exports were natural resources, and 55% of all exports were from the oil and gas sector 
(World Bank 2005: 8). Russia‟s “persistent good fortune” in the international price of 
hydrocarbons during the early 2000s was not leveraged to diversify the economy 
considerably and reduce dependency on extractive industries, perhaps in part because 
official figures grossly underestimated the economy‟s dependence on the energy sector 
(World Bank 2005: 5). For example, in 2000, official figures show that the oil and gas 
sector contributed between 8-20% of GDP, suggesting that the economy and economic 
growth were considerably more vulnerable to international price shocks than implied by 
the official figures (World Bank 2005: 8-9). Nevertheless, Russians benefitted widely 
from the windfall created by high energy prices in the early 2000s, creating an economic 
backdrop for the 2003 election that differed sharply from four years prior.  
Following Unity‘s triumph in the 1999 election, Kremlin insiders endeavored to 
augment the place of parties in essentially all major elections and enshrine United 
Russia‘s position through the reform of political parties and electoral rules that would 
govern future legislative elections (Hale 2006). The electoral law governing the 2003 
elections preserved the mixed system and the five percent threshold for representation in 
the parliament, but introduced an onerous regulatory labyrinth that was intended to 
consolidate the party system to the benefit of the established party of power. The 
Kremlin‘s 2001 law ―On Political Parties‖ and other associated reforms were sweeping in 
content and far ranging in their effect on political parties and the party system.  
Prima facie, the law attempted to create a party system built on parties that were 
truly national in membership and organization, rather than preserve the volatile ―floating‖ 
party system of the 1990s characterized by infinitesimal parties that commonly contested 
only one legislative election before dissolving altogether (Rose 2000). However, the law 
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also added layers of difficulty that political parties were forced to navigate in order to 
participate in electoral politics, although some argued the new rules were ―not 
prohibitive‖ (Golosov 2012: 5). The law required parties to meet the following requisites 
before contesting in an election: the party must have regional branches established in 
more than half of the regions, 10,000 or more members, an objective or action aimed at 
the performance of non-extremist activity, and created on bases other than professional, 
racial, national or religious affiliation (Federal Law No. 95-FZ on Political Parties, 2001). 
While the membership requirement was quite low in real terms, given the country‘s 
population was just shy of 146 million in 2001, by the mid-2000s, ―only United Russia 
and the [KPRF] could realistically claim sufficient numbers of activists, whereas many 
other parties, even registered ones, could not attain this target‖ (Golosov 2012: 5). The 
required regional distribution of party branches ―constitute[d] a de facto ban on regional 
and inter-regional political parties‖ and was ―unusual in comparative terms‖ (Wilson 
2006: 318). The OSCE Election Observation Mission Report concurred, commenting that 
this stipulation ―may seriously inhibit the development of local or regional political 
activism and effectively blocks the establishment of new political parties by any groups 
that seek to represent local, regional or minority interests‖ (OSCE 2004: 5). Ironically, 
electoral blocs headed up by regional leaders, such as the All Russia faction of 
Fatherland-All Russia and Unity, would have faced significant challenges in registration 
had this stipulation of the law been introduced earlier. Constricting political parties to 
non-professional, -racial, -national, or -religious bases particularly targeted organizations 
trying to foment separatist sentiment, with the ultimate objective of territorial autonomy 
from Russia, via formerly legitimate political avenues (Wilson 2006).  
Opposition party leaders, notably KPRF-head Zyuganov, argued the law was 
essentially undemocratic and would severely constrict party development by placing a 
―straightjacket‖ around parties, ultimately suffocating them altogether (Wilson 2006: 
316). Altogether, the intricacy of the law provides ―a basis to disqualify just about any 
organization the incumbent leadership finds troublesome‖ (Balzer 2003: 201). For 
example, the state registration of political parties and its regional branches contained nine 
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detailed stipulations, which also provided at least an equal number of opportunities for 
state interference in the process. The law had an immediate effect of reducing the number 
of registered parties, primarily based on insufficient regional branches. Although all 
major parties met the new law‘s requirements, 21 parties that were niche in orientation 
were ‗outlawed‘  (Oversloot and Verheul 2006). 
Other components of the package of reforms introduced in the early 2000s 
included numerous new clauses related to party finance and established state finance of 
parties, which was intended to make parties independent, especially from the wealthy, but 
politically-motivated, oligarchs (Wilson 2007). Opposition parties, notably the KPRF and 
LDPR, and the party of power were united in support of this dimension of reform because 
it freed political parties to a limited extent from the tenacious grip of private donors and 
sponsors who would expect parties to lobby for their interests in the legislature in 
exchange for financing (Ibid). Indeed, donations from private actors composed the lion‘s 
share of parties‘ income in the 1990s (Gelman 1998). The law explicitly tied public 
financing of parties to performance in the proportional representation tier of legislative 
elections and only financed those parties that received at least three percent of the 
proportional representation vote, giving each party 50 kopecks for each vote earned on an 
annual basis through the election cycle (Wilson 2007). This provision was plainly 
designed to shore up the party of power. Although it provided for state finance, the law 
did not help political parties during the 2003 campaign or on election day itself, as any 
state money was awarded after the results were announced; moreover, the level of state 
funding was not adequate to keep any major party free from powerful private interests 
after the election either (Ibid).  
The Central Election Commission registered 18 political parties and five electoral 
blocs for the party-list tier of the Duma contest, and 95% of the registered parties and 
blocs employed the 200,000-signature route to registration, as opposed to the cash 
payment option requiring $1.25 million. The requirements for registration remained 
largely intact from four years prior, specifically the number of signatures required 
(200,000), the maximum number of signatures obtained from one region (7% or 14,000) 
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and the vote share threshold after which the electoral deposit would be returned (3%). As 
in 1999, exemption from these registration requirements was not granted to parties 
already represented in the Duma. Notwithstanding these continuities, the amount of the 
electoral deposit was increased enormously, from 2.087 million rubles in 1999 to 37.5 
million in 2003 (Hutcheson 2013: 912). In 1995 and 1999, the CEC denied the 
registration of Yabloko and the LDPR, respectively, but the organization registered all 
party and bloc lists in 2003. ―On Political Parties‖ was intended to consolidate the party 
system to some degree, however the law did not produce the intended short term effect 
because 23 total parties and blocs participated in the election, only three fewer than four 
years earlier in 1999 (Wilson 2006). Thus, the law succeeded in reducing the number of 
potential participants in the election by denying legal recognition as a political party even 
if it did not meaningfully change the number of actual participants (Ibid). Among the 18 
competing parties and blocs, the core party troika again defined the rough contours of the 
party system: the KPRF on the left, the LDPR on the right, and Yabloko carving out the 
liberal-democratic niche. In contrast to the 1999 contest, where two potential parties 
struggled to emerge as the sole party of power, that battle had been resolved through the 
merger of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia by the time of the 2003 election and the 
refashioned party of power, United Russia, competed alone.  
The KPRF relied on tried-and-true strategies in the 2003 contest, hoping to repeat 
its solid performance in the 1990s, in which the KPRF was the only major party to 
actually win a higher vote share in the party-list tier in each successive election, 
beginning with the snap elections in 1993 (Wegren and Konitzer 2006). Up until 2003, 
the party had carved out a unique position for itself as the strongest party in Russia‘s 
weak party system (Ibid). Ultimately, however, the KPRF ―vie[ed] with the liberal parties 
for the accolade of the worst fought electoral campaign‖ (Sakwa 2005: 377).  
 With the merger of previous competitors Fatherland-All Russia and Unity in 
2002, the KPRF emerged as the party of power‘s most formidable opponent in 2003 and 
faced a deluge of attacks from all sides throughout the campaign. The KPRF‘s campaign 
manager stated that, during the electoral period, ―all the power of the state apparatus was 
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directed against us—from the state-owned mass media to state administrators at all levels 
of government‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 687). For example, the KPRF was the 
primary target for negative coverage in state-run media outlets, which alleged that the 
party was hypocritical and corrupt for accepting donations from large businesses and 
oligarchs, and in some cases even giving them spots on their party list, while publicly 
espousing workers‘ rights (OSCE 2004; Hale 2006). The KPRF failed to challenge the 
attacks leveled against it and even opted out of widely viewed televised debates once 
United Russia refused to participate as well (Hale 2006).  
The party was silent on its cozy relationship to oligarchs and big business, likely 
because such allegations were accurate: the KPRF allegedly received enormous donations 
from Boris Berezovsky and Yukos, who reportedly donated $100 million and between 
four and seven million, respectively (Wilson 2005). The party also purportedly sold spots 
on its party list for as high as $1.5-2 million and approximately one-fifth of the party‘s 
candidates had direct ties to big business (Ibid). As the Kremlin‘s main challenger, the 
KPRF bore the brunt of the anti-oligarch frenzy that emerged after the Kremlin‘s 
politically motivated arrest of Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky just two months prior 
to the election. Equally important, the KPRF and other opposition parties lost a key 
source of financial backing due to the Kremlin‘s selective application of the law.  
For the KPRF in particular, the 2003 electoral landscape differed from those of 
the 1990s because the country‘s transition from Communism was settled decisively, 
which shifted the focus of the overall campaign away from the old communist, anti-
communist cleavage and left the party with only a ―rump vote of transition losers‖ 
(Sakwa 2005: 377). Moreover, the economic context of the 2003 election was 
unfavorable compared to that surrounding previous contests: the 1995 election occurred 
at a time when the economy had been in free fall for five consecutive years with GDP 
contracting by almost 40% and the 1999 election took place in the aftermath of the 1998 
financial crisis, which forced the country to depend on food aid from the West to avert 
starvation and contributed to the ―fact that over one-third of the population was below the 
government‘s official poverty threshold‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 686). In contrast to 
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the elections in the mid- and late-1990s, positive developments on the economic front 
sapped the KPRF‘s traditional strategy of ―berating the existing government for 
destroying the economy and threatening the well-being of the Russian people‖ (Ibid). 
Seemingly impervious to changing political realities that produced a new contract 
between regime and society, the party nevertheless forged ahead with its traditional 
offerings based on a holistic denunciation of the regime that tendered neither viable 
leadership nor a program for the country with any long-term promise (Sakwa 2005). In 
short, the KPRF was a programmatic party without a viable program and largely 
unprepared to assume office; this failure ―weakened all programme parties and thus 
ultimately undermined the development of democracy in Russia‖ (Sakwa 2005: 379). The 
KRPF campaigned on the slogan ―Against the Current Anti-People Regime‖ (McFaul 
2003).  
Compounding the effects of a disastrous campaign, the KPRF‘s formerly 
cooperative relationship with the Agrarian Party crumbled. In the 1990s, the two leftist 
parties created their party lists in consultation to avoid competing directly with each other 
but a large portion of the Agrarian Party was absorbed by Fatherland-All Russia prior to 
the 1999 contest (Wegren and Konitzer 2006). The acrimonious relationship between the 
KPRF and what remained of the Agrarian Party continued into the 2003 election with the 
Agrarian Party fielding its candidates independent of the KPRF. Although the Agrarian 
Party‘s decision to go it alone in 2003 left the party with a vote share short of the 
threshold for representation, the roughly 3.5% of the party-list vote that the Agrarians did 
harvest was believed to have been ―directly siphoned off from the KPRF,‖ since there 
was a sizable correlation between KPRF support and occupation as an agricultural worker 
(Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 685).  
Despite the onslaught by the Kremlin and United Russia, and the increasing 
irrelevancy of the party‘s platform, the KPRF was widely expected to preserve its 
approximately 25% vote share from previous elections at the least, polling between 20 
and 30% during the 2003 campaign (Hale 2006). The final result of the election, 
however, proved the party of power‘s capacity to annihilate its opponents and devastated 
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the KPRF by halving its 1999 vote share, rendering it the biggest loser in the 2003 
contest. The KPRF essentially came full circle in the span of a decade, as its 2003 vote 
share was comparable to its third place showing in the 1993 snap elections, when the 
party was ―still recovering from suspension and suffering from internal division‖ 
(Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 678). Although the party returned to the legislature as the 
―only opposition party with any significant representation in the State Duma,‖ the 
KPRF‘s showing was disastrous and represented its ―long-awaited decline‖ (OSCE 2004: 
1; Clark 2006: 15).  
On the nationalist front, the LDPR again waged an energetic campaign in 2003 to 
sway disaffected voters by harping on the traditional anti-establishment and nationalist 
themes, advocating the ―very harshest treatment‖ for government bureaucrats and stating 
that those who mistreat ethnic Russians would ―pay‖ (Hale 2006: 70). The LDPR also 
advocated state building through the abandonment of federalism and the creation of a 
unitary state, while also recycling the great power rhetoric used in previous elections 
(Sakwa 2005). The party recognized that openly opposing President Putin and United 
Russia was not feasible, and instead portrayed leader Zhirinovsky as simply tougher than 
Putin, earning the party favorable coverage on state-controlled media (Hale 2006). For 
these reasons, the LDPR was alleged to be on the Kremlin payroll, receiving donations 
from state-owned enterprises and private business concerns on orders from central 
authorities (Wilson 2007). Witnessing the barrage of attacks on the KPRF, the LDPR 
hoped to benefit by sweeping up previous Communist loyalists: the party tacked ―For the 
Poor‖ to its conventional ―For Russia‖ slogan and adopted more left-leaning rhetoric than 
in the 1990s (Hale 2006).  
In the final election results, the LDPR‘s showing was a marked improvement over 
the previous election, indeed almost double its 1999 vote share, and was comparable to 
its performance in the mid-1990s. Unlike the other two parties, the LDPR was the only 
party of the core party troika to see its vote share increase since the previous election, 
rather than precipitously decline. The party thus made a critical step forward by 
effectively reversing a two-election decline in the 2003 contest.   
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 Yabloko faced a critical juncture in the 2003 election as to whether the party 
would pass the five percent threshold for legislative representation after experiencing 
declining support since the 1993 snap elections and leaving the party perilously close to 
the threshold in 1999. In the interim period between elections, Yabloko‘s support hovered 
just above, but dangerously close to, the five percent hurdle (Hale 2004). Gaining 
parliamentary representation was vital to the party‘s long-term survival, but its disastrous 
campaign in the 1999 election cast a long shadow, evident in the party‘s inability to 
attract as many major donors and independent politicians in the 2003 electoral cycle 
(McFaul 1997).  
Nevertheless, as in the 1990s, Yabloko received considerable funding from Yukos 
early on: the party raked in the equivalent of between four and six million dollars, but 
were required to place Yukos representatives on the party list as a condition for financial 
support (Wilson 2007). Khodorkovsky‘s arrest dealt a severe blow to Yabloko‘s, and 
other opposition parties‘, campaign coffers and deterred other opposition donors to 
continue funding parties that were not aligned with the Kremlin (Ibid). Moreover, the 
episode revealed rather conspicuously that the ―anti-oligarch‖ party had, in fact, close 
financial ties to oligarchs (Hale 2006). Indeed, the party campaigned in 2003 under the 
slogan ―Against the Criminal-Oligarch System.‖  
Coming to terms with political and financial realities, the party, like the LDPR, 
drastically shifted its campaign in the final weeks towards accommodation and 
cooperation with the party of power and President Putin himself. State-run media outlets 
featured Yabloko leader Yavlinsky collaborating with Putin in prime time (Hale 2006). 
President Putin himself commented in September that he would like Yabloko to be 
represented in the legislature because the party had been ―doing positive work‖ and 
―went out of his way‖ to help the party enter the legislature through the party-list, 
ostensibly to ―improve Russia‘s image abroad‖ and show that ―opposition forces were 
tolerated and still had their place in Russian politics (Sakwa 2005: 375; White 2007: 
217).  
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Taken together, the Yukos affair and highly publicized cooperation between 
Yabloko leaders and the executive administration all but destroyed the party‘s reputation 
as a defender of civil liberties, democracy and the rule of law (Ibid). As in 1999 when 
Yabloko missed a crucial opportunity to take a clear anti-war stance regarding the war in 
Chechnya, the party failed yet again four years later by not defending liberal principles 
during the campaign, at a time when shades of authoritarianism were unequivocally 
manifesting under President Putin and United Russia. Aside from these tactical and 
political errors, Yabloko otherwise advanced an expected policy platform that highlighted 
populist themes such as increasing the minimum wage and welfare stipends (Sakwa 
2005). A local Yabloko candidate in Pskov, a region bordering Estonia, Latvia and 
Belarus, commented, ―there was a huge problem with the campaign strategy. We were 
repeating what we‘ve been saying for the past ten years, instead of coming up with a new 
formula for the 21
st
 century‖ (The Economist 2003).  
Although Yabloko was expected to re-enter the legislature through the 
proportional representation contest, it was ultimately the only party in the core party 
troika that failed to clear the five percent hurdle. The party‘s failure in the 2003 elections 
was seen as ―a natural consequence of [the] strategic shift‖ to be loyal to the Kremlin, 
rather than maintaining its standard party line (Gelman 2005: 240). Another factor 
contributing to Yabloko‘s electoral rout was that liberalism was no longer associated with 
the Russian president and, without crucial executive support, the party was woefully 
incapable of preserving it independently (Sakwa 2005). For its part, Yabloko explained 
away its downfall as a product of electoral fraud rather than eroding support in the 
electorate. One Yabloko party activist explained that falsifications may have been 
directed against Yabloko since it is a liberal party: ―liberalism and the democratic idea is 
discriminated against now because of what happened under Yeltsin,‖ which makes the 
party an easy target for the regime because it supports ideas largely discredited in the 
eyes of the electorate (Party Activist in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011). The 
archetypal liberal party, and one of the oldest in post-communist Russia, earned a paltry 4 
single-mandate seats, but was consigned to non-parliamentary status in the party-list tier 
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for the first time in its decade-long history. Indeed, garnering 4.7% of the vote, the 
―against all‖ category won more electoral support than Yabloko and nearly enough to 
secure its own theoretical Duma representation (Sakwa 2005). Yabloko‘s inability to hold 
up the liberal contour of the post-communist party system into the 2000s was a major 
event in Russian party development and represented the near total disappearance of 
liberal parties and liberalism, both in the party system and parliament (Hale 2004). The 
deputy Kremlin chief of staff echoed this when he proclaimed immediately following the 
elections that the ―liberals‘ historical mission [is] exhausted‖ (Gelman 2005: 238). 
Yabloko was thus ―finished as an electoral force and would […] return to their traditional 
historical role of an ‗embattled and marginali[z]ed fragment in Russian society‘‖ (White 
2013: 69). The party‘s electoral undoing in 2003 thus stands in stark opposition to the 
nationalists and Communists, who both survived the new status quo under United Russia, 
albeit to varying degrees.  
The 2003 legislative election contrasted sharply with the 1995 and 1999 contests 
because the Kremlin supported the same political party or a direct descendent in two 
consecutive elections for the first time (Hale 2006). For the first time, the party of power 
was afforded an opportunity to fortify its position across elections (Sakwa 2005). Unity‘s 
surprise second place finish in the 1999 elections provided the momentum party builders 
needed to turn the electoral bloc into a full-fledged party of power with extensive local 
infrastructure in preparation for the 2003 contest (Hale 2006). Unity leadership pursued 
party growth vis-à-vis other parties along two tracks, coalition and absorption. Along 
with Fatherland-All Russia‘s group, Unity‘s parliamentary faction created a powerful 
coalition in the legislature with collectives of independent Duma deputies, notably 
Russia‘s Regions and People‘s Deputy, producing the overarching ―group of four‖ 
coalition (Hale 2006: 231). Within a short time, Unity absorbed the nearly extinct Our 
Home is Russia in early 2001 after disbanded by Chernomyrdin; the party also captured 
the remnants of Fatherland-All Russia after it was dissolved and officially merged with 
Unity soon after the election, together creating United Russia. In short, Putin ―realized 
that Unity and Fatherland were two halves of one whole‖ and would together make a 
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powerful party, united by the fact that both parties were ―concerned with securing 
administrative power at the federal and regional level‖ (Politician Formerly Affiliated 
with United Russia 2011). The merger of the two competing parties of power in the 
previous election elevated United Russia as the largest party in the legislature and 
signified a truly seismic change in the political environment. Through the merger with 
Fatherland, Unity ―eliminat[ed] a significant source of opposition‖ and ―gained key 
regional elites as allies‖ in one stroke (Riggs and Schraeder 2004: 146). The refashioned 
party of power enjoyed the broadest political base including both the Kremlin and 
regional governors, never before united with such a high degree of elite political 
consensus.  
Unlike his predecessor, President Putin explicitly endorsed the party of power in 
September, but did not formally join as a member. Less than a month before the election, 
President Putin publicly backed the party in no uncertain terms, stating, ―Concerning 
United Russia, I can tell you that I am not a member of this party, but this is a political 
force that I have been able to rely on over these last four years and that has consistently 
supported me…United Russia has shown itself capable of rising above a certain level of 
populism and not letting itself slip into populist mode, and has proven its ability to take 
responsible decisions and take on responsibility‖ (Quoted in Sakwa 2005: 372-373). 
United Russia featured quotations by the president prominently on campaign materials. 
The party directly benefitted from President Putin‘s high approval rating that hovered 
between 60-80% throughout his first term and party policies strongly reflected those of 
the president (Hale 2006).  
Despite criticism of United Russia for lacking a policy platform, other than its 
unyielding support of the president, the party of power did stake out an identifiable 
ideological position in arguing that the party neither occupied the left nor the right but the 
pragmatic and realistic center, which enabled the party to solve ―real problems for real 
people‖ (Quoted in Sakwa 2005: 373). In the campaign, United Russia focused on the 
themes of order and legality and the importance of maintaining a coalition fit to govern, 
rather than becoming entangled in the ideological struggles between left and right (Sakwa 
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2005). United Russia harped on deliverables in the social arena that would benefit all 
Russians, such as enhancing living standards and creating a ―civilized market‖ (Sakwa 
2005: 373). Regarding international affairs, United Russia echoed broadly nationalist 
ideas by arguing the country should occupy a worthy position in the world community, to 
be achieved via membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and visa-free travel 
between the EU and Russia within five years (Sakwa 2005). The party of power relied on 
state-owned media to promote its platform and opted out of televised debates, thereby 
signaling its political supremacy, certainty of electoral triumph, and antipathy for the 
electoral process itself (Ibid).  
United Russia stacked its 2003 party-list with more regional heavy-hitters than 
any of its party of power predecessors; the list included 29 of the most powerful regional 
heads in the country, giving United Russia access to and command over regional political 
machines that could turn out the vote for the party of power (Hale 2006). In addition to 
regional executives, many raion and municipal managers also allied themselves with 
United Russia, effectively removing a source of administrative resources for the KPRF in 
those areas, as previously regional- and local-level operators were ―friendly, or at least 
indifferent‖ to the KPRF (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 687). Approximately 27% of 
United Russia‘s 268 party-list candidates had close ties to major national and regional 
corporations, including 14 candidates associated with oil producers Lukoil, Yukos and 
Sibneft and 12 candidates connected to the metals industry through Russian Aluminum 
and Norilsk Nickel (Wilson 2007). United Russia‘s close bond with powerful regional 
governors and corporations produced ―unprecedented administrative capital‖ that could 
be leveraged in the 2003 campaign (Hale 2006: 84). Reserves of administrative capital 
were also expanded due to the fact that United Russia established regional party 
organizations in all of the 89 regions, accomplishing what all of its party of power 
ancestors had failed (Wegren and Konitzer 2007).  
United Russia also doggedly pursued electoral victory by engaging in a full-
blown two-pronged assault against the KPRF using state-owned media on one side, and 
on the other side, the creation of at least five Kremlin-friendly spoiler parties that 
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ideologically resembled the KPRF to poach votes from those disaffected by the negative 
media attacks (Wilson 2006; Gelman 2005; Hale et al. 2004). In creating numerous loyal 
opposition parties akin to the KPRF prior to the election, the Kremlin and United Russia 
by extension aimed to ―split and weaken‖ possible protest and opposition in the 
legislature (Gelman 2005: 242). Indeed, one such Kremlin creation was created just four 
months before the election, the Motherland (or Rodina) party. Sergei Glazyev, who was 
elected in 1999 via the KPRF‘s party list, and Dmitry Rogozin, a moderate nationalist, 
led Rodina in the 2003 elections, espousing the populist policies of economic 
redistribution coupled with nationalist rhetoric. Indeed, ―Rodina‘s platform overlap[ped] 
significantly with that of the KPRF in certain issue areas […] and its success […] may 
have been at least partially responsible for the depressed vote support of the KPRF‖ 
(Clark 2006: 22). Rodina exceeded expectations, culling approximately nine percent of 
the party-list vote by positioning itself as the patriotic left. Rodina‘s success coupled with 
the withering of the KPRF signaled that the Kremlin and United Russia had realized its 
long-term agenda of ―marginaliz[ing] the [K]PRF as a political force in the country and 
parliament‖ (Sakwa 2005: 385).  
But United Russia went a step beyond the creation of spoiler parties that 
resembled the KPRF and actually adopted a nationalist and patriotic platform itself, while 
also featuring prominently the party‘s ties to President Putin, who was widely regarded as 
a tough leader and often espoused such rhetoric himself. With regards to domestic policy, 
President Putin moved on numerous fronts to attract the KPRF‘s core constituency of 
rural voters: he increased pensions, paid wage arrears, embarked on a campaign to 
eradicate corruption by targeting the oligarchs, prioritized social development, upped 
state investment in agriculture, relieved large farms of some accumulated debt, and 
reformed the banking system with an eye toward making it easier for agricultural 
producers to gain access to credit (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 685-686). In an interview 
after the 2003 contest, the head of the KPRF‘s campaign staff commented, ―three of our 
main issues—rich and poor, protecting the rights of Russians, the people versus the 
oligarchs, were taken up by other parties. These issues, and the remaining basic 
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conditions of our program were all used by different politicians, and we need to admit, 
that they did this much more actively than we did‖ (Quoted in Wegren and Konitzer 
2006: 685). The combination of newly created and Kremlin-financed spoiler parties and a 
nationalist-patriotic platform co-opted by United Russia proved catastrophic for the 
KPRF: the KPRF ―ceded its monopoly‖ on nationalist-patriotic rhetoric and slogans to a 
more formidable party and President Putin himself, ―leaving the KPRF to occupy the 
narrower niche of a rather traditionalist leftist party‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 685). 
Ultimately, United Russia won a crushing victory in the party-list vote by capturing 
approximately 25% more than the second place finisher, the KPRF, and became the first 
truly successful party of power in post-communist Russia. Indeed, United Russia had 
won by a greater margin than any party in any of Russia‘s legislative elections since 1993 
(Clark 2006).  
The first legislative elections held since Vladimir Putin‘s election as president 
produced a ―commanding majority‖ for United Russia, with a combined total of 222 out 
of 450 seats, and surpassed the KPRF as the largest party in parliament (OSCE 2004: 1). 
United Russia ultimately secured even more Duma seats, 300 in total, once independents 
and deputies from other party lists reevaluated their loyalties and band-wagoned with the 
party of power, producing a two-thirds constitutional majority for United Russia. One 
party switcher was one of four single-mandate winners affiliated with Yabloko. For the 
first time in the short history of Russian legislative elections, the party of power not only 
preserved but also fortified its position to the point of being ―virtually unassailable‖ 
(Riggs and Schraeder 2004: 148).  
The election contributed to the ―Mexicanization‖ of the party system by 
transforming it into a one-party dominant system (Riggs and Schraeder 2004: 141; 
Gelman 2006). This feat was not achieved without the near total ―extinction of political 
opposition in Russia,‖ most conspicuously the KPRF and Yabloko (Gelman 2005: 241). 
The results of 2003 election fundamentally recast the opposition in Russia by 
―marginali[zing] not only the [K]PRF as the strongest programm[atic] party but of all 
program[atic] parties standing in the election,‖ such as Yabloko (Sawka 2005: 385). The 
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outcome was undoubtedly most catastrophic for Yabloko than the KPRF, since no 
Russian political party had survived after falling short of the five percent hurdle. 
Nevertheless, the clear ―losers‖ in the contest were united by opposition party status, 
origins independent from the Kremlin, and societal roots, while the ―winners,‖ namely 
United Russia, Kremlin-creation Rodina, and the LDPR, were united by Kremlin support, 
loyalty to President Putin, and nationalist platforms to some extent (McFaul 2003). 
Overall, the elections produced a Duma weakened as an independent institution and 
engendered a political opportunity structure that was judged ―unfavorable for opposition 
of any kind‖ (OSCE 2004; Gelman 2005: 241).  
The varying electoral trajectories of opposition parties in the 2003 contest 
demonstrate that the new political status quo under a successful dominant party was more 
inhospitable to some parties than others, as Yabloko was completely frozen out, the 
KPRF was severely crippled but alive, and the LDPR emerged with newfound vitality. 
Despite this divergence within the electoral trajectories of the opposition camp, the 
election was marked by the ―simultaneous decline of the left and right:‖ with economic 
liberalism clearly triumphant over statism by 2003, the citizenry ―turn[ed] away from 
ideology as such‖ (Aslund 2004: 281). This fact took the wind out of the sails of both the 
KPRF and Yabloko, as the former‘s constituency recognized that there was no viable 
alternative to a market economy, and the latter campaigning in support of the economic 
system that already existed made it seem like the ―leaders were just kicking an open 
door‖ (Aslund 2004: 282). Thus, with many crucial elements of the post-communist 
political and economic system in Russia already in operation, previously salient policy 
distinctions between political parties became essentially moot and voters made their 
decisions using alternative information.  
Another important feature of the election was that it illustrated the ―rise of a 
militant and aggressive nationalism‖ (Aslund 2004: 283). Among the three parties in the 
core party troika, the ultra-nationalist LDPR was the only to see its vote share rise and it 
was a substantial increase over 1999, to nearly double. Moreover, United Russia 
campaigned on vague nationalist themes, such as unity, stability and strength, and ran 
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away with the election. Clearly, the two prominent trends in the election results, the 
decline of the left and right and the rise of Russian nationalism, are related in that the 
resolution of post-communist political and economic problems created a void that could 
be filled with nationalist sentiment. In 2003, Russia had weathered the dual political and 
economic transition and survived, fostering a sense of pride and nationalism that was 
dampened throughout the 1990s due to veritable chaos.  
The 2003 Legislative Election as an Uncompetitive Election 
In contrast to the 1995 and 1999 legislative elections, the 2003 contest will be 
treated as an uncompetitive election because, although some electoral malfeasance 
occurred in the elections in the 1990s, the scale in which such practices were used in 
2003 was extreme even by post-Soviet Russia standards (Hale et al. 2004). In short, the 
election was ―entirely and fundamentally flawed from the start,‖ was ―far from fair,‖ and 
represented a regression of democratization in Russia (Sakwa 2005: 382, 369; OSCE 
2004). The contest was judged to be the ―most constrained and least competitive since the 
Soviet period‖ (Hale et al. 2004: 285). The Kremlin‘s domination of the electoral process 
―undermined the legitimacy of the regime itself [and] discredited Russia‘s democratic 
institutions,‖ creating an election that was no more than ―demonstration of what the 
power in the land is capable of‖ (Sakwa 2005: 383, 385).  
The lines between the executive administration and political parties, notably 
United Russia, were blurred due to the widespread use of state administrative resources 
that created a severely uneven playing field during the campaign and election itself 
(OSCE 2004). The OSCE Election Observation Mission Report notes that, ―while 
advantages of incumbency may be generally recognized, in the context of the 7 
December State Duma elections, these advantages seriously distorted the process (2004: 
1). In numerous regions, United Russia campaign offices were located within state or 
government administrative offices and the local government provided office equipment 
and transport services (OSCE 2004). Furthermore, the sizable proportion of regional 
governors on United Russia‘s party list (29 in total) led to open promotion of the party in 
their respective regions, directly contravening laws requiring candidates to suspend their 
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official functions during the election campaign period (Ibid). An annual student meeting 
with the governor of Khabarovsk, for instance, transformed into a campaign stop for the 
governor and United Russia (Ibid).  
Election observers noted a range of other practices that substantially jeopardized 
the freedom and fairness of the election. For example, observers witnessed widespread 
open voting in 29% of observed polling stations and group or family voting, i.e. where 
voters mark their ballots together, in 25% of stations; indeed, ―in practice secrecy of the 
vote is not treated as an obligation‖ (OSCE 2004: 6, 20). In one extreme case in a 
precinct located the ethnic republic of Bashkortostan, there were no voting booths present 
at all, and in other cases, precinct administrators expressly encouraged voters not to make 
use of voting booths or facilitated open voting by placing tables with pens attached next 
to ballot boxes (OSCE 2004). In the federal cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow, 
observers witnessed open voting in 49% and 36% of polling stations, respectively (OSCE 
2004: 21). In Russian regions and ethnic republics alike, employers required workers to 
secure absentee ballots for vote monitoring purposes or pledged job termination (OSCE 
2004). Once workers in Bashkortostan secured their absentee ballots, they were bussed in 
to Ufa by the thousands to vote at pre-selected polling stations (Ibid). Election observers 
noted an unusually high proportion of absentee ballots used in the region (Ibid). When 
automated counting machines were employed in Ufa, Bashkortostan, ―operator[s] stood 
by each machine all day and assisted voters, many of whom fed the ballot horizontally 
into the machine face-up, so their voting mark was clearly visible‖ (OSCE 2004: 9-10). 
Observers noted ―the blatant fraud that occurred in Bashkortostan and irregularities seen 
in some other national republics and in certain regions, particularly in Siberia and the Far 
East‖ (OSCE PA 2003). In remote rural areas in Tatarstan, precinct election 
commissioners stated that local leaders bribed voters with sugar, tea or sausages to vote 
for the party of power (Franklin 2004). Local election commissions openly displayed 
United Russia party materials in their offices and in Voronezh region, one of the polling 
stations was located within a United Russia party campaign office with United Russia 
campaign materials posted conspicuously  (OSCE 2004). Local governments slanted the 
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playing field toward the party of power and against opposition parties by refusing public 
advertising space that was previously arranged by opposition parties, preventing parties 
from securing appropriate spaces for rallies or meetings, destroying or impounding 
campaign posters and other materials, and detaining campaign workers by police (Ibid).  
The vote counting process was considered prejudicial in 27% of polling stations 
observed and an additional 31% had ―significant procedural errors and omissions‖; some 
14% of precinct election commissions also failed to issue copies of election results after 
the final tally to entitled persons as well as Russian non-partisan and political party 
observers (OSCE 2004: 2). The KPRF, Yabloko, and the Union of Right Forces together 
conducted their own 2003 election observation mission and alternative recount of the 
results using a system called FairGame. The alternative count suggested that results were 
falsified because Yabloko was found to have actually won almost six percent of the 
party-list vote (which would have allowed the party parliamentary representation), rather 
than the 4.3% tally in the official results (Wilson 2006: 334). Other results also varied to 
differing degrees from the official count: the KPRF received .01 less than its official 
12.61%; LDPR received 11.25% rather than the official 12.45%; and United Russia 
captured 33.66%, a significant difference from the 37.57% officially reported (Ibid). The 
FairGame results were believed to be accurate and unbiased because the KPRF‘s vote 
share was found to be lower than the official result and multiple exit polls conducted by 
The Moscow Times, the Soros Foundation, among others, largely corroborated 
FairGame‘s results (White 2007).  
In about a dozen regions, mostly in the ethnic republics, ―mass falsification [was] 
alleged‖ (Sakwa 2005: 382). Zyuganov demanded a recount in all areas where the official 
results diverged from those of the alternative recount and requested the CEC withhold 
from publishing the results; the CEC ignored Zyuganov‘s complaints and published the 
official count the following day (Wilson 2006). The CEC responded similarly when the 
KPRF and Yabloko entered another formal complaint asking for a recount, arguing 
peculiarly that the CEC was unable to investigate mistakes on the results forms because 
nearly all of them were completed incorrectly, despite the fact that the results forms were 
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filled out by district election commissions and not the parties themselves (Ibid). The CEC 
acknowledged, however, that there were differences between the results of the alternative 
recount and the official tally but not such that the ―true will of the voters‖ was distorted 
because the differences primarily involved voter turnout figures and the proportion of 
absentee ballots (Ibid). Yabloko leader Yavlinsky disagreed, commenting wryly that his 
party‘s biggest error in the election was that ―we should have understood earlier that to 
win five percent in Russia, twenty percent of the vote must be gathered de facto‖ (Quoted 
in White 2007: 220). The CEC granted no relief to any of the parties engaged in the 
alternative recount, which compromises the accuracy and validity of the election results.  
 Figure 6.1 supplies further evidence that strongly indicates that methods of 
manipulation were practiced in the 2003 legislative contest. Compared to the previous 
election in 1999, the right hand tail of the distribution became notably fatter in 2003. 
Additionally, a dubious small bump is apparent in voter turnout just higher than 80%, 
suggesting artificially augmented turnout, either through ballot box stuffing or the illicit 
changing of results protocols. The distribution of turnout in 2003 reveals the first 
instances of what quickly became the hallmarks of voter turnout and elections under 
United Russia: a fat right hand tail and suspicious peaks found at high levels of turnout.  
 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of Voter Turnout in 2003 
 
 
Raion-level national turnout in the first contest of the 2000s was 59.20% and the 
corresponding standard deviation was 12.27. The distribution of voter turnout was 
 250 
therefore considerably more dispersed from the mean in 2003 than was the case in 1999, 
when the standard deviation was 9.22. The increased standard deviation reflects the 
fattening of the right hand tail in 2003. Table 6.1 indicates the voter turnout threshold set 
for suspected electoral manipulation, the number of manipulated raions and the percent of 
raions that reported voter turnout exceeding the threshold, which was just greater than 
14%. Thus, the percent of raions classified as fraudulent increased by approximately one 
and half percent from 1999 to 2003, signaling the slow expansion of electoral 
manipulation under conditions of contracted competition with United Russia at the helm.  
 
Table 6.1: Manipulated Raions in 2003 
Voter Turnout Threshold 
(1 Standard Deviation Above 
Raion-level National Turnout) 
Number Manipulated Raions % Total Raions 
71.47 379 14.27 
 
As in 1995 and 1999, but to a significantly more pronounced degree, media 
coverage ―exhibit[ed] a clear bias in favour of United Russia‖ at the expense of 
opposition parties, notably the KPRF (OSCE 2004: 15). Freedom House noted that the 
Kremlin ―gained nearly total control of the broadcast media in 2003‖ by ―using restrictive 
legislation and exerting financial pressure through the government and government-
related companies‖ (2004: 164). State-owned or state-managed media outlets provided a 
substantial amount of positive coverage to United Russia, ranging from 16-22% of prime 
time news, and devoted a comparable share of negative coverage to the KPRF at 
approximately 14% (Ibid). There was also considerable coverage of President Putin 
himself, a fact considered ―to indirectly benefit the campaigns of pro-presidential 
political parties‖: over one-third of airtime on one channel was devoted to his activities 
(OSCE 2004: 16). Since the overwhelming majority of Russians obtain their news from 
television, United Russia‘s near monopolization of the national channels during the 
campaign proved a major advantage. KPRF leader Zyuganov filed a complaint with the 
CEC and the CEC‘s legal department concurred, stating there was a ―systematic and 
deliberate broadcast of positive or neutral information about United Russia and negative 
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information or information with negative commentaries about the KRPF‖ (Corwin 2003). 
In one instance, the primary state channel ORT reported on a new book by KPRF leader 
Zyuganov that, according to ORT, tried to show the ―spiritual proximity between the 
KPRF and the Russian Orthodox Church‖ (Ibid). The report then turned to archival 
footage detailing the Soviet‘s demolition of churches and two interviews with historians 
who disparaged the book (Ibid). The CEC Chairman elected only to issue warning letters 
to the two channels and generally lacked the ability or desire to investigate and legally 
pursue complaints regarding biased media coverage (Corwin 2003; OSCE 2004). 
Analysis 
 In 2003, the KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko are investigated, notwithstanding 
Yabloko‘s failure to cross the five percent threshold for legislative representation. The 
Kremlin-created Motherland party received Duma seats, but the party is excluded 
because it had not competed in the two previous elections in 1995 and 1999. Unity and 
Fatherland-All Russia‘s merger in the early 2000s formed the new dominant party, 
United Russia, which is analyzed alongside the core party troika. Table 2 details the two 
stronghold thresholds established for each party and indicates the number of strongholds 
and the percent of raions accounted for by both thresholds. Compared to the final election 
under President Yeltsin, the Communists and liberals lost numerous lower level 
strongholds but gained several higher level bastions of support while the nationalists 
preserved their lower level support but numerous higher threshold strongholds were 
wiped out.  
 
Table 6.2: Measuring the Dependent Variable: Party Strongholds in 2003 
 1 standard deviation 
above party‘s raion-
level national 
average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
2 standard deviations 
above party‘s raion-
level national 
average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
KPRF 18.95 428 16.03 24.62 91 3.41 
LDPR 16.80 391 13.15 21.67 45 1.69 
Yabloko 5.84 397 14.87 8.61 156 5.84 
United 
Russia 
54.35 346 12.96 68.21 154 5.77 
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Figure 6.2 displays the distribution of each party‘s vote share in the 2003 election and 
allows for the rough identification of the two stronghold thresholds for each. The 
distributions for the Communists and liberals were again more clustered than the previous 
election. In the case of the KPRF, the distribution was approximately twice as clustered 
in 2003 as in 1999: the standard deviation was 10.79 in the late 1990s but contracted 
sharply to 5.67 once United Russia rose to power. The distribution shows a slight bump 
beginning at approximately 15% but does not raise any suspicions because the party‘s 
raion-level national average was only roughly two percent less. Like the Communists, the 
standard deviation for Yabloko‘s distribution also narrowed, from 3.44 in 1999 to 2.76 in 
the early 2000s. The distribution displays a rather elongated right hand tail with a bump 
around nine percent, but, although the bump occurred at vote shares three times 
Yabloko‘s raion-level national average, the raions comprising the bump were located in 
Yabloko‘s urban heartland in Moscow and St. Petersburg and therefore are not subject to 
doubt. The small bump in the right tail is, in fact, significantly smaller than was the case 
in the previous and more competitive election. In contrast to the Communists and 
liberals, the nationalist‘s distribution did not experience the same winnowing effect from 
the 1990s to the early 2000s: the party‘s distribution was, in fact, more dispersed in 2003 
than it was in 1999, with standard deviations of 4.87 and 3.10, respectively. The 
distribution is quite abnormal, revealing a conspicuous peak and valley in the left tail 
around a null vote share and a soft ―step‖ at around eight percent, a few percent below the 
party‘s raion-level national average. United Russia‘s distribution revealed the most 
dispersion of the group with a standard deviation of 13.85. The distribution was therefore 
significantly more dispersed than Our Home is Russia‘s in 1995 and Unity‘s in 1999, but 
more clustered than Fatherland-All Russia‘s in the previous election. Similar to 
Yabloko‘s, United Russia‘s distribution also exhibits an elongated right tail with 
noticeable bumps at approximately 55%, 75%, and in the low 80% range, all of which 
surpass the lower stronghold threshold and two of which comfortably surpass the higher 
threshold. As United Russia‘s raion-level national average was just greater than 40% in 
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2003, many of these raions delivered vote shares to the dominant party that reached or 
exceeded no less than double the party‘s countrywide showing.  
 
Figure 6.2: Distribution of Parties‘ Vote Shares in 2003 
 
  
 
See Appendix Tables 55-78 (pages 580-627) for Multilevel Model Results. 
Ethnicity and Opposition Parties 
 Under the weight of the Kremlin‘s new party powerhouse, the electoral 
trajectories of opposition parties shifted strikingly in various conditions but retained a 
few core contours in the early 2000s. In the two competitive elections in the 1990s, the 
KPRF scored electoral windfalls in areas with geographically concentrated ethnic 
minorities at the raion level, with odds hiking one to seven percent; by 2003, however, 
denser populations of non-Russians did not exercise a systematic effect on the occurrence 
of party strongholds in the lower threshold models. Only in one strict specification did 
the proportion of ethnic minorities increase the odds of a bastion of support and the 
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magnitude of the effect was limited to approximately one percent in that isolated case. 
The fact that ethnic minorities were, save for one instance, not methodically connected to 
high vote shares for the Communists represented a sea change for the party in the early 
2000s: with that core constituency seemingly waffling, likely due to the presence of a 
dominant party with deep pockets for patronage, the KPRF struggled to preserve its once 
firm position in non-Russian communities. Refined measures of ethnic composition 
indicated that other minorities generated the transformation in the KPRF‘s constituency 
in part: while unit increases in the other minority population augmented the odds of a 
stronghold by one to six percent in the previous election, this demographic did not 
exercise a systematic influence in 2003 in all but one strict specification, in which the 
odds increased by merely one percent. Furthermore, titular minorities exerted a limited 
and negative impact on the KPRF vote in 1999, but the magnitude of the effect became 
greater in 2003 and was found across thresholds, diminishing the odds by three percent in 
a lower threshold model and by roughly seven percent in a strict specification. With its 
tentacles in numerous ethnic districts, the rise of United Russia effectively shifted the 
ground under the Communists and the correlates of the KPRF vote became more ethnic 
Russian than ever before. When vote share was treated continuously rather than 
dichotomously, as is the case in the statistical models, the association between the 
KPRF‘s vote share and the proportion of non-Russians appears inverse, as shown in 
Figure 6.3. The scatterplot pertaining to titular minorities is more consistent with the 
statistical findings, revealing a comparatively steep inverse relationship. On the other 
hand, the scatterplot detailing the association between other minorities and the KPRF‘s 
electoral fortunes or failures exhibits a more positive relationship, but one noticeably 
weaker than that which prevailed in 1999. Especially when compared to the scatterplots 
pertaining to the previous election, there are significantly fewer outlier raions with large 
ethnic minority populations that reported unusually high vote shares for the Communists. 
The most zealous ―red raions,‖ churning out vote shares reaching upwards of three times 
the party‘s national showing, had populations dominated almost entirely by other 
minorities and were located in Dagestan. As such, the mostly other minority raions that 
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the KPRF excelled in were comprised chiefly of non-titular but also non-Indo European 
ethnic minorities, such as those in Dagestan and some other Caucasian regions. The 
remaining enthusiastic raions were found in majority Russian raions in Bryansk Oblast on 
the Ukrainian border, Volgograd Oblast bordering Kazakhstan to the southeast, and many 
other so-called ―red belt‖ regions, such as Lipetsk, Tambov, and Kursk.  
 
Figure 6.3: Non-Russian Minorities and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 exposes the slow transformation in the ethnic contours of the Communist vote: 
in the final election of the 1990s, the KPRF captured a higher percentage of strongholds 
in majority-minority than majority-Russian raions overall, but by the first election of the 
2000s, the party drew a higher share from ethnic Russian areas. Of the majority-minority 
and majority-Russian raions, the percentage that were KPRF strongholds dropped in 
2003, from more than 20% in 1999 to less than 15% in 2003 in the former and from just 
less than 20% to just greater than 15% in the latter. An additional shift was apparent in 
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poorer regions, as the Communists harvested a higher percentage of strongholds in 
majority-minority raions by a sizable margin in the previous election but the balance 
heavily favored majority-Russian raions in 2003. The Communists suffered acutely in the 
Caucasus in the first contest with United Russia on the ballot: in 1999, even though two 
potential parties of power jockeyed for control of the Kremlin, the KPRF boasted 
stronghold level support in over 60% of majority-minority raions in the area, but the 
party‘s share plummeted to less than 20% in 2003. Likewise, of majority-Russian raions, 
the proportion that was KPRF bastions of support plunged by roughly 20%. The 
Communists were also unable to maintain levels of support comparable to the 1990s in 
the remaining regional contexts, save for one exception that served as a ray of light in the 
otherwise stormy conditions: the party gained ground in majority-Russian raions in 
resource-dependent regions in 2003. Interestingly, with the shift from the relaxed to the 
strict threshold, the ethnic contours of the Communist vote became less Russian. In 
contrast to the lower threshold, the KPRF captured a higher percentage of strongholds in 
majority-minority raions than majority-Russian raions overall and in poorer regions. 
Additionally, the raising of the stronghold threshold resulted in the evaporation of the few 
strongholds that the party had preserved in mostly Russian raions housed in Muslim 
regions.  
 
Figure 6.4: KPRF Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2003 
(lower threshold on the left) 
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Majority-minority raions registered average vote shares for the KPRF that were less than 
one percent below its countrywide showing, as indicated in Table 6.3. Although the shift 
from raions located in Russian federal regions and non-Muslim regions to those housed 
in ethnic republics and Muslim regions did not systematically affect the occurrence of 
KPRF strongholds, descriptive statistics suggest that the Communists‘ performance was 
sub-average in these two ethnic contexts at the regional level: the party‘s average was 
less than two percent and nearly two percent, respectively, under its raion-level national 
average. With regards to Muslim regions, the KPRF‘s fortunes in Muslim regions 
changed swiftly from the 1990s. In the previous contests, more competitive contestation 
and the absence of an effective party of power helped produce electoral windfalls for the 
Communists in Muslim regions, with odds soaring by dozens and hundreds of times. 
Thus, the lack of a systematic effect in 2003 represents a marked softening of support.  
 
Table 6.3: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the KPRF’s Electoral Performance in the 2003 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
13.27 14.17 11.76 10.82 11.08 11.34 14.66 12.95 10.87 
Min 
 
.030 .037 .030 .037 .030 .030 .030 .661 .030 
Max 
 
48.25 48.25 48.25 48.25 48.25 48.25 48.25 32.87 29.93 
SD 
 
5.67 6.09 7.23 6.76 6.48 7.81 7.35 5.44 5.57 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
A small share of Communist strongholds were located in ethnic republics and an even 
more limited proportion were found in predominantly Muslim regions, as shown in Table 
6.4: roughly 14% and less than 20% according to the lower and higher threshold for 
ethnic republics and less than seven percent and approximately 14% in the case of 
Muslim regions. 
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Table 6.4: KPRF Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2003 
 
 
 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(428 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(91 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
60 14.02 
18 19.78 
Russian federal 
regions 
368 85.98 
73 80.22 
Muslim regions 29 6.78 13 14.29 
Caucasus regions 69 16.12 18 19.78 
Poorer Regions 211 49.30 42 46.15 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
35 8.18 
13 14.29 
Fraudulent raions 40 9.35 16 17.58 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
388 90.65 75 82.42 
 
The KPRF preserved and expanded its pockets of support in areas with geographically 
concentrated ethnic minorities in the mid- to late-1990s but United Russia‘s accession 
drastically reconfigured the electoral arena in these areas and the KPRF was largely 
incapable of staving off the inevitable.  
 In contrast to the Communists, the ethnic contours of the nationalist vote 
remained generally intact from the 1990s and the party was shellacked once more by 
increases in the non-Russian population of any kind in 2003. The percent non-Russian 
covariate diminished the odds of a nationalist stronghold by three to five percent across 
the lower threshold models and by four percent in a strict specification. Unit increases in 
the titular minority population again shrunk the odds, but the magnitude of the negative 
effect was greater in some models than in the previous election, diminishing the 
likelihood of a stronghold by four to eight percent across-the-board in the relaxed models. 
Finally, other minorities plunged the odds by two to five percent in the lower threshold 
models, a modest improvement over the four to seven percent tumble indicated in 1999. 
The LDPR was well equipped to preserve its ethnic Russian constituency in the face of 
United Russia‘s rise to power because the dominant party homed in on ethnic minorities, 
leaving ethnic Russian areas in the nationalists‘ hands. However, the findings pertaining 
to the Communists collectively suggested that days in which the nationalists battled with 
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only the weak Yabloko for support from ethnic Russian areas may have been numbered. 
With United Russia squeezing the most formidable opposition party out of ethnic 
minority enclaves, the KPRF was forced to turn its attention to collecting votes from 
ethnic Russians instead, directly challenging the LPDR. Figure 6.5 displays the 
unmistakably inverse relationship between the LDPR‘s vote share and non-Russian 
minorities in 2003 and closely resemble those regarding the contest in 1999. In each of 
the three scatterplots, there are conspicuous clusters of raions located in the lower right 
quadrant, where raions populated entirely by ethnic minorities registered null vote shares 
for the nationalists. The LPDR‘s most enthusiastic raion, reporting a vote share more than 
twice the party‘s raion-level national mean, was comprised mostly of ethnic Russians 
with a small segment of other minorities and was found in Amur Oblast bordering China 
to the south. Other majority-Russian raions that churned out vote shares for the LDPR 
that exceeded twice its national mean were located in Primorsky Krai, Russia‘s 
southeasternmost region bordering China and North Korea, Magadan Oblast on the Sea 
of Okhotsk, and Sakhalin Oblast that borders the same sea. The few outliers at the 
intersection of high ethnic minority population and support for the nationalists were 
located in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Orenburg Oblast on the border with 
Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 6.5: Non-Russian Minorities and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
 
While the Communists were crushed in some regional environments with the entrance of 
United Russia into the electoral fray, the LDPR seemingly grew its support, particularly 
in the unlikely areas of majority-minority raions, as demonstrated in Figure 6.6, although 
the overall pattern of LDPR strongholds retained core ethnic Russian characteristics over 
time. In every regional environment, except for Muslim regions, a higher percentage of 
majority-Russian raions were LDPR strongholds than majority-minority raions. Of 
majority-Russian and majority-minority raions, the share that was LDPR strongholds was 
tilted heavily towards the former. Of the majority-Russian raions, the percentage that 
were LDPR strongholds fell from more than 20% in 1999 to just greater than 15% in 
2003, but, of the majority-minority raions, the share increased by a few percentage points 
from the previous election. Compared to 1999, a higher percentage of majority-minority 
raions in Muslim regions, those in the Caucasus, economically disadvantaged and 
resource-dependent regions, delivered stronghold level support to the LDPR in 2003. In 
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fact, the LDPR did not capture any strongholds in Muslim regions in 1999; not only did 
the nationalists gain bastions of support in Muslim regions in the election in which 
United Russia rose to power, but the strongholds that the party did capture were in 
majority-minority raions. Support for the nationalists also ballooned in the Caucasus in 
both majority-Russian and majority-minority raions: in 1999, the LDPR had no 
strongholds in majority-minority raions and, of the majority-Russian raions, much less 
than five percent channeled immense support to the party; in 2003, of majority-minority 
raions, a few percent were strongholds and, of majority-Russian raions, more than 10% 
were bastions of support. Of the majority-Russian raions in ethnic republics, the 
percentage that were strongholds rose from less than 15% in 1999 to greater than that in 
2003. Electoral support for the LDPR dwindled in a key constituency for the party, i.e. 
majority-Russian raions in poorer regions, dropping from nearly 35% of those raions in 
the last election to less than 20% in 2003.  
 
Figure 6.6: LDPR Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2003 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 6.5 suggest that the nationalists fared poorly in majority-
minority raions, as the party‘s average was less than 50% of its raion-level national mean, 
a larger drop off compared to 1999. At the regional level, ethnic republic and Muslim 
region status also generated serious setbacks for the LDPR: the party‘s average showing 
in ethnic republics was approximately one-third less than its countrywide take and the 
LDPR was thrashed in Muslim regions with an average roughly seven percent below. 
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Indeed, Muslim regions delivered the party the paltriest average of any regional context 
considered. Compared to the party‘s national mean, the LDPR‘s average in ethnic 
republics and Muslim regions took a steeper plunge than in the previous election.  
 
Table 6.5: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the LDPR’s Electoral Performance in the 2003 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
11.92 11.46 
 
5.90 6.75 7.47 4.54 8.71 12.14 11.59 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .246 0 
Max 
 
27.10 25.11 25.33 25.33 25.33 15.13 22.54 26.09 25.33 
SD 4.87 5.11 
 
5.04 5.23 5.72 4.54 6.42 4.62 5.18 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
The results from the multilevel models substantiate the descriptive statistics and paint a 
bleak picture of the nationalists‘ performance in these areas. The shift from raions in 
Russian federal regions to those nested within ethnic republics shrunk the odds by 
approximately 75% in a lower threshold model and the magnitude of the negative effect 
became even greater in the strict specifications, plunging the odds by roughly 90 to 99%. 
These findings are broadly similar with those pertaining to 1999. Nationalist strongholds 
in ethnic republics were scarce, as indicated in Table 6.6: 12% and nearly 7% of the 
party‘s bastions of support were found in these regions by the lower and higher threshold, 
respectively.  
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Table 6.6: LDPR Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2003 
 
 
 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(391 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(45 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
47 12.02 
3 6.67 
Russian federal 
regions 
344 87.98 
42 93.33 
Muslim regions 6 1.53 0 0 
Caucasus regions 21 5.37 1 2.22 
Poorer Regions 232 59.34 28 62.22 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
71 18.16 
5 11.11 
Fraudulent raions 9 2.30 2 4.44 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
382 97.69 43 95.56 
 
Muslim regions delivered a similarly harsh blow to the LDPR. The value of the odds for 
raions housed within Muslim regions was approximately one-twentieth the value for 
raions located elsewhere in a relaxed specification, a conspicuous decline from the late 
1990s when this distinction did not exercise a systematic effect on the occurrence of 
strongholds. Compared to the other regional settings considered, the nationalists enjoyed 
the fewest strongholds in these areas, less than two percent and zero according to the 
lower and higher threshold. Yet the fact that the party gained six strongholds in Muslim 
regions by the lower stronghold threshold represented a marked improvement compared 
to 1999 when the party captured no bastions of support with regards to either stronghold 
measure. The LDPR‘s electoral trajectory from the 1990s to the early 2000s with regard 
to the ethnic Russian, non-Russian cleavage retained core features but also reflected 
subtle shifts suggesting that the party was making modest inroads into constituencies 
outside of its traditional base, i.e. ethnic minorities. These limited but discernible initial 
forays into ethnic minority areas occurred at an unlikely electoral juncture: United 
Russia‘s dramatic rise to power in 2003 was achieved in no small part due to the 
mobilization of ethnic minorities, but the dominant party had not yet fully consolidated 
and established a stranglehold over these areas, allowing for faint infiltrations by the 
comparatively Kremlin-friendly nationalists.  
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 Alongside the nationalists, there is some evidence that Yabloko also carved out 
new pockets of support in ethnic minority areas in 2003, although the party‘s general 
profile seemed to remain mostly ethnic Russian. In the previous election, Yabloko 
suffered as a result of unit increases in all three ethnic composition covariates at the raion 
level: the odds tumbled four to 30% with regards to the percent non-Russian parameter, 
declined four to 13% in terms of the titular minority refinement, and took a five to 27% 
drop in relation to other minorities. In the early 2000s, increases in the percent minority 
and percent other minority covariates generated a modest positive effect, in fact, 
augmenting the odds of a liberal stronghold by one percent in the lower threshold models. 
These findings indicate that the Yabloko vote became less ethnic Russian and more 
minority than had been the case in the previous election. Communities with denser 
populations of titular minorities delivered another blow to the party, shrinking the odds 
by three percent in a lower threshold model, but one that paled in comparison to the late 
1990s. These signs of improvement were not strong enough, however, to propel the party 
over the threshold for legislative representation in 2003. When vote share was leveraged 
continuously rather than dichotomously and without controlling for the other variables as 
in the statistical models, the association between Yabloko‘s performance and the 
proportion of ethnic minorities appeared slightly grimmer but still showed some progress 
from the last election, especially vis-à-vis other minorities, as exhibited in Figure 6.7. 
Indeed, the scatterplot pertaining to other minorities shows a more balanced relationship 
in 2003 than the steep inverse association evident in 1999. When compared to the final 
election of the 1990s, the scatterplots reveal somewhat fewer outliers reporting high vote 
shares for the newly non-parliamentary party. Of the top 50 most liberal raions, two 
percent were found in the Republic of Karelia bordering Finland, four percent in St. 
Petersburg, 10% in Primorsky Krai, and an amazing 84% were housed in Moscow. A full 
100% of these raions were majority-Russian, with ethnic minority populations ranging 
from nine to 18%. The raions populated entirely or predominantly by ethnic minorities 
that channeled support to Yabloko exceeding the lower threshold set for party 
strongholds were found in Chelyabinsk Oblast bordering Kazakhstan, and, surprisingly, 
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the ethnic republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan in the Caucasus, and Bashkortostan, 
situated between the Urals Mountains and the Volga River. As was the case with the 
nationalists and to a more limited degree with the Communists, there are groups of raions 
packed into the lower right corner, indicating purely ethnic minority raions in which the 
liberal party‘s vote share hovered perilously close to zero.  
 
Figure 6.7: Non-Russian Minorities and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 demonstrates that the pattern of Yabloko strongholds generally followed 
ethnic Russian lines in the early 2000s, as it had in the 1990s, but also shows signs of 
expansion into some majority-minority raions. More than 15% of majority-Russian raions 
delivered tremendous support to the fragile liberal party, a jump of about five percent 
over 1999. Similarly, a greater percentage of majority-minority raions became Yabloko 
strongholds in the early 2000s, nearly doubling, in fact. Therefore, contrary to the 
findings from existing scholarship, Figure 6.8 reveals that Yabloko was, in fact, able to 
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―mobilize its core electorate and expand its limited social base‖ (White 2007: 210). In 
each regional context, save for in the Caucasus, a higher percentage of majority-Russian 
than majority-minority raions were bastions of support by a wide margin. Evidence of 
dramatic expansion is apparent in majority-Russian raions in poorer regions: of these 
raions, approximately 10% were strongholds in 1999, but Yabloko‘s share skyrocketed to 
25% four years later, which may help explain the LDPR‘s loss of support in this 
previously long-standing constituency. It is surprising that Yabloko may have muscled in 
on the nationalists‘ territory in poorer regions because, although Yabloko and the LDPR 
both target the ethnic Russian constituency, the liberal vote is traditionally housed in 
more prosperous areas while the nationalist vote typically reflects the opposite. 
Compared to 1999, a higher percentage of majority-minority raions in economically 
disadvantaged regions also churned out large vote shares for Yabloko. Likewise, Yabloko 
consolidated support from both majority-Russian and majority-minority raions in ethnic 
republics. Interestingly, with the shift in thresholds, the percent of both types of raions 
that were Yabloko strongholds remained nearly unchanged in ethnic republics. Yabloko‘s 
improved performance in ethnic republics may have been a result of Kremlin interference 
on its behalf, as Putin himself commented that he would like to see Yabloko in the Duma 
and state-run media featured Putin and Yabloko leader Yavlinsky cooperating during the 
campaign season. In Muslim regions and those in the Caucasus, the percentage of 
majority-minority raions that were Yabloko strongholds increased from 1999 while the 
share of majority-Russian raions diminished. In the case of the Caucasus, Yabloko‘s 
strongholds in majority-minority raions grew and those in majority-Russian raions 
dwindled to the point that the balance shifted in favor of majority-minority raions for the 
first time. Raising the stronghold threshold resulted in Yabloko losing all strongholds in 
Muslim regions and those in the Caucasus, and majority-minority bastions of support in 
poorer regions and those reliant on natural resources.  
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Figure 6.8: Yabloko Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2003 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Despite the fact that Figure 6.8 indicates that the party seemingly made modest inroads in 
a few majority-minority raions, Yabloko‘s average in majority-minority raions was lower 
than its raion-level national mean for the first time in 2003, as shown in Table 6.7. In the 
two elections in the 1990s, these raions delivered average vote shares to the small liberal 
party that were above its countrywide showing, albeit by a small amount, but, upon 
United Russia‘s rise, they handed it vote shares that were less than 50% of its national 
mean. Save for fraudulent raions, Yabloko performed the worst in majority-minority 
raions.  Descriptive statistics also provide evidence of Yabloko‘s rout in ethnic republics 
and Muslim regions: the average vote shares for Yabloko in these areas were merely 62% 
and 49% of the party‘s nationwide mean, respectively.  
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Table 6.7: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Yabloko’s Electoral Performance in the 2003 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
3.08 1.58 
 
1.47 1.32 1.94 1.48 1.83 3.76 2.66 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .061 .031 
Max 17.63 9.09 
 
7.92 10.93 11.58 8.51 7.79 17.63 9.77 
SD 
 
2.76 1.13 1.52 1.69 1.95 1.83 1.67 3.22 2.15 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
The findings from the statistical models corroborate Yabloko‘s failure in ethnic republics: 
the value for raions housed in ethnic republics was one-tenth the value of the odds for 
raions located in Russian federal regions. The magnitude of the negative effect was 
therefore comparable to that in the previous election. Table 6.8 indicates that raions in 
ethnic republics generated few liberal party strongholds, merely eight percent and less 
than two percent according to the relaxed and the strict measure. Yabloko thus excelled 
in the predominantly Russian oblasts and krais, as opposed to the primarily non-Russian 
ethnic republics.  
 
Table 6.8: Yabloko Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2003 
 
 
 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(397 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(156 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
32 8.06 
3 1.92 
Russian federal 
regions 
365 91.94 
153 98.08 
Muslim regions 11 2.77 0 0 
Caucasus regions 7 1.76 0 0 
Poorer Regions 315 79.35 148 94.87 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
42 10.58 
10 6.41 
Fraudulent raions 7 1.76 1 0.64 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
390 98.24 155 99.35 
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Unexpectedly, given the descriptive statistics presented above, Muslim region status did 
not produce statistically significant results once more, but Yabloko strongholds in 
Muslim regions were even more scarce than in ethnic republics, with less than two 
percent and zero by the lower and higher threshold. Overall, in the early 2000s, the 
political landscape pertaining to ethnic Russian and non-Russian constituencies was in 
flux to varying degrees for each member of the core party troika as a result of United 
Russia‘s presence in the electoral arena. The picture of the KPRF transformed from one 
that was primarily non-Russian to one that was slowly acquiring ethnic Russian contours. 
Seemingly numbered were the days in which the Communists were capable of competing 
in contests of strength with Kremlin favorites and challengers alike by leveraging rival 
political machines in ethnic minority areas, although the KPRF still enjoyed some 
residual support. While the Communists struggled to preserve their position, the 
nationalists entrenched themselves in ethnic Russian areas, which continued to function 
as the bedrock of the nationalist vote, and also managed to carve out a few isolated 
pockets of support in majority-minority raions. The LDPR was most likely able to expand 
into a few majority-minority raions because it was the most Kremlin-friendly opposition 
party and therefore may have benefited to a limited degree from the Kremlin‘s 
machinations. This development in the LDPR‘s electoral trajectory may help account for 
the party‘s higher vote share in 2003 than in the previous election, when the Kremlin had 
directed its attention toward destroying Fatherland-All Russia rather than potentially 
boosting its favorite opposition parties. Mirroring the nationalists, Yabloko‘s path from 
the Yeltsin era to the Putin era was also marked by a minor increase in ethnic minority 
support against the backdrop of a larger Russian constituency, but in Yabloko‘s case the 
ethnic minority votes were drawn chiefly from raions with larger populations of Indo-
Europeans rather than those with sizable non-titular and non-Indo European ethnic 
minority populations, as was true of the KPRF.  
The Urban-rural Divide and Opposition Parties 
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 The dramatic rise of United Russia also affected opposition parties‘ performance 
in the countryside. Even when two potential parties of power competed for votes in the 
countryside, the Communists carved out zones of dominance and the odds of KPRF 
strongholds were amplified two to four percent based on unit increases in the rural 
population, but by 2003 the magnitude of the positive effect had diminished, augmenting 
the odds by a negligible amount to one percent in the lower threshold models and by one 
percent in the strict specifications. This finding lends substantiation to current 
scholarship, which suggests, ―during the 1990s, the KPRF could count on strong rural 
support […] Since […] early in Putin‘s first term, however, an important shift in rural 
politics occurred, marked by the fact that the KPRF suffered an erosion of its rural 
electoral support. […] As a result of this dealignment, the KPRF experienced a 
significant decrease in the number of popular votes and seats in the 2003 Duma election‖ 
(Wegren and Konitzer 2007: 1038). Yet, the KRPF still received a modest boost in these 
areas in the models and descriptive statistics indicate that the party‘s average in majority-
rural areas was nearly one percent higher than its national mean, suggesting that the rural 
―dealignment‖ from the KPRF was perhaps short of wholesale (Ibid). The erosion of 
support among the KPRF‘s base was particularly unexpected because the party had 
rooted itself more firmly in rural areas from 1995 to 1999.  
Scholars have attributed the loss of rural support in 2003 to the fact that the KPRF 
―did not capture support from the rural cohort that was better off or from those who were 
adapting to new economic opportunities,‖ nor their traditional base of the most deprived: 
―the KPRF failed to obtain the support of those who were the most downtrodden and 
those who had been left behind by reforms, and this trend resonates with the dealignment 
thesis […] Apparently, the ineffectiveness of the KPRF in defending the interests of the 
disadvantaged during the 1990s caught up with the party and cost it support as Russian 
politics entered a new era under Putin‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 689, 691). The 
softening of support in the countryside for the Communists, the backbone of the KPRF 
vote, was one of the most conspicuous changes in electoral dynamics from the Yeltsin era 
to the Putin era: the decline in rural support was ―not only unexpected, but it also ha[d] 
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major implications for future elections‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 678). The fact that 
the most formidable opposition party struggled to retain its key constituency 
foreshadowed the complete emasculation of the political opposition in elections under 
United Russia because opposition parties were no longer equipped to compete even for 
their core constituencies in the presence of a dominant party. As the party that 
commanded the largest share of Duma seats from 1995 onward and the one with the 
largest membership and most robust organizational infrastructure, the KPRF had given 
the party system ―vibrancy‖ and ―prevented complete domination by the executive 
branch‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 678). In squeezing the Communists out of the 
countryside to a large degree, thereby eroding their bedrock support and throwing them 
against the ropes, United Russia succeeded where Our Home is Russia had failed. 
Consistent with the modest positive effect revealed in the model results, Figure 
6.9 shows a positive relationship between the KPRF‘s vote share and increasing 
proportions of rural inhabitants at the raion level, although the association is markedly 
less steep than in 1999. The two distinct outliers in the upper right quadrant, at the 
intersection of the countryside and vote shares more than thrice the party‘s raion-level 
national mean, were both located in Dagestan; the most enthusiastic urban raion was also 
found there. Notwithstanding the two most extreme rural outliers, there are discernibly 
fewer raions in the upper right quadrant than was the case in the late 1990s. As was the 
case in the prior two elections, the majority of urban raions reporting unusually high vote 
shares for the Communists were located in Russia‘s so-called Red Belt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 272 
Figure 6.9: Rural Inhabitants and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
Figure 6.10 portrays a different pattern of support than that which prevailed in the late 
1990s, when the Communists enjoyed strongholds in a higher percentage of majority-
rural raions than majority-urban raions in each regional context considered. Figure 6.10 
reveals more clearly than Figure 6.9 the drop in support in the countryside: just more than 
20% of mostly rural raions were bastions of support in 2003, a drop from the nearly 30% 
captured in 1999. Moreover, the percentage of strongholds in majority-urban and 
majority-rural raions shifted in favor of the former in ethnic republics and Muslim 
regions. Indeed, of the rural raions in ethnic republics, Muslim regions, those in the 
Caucasus, and those dependent on natural resources, the percent that channeled immense 
support to the Communists was halved, at the least, from 1999 to 2003. Although rural 
raions in the Caucasus continued to churn out the highest percentage of strongholds in 
2003, the plunge from the previous election was extreme, falling from nearly 60% of 
majority-rural raions to less than 30%. The decline of rural support in ethnic republics, 
Muslim regions and those in the Caucasus can be attributed chiefly to United Russia‘s 
overwhelming presence in these areas, but also to the other parties in the core party troika 
that made a few limited gains as well. Despite languishing in rural areas in several 
regional contexts, there is evidence that the Communists carved out more support in the 
countryside in resource regions, as the percentage that were KPRF strongholds hiked 
from less than 10% in 1999 to more than that in 2003. The KPRF also captured a higher 
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percentage of urban raions in ethnic republics and resource regions in 2003. Interestingly, 
with the shift in thresholds, the pattern of support became unambiguously rural.  
 
Figure 6.10: KPRF Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 2003 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
When faced with a formidable party of power in the 2000s, the KPRF was more or less 
outmatched in zones that it had locked down in the 1990s: in the countryside, the biggest 
loses for the KPRF ―occurred where […] United Russia made gains relative to the 
support for the electoral blocs Unity and Fatherland in 1999‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 
2006: 685). The KPRF was better positioned to compete with Unity and Fatherland-All 
Russia in 1999 than United Russia in 2003 because the competing parties of power in the 
late 1990s fragmented the rural vote rather than providing a vehicle for coalescence 
around a single party. The KPRF was therefore able to leverage its political machines in 
the countryside to compete for the rural vote that was essentially up for grabs. With the 
merger of Unity and Fatherland, however, these areas simply fell into line behind United 
Russia and the KPRF was taken by surprise.  
Alongside the Communists, the nationalists also experienced an erosion of rural 
support when United Russia was on the scene. The LDPR entrenched itself more 
thoroughly in the countryside across the 1990s, with unit increases in the rural population 
augmenting the odds by up to two percent in the late 1990s. By 2003, however, the rural 
covariate changed signs, producing a negative effect that diminished the odds by one 
percent in both the relaxed and strict specifications. The nationalist vote therefore became 
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less rural and more urban for the first time in the early 2000s, pushing into Yabloko‘s 
heartland. Moreover, the LDPR‘s showing in majority-rural areas was sub-average by a 
slight amount. Of the core party troika, the Communists and nationalists were the most 
well positioned to succeed in the countryside, but only the Communists managed to 
preserve a degree of the support they enjoyed in the 1990s into the 2000s. Thus the rural 
voter was far from ―‘open game‘ to be wood and won over by alternative parties‖ in 
2003, as the results indicate that fewer parties, i.e. the KPRF and United Russia, captured 
the rural vote than in the previous election, when the Communists, nationalists, Unity and 
Fatherland-All Russia carved up the countryside during open season (Wegren and 
Konitzer 2006: 678). Despite enjoying perhaps a somewhat privileged position among 
opposition parties as the Kremlin‘s favorite, the LDPR proved patently incapable of 
safeguarding gains made in the decade prior and became yet another casualty of United 
Russia‘s electoral spree in the countryside. Figure 6.11 corroborates the statistical results 
and, in sharp contrast to the previous two elections, shows an inverse association between 
the LDPR‘s vote share and the proportion of rural inhabitants in a raion. Of the top 50 
raions that churned out zealous support for the ultra-nationalists, a full 60% were 
majority-urban and were located in the oblasts of Amur, Kirov, Murmansk and 
Magadansk, as well as Primorsky Krai and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. The 
ardent rural raions were found in Sakhalin and Kurgan Oblasts, and Khabarovsk and 
Krasnoyarsk Krais.  
 
Figure 6.11: Rural Inhabitants and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2003 
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Figure 6.12 reveals the extent to which the ground in the countryside slipped out from 
under the nationalists‘ feet: in the previous election, the pattern of support was near 
completely rural with the exception of ethnic republics, but by 2003, the contours of the 
nationalist vote had become unambiguously urban. Of all urban and rural raions across 
the country‘s expanse, the percentage that were LDPR strongholds ballooned by five 
percent in the former when compared to the previous election and diminished 
commensurately in the latter. In the countryside, a smaller percent channeled high vote 
shares to the LDPR in ethnic republics, economically-deprived regions and those 
dependent on natural resources. The decline in ethnic republics and resource regions was 
the most severe: of rural raions in those two contexts, the share that were nationalist 
strongholds plunged by more than five percent and was cut in half, respectively. There is 
evidence that the LDPR adapted rather successfully to United Russia‘s encroachment in 
the countryside and spread its tentacles into urban areas to compensate for the erosion of 
rural support. For example, of urban raions in resource regions, the percentage that were 
bastions of support hiked from 15% in 1999 to nearly double that in 2003. The party also 
captured a more sizable share of urban raions in ethnic republics by roughly five percent. 
Unexpectedly, given United Russia‘s virtual occupation of Muslim regions and those in 
the Caucasus, in both regional environments a higher percentage of urban and rural raions 
alike delivered abnormally large vote shares to the LDPR. The LDPR had no strongholds 
in Muslim regions in 1999, but nearly 5% of the urban raions there were bastions of 
support in 2003. Of the urban and rural raions in the Caucasus, the share of nationalist 
strongholds increased from roughly two percent in both in 1999 to nearly 10% in urban 
raions and more than five percent in rural raions. Interestingly, the LDPR was incapable 
of expanding its share of urban and rural raions in the area ripest for deeper nationalist 
inroads, i.e. poorer regions. With the shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold, rural 
strongholds in ethnic republics and resource regions evaporated, urban bastions of 
support in the Caucasus vanished and strongholds of either type fell away in Muslim 
regions.  
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Figure 6.12: LDPR Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 2003 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Thus, one of the most consequential shifts from the perspective the Communists and 
nationalists that occurred with the emergence and consolidation of a successful party of 
power was the general dealignment of rural voters. Rural areas served as perhaps the 
single most important pockets of support for the Communists in the 1990s and one in 
which the LDPR began to prime and make fresh inroads in the late 1990s, but United 
Russia‘s infiltration sent a seismic shock wave throughout the countryside and swiftly 
brought these areas into the dominant party‘s fold. Without doubt, it is not coincidental 
that United Russia targeted rural areas as a means to achieve its electoral ends because 
they offered an environment ripe for electoral manipulation and patronage politics, away 
from the prying eyes of electoral observers and opposition party representatives.  
The dealignment of rural areas from the Communists and nationalists pushed 
these parties into the urban centers, crowding Yabloko‘s electoral enclaves with 
formidable opponents. However, as the party with the strongest urban base, Yabloko was 
well positioned to compete in these areas with the KPRF and LDPR, who were both 
tenderfoots in urban areas despite being seasoned in seeking votes in the countryside. As 
expected, the rural covariate shrunk the odds of a liberal stronghold, diminishing by six to 
seven percent across the board in the lower threshold models and by seven percent in the 
strict specifications. The magnitude of the negative effect was roughly comparable to that 
in the late 1990s. Thus, Yabloko excelled once more in more urban raions, which offered 
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a crucial refuge from dominant party incursions. Figure 6.13 appears strikingly similar to 
the corresponding scatterplots from the 1995 and 1999 election and again shows a steep 
inverse relationship between Yabloko‘s vote share and the proportion of rural inhabitants. 
Compared to 1999, there are fewer outliers in partially or predominantly rural raions: 
indeed, only a handful of raions of this type delivered vote shares that exceeded the five 
percent threshold of representation to the small liberal party. Of the top 50 most 
enthusiastic raions, 100% were purely urban, and located primarily in the federal cities of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. The most zealous predominantly rural raions were found in 
Sverdlovsk Oblast and the Republic of Karelia. 
 
Figure 6.13: Rural Inhabitants and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
The contours of Yabloko‘s strongholds continued to follow urban lines in the early 
2000s, as evident in Figure 6.14: in each regional environment, a higher percentage of 
predominantly urban raions than rural areas again delivered high vote shares to the fragile 
liberal party, but subtle fluctuations also manifested. For example, the percentage of 
urban raions that were strongholds increased by roughly five percent from the previous 
election, indicating that Yabloko cast a wider net around urban areas. The most 
conspicuous zone of expansion was in urban raions in economically disadvantaged 
regions, which were outside of Yabloko‘s traditional base located in wealthier areas: in 
1999, just greater than 15% were strongholds, but by 2003, that percentage skyrocketed 
to 40%. Yabloko thus made sizable gains in precisely those areas that previously 
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functioned as part of the backbone of the LDPR. Interestingly, a higher percentage, albeit 
slight, of rural raions in Muslim regions and the Caucasus became strongholds in 2003, 
an increase from zero in 1999. Notwithstanding Yabloko‘s surge in urban raions overall 
and under conditions of economic deprivation, the party lost ground in urban areas 
situated in United Russia‘s heartland, i.e. ethnic republics and the Caucasus. The 
percentage of urban raions in ethnic republics that were bastions of support fell from 
more than 20% in 1999 to less than 15% in 2003. Urban raions in the Caucasus dropped 
off more precipitously, plummeting from the more than 15% that were strongholds in the 
last election of the 1990s to roughly 5% in the early 2000s. Urban raions in resource 
dependent regions also drifted from Yabloko‘s reach from 1999 to 2003, slumping from 
nearly 35% to roughly one-quarter. Likewise, the share of rural raions that delivered high 
levels of support to Yabloko in these areas fell as well.  
 
Figure 6.14: Yabloko Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 
2003 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Thus, Yabloko managed to preserve to some degree key pockets of support in urban 
areas, despite the fact that it was without a doubt the feeblest of the core party troika and 
the reds and browns had begun to muscle in on its most treasured turf. Yabloko also felt 
the ripples produced by United Russia‘s consolidation of countryside support: with the 
Communists and nationalists forced retreat from rural areas, urban centers transformed 
into the new battleground for opposition parties and, consequently, they turned their 
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energies toward cannibalizing each other, perilously fracturing the urban vote to the 
benefit of United Russia.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and Opposition Parties 
 Opposition parties were also affected variably by the rise of United Russia in the 
Caucasus. Under the Yeltsin administration, the KPRF enjoyed a distinct advantage in the 
Caucasus with odds soaring by dozens to hundreds of times. In numerous instances, the 
magnitude of the KPRF‘s boost was significantly larger than that experienced by the 
enfeebled Our Home is Russia. United Russia‘s presence, however, ended 
unceremoniously the Communists‘ heyday in the area. In 2003, this parameter did not 
influence the occurrence of KPRF strongholds, representing a marked deterioration from 
the 1990s. Descriptive statistics point in the same direction: the KPRF‘s average in the 
Caucasus was six percent higher than its raion-level national mean in the late 1990s but 
was merely one percent higher in 2003. Still, of all the raion and regional environments 
considered, the KPRF‘s showing in the Caucasus was the best, relative to its raion-level 
national average. Furthermore, far fewer Communist strongholds were located in the 
Caucasus than was the case in 1999, 16% according to the lower threshold and roughly 
20% by the strict measure, the latter plummeting by more than half.  With the center-
periphery conflicts in the Caucasus settled decisively in favor of the Kremlin, these 
regions fell in line squarely behind United Russia and the KPRF was left out in the cold. 
Although the Communists would not benefit from a protest vote in 2003 as may have 
been the case in the mid- and late-1990s when the central government waged brutal 
military campaigns in the area, the decline of the Communists in the Caucasus was far 
from a foregone conclusion before the contest because the KPRF had well-oiled channels 
for delivering patronage resources, acquired from its Soviet-era predecessor and through 
the party‘s long tenure in the Duma post-transition, and well established political 
machines. Surely, the KPRF faced a daunting challenge of preserving its territory in the 
Caucasus when confronted with a powerhouse party like United Russia, but the 
Communists also failed to maintain the political resources that were at their disposal, 
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namely political machines with the capacity to at least compete with, even if not beat, the 
dominant party.  
While United Russia‘s ascent spelled catastrophe for the KPRF in the Caucasus, 
the LDPR fared better in the area than in the previous election: the shift from raions 
located elsewhere to those in Caucasian regions plunged the odds by 99% in 1999 but 
failed to achieve statistical significance in 2003, signifying an improved electoral 
atmosphere for the nationalists. However, the LDPR‘s showing in the Caucasus was yet 
again sub-average, falling further below its raion-level national average than four years 
prior. Merely five percent and two percent of LDPR strongholds were found in the 
Caucasus in the early 2000s.  
Yabloko experienced the opposite trajectory in the Caucasus: the distinction 
between Caucasian raions and others did not exercise a systematic effect on liberal 
strongholds in 1999 but the odds tumbled by 90 to 95% in 2003. Yabloko suffered 
acutely, capturing an average in the Caucasus was nearly 50% of its countrywide mean. 
The percent of Yabloko strongholds in the Caucasus was merely two according to the 
relaxed threshold and the party had no bastions of support according to the strict measure.  
 With drastic changes to the party system in 2003, the capacity of opposition 
parties to maintain their strongholds in economically disadvantaged areas, in the case of 
the KPRF and LDPR, or better off regions, in the case of Yabloko, varied considerably. 
The odds of KPRF strongholds were once again damaged by unit increases in gross 
regional product, falling by more than 50% in a lower specification. For the first time, 
however, the minority of KPRF strongholds was found in poorer regions, specifically 
49% according to the relaxed threshold and 46% according to the strict measure. The 
share of Communist party strongholds in economically deprived areas winnowed 
considerably when compared to the mid-1990s: in 1995, 69% and 73% by the lower and 
higher threshold, respectively, of KPRF bastions of support were housed in these areas. 
Regions with levels of economic development above the median reported average vote 
shares that were roughly half a percent lower than the Communists‘ raion-level national 
mean, indicating an improvement over previous contests when the hit absorbed by the 
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party was between one and a half percent and two and a half percent. Collectively, these 
data strongly suggest that support for the Communists from economically disadvantaged 
areas eroded, chiefly because United Russia targeted these constituencies with promises 
of social and economic deliverables but also because the KPRF itself was unable to 
translate the misery of the market that still affected segments of the population into votes 
(Wegren and Konitzer 2006). Drawing on survey results, existing scholarship found, 
―among the respondents with the lowest incomes, the KPRF was distinctly unpopular‖ 
(Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 690). Combined with the rather sudden dealignment of rural 
voters, the erosion of support in poorer areas undoubtedly accounted for a large part of 
the halving of the KPRF‘s vote share in 2003, rendering the impression that the KPRF 
was in its death throes after having been emasculated by a party of power with a capacity 
not seen since the days of the CPSU.  
Broadly following its trajectory in the 1990s, the LDPR again experienced 
setbacks in regions with higher levels of economic development, but to the least extent 
compared to the 1990s: unit increases in this covariate diminished the odds by 21 to 39% 
across the board in the lower threshold models and by 35% in a strict specification. The 
magnitude of the negative effect was therefore notably lesser, compared to the 90% drop 
from the previous contest and the more than 50% plunge in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, 
the nationalists secured more strongholds in poorer areas than in previous contests 
according to the lower threshold: in 1995, roughly 49% of LDPR strongholds were found 
in these locales; four years later, approximately 54% were located there, and in 2003, 
60% of the nationalists‘ bastions of support were situated in conditions of economic 
deprivation. The percentage of higher-level strongholds tapered off, however, from two-
thirds in 1999 to approximately 62% in 2003. For the first time, the LDPR‘s average in 
economically developed areas was marginally higher than the party‘s raion-level national 
mean. Indeed, only in economically advantaged regions was the nationalists‘ average 
vote share actually higher than the party‘s countrywide mean. Thus, the nationalists 
experienced a fate similar to the Communists in poorer areas: in 2003, there was a 
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marked softening of support in precisely those areas that had formed one of the party‘s 
core constituencies in the 1990s.  
Alongside the KPRF and LDPR, Yabloko also struggled to maintain its footing in 
areas that were once relatively sure bets, albeit in areas better off rather than 
economically depressed. In the previous election, the odds of a Yabloko stronghold were 
amplified by approximately 70 to 75% based on increases in regional economic 
advancement but in 2003, the party received a more limited boost, between 25 to 32% 
across the lower threshold models and between 28 to 56% across the strict specifications. 
Yabloko‘s average in economically developed regions was still marginally higher than its 
raion-level national mean in 2003, but the share of strongholds that were located in raions 
nested within poorer regions skyrocketed from roughly 20% and 21% according to the 
relaxed and strict threshold in 1999 to about 80% and 95%, respectively, in 2003. Indeed, 
never before had the majority of the party‘s strongholds been located in poorer, rather 
than wealthier, regions. Interestingly, despite the fact that the economy was booming and 
Yabloko‘s social base was historically rooted in areas that were better off economically, 
the party seemed to make new inroads in areas outside of their traditional base. As a 
niche party representing the urban intelligentsia, primarily in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
the expansion of Yabloko‘s social base into poorer areas muddled the party‘s identity and 
may have damaged its ability to preserve its core electorate in future elections.  In short, 
the respective constituencies of the core party troika were in flux in 2003 with regards to 
socioeconomic welfare at the regional level and future elections would reveal whether 
these trends continued or were ultimately reversed.  
 A region‘s reliance on natural resources produced results generally consistent 
with those from before United Russia‘s entry into the electoral fray, but shifts on the 
margins were also evident. Similar to the finding from 1999, the value for raions situated 
in resource dependent regions were approximately one-tenth the value of the odds for 
raions located in more diversified regions. Descriptive statistics suggest that the KPRF 
improved on its performance over 1999 in resource-rich regions: its average in these 
areas was roughly two percent less than its raion-level national mean in 2003, a 
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considerable gain from the six percent loss it experienced in the previous election. 
Furthermore, a higher percentage of Communist strongholds were found in resource 
regions according to both thresholds: the party doubled its share of strongholds from four 
percent in 1999 to eight percent in 2003 according to the lower measure, and increased its 
share of higher-level strongholds from zero to four percent, respectively. The Communist 
presence in resource dependent regions was therefore the strongest it had ever been in 
2003.  
The LDPR‘s trajectory in resource regions remained more or less unchanged from 
the 1990s. The shift from raions in diversified regions to those in resource abundant 
regions did not exercise a systematic effect on the occurrence of nationalist strongholds, 
as was true in 1999 as well. Yet again, the LDPR‘s average in resource regions was 
marginally lower than its countrywide take. Subtle shifts emerged in terms of the share of 
nationalist strongholds that were located in these regions: while the percentage of lower-
level strongholds fell from 20% in 1999 to 18% in 2003, the share of higher-level 
bastions of support more than doubled, from 5% to 11%.  
From the mid- to late-1990s, Yabloko carved out new pockets of support in 
resource-rich regions and consolidated this constituency in the early 2000s. In 1999, the 
odds of a liberal stronghold hiked three to five times based on resource-region status; in 
2003, the magnitude of the positive effect was considerably greater, with odds 
skyrocketing to nearly 12 times in a strict specification.  Descriptive statistics, on the 
other hand, paint a somewhat different picture. For example, Yabloko‘s mean in resource 
regions was below its national showing, whereas its average was above its raion-level 
national level four years prior. Furthermore, the share of liberal strongholds in resource 
abundant regions dwindled according to both thresholds, from 14% in 1999 to 11% in 
2003 by the relaxed measure, and from 20% to six percent, respectively, according to the 
strict threshold.  
Electoral Manipulation and Opposition Parties 
 The effects produced by abnormally high voter turnout, used to assess electoral 
manipulation, showcases the how quickly the new party of power reconfigured the 
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electoral arena to its own benefit and at the expense of all others. In the mid-1990s, the 
KPRF tangled with the feeble Our Home is Russia for control of manipulated raions and 
the Communists scored electoral windfalls as a result. In the late 1990s, however, Unity 
and Fatherland-All Russia‘s entry into the political fray complicated matters for the 
Communists in these areas, but the KPRF was ultimately able to preserve its zones of 
dominance and still captured a boost in the 1999 election, with odds of a stronghold 
jumping by two times in fraudulent raions. But United Russia was clearly more than the 
sum of its parts and, although 2003 was the first election that it contested, the party was 
able to lock down fraudulent raions with remarkable efficiency. The days when rival 
parties carved up manipulated raions were numbered at best. With the shift from the non-
fraudulent to the manipulated class, the odds of a Communist bastion of support 
plummeted by 56 to 63% across the board in the lower threshold models. In 1999, the 
party‘s average in fraudulent raions was higher than its nationwide showing by roughly 
one percent, but in 2003, its mean in these areas was approximately two percent less. 
Figure 6.15 reveals the dramatic shift in the KPRF‘s electoral fortunes in high turnout 
raions: there is an unmistakably inverse association between the KPRF‘s vote share and 
voter turnout in 2003 and raions populating the upper right quadrant, where unusually 
high political participation coincides with electoral windfalls, are few and far between. 
The outlier raions that reported close to full political participation and high vote shares 
for the Communists were located chiefly in Dagestan, Orenburg Oblast, which is located 
along the border with Kazakhstan, and Belgorod Oblast, which is located along the 
border with Ukraine, with a smattering from the oblasts of Orlov, Saratov, Novosibirsk, 
and the ethnic republic of North Ossetia.  
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Figure 6.15: Voter Turnout and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
As evident in Figure 6.16, the share of KPRF strongholds that were found in manipulated 
raions was essentially halved compared to the previous election according to both 
thresholds, from roughly 20% in 1999 to 9% in 2003 by the lower measure and from 
approximately one-third to 18%, respectively. Yet some patterns remained from the late 
1990s, namely the percentage of strongholds that were in these areas doubled with the 
shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold. The fact that the KPRF‘s vote share was 
halved from 1999 to 2003 and a fair share of the party‘s strongholds were still housed in 
fraudulent raions in 2003 suggested that the Communists would face an even tougher 
time in these areas and beyond in future Duma contests, when United Russia was more 
consolidated and effectively roped these raions off from opposition party access. Of the 
nearly 380 raions that reported turnout at least one standard deviation above raion-level 
national turnout, just over one-tenth delivered high votes shares to United Russia‘s 
archenemy according to the lower threshold. Although the Communists wrestled with 
Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, and the LDPR, albeit to a lesser extent, for control of 
manipulated raions in 1999, the KPRF captured stronghold-level support in a higher 
share of fraudulent raions, nearly 25%, than in 2003. When the stronghold threshold was 
raised, the percentage of manipulated raions that channeled immense support to the 
Communists dropped by more than half, to less than 5%.  
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Figure 6.16: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are KPRF Strongholds vs. Percent KPRF 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2003 
 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the KPRF was the party with the greatest capacity to challenge the 
Kremlin‘s party of power, at least in part by leveraging its deeply embedded political 
machines to mobilize voters and engage in electoral manipulation on its behalf. Despite 
retaining its position as the most formidable challenger to the emerging dominant party in 
the early 2000s, the Communists were all but devastated in manipulated areas. The story 
of the KPRF‘s demise in these areas is one partly of United Russia‘s tremendous 
capability, but also one of a missed opportunity vis-à-vis the KPRF itself. The KPRF had 
the political clout, patronage resources, party infrastructure, and know-how necessary to 
maintain its political machines, but missed the boat when such illicit methods and 
machinations became vital to the party‘s continued survival in a dominant party regime.  
 The LDPR faced a fate similar to the KPRF in fraudulent raions in 2003, but the 
nationalists‘ general performance in these areas was inferior to the Communists, even 
when the LDPR did manage to scoop up some strongholds in 1999. As such, the fact that 
the LDPR lost ground in manipulated raions in the early 2000s affected the party‘s 
general performance less than the KPRF‘s. Before United Russia‘s rise to power, the 
odds of a nationalist stronghold hiked two to three times in manipulated raions but the 
LDPR‘s fortunes changed drastically in 2003 and the odds plunged by 53 to 67% across 
the lower threshold models. If the nationalists profited in manipulated raions as a result of 
the Kremlin‘s generosity in the previous election, as speculated, the central authorities 
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clearly reassessed the political landscape and neglected to provide the same level of 
assistance to the Kremlin-friendly nationalists in 2003. With United Russia in the picture, 
the LDPR would be forced to fight on its own to remain in the Duma. Moreover, the 
party‘s average in high turnout raions was approximately five percent less than its 
countrywide mean. Figure 6.17 shows the steep inverse relationship between the 
nationalists‘ vote share and the level of voter turnout in a raion. The raions reporting 
zealous support for the LDPR and unusually high turnout were located in Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous Okrug, Arkhangelsk Oblast in northern Russia, and the oblasts of Kurgan, 
Novosibirsk, Orenburg, and Tyumen, which are all found along the border with 
Kazakhstan.  
 
Figure 6.17: Voter Turnout and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
The extent to which support for the nationalists deteriorated in high turnout raions is also 
revealed in Figure 6.18. Compared to the late 1990s, the percentage of LDPR strongholds 
that were housed in fraudulent areas dropped immensely, from roughly nine percent to 
about two percent according to the lower threshold, and from approximately 17% to four 
percent according to the strict measure. Of the raions across Russia reporting 
extraordinarily high voter turnout, a small share delivered high vote shares to the 
nationalists, less than three percent and less than one percent, according to the relaxed 
and strict threshold, respectively. In 1999, just greater than one-tenth of fraudulent raions 
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were lower-level LDPR strongholds; thus, the share carved out by the nationalists fell 
sharply.  
 
Figure 6.18: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are LDPR Strongholds vs. Percent LDPR 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2003 
 
 
In contrast to the KPRF, which was at least partly responsible for its poor performance in 
manipulated raions in 2003, the breakdown in support for the nationalists in these areas 
was most likely due to the withdrawal of Kremlin support for the party, rather than 
negligence in terms of party building. The fact that the LDPR ever captured electoral 
windfalls in these areas was the product of its cozy relationship with the Kremlin because 
the party lacked the infrastructural resources necessary to carry out widespread 
manipulation on its behalf; therefore, when United Russia came to the fore, the Kremlin‘s 
machinations in the electoral arena were rationalized to the benefit of the dominant party 
and the nationalists were overlooked. Without the Kremlin‘s implicit backing, the LDPR 
would struggle to maintain even a nominal presence in high turnout areas.  
 Surprisingly, given the fragility of the party and the sizable negative effect found 
vis-à-vis the KPRF and the LDPR, the odds of a Yabloko stronghold were not 
systematically affected by the shift from non-manipulated raions to the fraudulent class. 
This finding was, however, consistent with the model results from the previous election. 
Yet Yabloko‘s average showing in raions suspected for electoral malfeasance was nearly 
two percent less than its countrywide mean. Despite the lack of a statistical effect, when 
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vote share and turnout were both leveraged in their continuous forms, rather than 
dichotomously as in the multilevel models, an inverse association between Yabloko‘s 
vote share and the level of political participation is apparent, as shown in Figure 6.19. 
Only one raion that was coded as fraudulent churned out support for Yabloko that met the 
strict measure for stronghold, which was just shy of a nine percent vote share in 2003; 
this raion was found in Kamchatka Oblast on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Russian Far 
East and was rather unusual in that it was a stronghold for neither United Russia, nor the 
KPRF, nor the LDPR. Unexpectedly, Yabloko was the only party to capture stronghold-
level support there. High turnout raions that met the relaxed measure for Yabloko‘s 
strongholds were located in the city of Moscow, Sakhalin Oblast, and unexpectedly, the 
ethnic republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Bashkortostan.  
 
Figure 6.19: Voter Turnout and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
Figure 6.20 reveals that Yabloko strongholds were few and far between in manipulated 
raions, indeed, less than two percent and less than one percent, according to the lower and 
higher threshold, respectively. The share of strongholds in high turnout areas decreased 
sharply with the shift in thresholds in 2003, whereas it had increased sharply in 1999. 
Unexpectedly, of the hundreds of fraudulent raions, the share that were Yabloko 
strongholds actually doubled in 2003 from 1999 in relation to the relaxed threshold. 
However, the percentage that reported vote shares high enough to surpass the strict 
threshold fell precipitously compared to the last contest.  
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Figure 6.20: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Yabloko Strongholds vs. Percent 
Yabloko Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2003 
 
 
Since Yabloko had never enjoyed a systematic advantage in high turnout raions, as was 
the case for the KPRF and the LDPR, United Russia‘s tacit objective of establishing a 
monopoly over these areas undoubtedly affected the small liberal party the least.  
Ethnicity and the Dominant Party 
 Out of the starting gate, United Russia wasted little time and locked down areas 
with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities to the greatest degree of any party. All 
three covariates assessing ethnic composition at the raion level produced robust and 
positive results. With unit increases in the percent non-Russian covariate, the odds of a 
dominant party stronghold were augmented by approximately three to four percent across 
all of the relaxed threshold models and hiked three to roughly six percent across the 
board in the strict specifications. Similarly, higher proportions of titular minorities 
amplified the odds by two percent in a lower threshold model and by three to four percent 
in the upper measure models. Finally, percent increases in the other minority population 
lifted the odds by two to four percent in the relaxed models and by three to approximately 
four percent in the strict models. Before United Russia‘s birth, raions with denser 
populations of ethnic minorities channeled immense support to Our Home is Russia, 
Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, and the resilient KPRF. But as the undeniable heir to the 
party of power throne, United Russia generated a slipstream and these raions were pulled 
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along behind it. Figure 6.21 demonstrates that United Russia‘s vote share soared with 
denser populations of ethnic minorities of any kind. The majority of raions that churned 
out tremendous support for United Russia had predominantly ethnic minority populations 
and was located chiefly in the ethnic republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Tuva and Kabardino-Balkaria. United Russia also captured 
immense vote shares from raions with majority Russian populations, but these raions 
were also mostly located in the aforementioned ethnic republics, rather than in oblasts or 
krais that are populated largely by ethnic Russians. The cluster in the upper right 
quadrant of the scatterplot pertaining to other minorities reveals that these raions, 
delivering roughly 80% vote shares to United Russia, were located almost exclusively in 
Dagestan, indicating that these raions were comprised primarily of non-titular minority, 
but also non-Indo European, groups. In capturing stronghold level support from raions 
with non-titular and non-Indo European populations, such as those in Dagestan, the 
dominant party and the non-parliamentary Yabloko surprisingly shared the same 
constituency, although United Russia patently outshone the liberals in these areas. The 
most zealous raion, composed primarily of titular minorities, was found in Chechnya and 
reported an astonishing 97.96% vote share for United Russia. Ten raions registered 
support for the dominant party in excess of 95%; of these, 70% were majority-minority 
raions and the remaining 30% were majority-Russian. Of the twenty raions that reported 
vote shares between 90 and 95%, 95% were majority-minority raions.  
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Figure 6.21: Non-Russian Minorities and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
 
Figure 6.22 provides further substantiation of the ethnic minority pattern of support for 
the emerging dominant party: the percentage of majority-minority raions that delivered 
enormous vote shares to United Russia eclipsed the share of majority-Russian raions in 
each regional environment and this pattern endured across thresholds. Of all the majority-
minority raions across Russia, nearly half were United Russia strongholds according to 
the relaxed threshold, and nearly 30% according to the strict measure. The share of 
majority Russian raions that reported similar enthusiasm for the Kremlin‘s pick was far 
lower, indeed less than 10% and less than 5%, respectively. Majority-minority raions in 
ethnic republics, Muslim regions, and those in the Caucasus were the most ardent, as 
more than half, greater than 60%, and upwards of 70%, respectively, registered unusually 
strong support. On the other hand, those in economically disadvantaged regions and 
resource dependent regions appeared apathetic in comparison because just over 30% and 
greater than 40% acted as lower-level United Russia strongholds. The percentage of 
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majority-Russian raions in ethnic republics and Muslim regions that were bastions of 
support was also higher than in poorer regions and those with abundant natural resource 
endowments: roughly 20% and approximately 30%, compared to less than 10% each for 
the latter two. Interestingly, given surging support from majority-minority raions in the 
Caucasus, the percentage of majority-Russian raions that were United Russia strongholds 
was the least of any regional context investigated. Compared to Unity and Fatherland-All 
Russia in 1999, a higher percentage of majority-minority raions in ethnic republics, the 
Caucasus, and poorer regions were United Russia strongholds, but a lower percentage 
were bastions of support in Muslim regions and resource rich regions. In terms of 
majority-Russian raions, a greater share of those in ethnic republics and Muslim regions 
delivered high vote shares to United Russia compared to Unity and Fatherland-All Russia 
before, but a lower share in the Caucasus, poorer regions, and resource regions did 
likewise.  
 
Figure 6.22: United Russia Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 
2003 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics from Table 6.9 lend additional evidence of United Russia‘s electoral 
feat in majority-minority raions: the party‘s average in these areas was a full 15% higher 
than its raion-level national mean. Relative to each party‘s nationwide average, United 
Russia established a firmer grip over majority-minority raions than had the two parties 
that tangled for party of power status in 1999, as Fatherland‘s advance was limited to a 
three percent increase. Furthermore, although United Russia‘s party of power predecessor 
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in 1995 also excelled in raions with denser populations of ethnic minorities, Our Home is 
Russia‘s boost in majority-minority raions was merely two percent. Thus, the degree of 
these parties‘ dominance in ethnic minority areas paled in comparison to United Russia‘s 
in the early 2000s.  The nascent dominant party also outstripped its national performance 
in regions with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities, namely ethnic republics 
and Muslim regions. For example, United Russia‘s mean showing in ethnic republics was 
more than 13% higher than its countrywide average and its performance in Muslim 
regions was the best of any raion or regional context, skyrocketing approximately 21% 
higher. Of the two parties that merged to form United Russia before the 2003 contest, the 
quickly consolidating dominant party looked more like Fatherland-All Russia than Unity 
according to these data: Fatherland‘s bump in ethnic republics was 10% and was 21% in 
Muslim regions in 1999. In the mid-1990s, Our Home is Russia profited to a greater 
degree than United Russia in these regions relative to its raion-level national average, 
with a mean that was nearly double in ethnic republics and more than double in Muslim 
regions, but Our Home‘s countrywide mean was paltry compared to United Russia‘s. 
Indeed, United Russia‘s raion-level national average in 2003 was more than four times 
greater than Our Home‘s in 1995. These considerations bring to light the stark differences 
in performance between the anemic party of power in 1995 and the remarkably 
successful one that emerged in 2003.  
 
Table 6.9: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of United Russia’s Electoral Performance in the 
2003 Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
40.49 43.72 55.48 58.80 53.82 61.43 46.87 39.10 45.94 
Min 
 
4.44 4.44 8.21 8.21 8.21 8.21 8.21 16.97 16.96 
Max 
 
97.96 97.96 97.96 97.96 97.96 97.96 97.96 97.32 97.32 
SD 
 
13.85 15.77 19.54 19.55 19.15 19.79 19.32 12.75 17.23 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
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The model results also demonstrate United Russia‘s prowess in ethnic republics and 
Muslim regions in its early days. The value for raions located in ethnic republics was 39 
to 152 times higher than the value of the odds for raions nested within Russian federal 
regions in the relaxed threshold models and was between 24 to 162 times higher in the 
strict specifications. In the 1995 election, no party was able to establish monopoly control 
over the ethnic republics, as the feeble Our Home is Russia wrestled with the KPRF and 
both parties ultimately earned electoral dividends for their efforts. In 1999, on the other 
hand, Fatherland-All Russia flexed its muscle in these regions and hermetically sealed off 
these areas from intruders, including its party of power rival Unity. United Russia thus 
preserved the dominance in ethnic republics that Fatherland had secured. Astonishingly, 
more than two-thirds of United Russia‘s strongholds were located in ethnic republics by 
the lower threshold, and upwards of 86% by the higher measure, as reflected in Table 
6.10.  
 
Table 6.10: United Russia Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2003 
 
 
 
# of United Russia 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(346 Total) 
% of United Russia 
Strongholds 
# of United Russia 
Strongholds 
(Higher Threshold) 
(154 Total) 
% of United Russia 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
235 67.92 
133 86.36 
Russian federal 
regions 
111 32.08 
21 13.64 
Muslim regions 140 40.46 94 61.04 
Caucasus 
regions 
84 24.28 
51 33.12 
Poorer Regions 143 41.33 61 39.61 
Natural 
Resource 
Regions 
93 26.88 
48 31.17 
Fraudulent 
raions 
222 64.16 132 85.71 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
124 35.84 22 14.29 
 
United Russia scored electoral windfalls in Muslim regions in 2003: the shift from the 
reference group to the indicator group magnified the odds by 22 to 184 times across the 
relaxed models, and by 53 to 786 times in the strict specifications. Paralleling the 
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dynamics prevailing in ethnic republics, Muslim regions were carved up by both Our 
Home is Russia and the KPRF in 1995 contest. However, in 1999, Fatherland was 
incapable to evicting the KPRF from this prized territory and was forced to divide the 
spoils. United Russia succeeded where both Our Home and Fatherland had failed and 
became the sole beneficiary in these regions. Of United Russia‘s strongholds, two-fifths 
and three-fifths by the lower and higher threshold, respectively, were drawn from Muslim 
regions. United Russia‘s commanding performance in Muslim regions squeezed the 
KPRF out from areas that had previously served as crucial pockets of support throughout 
the 1990s. Yet there was still room for the dominant party to monopolize Muslim regions 
more fully than it did in 2003, as shown earlier in Figure 22. Overall, United Russia 
triumphed in raions and regions with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities, 
which served as a central pillar of party dominance at election time.  
The Urban-rural Divide and the Dominant Party 
 In addition to pocketing high vote shares from raions and regions with dense 
ethnic minority populations, United Russia largely cornered the vote in the countryside, a 
development that essentially broke the back of the KPRF in 2003. Unit increases in the 
rural population at the raion level amplified the odds of a dominant party stronghold by 
one to three percent in the relaxed and strict specifications alike. United Russia‘s gains in 
the countryside closely followed inroads made in the previous election by Fatherland-All 
Russia. In contrast, the findings pertaining to Our Home is Russia in 1995 were 
inconsistent in rural areas, increasing the odds of strongholds in some models but 
decreasing them in others. United Russia‘s average in predominantly rural raions was 
more than three percent higher than its nationwide mean. Figure 6.23 reveals the direct 
relationship between United Russia‘s vote share and the proportion of rural inhabitants in 
a raion. The majority of the raions delivering the highest vote shares to the dominant 
party was entirely rural, and was located in the ethnic republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, 
Tatarstan, Mordovia, Tuva, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The most ardent urban raions were 
also located in those same regions. Of the top 50 raions in terms of United Russia‘s vote 
share, 58% were entirely rural, 4% were entirely urban, and 38% were mixed. The four 
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raions that reported vote shares for the dominant party upwards of 97% were all situated 
fully in the countryside.  
 
Figure 6.23: Rural Inhabitants and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
The pattern of United Russia‘s support was clearly rural in 2003, as evident in Figure 
6.24: of the rural and urban raions in each regional context, as well as overall, a 
significantly higher percentage of the former than the latter were strongholds and this 
pattern held across thresholds. Of the rural raions across the country‘s expanse, 20% 
channeled immense support to United Russia, while only 5% of their urban counterparts 
recorded comparable vote shares. Strikingly, nearly 70% of rural raions and upwards of 
40% of urban raions in Muslim regions were United Russia strongholds, the highest 
percentage of the rural and urban raions in any given regional context. More than half of 
the raions situated mostly in the countryside in ethnic republics were bastions of support. 
The share of urban and rural raions in poorer regions that United Russia harvested 
stronghold-level vote shares from, less than 5% of the former and less than 20% of the 
latter, was the smallest of any regional environment. The percentage of urban raions in 
resource regions that were bastions of support was also comparatively low, albeit slightly 
higher than economically disadvantaged regions. Compared to the failed party of power, 
Our Home is Russia, in the mid-1990s, United Russia‘s pattern of support with regard to 
the urban-rural divide is remarkably similar, despite the fact that the degree of dominance 
was much greater in the 2000s. When considered in light of Fatherland and Unity in 
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1999, the share of rural raions in Muslim regions that were strongholds was slightly 
lower for United Russia than Fatherland. Urban raions in resource regions were the only 
other area in which the percentage of raions of either type that were strongholds was 
higher for Fatherland than for United Russia. Unity also outstripped United Russia in a 
few isolated cases: a higher percentage of urban raions overall, rural and urban raions in 
poorer regions, and urban raions in resource regions were Unity strongholds in 1999 than 
were bastions of support for the Kremlin‘s pick in 2003. 
 
Figure 6.24: United Russia Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts 
in 2003 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and the Dominant Party 
Turning to the regional level correlates of the United Russia vote, the emerging 
dominant party performed exceptionally well in the Caucasus. The value for raions 
situated in the Caucasus was 17 to 159 times the value of the odds for raions located 
elsewhere across the board in the relaxed models and was 223 to 1245 times the value of 
the odds in the strict specifications. Descriptive statistics corroborate these towering 
odds: United Russia‘s average take in Caucasian raions was six percent higher than its 
nationwide mean. Furthermore, approximately one-quarter and one-third of United 
Russia‘s strongholds were found in the Caucasus, according to the relaxed and strict 
threshold, respectively. In the mid-1990s, the odds of Our Home is Russia strongholds 
plummeted in a lower threshold model but skyrocketed by 34 to 99 times in the strict 
specifications. The KPRF challenged the party of power in these restive regions and 
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benefitted consistently. In the 1999 election, in which two dueling parties of power vied 
for control of the Kremlin, location in the Caucasus did not exercise a systematic effect 
on the occurrence of Unity strongholds, but Fatherland scored electoral windfalls in these 
areas. In 2003, United Russia made deeper inroads in these areas than had its constituent 
parts in the previous contest: descriptive statistics reveal that United Russia outperformed 
Fatherland, as its mean in the Caucasus was six percent higher than its raion-level 
national average and Fatherland received a boost of less than one percent in 1999. 
Moreover, the share of United Russia‘s strongholds that were located in the Caucasus 
was roughly 25% and 33% by the lower and higher threshold, respectively, which was an 
improvement over Fatherland‘s 10% and six percent. Fatherland did not enjoy an 
electoral monopoly in the Caucasus and had to compete head to head with the KPRF for 
control of the restive republics. United Russia, however, was able to rationalize the 
electoral arena in the Caucasus by dispatching the Communists, ensuring that high vote 
shares would be channeled its way at the expense of all others.  
 Contextual correlates assessing socioeconomic welfare, namely gross regional 
product and resource dependence, damaged the odds of dominant party bastions of 
support. Unit increases in economic development diminished the odds by 69% in a lower 
threshold models and the magnitude of the effect was greater in the strict specifications, 
plunging the odds by 70 to 75%. United Russia thus excelled in economically 
disadvantaged regions, the former locus of Communist and nationalist strength in the 
1990s.  United Russia‘s predecessors from the 1995 and 1999 elections also languished 
with increases in gross regional product: the odds of Our Home is Russia strongholds fell 
66 to 82% in 1995, and the odds of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia bastions of support 
dropped by 50% and between 80 to 93%, respectively, in 1999. United Russia therefore 
targeted the same constituency as its forerunners, but scored vote shares many times 
higher than those parties competing in the 1990s. United Russia‘s showing in 
economically developed regions was sub-average, approximately one percent less than its 
countrywide mean. A healthy share of the dominant party‘s strongholds was found in 
poorer regions, 41% and 40% by the relaxed and strict threshold, which was less than the 
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62% and 77% of Unity‘s strongholds and more than the 18% and 15% of Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s strongholds in 1999.  
Mirroring the effects of higher levels of regional economic development, natural 
resource wealth also depressed the odds of United Russia strongholds: the value for 
raions situated in resource rich regions were one-tenth the value of the odds for raions 
located in diversified regional economies in the lower threshold models. United Russia‘s 
average in resource regions took a larger hit than was the case for raions in economically 
developed regions, coming in at roughly five percent below its raion-level national mean. 
Roughly 27% and 31% of dominant party strongholds occurred in resource regions. The 
fact that United Russia withered in resource regions diverged from the electoral 
trajectories of Our Home is Russia, as well as Unity and Fatherland-All Russia. The odds 
of an Our Home stronghold in the mid-1990s towered to between 34 and 53 times in 
resource regions and the party‘s average in these raions was a full five percent higher 
than its rather paltry national mean. In fact, resource regions were the only raion or 
regional environment in which the electoral paths of Our Home is Russia and United 
Russia veered in different directions. In the final election of the 1990s, resource region 
status exerted a systematic effect on neither the occurrence of Unity nor Fatherland-All 
Russian strongholds. Descriptive data, however, indicated that Fatherland performed well 
in these areas, as its average in resource regions was eight percent higher than its 
countrywide mean and roughly one-third and more than one-half of Fatherland 
strongholds were found in these regions. United Russia therefore distinguished itself from 
the failed party of power in the mid-1990s and the two dueling parties in the late-1990s 
by performing poorly in resource regions.  
Electoral Manipulation and the Dominant Party 
  With the resources of the Kremlin and the backing of regional governors sitting 
atop powerhouse political machines, United Russia flaunted its political prowess in raions 
suspected for electoral manipulation. The shift from non-fraudulent to manipulated raions 
hiked the odds of a stronghold by 10 to 14 times across the board in the lower threshold 
models and by 26 to 61 times in across all of the strict specifications. The magnitude of 
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the positive effect was therefore greater than that vis-à-vis Our Home is Russia in 1995, 
when odds were amplified by 70% to three times, and Unity in 1999, when odds lifted by 
two to six times, and Fatherland-All Russia in most models in 1999, when odds ballooned 
by seven to 66 times. In high turnout raions, United Russia‘s performance closely 
approximated Fatherland-All Russia‘s in the previous election: United Russia‘s mean 
showing was more than 18% higher than its countrywide average, and Fatherland‘s was 
15% higher before. Figure 6.25 corroborates these data by revealing the robust and direct 
association between United Russia‘s vote share and the level of political participation at 
the raion level. Of the 100 most enthusiastic raions for United Russia, 91% were coded 
positively for electoral malfeasance. Surprisingly, the raion that delivered United 
Russia‘s highest vote share reported turnout of 77.46%, which did not surpass the 
threshold set for fraud, i.e. 71.47%, by a large margin. The vast majority of unusually 
zealous raions, however, reported turnout figures in the range of 90 to upwards of 99%. 
No raions reported three-figure voter turnout rates in 2003.  
 
Figure 6.25: Voter Turnout and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2003 
 
 
The percentage of United Russia‘s strongholds that was found in fraudulent raions was 
nothing short of striking, 68% according to the relaxed measure and 86% according to the 
strict threshold, as shown in Figure 6.26. The share of fraudulent raions that were United 
Russia strongholds, on the other hand, reveals that the new party of power had not fully 
consolidated its grip over these areas; just less than 60% of manipulated raions were 
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lower-level dominant party strongholds and roughly 35% were higher-level bastions of 
support. There is additional evidence indicating that the electoral malfeasance that did 
occur in the early 2000s did not universally benefit the Kremlin‘s party project because 
54 of the 379 raions coded positively for fraud were not United Russia strongholds but 
recorded high levels of support for opposition parties and, furthermore, a variety of others 
were not strongholds for any of the parties examined. Indeed, a rather large number of the 
379 fraudulent raions in 2003 were not strongholds for United Russia, the KPRF, the 
LDPR, or Yabloko: 37 raions in Bashkortostan, 17 in Sakha, six in Belgorod, five in 
Tatarstan, four in each Dagestan and Omsk, three in each Perm, Tyumen, and Vologod, 
and one or two raions in a variety of other regions. These raions thus reported incredibly 
high political participation but there was no clear beneficiary of this mobilization, 
suggesting that voters may have accepted patronage goods in exchange for turning out to 
vote (presumably for United Russia) but then ultimately voted as they wished (Nichter 
2008). Despite its nascency, the percentage of fraudulent raions that were United Russia 
strongholds was significantly higher than had been the case for Our Home is Russia, with 
just above 15% and just above 10%, Unity, with roughly 15% and less than 5%, and 
Fatherland-All Russia, with 40% and approximately 30%.  
 
Figure 6.26: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are United Russia Strongholds vs. Percent 
United Russia Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2003 
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Figure 6.27 showcases United Russia‘s performance vis-à-vis that of opposition parties 
under conditions of varying turnout. In the vast majority of raions reporting turnout above 
71.47%, United Russia‘s vote share was higher than each member of the core party 
troika. Although the KPRF was best equipped to compete with the emerging dominant 
party in manipulated raions compared to the nationalists and liberals, the zones of 
convergence in the first scatterplot suggest that United Russia lorded over these areas to 
the KPRF‘s detriment with the exception of only a few isolated cases. A stark picture 
emerged in 2003 in which raions reporting abnormally high turnout figures were quickly 
absorbed into United Russia‘s political machine and forked over equally incredible vote 
shares to the new party of power.  
 
Figure 6.27: Voter Turnout and United Russia vs. Opposition Parties‘ Vote Shares in 
2003 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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 The emergence of United Russia and its spectacular triumph in the 2003 Duma 
elections dramatically reconfigured Russian political space and forced even the most 
formidable opposition parties, such as the KPRF, to the sidelines. The contours of the 
United Russia vote largely followed those from the failed Our Home is Russia in the mid-
1990s, but the emerging dominant party benefitted from an economy that rebounded 
quickly from the economic crisis in the late 1990s and reached boom levels in the early 
2000s, which provided the resources necessary to grease the palms of regional executives 
and grease the wheels of their patronage-based political machines. President Putin 
exercised unparalleled leadership in building United Russia‘s capacity and geographic 
reach almost overnight, and was more willing to engage in widespread electoral 
malfeasance to pull off a victory for his party than was his democratically committed 
predecessor.  
With unprecedented resources at United Russia‘s disposal, the party succeeded in 
marginalizing its chief competition, the Communists, in ways that Our Home is Russia 
could have only dreamed of in 1995. United Russia excelled in precisely those areas that 
formed the backbone of its comparatively weak forerunner in the mid-1990s and the 
KPRF throughout that decade, namely raions and regions with geographically 
concentrated minorities, the countryside, regions in the Caucasus and those with weaker 
regional economies, and the KPRF was powerless to resist. The birth of a dominant party 
in Russia in the early 2000s was, to a large extent, predicated on the subversion of the 
KPRF‘s political machine that had vanquished Our Home is Russia in 1995 and 
effectively challenged the two competing parties of power in the subsequent election.  
With the emergence of the catch-all United Russia, opposition parties, particularly 
the liberals, generally preserved their niche appeals and consequently failed to protect or 
expand their pockets of support in the electorate. Although members of the core party 
troika made several new inroads on the margins, the prevailing picture was one of 
opposition party emasculation in 2003: the KPRF‘s vote share was essentially halved and 
Yabloko was shut out from the Duma in the party-list tier. The era in which opposition 
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parties were on more or less equal footing with those whose sights were set on the party 
of power prize was undeniably over and United Russia became the only game in town.  
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Chapter 7: The 2007 Parliamentary Election: United Russia at its Apex and 
Opposition Party Stagnation on Display 
In 2007, United Russia flaunted its political prowess and reached the height of its 
power, capturing a vote share just shy of two-thirds, while its closest competitor the 
KPRF harvested approximately 50% less. At least theoretically, the 2007 legislative 
election offered opposition parties an opportunity to regain ground lost in the previous 
contest and potentially forestall the full consolidation of United Russia as a dominant 
party. However, United Russia‘s performance in the 2003 election signaled that a new era 
of Russian politics had arrived, one characterized by a party of power with the resources 
and political clout necessary to produce the electoral outcomes it desired, and a lack of 
meaningful political opposition in the legislature. With one election under its belt, United 
Russia had practice in the electoral battleground and aimed not merely to win the contest, 
as that outcome was a foregone conclusion by all accounts, but to signal its political 
supremacy to challengers.  
To secure United Russia‘s political prospects, nothing short of an overwhelming 
victory was required in the Duma contest in December 2007: the Kremlin was in the 
midst of its preparations for presidential succession in 2008 and the outcome of the Duma 
race would provide valuable information about the temper of the electorate heading into 
the presidential contest. A solid showing was necessary to signal to potential presidential 
contenders that the Kremlin‘s eventual pick was the heir apparent and the presidential 
contest was a formality staged only to confirm what was well known in advance. The 
legislative contest was also a proving ground in the sense that it provided the Kremlin 
with an opportunity to test and sharpen its manifold instruments of manipulation in 
advance of the main event. Competing in an election the Kremlin was desperate to win, 
and would try to do so by using any and all means necessary, the core party troika faced 
the worst chances of success up to that point in time and were relegated to competing 
primarily for defectors from the ruling party. The uncompetitive election of 2007 tested 
opposition parties‘ mettle and ability to remain afloat under the weight of a hefty 
dominant party. The 2007 election thus differed from the previous contest because United 
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Russia was no longer a tenderfoot in the electoral arena and therefore concentrated 
primarily on consolidating its hold on power with the aim of becoming the only game in 
town.  
The 2007 Legislative Election in Context  
United Russia‘s resounding victory in the 2003 election coupled with President 
Putin‘s virtually unassailable position in the eyes of the public leading up to the 
presidential contest in March 2004 frightened opposition parties to the extent that none of 
the top parties nominated their best candidates to compete with Putin for the presidency 
(Hale et al. 2004). Both the leaders of the KPRF and LDPR, Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky, 
respectively, had contested the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections but were 
conspicuously absent from the list of contenders in 2004, with a little-known KPRF 
nominee and Zhirinovsky‘s former bodyguard taking their turns in the ring. Some at the 
time interpreted Zyuganov‘s absence as ―calculated, in part, to avoid another contest in 
which [the KPRF] would be embarrassed electorally‖ (Clark 2006: 21). In contrast, the 
liberal Yabloko decided not to field any candidate, although Yavlinsky had also 
participated alongside Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky in 1996 and 2000. In particular, 
Yabloko‘s decision to not put forward a presidential contender after it lost legislative 
representation in 2003 represented nothing short of the capitulation of the liberals to 
Putin and United Russia and signaled the death knell for democratic values in Russia. 
Weak challengers from both the KPRF and LDPR and the absence of a Yabloko 
candidate resulted in a lack of serious alternatives to Putin, an embarrassment for the 
regime which sought to retain at least a semblance of democracy.  
The political environment surrounding the second legislative contest of the 2000s 
was thus dominated by ‗the Putin effect‘. President Putin received a massive popular 
endorsement presidential election: he was re-elected in 2004 with an extraordinary 70% 
of the vote, while the second-place finisher tied to the KPRF harvested merely 13% and 
none of the other challengers received more than five percent. While most elected leaders 
experience declining public approval with varying degrees of rapidity, Putin‘s approval 
rating went from 76% in January 2001 to a ―Turkmenian‖ 87% by December 2007, ―an 
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almost unprecedented situation for a leader in any peacetime democracy‖ (McAllister and 
White 2008: 950). Putin‘s skyrocketing approval ratings were largely attributable to rapid 
and widespread economic growth and his defiance towards the West during the 2003 Iraq 
invasion (Ibid). Although the Russian constitution forbade President Putin from seeking a 
third consecutive term in the March 2008 presidential elections, a highly publicized 
campaign launched by the All-Russian Council of Initiative Groups to Support Putin 
demanded that President Putin and United Russia amend the constitution to allow for a 
third term or retain Putin as a ―national father figure‖ that would be able to lead the 
nation while not formally occupying the executive (AFP 2007).  
Less than a year after the 2003 legislative election, dozens of armed militants who 
were later identified as Islamic separatists held over a thousand hostage, including more 
than 750 children, in a school gymnasium mined with explosives in Beslan, North 
Ossetia. Russian security forces stormed the school and exchanges of gunfire and 
explosions continued for days, leaving over 300 dead, of which 186 were children, and 
over 800 wounded. Russia‘s deadliest terrorist attack was cited as the pretext for 
comprehensive political and electoral reform aimed at shoring up the power vertical: 
fundamental restructuring of all levels of government was required to create a single 
system of authority and prevent state fragmentation or wholesale collapse (White and 
Kryshtanovskaya 2011). The reforms were in the works years prior to Beslan, but the 
crisis provided the immediate catalyst for action directed at emasculating the regional 
governors and buttressing the party of power through electoral system reform pertaining 
to elections to the State Duma. The direct election of approximately 80 regional 
governors was abolished in favor of presidential appointment as the method constituting 
the Federation Council, a change that made the regional governors completely dependent 
on the central executive for continued power and patronage. Moreover, the regional 
governors were subject to dismissal by the president if he lost confidence in their 
leadership. The second and most important change affected the electoral system 
governing legislative elections: a fully proportional system was introduced.  
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The economy continued to thrive under President Putin and United Russia, 
growing more than 8% in 2007 alone, marking a six-year high and surpassing the official 
government forecast of 6.5-7% (Cooper 2009: 6). Average real wages increased by more 
than 16% and real personal disposable income was up by 12%; the unemployment rate 
continued to tick downwards, leveling off at 6.2% in 2007 (Ibid). Russian oil production 
had steadily increased since the 2003 legislative election, reaching almost 10 million 
barrels per day, which contributed heavily to the 4.6% fiscal surplus in 2007 (Cooper 
2009: 15). In 2006, Russia overtook Saudi Arabia and reclaimed its title, last enjoyed in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, of being the world‘s largest petroleum producer (Goldman 
2008: 3-4). However, tempering the excitement was the fact that increased output was 
largely the result of over-pumping, rather than new exploration, and therefore not 
sustainable over the long term (Goldman 2008: 111). Total export revenues in 2007 were 
again dominated by natural resources, particularly oil, natural gas and coal, accounting 
for 65% of the total, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals contributed another 14% (Cooper 
2009: 17). The price of oil soared, reaching $100 a barrel around the time of the Duma 
contest, generating a ―cash blizzard‖ that United Russia would benefit from when seeking 
votes (Goldman 2008: 79, 136). The government trade surplus from increased energy 
exports went straight into the country‘s currency reserves, which ballooned by more than 
$100 billion in 2006 alone, hitting $300 billion in toto by the end of the year (Goldman 
2008: 80). By the spring of 2007, the state reserves were bursting with $420 billion, 
making Russia the third largest holder of foreign currency reserves as well as gold, 
lagging behind only China and Japan (Ibid). The stabilization fund that the government 
established had more than $120 billion in 2007, providing a substantial cushion to buoy 
the economy in the event of downturn (Goldman 2008: 91). The Russian stock market 
skyrocketed: when Putin entered office in August of 1999 as Yeltsin‘s Prime Minister, 
the capitalized value of Russia‘s publicly traded stocks was $74 billion but surpassed the 
$1 trillion mark by 2006 (Goldman 2008: 81).  
The executive and legislature, under United Russia‘s control, focused primarily 
on re-stabilizing the economy and passing a range of important reforms from 1999 to the 
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early 2000s but since then, the government turned its attention to regaining control over 
strategic economic sectors, which also provided a method to stamp out political 
dissention from independently wealthy owners (Cooper 2009). The government 
specifically targeted those corporations and conglomerates that were obtained by the 
oligarchs through the privatization process in the mid-1990s using largely corrupt means. 
The arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky (who was ultimately sentenced to more than eight 
years in an East Siberian prison on charges of tax evasion, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, 
extortion and grand theft) and hostile takeover of the Yukos oil company just before the 
2003 legislative election represented only the beginning of governmental action against 
privately held wealth and political capital that had been leveraged to shore up opposition 
parties financially. The Kremlin believed that privately-held natural resource companies, 
such as Yukos, were vulnerable to foreign ownership because their oligarch CEOs 
entertained the idea of selling off portions to various international companies such as 
Exxon-Mobil and Chevron, which was a ―heretical if not treasonous act‖ to those in the 
Kremlin (Goldman 2008: 86). In December 2004, a front for state-controlled Rosneft 
purchased Yukos‘ Yuganskneftegaz, the company‘s most valuable holding, at a rigged 
auction for under half of what the market would have supported at the time (Goldman 
2008: 120). After the Yukos affair, the government moved to expand its control over the 
oil industry at large and the Kremlin set its sights next on Sibneft, formerly owned by 
oligarch and one-time Kremlin financier Boris Berezovsky: in September 2005, the 
oligarch Roman Abramovich sold his 72% share of Sibneft to then state-controlled 
Gazprom. Majority-state owned Rosneft purchased a controlling stake in Gazprom in 
mid-2005, providing the Russian government with control over the world‘s largest 
extractor of natural gas and Russia‘s web of natural gas pipelines fueling Central Asia 
and Europe. Indeed, Gazprom was a golden ticket for the government in terms of revenue 
generation, as it produced 87% of the country‘s gas in 2004 (Goldman 2008: 186).  
With the ―holy of holies‖, as Putin referred to Gazprom, in the state‘s hands, 
Russia became ―‘Gazpromistan‘ […] run by its president and spiritual leader, Gazputin, 
an obvious play on the gas-rich countries of Central Asia, as well as Rasputin, the mad 
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monk favorite of the last czar‘s wife, Czarina Alexandra‖ (Goldman 2008: 143). 
Coinciding with these partial or complete renationalizations in the oil industry, central 
authorities also encroached on other strategic sectors, such as finance, aviation, machine-
building and power generation equipment: a state-owned company producing defense 
equipment seized control of the largest producer of Russian cars, the state gained a 
controlling share in the company that produces two-thirds of the world‘s titanium and 
also captured a controlling stake in the company that monopolized aircraft production 
(Cooper 2009). In two terms as president, Putin had accomplished nothing short of the 
wholesale reversal of the privatization process that Yeltsin presided over in the 1990s, at 
least with regard to those companies atop Russian industry (Goldman 2008: 133). Thus, 
sizable growth and increased state intervention in strategic sectors dominated the 
economic landscape surrounding the 2007 contest. 
The electoral law governing the 2007 legislative contest marked a significant 
departure from all previous post-communist electoral frameworks across numerous 
dimensions, all of which erected new barriers to entry for parties and electoral blocs. A 
new law passed in 2005 abolished the single-mandate tier of the electoral system and 
created a pure proportional party-list system that allowed only established political 
parties to nominate candidates and seek election. The shift to a purely proportional 
formula excluded independent and local candidates from participation, a group that 
historically formed a large or the largest proportion of the total SMD candidates; 
previously, this group was eligible to gain legislative representation only through the 
constituency races due to either political independence or affiliation with a party too 
small to cross the party-list threshold. For the first time in post-communist Russian 
history, political parties emerged as the sole legitimate actors in parliamentary elections 
and politics. At the time, the election of deputies exclusively through party lists was 
hoped to have a positive effect on parties and party-building, since all formerly 
independent candidates were obliged to align with a party to make it into the Duma and 
the parties would need to secure more votes in the regions to remain viable (European 
Parliament 2011).  
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The Kremlin‘s ulterior goal, achieved in the legislature via United Russia‘s 
majority, was to ―eliminate the unpredictability that had always been inherent in the 
single-member constituency elections. Someone unexpected and undesirable might be 
elected. And if enough of them were elected, the State Duma could become unpredictable 
in its behavior‖ (White and Kryshtanovskaya 2011: 562). More than unpredictability, the 
change represented another action against regional influence in the Duma because single-
seat deputies were often more loyal to their regional elite than the central government, as 
re-election often hinged on good relations with the regional executives; in other words, 
―single-seat deputies [meant] power in the regions‖ (White and Kryshtanovskaya 2011: 
563). With all politics conducted through parties, central control over the party system 
and individual parties would be easier to assert.  
Yet another ulterior motive encouraging this change to the electoral system was to 
target the KPRF specifically, as the ―final destruction of the regime‘s main opponent […] 
because such an election system would stimulate the rise of non-communist alternatives 
on the leftist political flange‖ (Wegren and Konitzer 2006: 693). Although alternatives to 
the KPRF may have emerged, the move to a purely proportional system would likely 
have not affected the KPRF as much as centrist and liberal parties: during the three 
legislative contests in the 1990s and in 2003, the majority of KPRF Duma deputies came 
from the party list rather than the SMD tier, while the majority of Duma deputies 
representing centrist and liberal parties were elected in SMD races (Wegren and Konitzer 
2006). In fact, based on the results from the 2003 election, the parties that would be most 
negatively affected by the shift to pure proportional representation would not be the 
KPRF but United Russia, as 45% of its Duma deputies were elected through the SMD 
tier, and Motherland, the Kremlin puppet party designed to siphon votes of the KPRF, 
since approximately 20% of its deputies were elected in single-mandate contests. 
Ultimately, the new electoral system proved advantageous for United Russia because it 
captured a significantly higher vote share in 2007 than in the previous election. 
The threshold for legislative representation was raised by a considerable amount, 
from five to seven percent, chilling political pluralism in the lower house of the 
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legislature. The pure party-list system coupled with the higher representation hurdle was 
hoped to consolidate the supply of parties, offering a degree of stability for voters and 
allowing the development of partisan attachments that was exceedingly difficult in the 
extreme multipartism prevailing in the 1990s. The seven percent threshold was one of the 
highest for representation in Europe, only lower than Turkey‘s 10% hurdle (PACE 2007; 
Treisman 2011). The higher threshold benefitted larger parties to the greatest extent and 
erected more formidable barriers to entry for smaller parties. Ultimately, the new hurdle 
did not change the number of parties in the Duma, as no more parties crossed the 
previous threshold as the new one in 2007. Nevertheless, the reform was intended to 
reduce Duma parties, which would benefit the best positioned party, the party of power, 
because parties that successfully cleared the higher threshold would gain an even larger 
share of seats, as parties that had not cleared the hurdle would not secure any 
representation (White and Kryshtanovskaya 2011: 564). The advantages produced by the 
higher threshold would accrue disproportionately to the party of power for other reasons 
as well. The increased hurdle would force most parties to the margins in the political 
arena because voters would not want to waste their votes on a party unlikely to clear the 
threshold, wealthy donors would abandon them financially, and promising political elites 
would align with more formidable parties (Ibid). Intensifying the effect of the higher 
representation hurdle, a new ban on electoral bloc formation dispensed with the 
mechanism through which smaller parties joined forces and became more formidable 
competitors (Ibid).  
Another reform reduced the minimum number of parties that must be represented 
in the Duma from four parties to two. If only one party cleared the new seven percent 
threshold, the second-place finisher would also receive Duma representation regardless of 
vote share. Puzzlingly, party list candidates were not obligated to be members of their 
nominating party, provided that the individual was not a member of any other party and 
such members did not constitute more than 50% of the total party list (McAllister and 
White 2008). However, mandating that those elected via party-list join their party‘s 
Duma fraction, under the threat of expulsion from the legislature, ensured new post-
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election party loyalty. Previously, deputies were not obligated to join their party‘s 
fraction once the Duma convened, enabling United Russia to poach roughly 80 deputies 
from competing party lists or independents in 2003 (Ibid).  
Further changes also advantaged larger parties at the expense of smaller ones. For 
example, the ―against all‖ option on the ballot was abandoned in July 2006, leaving 
voters who wanted to register their displeasure with all the competing parties with only 
one option to do so: ―spoiling‖ their ballot by marking an X through it. Over one percent 
of voters spoiled their ballots in the 2007 contest. The ―against all‖ option had been 
included since before the 1993 snap election. This choice was more popular than many 
parties in the 2003 election, garnering more votes than Yabloko and nearly enough to 
secure theoretical Duma representation from the party-list tier. Despite the fact that 
international election observers disapproved of the option because it potentially poached 
votes from smaller parties that may have otherwise cleared the hurdle, Russian political 
analysts viewed the against all option as a ―traditional form of electoral protest. As such, 
it may be considered a sign of health in a democracy. Voters shows that they are not 
afraid to register their displeasure with the […] system publicly, and that they are willing 
to turnout out at the polls to register that displeasure, thereby displaying their interest and 
concern in their country‘s democracy‖ (Petrov 2004: 252). Public opinion polling showed 
that a clear majority of Russians, 60%, opposed the removal of the ―against all‖ option, 
while less than 20% supported such a change (McAllister and White 2008: 935). To the 
Kremlin and the dominant party however, the ―against all‖ alternative represented the 
political ―‘nihilism and protest‘ of the 1990s that had been ‗harmful to the political 
culture‘ in that it had ‗encouraged and strengthened counterproductive negative 
attitudes;‘ a choice ‗should always be concrete, and positive‘‖ (White and 
Kryshtanovskaya 2011: 572).  
An extra change ―withdr[ew] yet another ‗weapon of the weak‘—in this case, the 
ability to invalidate the election itself by abstaining in sufficiently large numbers‖: a 
December 2006 amendment removed the minimal turnout requirement to declare 
legislative elections valid (formerly, a 25% minimum turnout was required) (McAllister 
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and White 2008: 935). The abolition of the 25% minimum voter turnout rule therefore 
provided United Russia with a fail-safe mechanism to ensure continued power in the 
legislature without administering new elections. Indeed, even if the entire Russian 
electorate abstained from voting, the legislative election would still be deemed valid if 
only Putin himself turned up to vote (Kara-Murza 2011).  
The electoral law preserved some of the financial stipulations and penalties 
imposed in previous elections on parties failing to garner minimum vote shares of 
between two and four percent, such as losing election deposits for parties registered via 
cash payment instead of signatures, and recompensing the government for free air time 
allotted during the campaign. However, each threshold was increased to the detriment of 
small parties: parties garnering less than four percent (formerly three percent) would 
forfeit their cash deposit and parties capturing less than three percent (formerly two 
percent) would be ordered to return the value of free broadcasting.  
The cumulative effect of sweeping political and electoral reform progressively 
curtailed the independent activities of political parties and electoral blocs, and paved the 
way for United Russia to consolidate its dominance effortlessly in the 2007 contest 
(White 2011; Gelman 2008). Comprehensive changes to the electoral law were criticized 
by the Council of Europe in the mid-2000s: ―recent changes to the legislation concerning 
the elections of the State Duma and the organi[z]ation of political parties will severely 
restrict political competition. The significantly higher electoral threshold (7%), the 
prohibition of electoral coalitions and the reduction, from four to two, of the minimum 
number of parties to be represented in the lower chamber, as well as new, restrictive rules 
for parties entitled to contest State Duma elections, will significantly raise the entry 
barrier to the parliament, in clear favour of the parties already represented in the current 
State Duma‖ (Council of Europe 2005: Paragraph 7). Despite vast reforms, the major 
opposition parties made their way back into the Duma in 2007, albeit both the KPRF and 
LDPR re-entered in a weaker state compared to the previous election; it was therefore 
premature to forecast that these leading opposition parties were about to become extinct, 
even under conditions of one-party dominance (Gelman 2008: 913). Nevertheless, the 
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package of reforms ―intentionally or otherwise […] in fact established a ‗real legal and 
political platform for the establishment of not even a relative but the unconditional 
monopoly of a single political force‘‖ (White and Kryshtanovskaya 2011: 574).  
The CEC ultimately registered 11 parties to contest the 2007 elections. Per 
December 2004 amendments to the 2001 ―On Political Parties‖ law, each political party 
was required to have a minimum of 50,000 members, a significant increase from the 
10,000 necessary under the original law. Furthermore, the amended version required each 
party satisfy a geographic distribution condition by having regional branches in at least 
45 of the federation subjects with at least 500 members in each. Previously, parties were 
required to have branches in at least 50 regions with at least 100 members each. These 
newly introduced legal requirements applied to new and established political parties alike 
and were ―virtually impossible to meet, practically forcing many parties to fake 
membership numbers‖ (Kynev 2012). Additionally, a 2006 law required that parties 
submit to verification of their compliance with the new legal framework, causing many 
parties to disband or reassemble as civic organizations (Ibid). Errors detected in the 
process of compliance verification, most frequently discovered in the case of opposition 
parties, resulted in numerous court cases and yet more dissolutions the following year 
(Ibid). Parties without Duma representation at the time, such as Yabloko, were required 
to collect 200,000 signatures or make a cash deposit of approximately $2.5 million 
(Yabloko opted for the cash deposit route to registration). The amount of the cash deposit 
was significantly higher than four years prior, increasing from 37.5 million rubles in 2003 
to 60 million rubles in 2007. The deposit was returned to parties that garnered at least 4% 
in the election; previously, the deposit was returned if parties met a lower threshold of 
3%.  
The stipulations regarding the maximum number of signatures obtained from any 
given region and the minimum number of regions in which signatures were gathered 
were both tightened. In 2003, the maximum number of signatures collected in a region 
was 7% or 14,000 signatures, while in 2011 this was stiffened to 5% or 10,000 
signatures. Likewise, parties were obligated to collect signatures in a minimum of 15 
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regions in 2003, but 2007 regulations stipulated a minimum of 20 federal subjects. The 
requirements for signature validity were more demanding: a party would not be registered 
if more than five percent of the 200,000 signatures were invalid (formerly 25%) or if the 
number of valid signatures fell below 200,000 once the invalid signatures were omitted 
(McAllister and White 2008). These registration requirements were waived for parties 
currently represented, favoring the parties in the outgoing Duma, including the party of 
power, the KPRF and LDPR. Among the 11 registered parties were those constituting the 
core party troika: the KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko, albeit an extra-parliamentary party. 
United Russia‘s astounding performance in the 2003 election left only two other parties 
that ―could be regarded as serious competitors although scarcely as an electoral 
challenge‖: the KPRF and LDPR (McAllister and White 2008: 939).  
The KPRF entered the election season in 2007 still fragile from the previous 
contest that cut its vote share in half but secure in its position as United Russia‘s most 
formidable opponent. Despite the decline in ―transitional uncertainty‖ that shrunk the 
―role of ideology as a product in Russia‘s electoral market,‖ the KPRF clung to its 
longstanding ideological offerings (Gelman 2008: 921). Under the party‘s manifesto, 
―Power for the Working People!‖ the party aimed to defend ordinary people by carrying 
out a more equitable distribution of national wealth and undoing the vertical chain of 
command that had been developed under President Putin (McAllister and White 2008). 
The KPRF would also continue its struggle to reclaim its image as the ―chief and only 
champion of the Russian people‖ and follow several steps to guide Russia to a worthy 
future: nationalization of natural resources and other strategic industries, higher pay and 
pensions, state-run modernization of industry, agriculture and transport, more honest 
elections and cutback in the state bureaucracy, renewal of the death penalty, free and high 
quality education and health services, a new constitution, and revival of relations among 
the former Soviet states, including Ukraine, Belarus and possibly Kazakhstan (McAllister 
and White 2008: 940). The party program included a new discussion of ethnic issues 
using old Soviet newspeak that aimed to retain the KPRF‘s core voters who harbored 
xenophobic sentiment and an inferiority complex due to economic dislocation after the 
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reforms of the 1990s (Babich 2007). Despite the fact that this pocket of loyal supporters 
was continually shrinking as a result of demographic shifts, the KPRF did not dilute its 
position on the ethnic question to be more inclusive (Ibid). In the 2007 election, the 
KPRF notably intensified its critique of United Russia, which ―gave it a chance of turning 
into an epicenter of opposition‖ in future legislative contests; nevertheless, the party was 
still haunted by the stigma of being the inheritor of the former CPSU and, compounding 
its image as a ―ghost of the past,‖ the KPRF failed to incorporate any democratic values 
or similar orientations that may have breathed new life into the party (Peregudov 2009: 
60). The KPRF continued its uninterrupted streak of legislative representation in post-
communist Russia, but roughly one percent of the party‘s 2003 vote share was shaved off 
in the final 2007 tally, leaving it with approximately 12%.  The result generally preserved 
the KPRF‘s position as the ―most obvious alternative to an otherwise entirely dominant 
United Russia‖ and was the second largest party in the Duma (McAllister and White 
2008: 946).  
The LDPR returned as the quintessential but controversial nationalist party under 
the leadership of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The party list included Andrei Lugovoi, who was 
wanted in the United Kingdom for the murder of former KGB agent Alexander 
Litvinenko by radioactive poisoning and who would receive diplomatic immunity if the 
party surpassed the seven percent threshold. Also on the party‘s federal list was Igor 
Lebedev, the son of LPDR-leader Zhirinovsky and leader of the LDPR faction in the 
Duma. The LDPR‘s platform focused primarily on righting the wrongs done to the 
country and ordinary citizens by officials and oligarchs: natural resources were to be 
reclaimed from the oligarchs, the profits put toward improving living standards, and a 
progressive income tax would be introduced to raise revenue for higher pensions, a 
significant increase in all salaries, and better housing (McAllister and White 2008: 940). 
LDPR Duma deputies would push through a seven-hour workday with Wednesdays off if 
the party won representation in the fifth Duma (McAllister and White 2008: 941). The 
party also advocated a return to the pre-1917 government structure, i.e. a unitary state 
comprised of governorships rather than federalism (Babich 2007). As in previous 
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elections, the LDPR continued to advocate for the reintegration of the former Soviet 
states. Alongside the KPRF, the LDPR regained parliamentary representation for the fifth 
time, but its vote share was approximately three percent less than its 2003 showing. Thus, 
the party was once again able to remain ―afloat only thanks to the popularity of its leader 
in that section of society which is inclined to take second-rate populism and demagogy as 
a sign of political virtuosity and independence‖ (Peregudov 2009: 60).  
Yabloko joined the electoral fray in 2007 as the only extra-parliamentary party in 
the core party troika and struggled to be the only party in post-communist Russian history 
to lose and subsequently regain legislative representation. As a programmatically-
oriented party, Yabloko offered a cogent program based on several steps to equal 
opportunities: free elections, separation of government power and also separation 
between government and private business, an independent court system, development of 
a middle class through small businesses, a one-time tax on the profits earned through 
corrupt auctions of state property in the 1990s, development of trade unions to protect the 
rights of workers, strict regulation of monopolies (notably Gazprom), redoubled 
investment in public health and education, and a renewed emphasis on the environment 
(McAllister and White 2008: 941). Yet overall, the party was ―merely inept and its 
campaign appeal was bleak‖ (Gelman 2008: 926). Although Yabloko secured four seats 
in the single-mandate tier of the 2003 election, the aftermath proved devastating as one 
deputy ultimately joined United Russia and three others became independents. One year 
before the 2007 contest, Yabloko abandoned plans to unify with The Union of Right 
Forces (SPS), a neoliberal party that won only three seats from the single-mandate tier in 
the previous election (RIA Novosti 2006). Yabloko again failed to cross the threshold for 
representation, garnering less than two percent of the vote, which itself was almost three 
percent less than the party‘s performance in 2003. Thus, the shocking result from the 
previous contest did not ―trigger a needed renewal‖ in 2007 as some had hoped (The 
Economist 2003). The results of post-election poll conducted by the Levada center 
presaged continual decline for Yabloko, as the vast majority of respondents (69%) 
forecast ―a bleak future‖ for the party (RIA Novosti 2007f). Thus, Yabloko moved 
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progressively deeper into the political wilderness with each consecutive legislative 
election, ―suffer[ing] most from the political changes of the 2000s‖ (Gelman 2008: 926).  
United Russia was forecast to secure an overwhelming victory leading up to the 
election. The results of the legislative election were particularly important for United 
Russia, as they would provide an initial forecast of the results for the presidential election 
three months later when presidential succession was at stake (McAllister and White 
2008). Therefore, United Russia looked for a strong showing in the legislative contest to 
gather momentum behind the Kremlin‘s handpicked successor to President Putin; a 
strong showing in 2007 would ensure that ―a victory in March 2008 would be inevitable. 
The second round of elections would simply be technical‖ (White and Kryshtanovskaya 
2011: 560). Some time prior to United Russia‘s convention, in February 2006, the chief 
Kremlin political strategist commented that the Kremlin intended to preserve the party of 
power‘s dominance in the political arena for the next 10-15 years and compared the 
Russian party system under United Russia with Japan under the LDP or Sweden under 
the Social Democrats (Gelman 2008).  
For the first time in post-communist Russia, President Putin claimed the first and 
only spot on United Russia‘s federal party-list after accepting United Russia‘s invitation 
at the party‘s convention in October. United Russia thus gave up its ―leading troika‖ 
practice of nominating three federal candidates (RIA Novosti 2007a). Despite occupying 
a place on United Russia‘s list, President Putin declined to join the party as a member, 
commenting, ―Although I was an initiator in the establishment of United Russia, I, like 
the overwhelming majority of the country‘s citizens, do not belong to a party and am 
reluctant to change this status‖ (RIA Novosti, 2007). Putin explained his decision to head 
up the party list was to ensure the Duma did not become a ―collection of populists 
paralyzed by corruption and demagoguery‖ as in the past and to stave off threats to 
stability and peace originating with the liberals and Communists (Nichol 2007: 3). 
Opposition parties called for Putin to abandon his place on United Russia‘s party list, 
arguing that his position as president accorded him considerable influence, particularly in 
leveraging extensive administrative resources to help the party at the polls (RIA Novosti 
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2007c). The mood of the electorate during the campaign indicated that the ―personal 
participation of popular political leaders, primarily Putin, benefited United Russia‖ 
(Golosov 2012: 5). Although President Putin was a departing president and stated on 
numerous occasions that he would not seek a constitutional amendment to allow for a 
third consecutive term, the Kremlin and United Russia transformed the legislative contest 
in 2007 into a referendum on Putin‘s presidency and him personally, suggesting that it 
mainly functioned as a show of loyalty.  
At the October convention, United Russia adopted a party platform that supported 
Putin‘s agenda, the so-called ―Putin Plan‖ and subsequently ran on the campaign slogan 
―Vote for Putin‘s Plan!‖. The Putin Plan‘s identifiable components included preserving 
Russia as a ―unique and great civili[z]ation, […] building a competitive economy, 
[establishing] a new quality of life, [establishing] the institutions of a civil society, [and] 
the further development of Russia as a sovereign democracy‖ (McAllister and White 
2008: 938). The party of power tried to counter the perceived threat of Western countries 
launching a color revolution akin to Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 by creating a 
nationalist and anti-Western youth wing to hold rallies in support of the party during the 
campaign season. However, United Russia‘s party platform skirted the issue of migration 
and instead focused on the country‘s unity in an attempt to court non-Russian 
constituencies.  United Russia professed that Russia was a country that has ―become a 
common Motherland for all Russian citizens, where national cultures and languages 
develop unimpeded, where every person‘s national and religious feelings are respected, 
where any manifestations of xenophobia and nationalism are uprooted‖ (Babich 2007). 
Save for the liberal Yabloko and one other, United Russia was the only party with a 
national presence that did not include xenophobic statements in its program, which 
observers attributed to the fact that the ruling party‘s base was so strong that the party did 
not need to exploit nationalism to curry favor among ethnic Russians  (Ibid). United 
Russia oriented its electoral campaign around harvesting the support of ―as many 
politically disinterested, loyal voters as possible while convincing all others to stay 
home‖ (Golosov 2012: 6). As in 2003, United Russia stacked its party list with 65 
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regional governors and four members of the cabinet of ministers (Gelman 2008). The 
ruling party reported a membership of 1.25 million, significantly higher than its most 
formidable competitor, the KPRF, and 45,000 branches operating at all administrative 
levels. In a replay of 2003, United Russia opted out of televised debates in the 2007 
campaign period in order to signal the party‘s ―exclusive character,‖ but made use of free 
broadcasting time allocated to the party (Peregudov 2009: 51).  
With their KPRF ―enemy‖ still in the legislature, the Kremlin and United Russia 
redoubled efforts to exclude them politically by building another satellite party after the 
Motherland (or Rodina) party moved from Kremlin-loyalist to genuine opposition 
(Gelman 2008: 920). The new invented opposition party, A Just Russia, was created 
through the merger of three smaller satellite parties; A Just Russia, like Motherland 
before it, was designed to poach votes from the KPRF and acted as a back-up party of 
power by allowing the Kremlin to distribute its eggs to some extent, rather than putting 
them all in the United Russia basket (Gelman 2008). A Just Russia won a vote share 
comparable to Motherland in the elections and cemented its position as the new Kremlin-
friendly satellite in the Duma. For its part, the dominant party won a clear mandate with 
just under two-thirds of the votes cast, an astonishing performance by any measure but 
especially when compared to the second-place finisher, the KPRF, which collected only 
12%. Attracting approximately 14% of each of the KPRF‘s and LDPR‘s 2003 voters 
augmented United Russia‘s showing, as evident in the flow of votes from 2003 to 2007 
(McAllister and White 2008: 947). Coupled with deputies that aligned with the party of 
power after the election, United Russia gained the two-thirds majority necessary for 
constitutional amendment. United Russia‘s triumph in the election was widely viewed as 
an endorsement of President Putin rather than United Russia, mostly due to Putin‘s 
position atop the party‘s list (Nichol 2007).  
The 2007 results furnished uncontestable evidence that United Russia was the 
only game in town and demonstrated the ―deep stagnation of opposition politics‖ in the 
context of single-party dominance (Gelman 2008: 927). Each of the three parties forming 
the core party troika experienced declining vote shares, with the LDPR witnessing the 
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largest backsliding in support compared to 2003 but still making it back into the Duma. 
Yabloko fell farther short of the seven percent hurdle in 2007 than the five percent 
threshold four years prior, providing additional substantiation to claims that the party was 
uniquely ill-equipped to survive the new political status quo characterized by United 
Russia‘s hegemony and increasingly uncompetitive elections. United Russia‘s dominance 
in the election created a parliament in which meetings of the legislature were transformed 
into ―party meeting[s]. A parliament wholly dominated by one party […] is also a party 
meeting, but with guests‖ (Petrov 2011: 46). In this system, opposition parties were 
unwelcome guests, but also necessary to maintain the façade of multipartism masking 
United Russia‘s near-total control of the lower house.  
The 2007 Legislative Election as an Uncompetitive Election 
As in 2003, the 2007 parliamentary election will also be treated as an 
uncompetitive election. Observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly reported that 
the election was ―not fair‖ and ―failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe 
commitments and standards for democratic elections‖ (OSCE PA 2007). The head of the 
Council of Europe‘s Parliamentary Assembly commented, ―if Russia is a managed 
democracy then this was a managed election‖ (Harding 2007). Moreover, the Russian 
non-governmental organization Golos judged the election was neither free nor fair. In 
2007, the ―entire electoral process, it appeared, had acquired a ‗routine character: the 
approval of what exists,‘‖ much the same as party-controlled elections under Soviet rule 
(Quoted in McAllister and White 2008: 938). The contest exemplified ―‘authoritarian 
elections,‘ a form of ‗unfree competition‘ in which the ‗institutional facades of 
democracy, including regular multiparty elections […] were used to ‗conceal (and 
reproduce) [the] harsh realities of authoritarian governance‘‖ (White 2011: 937; Schedler 
2006).  
It is important to note that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) did not observe the 2007 parliamentary elections, citing delays 
and restrictions that rendered the organization unable to deliver its mandate (OSCE 
2007). The organization received a delayed invitation from Russian authorities that 
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contained ―unprecedented restrictions‖ on their activities and many experts and observers 
experienced continuous denials of entry visas (Ibid). Nevertheless, the head of the CEC 
claimed that visas had been issued and President Putin stated, ―we have information that 
this [ODIHR decision] was made on the recommendations of the U.S. State Department,‖ 
and averred, ―actions such as these cannot wreck the elections‖ by suggesting they are 
illegitimate (Quoted in Nichol 2007: 2). The OSCE thus concluded that the ―authorities 
of the Russian Federation remain unwilling to receive ODIHR observers in a timely and 
co-operative manner and co-operate fully with them‖ (Ibid). Observers who were present 
reported that they were restricted in their work and were not allowed to observe voting at 
polling stations on Election Day (OSCE PA 2007). A total of 350 observers affiliated 
with various organizations monitored the 2007 elections, approximately three times fewer 
than observed the contest four years prior (RIA Novosti 2007b). Despite comparatively 
narrow participation of international observers, the OSCE‘s Parliamentary Assembly was 
able to send 70 short-term observers to assess the election.  A new ban on the release of 
public reports directly after the elections was enacted (Ibid). Generally, election 
observers reported major concerns in areas identical to those noted in the previous 
legislative election, namely the merging of the state and United Russia, strong media bias 
in favor of United Russia and President Putin, an electoral code that prevented new and 
smaller parties to emerge and compete effectively, and widespread harassment of 
opposition parties (OSCE PA 2007). In short, ―there was not a level political playing field 
in Russia in 2007‖ (Ibid). 
 The ruling party used administrative resources extensively, such as state 
infrastructure and paying party personnel through the public payroll (Ibid). For example, 
state and local officers frequently worked as part of a United Russia campaign team and 
municipal offices were routinely transformed entirely into party campaign headquarters 
(White 2011). Although public officials were not allowed to leverage their positions by 
campaigning for a specific party unless their normal duties were suspended, this 
stipulation did not apply to ―federal ministers or governors under a change in the law that 
had been ‗almost unnoticed at the time.‘ Those who campaigned against the Kremlin‘s 
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favoured [parties] were, in effect, campaigning against the state itself‖ (White 2011: 
534). Furthermore, regional governors, who were selected through appointment rather 
than direct election beginning in 2004, constituted a sizable proportion of United Russia‘s 
party-list but were unlikely to vacate their positions atop regional government structures 
to fill their Duma seats, deliberately misleading voters (OSCE PA 2007). Although not a 
member himself, President Putin played such a major role in United Russia‘s election 
campaign that the legislative election transformed into a referendum on his presidency 
(Ibid). 
One of the primary mechanisms of state interference and the use of administrative 
resources was compulsion, or ―organi[z]ed pressure to vote‖ (White 2011: 544). An 
example of state interference on behalf of the dominant party came from Nizhny 
Novgorod, where foreman visited workers at the city‘s largest vehicle factory and 
instructed them to vote for United Russia, under threat of unspecified punishment 
(McAllister and White 2008: 943). In other areas, teachers at all levels of education 
endorsed United Russia by distributing campaign materials about ―Putin‘s Plan,‖ telling 
their students to encourage their parents to vote accordingly or ordering parents and 
university students to attend meetings with party representatives and vote for United 
Russia, under threat of dormitory eviction  (Ibid). In Orel, students were obligated to 
become members of the party itself. United Russia representatives informed students at 
universities underachieving in terms of United Russia membership that university 
funding would be cut (White 2011). In Ulyanovsk, students were required to use their 
mobile phones to photograph their ballot in the voting booth to prove they had voted for 
United Russia (Ibid). At one polling station in Chelyabinsk, a photographer was present 
inside the voting booth itself (Ibid). The scale of these practices suggested that electoral 
manipulation in the form of compulsion was systematic. In the republic of Adygea, 
officials sent out instructions requiring stallholders in the local market to display United 
Russia publicity for free but also to collect and put it up the campaign materials, as the 
officials themselves were ‗too busy‘ (White 2011: 541). The Kremlin also reportedly 
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demanded that cell phone companies text message their subscribers ―inviting‖ them to 
vote (RIA Novosti 2007d).  
Citing a problem that was also salient on election day in previous contests, voting 
arrangements that employed electronic boxes and voting booths in 2007 frequently 
―failed to protect the secrecy of the vote‖ (OSCE PA 2007). Moreover, the CEC 
conceded that multiple voting had become a ―common practice‖ on election day: 
―electoral Stakhanovites‖ would travel by bus to different precinct stations claiming to be 
temporary residents and vote numerous times (White 2011: 547). A more nefarious form 
of multiple voting occurred in Dagestan, where a group of approximately 50 people 
entered a voting station flanked by armed guards and cast about 300 ballots (White 
2011). 
The counting of the votes and the final tally seemed to proceed according to 
directives provided by central authorities rather than standard electoral protocols. 
Allegedly, ―target figures‖ were provided regarding levels of acceptable turnout and party 
vote shares through oral correspondence with lower level officials across the country 
starting as early as the summer of 2007 (White 2011: 543). The average target set for 
United Russia was 50 or 60%, which could be higher but definitely not lower; traditional 
support for the KRPF in the red belt south of Moscow was to be transferred to Kremlin-
created spoiler party on the left, A Just Russia, although the Communists were still 
supposed to come in second place, followed by the LDPR that was intended to receive 
about 7% (the threshold for representation) (Ibid).  In one region, the governor ordered 
subordinates to provide a turnout of 60%, a 60% vote share for the dominant party, and 
no more than 5% (under the electoral hurdle) for the KRPF (Ibid). Some regions 
essentially competed to report higher turnout figures and vote shares for United Russia, 
with North Caucasus republics ―hailing improbably turnouts nearing 100% with 
correspondingly high percentages of votes for United Russia‖ (Nichol 2007: 3). Chechen 
President Ramzan Kadyrov called for Chechen voters to support United Russia in the 
parliamentary elections, commenting ―We have to prove on December 2 that we fully 
support Putin and his party by voting 100% for him‖; ultimately United Russia captured 
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over 99% of the vote in the region (RIA Novosti 2007e). By these directives originating 
at the highest levels of government, voter turnout across the country was inflated and the 
party of power‘s vote share was made high enough to proceed seamlessly with the central 
administration‘s political and economic agenda in the legislature. The planned targets that 
were communicated in an uninterrupted chain from the highest level down to the 
municipal administrators proved a reliable method of ensuring support for the dominant 
party due to new selection criteria for regional governors, i.e. presidential appointment. It 
was a ―matter of ‗personally signing your death warrant‘ if the figures were 
unsatisfactory, or ‗continuing to sit in the governor‘s seat undisturbed‘‖ (White 2011: 
543). Turnout percentages in numerous precincts revealed suspicious ―spikes at 60, 70, 
80, 90, and even 100 percent,‖ providing ―strong evidence of fraud‖ (Hale and Colton 
2010: 19). According to one analysis, a larger number of polling stations reported voter 
turnout of 100% than reported the real average of 51 percent (RFE/RL Newsline 2008). 
The direct falsification of results in 2007 became one part of a „massive administrative 
electoral technology‟ that began to have a “significant influence on the distribution of 
votes among the candidates and parties, if not necessarily on the outcome” (White 2011: 
553).  
The process of counting the votes betrayed ballot-stuffing attempts, as 
suspiciously large stacks of ballots contained sequences of votes for the same party or 
ballots were counted that appeared to have been cast before the polling stations formally 
opened; when observers drew attention to suspected ballot stuffing, they were arrested 
and threatened with criminal prosecution (White 2011). Moreover, twice as many 
absentee ballots had been cast in 2007 than four years earlier, indicating the growth of the 
form of voting most susceptible to manipulation and misuse on behalf of the dominant 
party (OSCE PA 2007). Myagkov et al. estimated that ―anywhere between 20 and 25 
percent of United Russia‟s [2007] vote” was “won in a way that would not pass muster in 
an established or traditional democracy” (2009: 137).  
From a different angle, Figure 7.1 provides additional evidence that electoral 
manipulation was likely practiced in the 2007 contest. The distribution of voter turnout 
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reveals a suspicious peak in the right tail, strongly suggesting artificially augmented 
turnout because the distribution of voter turnout across raions ought to follow a normal or 
Gaussian distribution, if the data are ―roughly homogenous and outliers are the result of 
uncorrelated or random factors‖ (Myagkov, et al. 2009: 31). The distribution of voter 
turnout in 2007 appears more abnormal than that from 2003, when an elongated right tail 
was evident but the conspicuous bump was absent. The location and size of the distortion 
in the distribution is suspect in that a distinct local maximum occurs in the far right tail, 
where electoral participation is the highest, and is large enough to produce a bimodal 
distribution.  
 
Figure 7.1: Distribution of Voter Turnout in 2007 
 
 
Table 7.1 details the voter turnout threshold used to assess electoral manipulation and the 
amount of raions that surpassed that threshold. In 2007, raion-level national turnout was 
68.16% and the corresponding standard deviation was 13.33. The distribution of voter 
turnout was therefore more dispersed than in 2003, when the standard deviation was 
12.27. Just over 17% of the more than 2,700 raions in Russia qualified as fraudulent, a 
noticeable increase from the 14.27% that met the turnout threshold in 2003. Indeed, 
upwards of 80 additional raions were considered manipulated in 2007 than in the 
previous contest. Given that voter turnout was roughly 10% higher in 2007 than 2003, 
which hiked the threshold for fraud, the metastasis of electoral malfeasance in 2007 is 
particularly striking. The turnout threshold accounts for the entirety of raions producing 
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the suspicious bump in the right hand tail seen in Figure 1, as well as some raions that 
reported slightly more limited turnout.  
 
Table 7.1: Manipulated Raions in 2007 
Voter Turnout Threshold 
(1 Standard Deviation Above Raion-level National 
Turnout) 
Number Manipulated 
Raions 
% Total 
Raions 
81.49 461 17.01 
 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 largely corroborate qualitative findings about the nefarious 
inflation of voter turnout in the election and, as will be shown later, the relationship 
between unusually high turnout and high vote shares for the dominant party. 
During the electoral period, opposition parties faced a minefield of regime 
coercion, continuously reporting ―harassment, detentions [and] confiscation of election 
material‖ (OSCE PA 2007). The police visited KPRF activists in their private homes, 
removing stacks of flyers and newspapers (Ibid). All across the country the party reported 
the seizure of printing equipment, intrusive tax inspections and the confiscation of its 
electoral communications (White 2011). The regime thus practiced not only nonviolent 
forms of electoral manipulation, such as ballot stuffing or facilitating multiple voting, but 
also employed more nefarious methods to tilt the playing field towards the dominant 
party and away from the party of power‘s primary opposition, the KPRF.  
 As was the case four years prior and to a more limited extent in the 1990s, 
broadcast media offered ―overwhelmingly positive coverage‖ of the president and the 
party of power to the point of almost total domination of the airwaves, resulting in 
―grotesque disparities‖ (OSCE PA 2007; White 2011: 535). The dominant party enjoyed 
privileged access to the mass media receiving between 57-62% of all prime-time political 
news coverage in the heart of the campaign period (McAllister and White 2008: 942). In 
November 2007 alone, the two channels with the largest audiences devoted 69% and 
72%, respectively, to the party of power (White 2011: 535). The Centre for Journalism in 
Extreme Situations (CJES) found that, in the pre-election period, United Russia enjoyed 
10 times the coverage as its primary opponent, the KPRF (Ibid).  
Analysis  
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 The parties analyzed in the 2003 election, i.e. the core party troika and United 
Russia, remain under investigation in the 2007 contest. A Just Russia, the Kremlin 
creation that ultimately moved into the political opposition, is therefore excluded for 
consistency across elections. Table 7.2 below details the two stronghold thresholds for 
each party, the number of strongholds each captured, and the percent of total raions their 
share of strongholds represented. The number of Communist and liberal strongholds 
dwindled according to both thresholds compared to the previous election. Lower-level 
LDPR strongholds also dropped but the party harvested several more bastions of support 
according to the strict threshold. As anticipated based on United Russia‘s spectacular 
performance in the 2007 election, the number of dominant party strongholds grew, by 46 
and 20 according to the relaxed and strict threshold.  
 
Table 7.2: Measuring the Dependent Variable: Party Strongholds in 2007 
 1 standard deviation 
above party‘s raion-
level national 
average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
2 standard deviations 
above party‘s raion-
level national 
average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
KPRF 15.22 404 14.91 19.78 71 2.62 
LDPR 11.73 376 13.87 15.45 50 1.85 
Yabloko 2.50 282 10.41 3.93 150 5.54 
United 
Russia 
79.15 392 14.46 91.27 174 6.42 
 
Figure 7.2 exhibits the distribution of the dominant party and the core party troika‘s vote 
shares, allowing for the rough visual pinpointing of the two stronghold thresholds for 
each party. The KPRF‘s distribution was quite unusual because it dipped at almost the 
precise location of the party‘s national mean of 10.66 and there was a conspicuous bump 
in the left tail of the distribution where electoral defeat prevailed. In acquiring the bump 
in the left tail, the distribution of the KPRF‘s vote share began to look more like the 
LDPR‘s in 2007 than had been the case in previous elections. Continuing with the trend 
of progressive clustering in each election, the standard deviation was notably more 
clustered around the KPRF‘s national average than in the 1990s and the early 2000s, 
contracting to 4.56 from 5.67 in the previous election. The LDPR‘s distribution is 
strikingly similar to the KRPF‘s because it also reveals a discernible bump in the left tail 
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but is distinct in that the bump is markedly more pronounced and akin to a peak. 
Similarly, the LDPR‘s distribution became more clustered rather than more dispersed 
when United Russia was at its apex: the standard deviation contracted from 4.87 in 2003 
to 3.10 in 2007. Yabloko‘s distribution was the most clustered of the core party troika, as 
the standard deviation was 1.43. Like the KPRF and the nationalists, albeit the latter to a 
lesser degree, Yabloko‘s distributions exhibited less dispersion over time: the standard 
deviation was 2.76 in the previous election. The distribution‘s right tail is bumpier than 
that of the Communists and nationalists, with loci of higher support found in various 
urban centers, but it did not reveal an unusual bump in the left tail because the party 
performed so poorly in 2007, capturing a national average of a paltry 1.07%. Compared 
to the core party troika, United Russia‘s distribution displayed significantly more 
dispersion with a standard deviation of 12.12. Interestingly, the distribution was markedly 
more clustered than in the previous election when the standard deviation was 13.85. A 
suspicious peak is evident in the right hand tail of United Russia‘s distribution, in 
precisely the area where electoral windfalls are concentrated. Indeed, it roughly 
approximates the mirror image of the KPRF and LDPR‘s. In 2003, the distribution of 
United Russia‘s vote share had also displayed a fat right tail, but not the sizable bump 
that emerged when the dominant party was in its finest form.  
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of Parties‘ Vote Shares in 2007 
 
  
 
See Appendix Tables 79-102 (pages 628-675) for Multilevel Model Results. 
Ethnicity and Opposition Parties 
 Under the immense weight of United Russia, the KPRF generally performed 
poorly in raions with larger populations of ethnic minorities, despite somewhat irregular 
findings from the statistical models. The percent minority covariate decreased the odds of 
a stronghold by two percent across the majority of the lower threshold models but 
increased the odds by roughly two percent in a strict specification. In 2003, the odds of a 
Communist stronghold increased by a limited amount, approximately one percent, in a 
higher threshold model, but did not exert a systematic effect in the relaxed models. Other 
minorities depressed the odds of a bastion of support by two to four percent in the relaxed 
models but raised the odds by approximately two percent in a strict model. In the 
previous election, the effect of other minorities was also mixed because the covariate did 
not achieve statistical significance in the relaxed models but increased the odds by only 
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one percent in a strict specification. The titular minority covariate failed to achieve 
standard levels of statistical significance in any of the models in 2007, which departed 
from the findings pertaining to 2003, in which the odds plummeted by three to roughly 
seven percent. The lack of a systematic effect when the dominant party was at its apex 
suggests an improvement over the poor performance in titular minority areas during 
United Russia‘s initial consolidation. When vote share was employed continuously rather 
than dichotomously, the KPRF suffered in areas with dense minority communities of any 
kind, as shown clearly in Figure 7.3. The inverse relationships between the KPRF‘s vote 
share and the three ethnic composition covariates appear significantly steeper than was 
the case in 2003. The association seems most negative concerning titular minorities and 
the least pronounced regarding other minorities. There are comparatively fewer raions 
populating the upper right quadrant of the scatterplots, where robust minority populations 
coincide with high vote shares for the party. The most zealous ―red raion,‖ furnishing the 
Communists with a vote share of nearly 30%, was an almost purely ethnic Russian raion 
found in Tambov Oblast in central Russia. The other especially enthusiastic raions, 
supplying the Communists with vote shares more than double their national average, 
were virtually all majority-Russian raions and were located also in Tambov, as well as in 
Moscow Oblast, Belgorod Oblast bordering Ukraine, and the Republic of Urdmurtia just 
North of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Only a few majority-minority raions supported the 
KPRF in high numbers: a predominantly titular minority raion in North Ossetia bordering 
the occupied South Ossetia in the Northern Caucasus, and a mostly other minority raion 
in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the Volga River.  
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Figure 7.3: Non-Russian Minorities and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 corroborates the majority of the statistical findings and those from the 
scatterplots: the pattern of KPRF support was ethnic Russian without exception for the 
first time. Of all majority-Russian raions, the KPRF received stronghold level support in 
just greater than 15%, which was comparable to the party‘s share in the previous election 
and those in the 1990s. A more significant change was evident in majority-minority 
raions: in the 1990s, of these raions, roughly 25% delivered immense support to the party 
but the percentage dropped progressively during the 2000s, to less than 15% in 2003 and 
to less than five percent when United Russia was in its prime. In each regional context 
per the lower threshold, of the number of majority-Russian and majority-minority raions, 
the KRPF captured a higher percentage of strongholds in majority-Russian raions, with 
the greatest disparities between ethnic contexts evident in the Caucasus and in poorer 
regions. In ethnic republics, Muslim regions, and those in the Caucasus, the percentage of 
majority Russian raions as opposed to majority-minority raions that were Communist 
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strongholds shifted starkly in favor of the former compared to 2003. The extent of the 
KPRF‘s emasculation throughout the 2000s is readily apparent: for example, the 
percentage of majority-minority raions in the Caucasus that were KPRF strongholds fell 
from 30% in 2003 to less than 5% in 2007. Similarly, of the ethnic minority raions in 
Muslim regions, the KPRF‘s share plunged from nearly 15% to roughly two percent in 
the same period. The percentage of Russian raions in these regions that delivered high 
levels of support, however, remained stable. Furthermore, from 2003 to 2007, half the 
percentage of majority minority raions in poorer regions and those dependent on natural 
resources channeled immense support to the KPRF. The only noticeable positive change 
for the Communists occurred in the Caucasus, where the share of majority-Russian raions 
that were strongholds jumped by about five percent from 2003. The loss of ethnic 
minority support in every regional environment undoubtedly sapped the Communists of a 
large part of their vote share. With the shift from the lower to the higher threshold in 
ethnic republics, the balance between the percentage of strongholds in majority-Russian 
and majority-minority raions switches in favor of the latter and strongholds in Muslim 
regions evaporate entirely. Moreover, the ratcheting up of the stronghold threshold 
resulted in the evaporation of the bastions drawn from majority-minority raions in 
resource-dependent regions.  
 
Figure 7.4: KPRF Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2007 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics evident in Table 7.3 provide further evidence of the KPRF‘s rout in 
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raions and regions with concentrated ethnic minority populations: the party‘s average 
vote share in majority-minority raions was more than four percent below its raion-level 
national mean; in ethnic regions, the Communists fared comparatively better but still 
dreadfully, harvesting support nearly four percent less than nationally; finally, in Muslim 
regions, the Communists performed the worst out of the ethnic contexts considered with a 
mean that was less than half of its countrywide showing. In each of these contexts, the 
KPRF‘s mean relative to its countrywide average was considerably worse than was the 
case in 2003.  
 
Table 7.3: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the KPRF’s Electoral Performance in the 2007 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
10.66 9.56 6.47 5.44 6.80 5.17 9.87 10.72 7.57 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 
Max 
 
28.26 26.45 22.46 16.55 25.44 17.37 22.46 25.35 25.44 
SD 
 
4.56 4.45 4.42 3.80 4.36 4.23 5.45 4.49 4.27 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
In a strict specification, the shift from a raion located in a Russian federal region to an 
ethnic republic collapsed the odds of a KPRF stronghold by an astonishing 99%, the 
greatest magnitude of effect of any of the correlates of the Communist vote considered. 
In 2003, ethnic region status did not exert a systematic effect; therefore, the fact that the 
odds plunged so precipitously during United Russia‘s second electoral foray was striking 
and portended nothing less than electoral catastrophe for the KPRF in these regions in 
future contests. Interestingly, given the findings discussed above, a raion‘s location in a 
predominantly Muslim region did not generate statistically significant results, a finding 
consistent with those from 2003. As indicated in Table 7.4, of all Communist 
strongholds, few were found in ethnic regions, approximately four percent and less than 
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three percent according to the lower and higher measure, respectively, and even less were 
located in Muslim regions. Indeed, as mentioned, the KPRF failed to capture any 
strongholds in Muslim regions by the strict threshold, the largest drop possible from the 
roughly 14% secured in the previous contest. The plunge in strongholds in Muslim 
regions was also evident with regard to the lower threshold, plunging to less than one 
percent from nearly seven percent four years prior. The percentage of strongholds found 
in ethnic regions also shrunk nearly to the point of non-existence, falling from 14% and 
nearly 20% according to the lower and higher threshold in 2003 to less than five percent 
by both thresholds in 2007.  
 
Table 7.4: KPRF Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2007 
 
 
 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(404 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(71 Total) 
% of KPRF 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
18 4.46 
2 2.82 
Russian federal 
regions 
386 95.54 
69 97.18 
Muslim regions 4 0.99 0 0 
Caucasus regions 48 11.88 3 4.23 
Poorer Regions 171 42.33 36 50.70 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
23 5.69 
1 1.41 
Fraudulent raions 4 0.99 0 0 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
400 99.01 71 100 
 
Despite preserving its position as the strongest opposition party in Russia‘s dominant 
party system, the KPRF was generally incapable of recapturing the ethnic minority 
support that it enjoyed in the 1990s.  
 Paralleling the Communists defeat, the LDPR also performed shabbily in areas 
with geographically concentrated minorities. Unlike the KPRF, however, the LDPR‘s 
weak performance in ethnic minority areas was expected because the party had, in fact, 
never experienced success in these raions, even during the 1990s, and was oriented 
primarily around appealing to ethnic Russian rather than minority constituencies. Unit 
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increases in the ethnic non-Russian, titular minority, and other minority population at the 
raion level decreased the odds of a stronghold by two to four percent across all of the 
relaxed measure models and in a strict specification in the case of the minority covariate 
and across the majority of the models for the remaining ethnic composition refinements. 
Despite general continuity in the LDPR‘s trajectory in raions with larger ethnic minority 
populations from the 1990s to the late 2000s, differences manifested: the magnitude of 
the negative effect in 2007 was notably smaller than that in the 1990s and even in 2003, 
when ethnic composition covariates reduced the odds by up to eight percent, contingent 
on the model and the election. Indeed, even when United Russia was at the height of its 
power, the magnitude of the negative effect from titular minorities on LDPR strongholds 
in particular was a notable improvement over the four to eight percent drop experienced 
in 2003. These findings were unanticipated because the presence of a dominant party 
with unshakable ties to ethnic minority areas did not result in the nationalists 
experiencing an even greater rout in 2007 than in the 1990s, when these pockets of 
support were up for grabs to a greater degree. Figure 7.5 substantiates the statistical 
findings and reveals steep plunges in the nationalists‘ vote share as the proportion of 
ethnic minorities rose. Compared to the scatterplots from 2003, the inverse association 
was clearly steeper with regards to all three ethnic composition covariates. As was also 
evident in 2003, in the scatterplots detailing the relationship concerning non-Russians and 
titular minorities, there are conspicuous and dense clusters where purely ethnic minority 
populations coincide with rock bottom vote shares for the ultra-nationalists. The most 
fanatical raion was a majority-Russian raion with a sizable population of other minorities 
in Murmansk Oblast bordering Finland: this raion endowed the nationalists with a vote 
share more than three times their national average. Of the 31 raions that supported the 
LDPR at least twice as much as its countrywide showing, more than 93% were majority-
Russian. These raions were located in Chita Oblast, in southeast Siberia bordering China 
and Mongolia, Magadan Oblast, next to the Kamchatka Peninsula on the Sea of Okhotsk, 
Perm Krai, located on the western side of the Ural Mountains, Yaroslavl Oblast, located 
near both Moscow City and St. Petersburg. The remaining nationalist zealots were 
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majority-minority raions, one populated predominantly by other minorities in Khanty-
Mansi Autonomous Okrug in the Urals federal district, and the other, also with a dense 
population of other minorities, in Magadan Oblast. The most ardent supporters within a 
majority titular minority raion were found in the Republic of Komi, in northwestern 
Russia to the west of the Ural Mountains.  
  
Figure 7.5: Non-Russian Minorities and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 highlights the ethnic Russian contours of LDPR support by comparing the 
proportion of majority-Russian raions that were nationalist strongholds to their majority-
minority counterparts. Of the majority-Russian raions, the percentage of nationalist 
strongholds dropped by approximately five percent in 2007 compared to the 1990s, but 
changed little from the previous contest. In contrast, of majority-minority raions, the 
percentage that channeled abnormally high support to the nationalists was as trivial as in 
the previous decade and even the small share that still served as strongholds for the 
 340 
LDPR in 2007 was halved from 2003. Of the number of raions of each type in each 
regional environment, the LDPR harvested a higher share of strongholds from majority-
Russian than majority-minority raions and the pattern largely held across thresholds. As 
was the case in the 1990s, the LDPR‘s strongholds in Muslim regions were drawn 
exclusively from majority-Russian raions across thresholds. In 2003, the LDPR had 
shown unexpected signs of growth in majority-minority raions in Muslim regions. In fact, 
of the ethnic minority and Russian raions in Muslim regions, only majority-minority 
raions were LDPR strongholds in the early 2000s, but any indications of expansion were 
completely erased in 2007. With United Russia at its prime, the share of ethnic minority 
raions in these areas that were bastions of support for the nationalists was eradicated. 
Similarly, the percentage of minority raions in the Caucasus that were strongholds fell to 
zero in 2007, but the LDPR managed to preserve the share of Russian raions that were 
strongholds in these areas from the prior contest. Other evidence that the LDPR was 
withering under the dominant party, especially in predominantly minority raions, was 
seen in poorer regions and those dependent on natural resources: the share of the former 
that were strongholds plunged to nearly none and the percentage of the latter was halved 
from 2003. There were also signs of expansion during the 2000s, especially in Russian 
regions in ethnic republics, where the percentage that were strongholds increased by 
roughly five percent to more than one-fifth, and resource-rich regions, where the share 
increased by approximately 10% to more than one-third.  
 
Figure 7.6: LDPR Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2007 
(lower threshold on the left) 
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Table 7.5 indicates that the LDPR performed horrendously in majority-minority raions, 
harvesting average support that was only approximately 40% of the party‘s national take, 
a modest improvement from its performance in these areas in 2003. Along with majority-
minority raions, the nationalists fared poorly in ethnic republics and Muslim regions. The 
party‘s average was just over half of its raion-level national mean in ethnic republics and 
Muslim regions earned the distinction of handing the party its lowest average vote share 
of all the raion and regional environments examined, at slightly greater than one percent. 
Despite the LDPR‘s abysmal performance in ethnic republics and Muslim regions, the 
party‘s average in these areas was still better than was the case four years prior.  
 
Table 7.5: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the LDPR’s Electoral Performance in the 2007 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
8.01 7.01 3.35 2.96 4.47 1.40 5.25 7.85 7.33 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.13 
Max 
 
24.41 22.60 17.26 16.89 16.89 10.95 15.79 18.23 18.23 
SD 
 
3.72 3.79 3.65 3.19 4.40 1.91 4.36 3.41 4.83 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
The value for raions situated in ethnic republics was less than one-twentieth the value of 
the odds for raions located in Russian federal regions. The magnitude of the negative 
effect was therefore significantly greater than revealed in the 2003 results, when the value 
for raions in ethnic republics was roughly one-quarter the value of the odds for raions 
situated elsewhere. Table 7.6 indicates that few nationalist strongholds were found in 
ethnic republics, 13% by the relaxed measure and merely 4% by the strict threshold. 
Compared to 2003, the percentage pertaining to the lower threshold was actually higher, 
albeit by one percent; on the other hand, the share of higher-level strongholds dropped. 
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Surprisingly, given the findings pertaining to the raion-level ethnic composition 
correlates in the models, the descriptive statistics discussed above and the effect of ethnic 
republic status, the shift from raions nested within non-Muslim regions to location in a 
Muslim region failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance, a striking 
finding since this shift plunged the odds of LDPR strongholds by a full 97% in 2003. 
Paralleling the descriptive statistics, the LDPR performed the worst in Muslim regions, 
capturing no stronghold level support whatsoever, a notable decline from the six lower-
level strongholds that were in these regions in 2003.  
 
Table 7.6: LDPR Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2007 
 
 
 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(376 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds 
(Higher Threshold) 
(50 Total) 
% of LDPR 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
49 13.03 
2 4.0 
Russian federal 
regions 
327 86.97 
48 96.0 
Muslim regions 0 0 0 0 
Caucasus regions 18 4.79 1 2.0 
Poorer Regions 183 48.67 32 64.0 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
92 24.47 
6 12.0 
Fraudulent raions 10 2.66 5 10.0 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
366 97.34 45 90.0 
 
 Compared to the Communists and nationalists, the ethnic correlates of the 
Yabloko vote were distinct in that the liberals benefitted from increases in the ethnic non-
Russian and other minority population at the raion level. The percent minority covariate 
increased the odds of a bastion of support by one to three percent and by approximately 
two percent in some of the relaxed and strict models, respectively. Similarly, the other 
minority refinement amplified the odds by two to three percent across the majority of the 
relaxed models and boosted the odds by roughly three percent in a strict specification. 
The magnitude of the positive effect of non-Russians and other minorities was greater 
than four years prior, when unit increases in these covariates increased the odds by one 
percent. Denser populations of titular minorities dwindled the odds by three percent in 
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2003 but did not exercise a systematic effect on the occurrence of Yabloko strongholds in 
2007, a clear improvement for the non-parliamentary party. When Yabloko‘s vote share 
is leveraged as a continuous variable, rather than dichotomous, a relatively stable 
association between growing populations of ethnic non-Russians and other minorities 
emerges, as Figure 7.7 shows. Although the titular minority covariate did not generate 
statistically significant results, the scatterplot details an inverse relationship, with 
Yabloko‘s vote share essentially zero in purely titular minority raions. Compared to the 
elections in the 1990s, there are markedly fewer raions populated by enthusiastic 
supporters of the non-parliamentary liberal party, especially in majority-minority raions. 
Yabloko‘s highest supporting raion delivered a vote share that was nearly eleven times 
the liberals‘ raion-level national average. As was the case in previous elections, 
Yabloko‘s strongest pockets of support were found in majority-Russian raions with 
sizable other minority populations in the two federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
Of Yabloko‘s top 50 raions in terms of the party‘s vote share, two percent were in the 
Republic of Karelia bordering Finland and on the White Sea, ten percent in St. 
Petersburg, and 88% in Moscow. The two outliers with titular minority populations of 
approximately 60% and 80% were located in the Republics of Karelia and Ingushetia, 
respectively.  The two evident outliers from raions with purely other minority populations 
were both located in Chelyabinsk Oblast, which borders Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 7.7: Non-Russian Minorities and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
 
In contrast to the statistical results, Figure 7.8 reveals that Yabloko‘s pattern of support 
followed ethnic Russian lines. Unlike the Communists and nationalists, of the majority-
minority and majority-Russian raions, the share that registered high levels of support for 
the non-parliamentary party were both comparable to the 1990s. However, compared to 
the early 2000s, the percentage of minority raions that were strongholds was halved and 
that of their Russian counterparts fell by four percent. The extent of Yabloko‘s 
deterioration is visible in each dyad: the percentage of minority raions in ethnic republics 
that were strongholds fell to close to zero and the share of Russian raions dropped from 
close to 15% in 2003 to four percent in 2007; the share of raions in both environments in 
Muslim regions that delivered high levels of support were wiped out entirely, with the 
percentage of Russian raions plunging from 15% to zero and the few majority-minority 
raions forfeited; the share of minority raions in the Caucasus dropped to zero and the 
share of Russian raions was halved as well; Russian raions in poorer regions fell 
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precipitously from 25% to five percent and their minority counterparts dipped close to 
zero; finally, the percentage of Russian raions in resource regions dwindled from 15% to 
roughly six percent and the share of minority raions was lost altogether. The party was 
simply unable to remain afloat with drastic changes to the party system and the level of 
competitiveness in legislative elections. Across thresholds, in each regional context, 
Yabloko captured a higher percentage of strongholds in majority-Russian raions than 
majority-minority. In the Caucasus and resource-dependent regions, Yabloko‘s only 
bastions of support were drawn from majority-Russian areas but the party failed to retain 
the small percentage of strongholds in the Caucasus when the stronghold measure was 
raised.  
 
Figure 7.8: Yabloko Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2007 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics from Table 7.7 suggest that Yabloko performed poorly in majority-
minority raions, as well as ethnic federal regions and those with a preponderance of 
Muslim inhabitants. In each ethnic environment, Yabloko was incapable of mustering 
average support of even one half of a percent, a drop of approximately one percent in 
each case from 2003. Like the Communists and nationalists, the liberals performed the 
worst in raions in Muslim regions, harvesting average support only scarcely exceeding 
zero. As was true four years prior, the party mobilized the most support in ethnic 
republics compared to majority-minority raions and Muslim regions, but even in those 
raions, Yabloko‘s mean showing was less than half of its countrywide average.  
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Table 7.7: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Yabloko’s Electoral Performance in the 2007 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
1.07 .430 .330 .257 .489 .238 .534 1.45 .680 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 
 
11.52 4.99 4.58 2.55 6.66 2.39 2.78 11.52 4.95 
SD 
 
1.43 .346 .446 .313 .693 .393 .582 1.82 .734 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
The multilevel model results regarding ethnic republic status substantiate the descriptive 
statistics: the value for raions nested within ethnic federal regions was merely one-
twentieth the value of the odds for raions located elsewhere across the majority of the 
relaxed models. Yabloko was thus the only member of the core party troika in which 
ethnic republic status reached standard levels of statistical significance. During United 
Russia‘s initial rise, ethnic region status plunged the odds by roughly 90%; as such, the 
lack of a systematic effect on Yabloko strongholds in the late 2000s represented an 
improvement. Indeed, per Table 7.8, merely three percent of Yabloko‘s strongholds were 
located in ethnic regions according to both stronghold measures and the party enjoyed no 
strongholds of any type in Muslim regions. The share of strongholds in ethnic republics 
and Muslim regions fell from eight percent and nearly three percent, respectively, by the 
lower threshold in 2003.  
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Table 7.8: Yabloko Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2007 
 
 
 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(282 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(150 Total) 
% of Yabloko 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
9 3.19 
5 3.33 
Russian federal 
regions 
273 96.81 
145 96.67 
Muslim regions 0 0 0 0 
Caucasus regions 2 0.71 0 0 
Poorer Regions 47 16.67 10 6.67 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
16 5.67 
4 2.67 
Fraudulent raions 1 0.35 0 0 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
281 99.65 150 100 
 
Although United Russia dominated Muslim regions, the odds of opposition parties 
capturing stronghold level support in these areas were not severely damaged.  
The Urban-rural Divide and Opposition Parties 
While the core party troika experienced divergent fates in the countryside in the 
1990s, the Communists, nationalists, and liberals alike were thrashed in rural areas when 
United Russia was at its finest. Interestingly, the countryside represented the sole area of 
convergence of opposition parties‘ electoral trajectories under United Russia. The 
KPRF‘s electoral fortunes in the countryside shifted drastically from the 1990s to the 
2000s: higher proportions of rural residents augmented the odds of a KPRF stronghold by 
one to two percent in 1995 and by two to four percent in 1999, but in 2003 there was a 
marked softening of support and odds increased by only a negligible amount to one 
percent and diminished the odds by two to three percent across all of the lower threshold 
models in 2007. The magnitude of the negative effect became greater in some of the strict 
specifications, shrinking the odds by three to four percent. The election in 2007, then, 
was the first in which the effect of rurality on KPRF strongholds moved into negative 
territory. The Communists‘ average in majority-rural raions was less than one percent 
under its raion-level national mean, a shift from the one percent boost that the party 
received residually in 2003. Figure 7.9 exposes these findings visually: there was a clear 
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inverse relationship between the KPRF‘s vote share and the level of a raion‘s ruralness 
for the first time in post-communist Russian elections. The scatterplot below resembles 
the mirror opposite of those in the 1990s and 2003: in sharp contrast to the scatterplots 
detailing this relationship during the two elections examined under Yeltsin and the first 
under United Russia, the most zealous supporters of the Communists were more 
frequently found in city centers than the countryside in 2007. The high supporting raions 
that were majority-urban were in Tambov, Moscow and Voronezh Oblasts and the 
Republic of Urdmurtia, while their countryside counterparts hailed from Belgorod Oblast, 
Kaluga Oblast, due west of Moscow Oblast in the heart of European Russia, Nizhny 
Novgorod Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and the Republic of Altai, which 
shares a border with China, Mongolia and Kazakhstan.  
 
Figure 7.9: Rural Inhabitants and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
Especially when compared to the 1990s, the picture of KPRF support portrayed by Figure 
7.10 is remarkably urban across both thresholds. The party that once drew its most 
enthusiastic support from the countryside acquired the contours of an urban party in the 
late 2000s. Of all the majority urban raions across Russia, the percentage that was KPRF 
strongholds more than doubled from 2003 to 2007. However, of the raions in the 
countryside, the KPRF‘s share of strongholds fell by more than half in the same period. 
Save for one instance, i.e. in the Caucasus according to the strict measure, a higher 
percentage of urban than rural areas were KPRF strongholds in each regional context, a 
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first for the Communists. The loci of expansion for the KPRF in 2003 were confined 
exclusively to urban raions in poorer regions: more than 20% delivered unusually high 
vote shares to the Communists, double the percentage from 2003. In all other respects, 
the percentage of urban and rural raions in each regional setting that was KPRF 
strongholds fell markedly when the dominant party was in its prime. United Russia‘s 
infiltration of the Caucasus was far from out-and-out even in 2007, as nearly 15% of rural 
raions churned out stronghold level support for the dominant party‘s most formidable 
challenger and the percentage of urban raions in these regions that were bastions of 
support for the KPRF increased by a few points over 2003. Although close to 15% of 
rural raions in the Caucasus were KPRF strongholds, that share was considerably less 
than the nearly 30% from four years prior. The smallest disparity between urban and rural 
environments occurred in resource-dependent regions; the KPRF‘s performance in the 
remaining regional contexts was considerably skewed in favor of urban locales. With the 
shift in thresholds, all strongholds in Muslim regions evaporated and rural strongholds in 
resource-dependent regions vanished.  
 
Figure 7.10: KPRF Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 2007 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The findings that rural voters continued to turn away from the Communist party en masse 
in 2007 critically extend Wegren and Konitzer‘s findings regarding the 1999 and 2003 
legislative elections (2006). These scholars argue, ―since the late 1990s and early in 
Putin‘s first term […] an important shift in rural politics occurred, marked by the fact that 
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the KPRF suffered an erosion of its rural electoral support‖ (2006: 1038). Specifically, 
they trace the erosion in rural support for the KPRF to the 1999 election (Wegren and 
Konitzer 2006). It is important to note, however, that the statistical findings presented 
earlier regarding the KPRF‘s performance in rural areas in 1999 differ markedly from 
Wegren and Konitzer‘s: rather than finding evidence of rural dealignment from the 
Communists, I found that the occurrence of KPRF strongholds was positively influenced 
by increasing ruralness at the raion level. Nevertheless, the fact that the KPRF performed 
poorly in the countryside in 2007 indicates that the dealignment identified by Wegren and 
Konitzer endured in subsequent elections. United Russia‘s political dominance and 
extensive resources at the party‘s disposal due to the booming economy frustrated the 
Communists‘ attempts to woo back rural constituencies lost in previous contests.  
Broadly paralleling the KPRF‘s electoral trajectory in the countryside, the LDPR 
also experienced changing fortunes in more rural areas from the 1990s to the late 2000s. 
In the late 1990s, the ultra-nationalists received a boost of approximately one to two 
percent in the countryside but throughout the 2000s, the party suffered in these areas to a 
similar extent. The magnitude of the negative effect in some of the 2007 was larger than 
was the case in 2003, when odds diminished by one percent at most. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the negative effect of increasing ruralness on the occurrence of nationalist 
strongholds in some of the models was less than that experienced by the KRPF, with the 
LDPR‘s odds dipping by two percent across the relaxed threshold models. The 
nationalists‘ average showing in majority-rural raions was one percent less than its 
national take, a dive deeper than that experienced in 2003. Figure 7.11 illustrates the 
steep plunge in the LDPR‘s vote share with the shift from urban centers to the 
countryside. Indeed, the plunge was noticeably more severe than in 2003. Of the raions 
that handed the nationalists vote shares more than double their national mean, 
approximately 22% were found in city centers, more than one-quarter were located 
entirely in the countryside, and the majority were in mixed settings. The urban 
enthusiasts were raions in Murmansk, Chita, Kirov, and Yaroslavl Oblasts, Perm Krai, 
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the Republic of Karelia, and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and the rural 
devotees were located primarily in the same regions as their urban counterparts.  
 
Figure 7.11: Rural Inhabitants and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
Figure 7.12 looks strikingly different to the bar charts from the final election of the 
1990s, when the balance in percentages between LDPR strongholds in urban and rural 
raions favored rural raions in some regional settings. Of all urban raions, 20% delivered 
high vote totals to the nationalists, nearly double the percentage as in the 1990s. Even 
compared to 2003, the percentage of urban raions that were nationalist strongholds 
increased by roughly five percent. In contrast, of the rural raions, less than 10% were 
LDPR strongholds in 2007, down approximately 10% from the 1990s and halved from 
four years prior. Of the urban and rural raions in each environment, the nationalists 
captured a higher percentage of strongholds in the former than the latter and the general 
contours held across thresholds. Areas of deterioration from the previous contest were 
evident in rural raions in the Caucasus, in which the percentage that were strongholds 
was more than halved, rural raions in poorer regions, in which the percentage dropped by 
five percent, and both urban and rural raions in Muslim regions, in which the share of 
both plummeted to zero. On the other hand, zones of growth were apparent chiefly in 
urban raions. For example, of the urban raions in the Caucasus, the share that was LDPR 
strongholds was a few percentage points higher over 2003. Similarly, close to 45% of 
urban raions in resource-dependent regions and roughly 25% of those in poorer regions 
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channeled immense support to the nationalists, which were increases of about 20% in the 
case of the former and more than five percent in the case of the latter over 2003. 
Surprisingly, there was little fluctuation in ethnic republics for either rural or urban 
raions. Compared to the pattern evident in 2003, which still favored urban raions in all 
contexts, the disparity within each dyad grew more pronounced toward urban centers in 
2007. The shift in thresholds resulted in the falling away of rural support in ethnic 
republics and the Caucasus.  
 
Figure 7.12: LDPR Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 2007 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Thus, one of the most consequential shifts from the perspective the Communists and 
nationalists that occurred with the emergence and consolidation of a successful party of 
power was the sweeping dealignment of rural voters. Rural areas served as perhaps the 
single most important pockets of support for the Communists in the 1990s and one in 
which the LDPR began to prime and make fresh inroads in the late 1990s, but United 
Russia‘s infiltration sent a seismic shock wave throughout the countryside and swiftly 
brought these areas into the dominant party‘s fold. Without doubt, it is not coincidental 
that United Russia targeted rural areas as a means to achieve its electoral ends because 
they offered an environment ripe for electoral manipulation and patronage politics, away 
from the prying eyes of electoral observers and opposition party representatives.  
The dealignment of rural areas from the Communists and nationalists pushed 
these parties into the urban centers, crowding Yabloko‘s electoral enclaves with 
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formidable opponents. Once again, the odds of a liberal stronghold collapsed with 
increases in raion level ruralness, by nine to 17% across the lower threshold 
specifications and by six to 14% across the higher threshold models. The negative affect 
of the countryside on Yabloko‘s electoral support in 2007 is consistent with the findings 
from the mid- and late-1990s, but the magnitude of the effect was greater in the majority 
of the models than in 2003, when the odds dropped by six to seven percent. The 
magnitude of the negative effect of the countryside on the occurrence of Yabloko 
strongholds was by far the greatest of any opposition party in 2007. Yabloko‘s mean vote 
share in majority-rural areas was, once again, less than half of the party‘s raion-level 
national average. Compared to the scatterplots from the more competitive elections in the 
1990s, Figure 7.13 reveals significantly fewer zealously liberal raions, but the ones that 
are evident were found predominantly in urban centers. In the early 2000s, there were 
more entirely rural raions that channeled high vote shares to the party. Of the top 100 
raions voting for Yabloko in hordes, 98% were fully urban and nearly all in Moscow or 
St. Petersburg, one percent was mostly urban and also in Moscow, and the remaining one 
percent was a majority-rural raion in the Republic of Karelia. The other majority-rural 
outlier, at roughly 60% rural, was also found in Karelia.  
 
Figure 7.13: Rural Inhabitants and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
Figure 7.14 reveals a broadly similar pattern to that which prevailed in the 1990s but also 
illustrates Yabloko‘s rapid emasculation under a dominant party at the peak of its 
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performance. Of urban raions, the share that were Yabloko strongholds in 2007 dropped 
approximately five percent from the 1990s but dropped from roughly 10% from 2003; 
likewise, of rural raions, only an infinitesimal percentage were Yabloko strongholds, 
which represented only a slight decline compared to the Yeltsin years and the first 
election of United Russia‘s reign. Yabloko captured significantly higher percentages of 
strongholds in urban raions than their rural counterparts in all cases and, surprisingly, of 
the rural raions that were Yabloko strongholds, the bastions of support were located in 
ethnic republics and poorer regions, outside of Yabloko‘s traditional constituency. The 
share of urban and rural raions that were liberal bastions of support diminished in nearly 
every single dyad compared to the previous election: while the percentage of rural raions 
that were strongholds remained more or less unchanged, roughly 15% of urban raions in 
ethnic republics were strongholds in 2003 but this fell to less than five percent in 2007; 
the share of both types of raions in Muslim regions was wiped out, with urban raions 
plunging from about 15% to zero; urban raions in the Caucasus were halved while rural 
raions became extinct; the percentage of urban raions in economically disadvantaged 
regions fell from 40% in 2003 to less than 10% in 2007; finally, the share of rural raions 
in resource regions that were strongholds was lost entirely and urban raions dropped from 
25% to 10%. Of the urban raions in each regional setting, poorer regions and those with 
abundant natural resources were the most enthusiastic for Yabloko.  
 
Figure 7.14: Yabloko Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 
2007 (lower threshold on the left) 
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Surprisingly, Yabloko managed to preserve to some degree a key pocket of support in 
urban areas, despite the fact that it was without a doubt the feeblest in the core party 
troika and the reds and browns had begun to muscle in on its most treasured turf. 
Yabloko thus also felt the ripples produced by United Russia‘s consolidation of 
countryside support: with the Communists and nationalists forced retreat from rural areas, 
urban centers transformed into the new battleground for opposition parties and, 
consequently, they turned their energies toward cannibalizing each other, perilously 
fracturing the urban vote to the benefit of United Russia.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and Opposition Parties 
 In contrast to the two variables assessing ethnic republic status and predominantly 
Muslim populations, the remaining region level indicators exerted more widespread 
effects on the occurrence of opposition party strongholds in 2007. As was the case in 
2003, this variable did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in 2007 
vis-à-vis the KPRF. The KPRF‘s average in the Caucasus closely approximated its raion-
level national mean, but was slightly below, a change from the more than one percent 
boost the party received in the previous election. Nearly 12% of the KPRF‘s strongholds 
were found in the area according to the lower threshold and four percent by the strict 
measure, the latter declining conspicuously from nearly 20% in 2003. The LDPR and 
Yabloko, on the other hand, were harmed in the Caucasus. As in the late 1990s, when two 
potential parties of power competed, both with strong ties to the Caucasus, the odds of an 
LDPR stronghold plummeted sharply: in 2007, the value for raions in the Caucasus were 
approximately one-tenth the value of the odds for raions located elsewhere. This finding, 
however, diverged from those four years prior, when Caucasus location did not exercise a 
systematic effect on the occurrence of LDPR strongholds. The nationalists struggled to 
maintain support in the area, harvesting average support that was three percent less than 
its national take, a drop comparable to the early 2000s. Less than five percent and two 
percent of the party‘s strongholds were located in the Caucasus, by the lower and higher 
threshold, respectively, nearly identical to the previous election. As was the case in 2003, 
location in the Caucasus exercised a systematic and extremely negative effect on Yabloko 
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strongholds in 2007, plunging the odds by more than 90%. The magnitude of the negative 
effect was comparable to four years prior. Yabloko‘s average in the area was 50% lower 
than its national mean, a more sizable drop than in the early 2000s, and less than one 
percent and zero of the party‘s strongholds were found in the area according to the 
relaxed and strict measure, accordingly.  
 Correlates of the vote indicating federal subjects‘ gross regional product and 
dependence on natural resources produced diverse results and provide evidence of 
opposition parties‘ changing fortunes under competitive and uncompetitive elections. 
While increases in gross regional product harmed the Communists in the three prior 
elections, relative economic development did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance in 2007. Of all the raion and regional environments investigated, the KPRF‘s 
average was, in fact, the highest in regions that exceeded the median gross regional 
product, albeit still within one percent of its national mean. The KPRF captured a sizable 
share of strongholds in poorer regions, 42% and half by the lower and higher measure, 
the latter representing an improvement from the 46% in 2003. The LDPR distinguished 
itself as the only party handicapped due to increasing socioeconomic welfare at the 
regional level: the odds of a stronghold shrunk by 25% in a lower threshold model and its 
average in economically advantaged regions was less than its countrywide showing. The 
magnitude of the negative effect in some of the 2007 models was therefore less than in 
2003, when the odds plunged by up to 39%. Corresponding to the lower and higher 
threshold, nearly half and almost two-thirds of ultra-nationalist strongholds were drawn 
from regions with sub-average levels of economic development, a drop from the nearly 
60% harvested in these areas according to the relaxed threshold in 2003. Congruent with 
the findings from previous elections, Yabloko outstripped the Communists and 
nationalists in wealthier regions, with odds of a liberal stronghold jumping 12 to 36% 
across the lower threshold models and 39% in a strict specification. However, the 
magnitude of the effect was notably smaller than in the 1990s, when odds ballooned by 
two times in 1995 and by approximately 75% in 1999, and in some of the models from 
the early 2000s, when the odds were amplified by 56% at the greatest. Nevertheless, the 
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liberals again raked in their highest average support from wealthier regions, compared to 
the other raion and regional environments. Approximately 17% and roughly seven 
percent of Yabloko‘s bastions of support were located in comparatively underprivileged 
regions, a large decline from the nearly 80% and 95%, respectively, seen in 2003.  
Resource dependence shriveled the odds of a Communist stronghold by roughly 
84 to 86% across the relaxed specifications and by 95 to 97% in the strict models, 
mirroring the findings from 1999 and 2003, where the odds also plummeted sharply. 
Average support in these regions again fell to three percent less than the KPRF‘s national 
level and a paltry six percent and one percent of the party‘s bastions were located in 
resource-dependent regions, by the lower and higher threshold. The share of Communist 
strongholds in resource regions thus fell sharply compared to 2003, when roughly eight 
percent and 14% were found there. Thus, the KPRF performed better in areas with 
comparatively more diversified regional economies. Unlike the KPRF and surprisingly, 
given both the party‘s traditional support base and the effect produced by increases in 
gross regional product, raions located in resource-abundant regions hiked the odds of an 
LDPR stronghold by at least four times and over five times at the most in all the lower 
measure models. In 2003, resource-region status did not systematically affect the 
occurrence of LDPR strongholds; thus, the robust and positive effect in 2007 was a 
drastic improvement. In these areas, the party‘s average closely approximated its national 
mean as was the case four years prior, and nearly one-quarter and roughly 12% of 
nationalist strongholds were drawn from these raions. The share of strongholds culled 
from resource regions in 2007 was larger than in 2003, when 18% and 11% were found 
there. Considering the odds of a stronghold plummeted by roughly 80% in the mid-
1990s, the LDPR‘s electoral trajectory in resource-rich regions from the 1990s to the late 
2000s represents a sharp reversal in fortunes and indicates that the party established new 
footholds in precisely those areas where conditions were the least favorable for its 
success. Furthermore, the LDPR called for increased taxes on natural-resource concerns 
during the 2003 election, which might have soured resource-rich areas on the nationalists 
for years to come (The Economist 2003). In fact, the LDPR was the only party, including 
 358 
United Russia, to gain an advantage in resource-dependent regions. Even when the 
dominant party was virtually untouchable, an arguably second-rate opposition party 
managed to secure electoral windfalls from an area that was, at least theoretically, ripe for 
patronage politics due to the presence of abundant natural resources. The liberal Yabloko 
thrived in resource regions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with odds amplified by 
three to nearly 12 times contingent on the model and election, but the shift from raions 
located in regions with diversified economies to those situated in resource-dependent 
regions in the late 2000s did not systematically influence the occurrence of strongholds, 
signifying an observable softening in these longstanding pockets of support. Descriptive 
statistics indicate that Yabloko‘s average performance in these areas was subpar, albeit 
within one percent of its countrywide showing. The percentage of liberal strongholds that 
were nested in resource-dependent federal subjects in 2007 was roughly halved from 
2003, dropping from 11% to six percent with regards to the relaxed threshold and from 
six percent to three percent pertaining to the strict measure.  
Electoral Manipulation and Opposition Parties 
The core party troika was generally annihilated in raions with voter turnout 
reaching levels specified for suspected electoral manipulation, but variation emerged 
between parties with regards to the magnitude of the effects. For the Communists, the 
value of the odds for raions in manipulated raions was one-tenth to one-twentieth the 
value for their non-manipulated counterparts across all lower threshold models, a 
deterioration from the 56 to 63% drop in 2003. Indeed, the KPRF‘s average in fraudulent 
raions was less than 50% of its national mean; of the various raion and regional settings 
examined, the Communists, in addition to the nationalists and liberals, performed worse 
in only Muslim regions. KPRF strongholds in abnormally high turnout raions were 
extremely rare: a paltry one percent and zero of the party‘s strongholds by the lower and 
higher threshold were located in these areas, down from roughly nine percent and nearly 
18% in the previous contest. Although it is expected that opposition parties would suffer 
in elections heavily tilted towards the dominant party by means of manipulation and hard 
and soft coercion, the KPRF performed strongly in manipulated raions even in the late 
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1990s when two well-equipped potential parties of power jockeyed for control of the 
Kremlin. But in 2007, the KPRF was finally vanquished by United Russia in high turnout 
raions. Figure 7.15 illustrates the acutely negative association between the level of voter 
turnout and the Communists‘ vote share. The upper right quadrant, at the nexus between 
high turnout and high vote share, was an electoral desert for the KRPF. The one rather 
conspicuous outlier that reported voter turnout just below the threshold established for 
suspected electoral manipulation, which is 81.49%, and registered an unusually high vote 
share for the Communists was located in Belgorod Oblast. On the other hand, there is a 
dense grouping of raions populating lower right quadrant, where high political 
participation coincides with total electoral defeat.  
 
Figure 7.15: Voter Turnout and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
Figure 7.16 provides additional evidence of the Communists‘ rout in fraudulent raions: as 
mentioned, a mere one percent of the KPRF‘s strongholds were housed in these raions 
according to the lower threshold and none by the strict measure. Of the more than 450 
manipulated raions in 2007, the KPRF enjoyed stronghold level support in less than one 
percent according to the relaxed measure and were entirely absent from high turnout 
zones when the threshold was raised. Especially when compared to Figure 16 regarding 
the Communists‘ performance in manipulated raions in the two competitive elections in 
the 1990s and even in the first less competitive contest in 2003, the depth of the 
Communists‘ descent in these areas is striking. Indeed, the share of fraudulent raions that 
 360 
were KPRF strongholds in the early 2000s was still more than 10% by the lower 
threshold and just less than 5% by the strict measure. Although it took two elections to 
drive the KPRF out of high turnout raions, United Russia reaped the rewards in the form 
of electoral windfalls in 2007.  
 
Figure 7.16: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are KPRF Strongholds vs. Percent KPRF 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2007 
 
 
Alongside the Communists, the nationalists also faced an uphill battle to win 
support in manipulated raions in 2007, at least according to the lower stronghold 
threshold. The odds of an LDPR stronghold plummeted by 52 to 60% in some models, a 
drop comparable to 2003. The magnitude of the negative effect for the LDPR was thus 
smaller than that for the KPRF in the relaxed models, indicating that the occurrence of 
nationalist strongholds was less damaged in manipulated raions than the Communists, 
United Russia‘s most formidable opposition. Unexpectedly, the odds of an LDPR 
stronghold skyrocketed to between three and six times in the strict specifications. The 
nationalists had also performed well in manipulated areas in the late 1990s, receiving a 
boost of two to three times, but its good fortune when United Russia was at the height of 
its power is puzzling. It is counterintuitive that the nationalists experienced more rather 
than less success in fraudulent areas according to the strict threshold, especially when 
considered in conjunction with evidence revealing the efficiency of fraud under United 
Russia, discussed with reference to Figure 7.26.  
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At least to some degree, the threat of opposition party success triggered the 
Kremlin‘s use of electoral manipulation in the first place and the fact that the nationalists, 
of all parties, were able to capture electoral windfalls in these areas when the dominant 
party was at its apex is striking. Yet, it is plausible that United Russia, which carried out 
the lion‘s share of the electoral manipulation that occurred in 2007, transferred some 
votes in these areas to the LDPR, since it was the most Kremlin-friendly party that was 
also expected to cross the threshold for legislative representation, and United Russia 
would benefit from creating the façade of multiparty competition in raions where its own 
overwhelming victory was virtually guaranteed. As mentioned regarding the 1999 
election, a similar logic likely also explained why the LDPR secured electoral windfalls 
in these raions in 1999. One interesting point is that, if United Russia did, in fact, transfer 
votes to the LDPR, the party threw quite a few votes to the nationalists because the odds 
of a stronghold only ballooned when the strict threshold was leveraged, i.e. indicating 
that the party‘s vote share was more than two standard deviations above its raion-level 
national average. In other words, United Russia did not simply toss one or two votes, here 
or there, the nationalists‘ way but rather transferred to the party levels of support that 
were significantly higher than the LDPR‘s countrywide showing. Perhaps United Russia 
believed that it was imperative for another party to also perform unusually well in these 
areas to avoid speculation that United Russia engaged in electoral malfeasance, although 
that rationale runs counter to the logic that the party was seeking to demonstrate its 
political dominance rather blatantly.  
Nevertheless, the LDPR‘s average in raions deemed fraudulent was less than five 
percent below its raion-level national mean, as was true in 2003, and nationalist 
strongholds were rare, with roughly three percent and ten percent by the lower and higher 
measure drawn from these areas. Figure 7.17 looks strikingly similar to the corresponding 
scatterplot from 2003 and again showcases the unambiguously inverse relationship 
between the LDPR‘s vote share and political participation. Compared to the scatterplot 
for the KPRF, more high turnout raions made their way into the upper right quadrant, 
supplying the nationalists with electoral windfalls, but the two scatterplots both exhibit 
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conspicuous and dense clusters of raions in the lower right quadrant. The outliers, subject 
to suspicion of electoral manipulation and reporting high vote shares for the nationalists, 
were located in the Republic of Karelia, Chita and Kirov Oblasts, and Krasnodar Krai. 
The remaining outliers reported turnout that was closer to the raion-level national turnout 
average of roughly 68%.  
 
Figure 7.17: Voter Turnout and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
Figure 7.18 demonstrates how the stronghold thresholds capture different pictures of the 
LDPR‘s performance in manipulated raions: as mentioned, nearly three percent of the 
nationalists‘ strongholds were housed in these raions according to the lower threshold, 
but the share of strongholds jumped markedly, up to 10%, when the threshold was raised. 
Surprisingly, the share of nationalist strongholds harvested from high turnout raions was 
significantly higher than in 2003, when roughly two percent and four percent were 
bastions of support. Of the raions coded positively for electoral fraud, the nationalists 
carved out strongholds in only a small fraction. The share of manipulated raions that were 
bastions of support remained essentially unchanged from 2003.  
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Figure 7.18: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are LDPR Strongholds vs. Percent LDPR 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2007 
 
 
The liberals suffered as a result of electoral manipulation to a degree comparable 
to the Communists: the value for fraudulent raions was one-tenth to one-twentieth the 
value of the odds for raions with lower turnout levels across the vast majority of lower 
threshold models. In 2003, a raion‘s status as fraudulent did not exercise a systematic 
effect on the occurrence of Yabloko strongholds; thus, the precipitous drop in the odds in 
the late 2000s indicated a severe disintegration of support. Yabloko‘s showing in 
manipulated raions was nothing short of deplorable: its average was nearly one percent 
less than its national mean, and Yabloko‘s national mean was merely 1.07% that year. 
Even during United Russia‘s initial rise in 2003, the non-parliamentary party had scraped 
together an average in manipulated areas that was over one percent. Figure 7.19 reveals 
the negative relationship between Yabloko‘s vote share and voter turnout. As expected, 
since Yabloko is the only non-parliamentary opposition party investigated, few raions 
were particularly enthusiastic. The small cluster of raions approaching full turnout and 
registering sizable vote shares for Yabloko were located in the ethnic republics of 
Ingushetia and Karelia, and Krasnodar Krai. The scatterplot indicates that the vast 
majority of raions that were liberal zealots reported turnout that was sub-average, in 
several cases roughly 20% less than the national mean.  
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Figure 7.19: Voter Turnout and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
Figure 7.20 highlights how poorly the non-parliamentary liberal party fared in the 
presence of electoral manipulation. Of the 282 lower level Yabloko strongholds, less than 
one-half of one percent was housed in raions with suspiciously high political 
participation. When the threshold for stronghold was raised, the share of bastions of 
support in these raions was wiped out entirely. The percentage of strongholds found in 
high turnout raions in 2007 therefore declined from the already infinitesimal share in 
2003. Over 450 raions were suspected of artificially augmenting voter turnout and 
Yabloko‘s presence was scant, indeed, less than one-half of one percent of these raions 
was strongholds by the lower measure and none were by the higher threshold. Yabloko 
also suffered when methods of manipulation were practiced in the 1990s, but, 
surprisingly, the party‘s performance in these raions in the 2000s under United Russia did 
not differ substantially from when elections were more competitive. The party was 
simply unfit to compete when political contestation contracted sharply, regardless of 
when or where that occurred.  
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Figure 7.20: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Yabloko Strongholds vs. Percent 
Yabloko Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2007 
 
 
With a dominant party monopolizing raions suspected for electoral malfeasance, the core 
party troika was forced to turn their attention to lower turnout raions, in which United 
Russia also maintained an impressive presence, and fight to gain footholds in a crowded 
electoral arena. Echoing the political scene in urban centers, United Russia confined 
opposition parties to raions with lower turnout, precisely where electoral manipulation 
and patronage-based voter mobilization was more difficult to carry out on its behalf.  
Ethnicity and the Dominant Party 
United Russia performed exceptionally well in areas with dense ethnic minority 
populations in the 2007 contest. Unit increases in the percent non-Russian covariate 
increased the odds of a dominant party stronghold by one to four percent in the lower 
threshold models and by three to six percent in the strict specifications, roughly 
comparable to four years prior. Similarly, higher densities of titular minorities augmented 
the odds by two to four percent across both measures. Larger populations of other 
minorities, however, did not exercise an influence on the occurrence of dominant party 
bastions, diverging from the findings in 2003, when unit increases in other minorities 
exercised a positive effect, raising the odds by two to four percent across thresholds. 
Figure 7.21 corroborates the robust and direct association between geographically 
concentrated ethnic minorities at the raion level, especially titular minorities, and United 
Russia‘s performance. In all three scatterplots, there are clusters of raions with large 
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populations of ethnic minorities in the upper right corner where United Russia pocketed 
nearly 100% of the vote, but these clusters are more diffuse in the case of other minorities 
than the other two measures of raion-level ethnic composition. The raions populating that 
cluster in the non-Russian and titular minority scatterplots were found in ethnic republics 
across the country‘s expanse, such as Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino Balkaria, and 
Ingushetia in the Caucasus area, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the Volga District, 
Mordovia in the East European Plain of Russia and Tuva on the Mongolian border. 
Interestingly, some of the fanatical ethnic Russian raions were located in Rostov on the 
Ukrainian border, which housed many of Yabloko‘s most enthusiastic strongholds in both 
the 1995 and 1999 election. However, the tide of electoral support in Rostov seemed to 
be turning away from the liberal Yabloko and toward the party of power, as the regional 
executive of Rostov supported Fatherland-All Russia in 1999 and raions then voted 
abundantly for United Russia in the 2000s. Many of the other ethnic Russian raions that 
were ardent supporters of the dominant party were situated within the ethnic republics of 
Mordovia, Bashkortostan and Karachay Cherkessia. The most zealous supporter, 
reporting a 100% vote share and full turnout to boot, was located in the republic of 
Karachay Cherkessia in the north Caucasus and bordering Georgia.  
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Figure 7.21: Non-Russian Minorities and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
 
Like the statistical results, Figure 7.22 reveals the unambiguous pattern of ethnic minority 
support that held across thresholds: in each regional context, a considerably higher 
percentage of majority-minority raions were strongholds for United Russia than majority-
Russian raions. Of all majority-minority raions, nearly 60% churned out abnormally high 
support for the dominant party, an increase of 15% over 2003; majority-Russian raions 
were less enthusiastic with less than 10% registering stronghold level support, a share 
comparable to the previous election. Especially in the case of the lower threshold, of 
majority-minority raions located within Muslim regions and those situated within the 
Caucasus, United Russia harvested a tremendous share: of the majority-minority areas in 
each regional environment, the dominant party enjoyed strongholds in upwards of 90%, 
an improvement from the more than 60% and greater than 70%, in Muslim regions and 
those in the Caucasus, respectively, in 2003.  In ethnic republics, poorer regions, and 
those dependent on natural resource endowments, more than 60% of majority-minority 
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raions churned out tremendous support for United Russia, a jump of roughly 10%, 
double, and approximately 15%, respectively, from the previous election. A noticeably 
higher percentage of majority-Russian raions, roughly 60%, located within Muslim 
regions than in the Caucasus channeled high levels of support to the dominant party than 
in the remaining environments. Indeed, in Russian raions in Muslim regions, the 
percentage that was United Russia strongholds doubled from the early 2000s. There was 
comparatively less fluctuation in the share of Russian raions in the other regional settings.  
 
Figure 7.22: United Russia Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 
2007 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Table 7.9 provides additional substantiation of ethnic minority support for the dominant 
party: United Russia‘s average vote share in raions with minority populations that 
exceeded half of the total populace was, astonishingly, nearly 16% higher than its raion-
level national showing, a boost comparable to 2003.  
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Table 7.9: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of United Russia’s Electoral Performance in the 
2007 Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
66.92 71.49 82.07 85.76 79.66 89.71 74.54 66.05 73.52 
Min 
 
30.66 48.90 51.15 36.84 35.58 60.50 36.84 30.66 36.58 
Max 
 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.07 99.15 
SD 
 
12.12 11.53 12.82 10.68 13.85 8.73 15.86 11.68 14.11 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Gross Regional Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
In addition to predominantly non-Russian raions, the party cornered the electoral market 
in ethnic republics: the value for raions situated in ethnic republics were between 20 to 
nearly 84 times the value of the odds for raions located elsewhere in the relaxed threshold 
models and 32 times by the strict measure. Interestingly, the magnitude of the positive 
effect was less than four years prior in some of the models, when ethnic region status 
skyrocketed the odds by 24 and 162 times. Descriptive statistics from Table 9 indicate 
that the party‘s average vote share in ethnic republics was almost 13% higher than its 
national take, as was the case in 2003, and Table 7.10 shows that almost 75% and more 
than 90% of United Russia‘s strongholds were located in these regions, according to the 
lower and higher threshold, respectively. The share of dominant party strongholds found 
in ethnic republics increased in 2007 from 68% and 86% in the early 2000s.  
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Similarly, raions in predominantly Muslim regions were between nearly 20 to 188 times 
more likely to be bastions of support for United Russia in the lower threshold models and 
the magnitude of the effect increased in the higher threshold specifications, from between 
179 to 306 times. Mirroring the findings from the ethnic region variable, the magnitude 
of the positive effect was less in some models than 2003, when odds skyrocketed by 22 to 
786 times. United Russia‘s mean showing in Muslim regions was nearly 23% higher than 
its countrywide take, similar to its performance in 2003, and more than half and over 
70% of the party‘s bastions of support were found in Muslim regions, according to the 
lower and higher threshold, accordingly. In 2003, 40% and roughly 60% of United 
Russia‘s strongholds were housed in these regions. The dominant party established an 
unyielding grip over not only ethnic republics and Muslim regions, but also majority-
minority raions situated in other regional environments. In the 1990s, areas with 
geographically-concentrated ethnic minorities, whether at the raion- or regional-level, 
were carved up by different parties, such as Our Home is Russia and the KPRF in 1995 
and the KPRF, Fatherland-All Russia and Unity in 1999, but the 2000s witnessed the 
swift consolidation of the party market in these areas, which culminated in United Russia 
becoming the only game in town.  
The Urban-Rural Divide and the Dominant Party 
Table 7.10: United Russia Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2007 
 
 
 
# of  United Russia 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(392 Total) 
% of   United 
Russia  Strongholds 
# of   United Russia  
Strongholds 
(Higher Threshold) 
(174 Total) 
% of   United 
Russia Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
293 74.74 
160 91.95 
Russian federal 
regions 
99 25.25 
14 8.05 
Muslim regions 215 54.85 125 71.84 
Caucasus 
regions 
108 27.55 
63 36.21 
Poorer Regions 200 51.02 96 55.17 
Natural 
Resource 
Regions 
146 37.24 
79 45.40 
Fraudulent 
raions 
176 44.90 
170 97.70 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
216 55.10 
4 2.30 
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United Russia continued its reign in the countryside. Higher proportions of rural 
inhabitants increased the odds of a stronghold by a slight degree to one percent in the 
relaxed models and by one to two percent in the strict specifications. Compared to 2003, 
the magnitude of the positive effect was lesser, as the rural covariate amplified the odds 
by one to three percent across thresholds. Figure 7.23 demonstrates the positive and 
robust relationship between rural locales and high electoral returns for the party. 
Interestingly, there are dense clusters of outliers in both urban centers and the 
countryside, with comparatively fewer fanatical raions in the blended areas in between. 
As anticipated, the enthusiastic raions situated in urban centers, populating the upper left 
quadrant of the scatterplot, were found in ethnic republics, such as Chechnya, Ingushetia, 
Karachay Cherkessia, Kabardino Balkaria, Mordovia, Tatarstan and Tuva. However, the 
majority of diehards were in the countryside, nested within the same regions as the urban 
outliers and Dagestan. Thus, United Russia‘s pattern of support, even along the salient 
urban-rural divide in Russian politics, essentially mirrored the ethnic social cleavage, 
rather than revealing more unique dynamics.  
 
Figure 7.23: Rural Inhabitants and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
United Russia‘s average in predominantly rural zones was almost five percent higher than 
its raion-level national vote share, a sub-standard showing when compared to majority-
minority raions and those in ethnic republics and Muslim regions, suggesting that there is 
some daylight between ethnic and rural areas in the dominant party vote. The dominant 
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party‘s performance in the countryside, according to these descriptive statistics, was 
better in 2007 than 2003, when the boost United Russia received was just greater than 
three percent. Figure 7.24 reveals that, of the number of majority-urban and majority-
rural in each regional setting, a higher percentage were United Russia strongholds in the 
latter than the former, with a clear spike in Muslim regions. Approximately 20% of all 
rural raions were United Russia strongholds, while less than 10% of urban raions reported 
such high vote totals. Of the urban and rural raions in each regional environment, a 
higher percentage in nearly all cases were bastions of support for the dominant party than 
was the case in 2003: of the urban and rural raions in ethnic republics, the percentage that 
delivered high vote totals increased by roughly 10% in both cases; urban raions in 
Muslim regions increased from over 40% to about 70% and rural raions moved from 
upwards of 60% to nearly 100%; while the share of urban raions in the Caucasus changed 
little, the percentage of rural raions that were strongholds increased from nearly 40% to 
close to 50%; in poorer regions, the share of urban raions doubled from approximately 
five percent to 10%, although there was only slight change in rural raions; finally, in 
resource regions, the percentage of urban raions that registered immense vote shares 
increased from about five percent to nearly 20% and rural raions increased by roughly 
10%. A higher percentage of urban raions in Muslim regions than rural raions in any 
other regional context reported a tremendous showing for United Russia.  
 
Figure 7.24: United Russia Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts 
in 2007 (lower threshold on the left) 
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Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and the Dominant Party 
Regional contextual correlates of United Russia‘s electoral support generated 
diverse results. A shift from the reference group to the indicator group of the Caucasus 
region variable hiked the odds by 270 times in a relaxed measure model and by between 
147 and 624 times in the strict specifications. The dominant party had also received an 
immense boost in the Caucasus in 2003. United Russia‘s average showing in the 
Caucasus was nearly eight percent higher than its national mean, an improvement over 
the six percent surge in the areas in 2003. Roughly 27% and 36% of the party‘s 
strongholds were located in the Caucasus according to the lower and higher measure, a 
higher percentage across thresholds from four years prior.  
In sharp contrast to the robust and positive effect of Caucasus location on United 
Russia‘s electoral windfalls, raions located in regions with higher levels of relative 
wealth, as assessed by gross regional product, plummeted the odds of a stronghold by at 
least 69% and at most 86% across the lower measure models and by 79% in a higher 
threshold specification. The magnitude of negative effect was thus comparable to 2003.  
The dominant party excelled in economically disadvantaged regions rather than 
those better off. Although this finding was anticipated based the results from 2003, raions 
located in regions that might have benefitted more than some others from the booming 
economy might be expected to reward United Russia at election time for its leadership in 
the Duma and through the presidency, especially with regards to the economy. One 
potential explanation for why the dominant party did, in fact, suffer in wealthier regions 
is that voters living under more favorable economic conditions could afford to consider 
alternatives to United Russia because they were less in need of the patronage resources 
that the dominant party dispensed in exchange for electoral support. Thus, it may be the 
case that United Russia was simply unable to leverage patronage resources as a means of 
collecting support in areas that were already thriving economically, but these resources 
became indispensible for harvesting votes in underprivileged regions. Approximately half 
of the party‘s strongholds by both thresholds were located in regions with substandard 
gross regional products, roughly 10% more than was the case in the early 2000s. United 
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Russia‘s average in economically developed regions was once again less than its raion-
level national mean, albeit within one percent.  
Interestingly, given the sizable and negative effect of relative wealth, a region‘s 
status as economically dependent on natural resources did not produce a systematic effect 
on the occurrence of United Russia strongholds in any of the models specified. In the 
previous election, resource region status plunged the odds by 90% in the lower threshold 
models; therefore, the lack of a systematic and negative effect signified progress for the 
dominant party. Diverging somewhat from the statistical results, descriptive statistics 
suggest that United Russia performed well under conditions of resource abundance: more 
than one-third and roughly one-half of the party‘s strongholds were situated in resource-
rich regions according to both measures, compared to the 27% and 31% found in 2003. 
While United Russia‘s average take in resource regions was roughly five percent below 
its raion-level national average four years prior, its mean in these areas was more than six 
percent greater than nationally in 2007, a drastic shift over the course of just one election.  
Electoral Manipulation and the Dominant Party 
 As anticipated, United Russia benefitted tremendously from extraordinarily high 
levels of voter turnout across all models specified for 2007. The value for raions coded 
positively for suspected electoral manipulation were 49 to 64 times the value of the odds 
for their non-manipulated counterparts in the lower threshold models, and 35 to 69 times 
the value in the higher specifications. In the majority of the 2007 models, the magnitude 
of the positive effect was significantly greater than in 2003, when the odds lifted by 10 to 
64 times. Fraudulent raions registered average support for the dominant party that was 
more than 15% greater than nationally, slightly less than the 18% boost the party 
captured four years prior. Figure 7.25 corroborates these findings, showcasing the steep 
rise in United Russia‟s vote share as voter turnout increased. Furthermore, in the upper 
right quadrant, a dense cluster of raions is evident, which reported voter turnout 
approximating 100% and similar vote shares for the dominant party.  Unsurprisingly, the 
outlier raions were the usual suspects, i.e. raions in various ethnic republics that were 
already identified in the scatterplots detailing the relationships between concentrations of 
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ethnic minorities and rural populations and the United Russia vote. Amazingly, 53 raions 
reported vote shares for the dominant party between 95 and 97% with turnout figures 
reaching similar levels. An additional 22 raions registered 98% support for United Russia 
and turnout rates between 92 and 99%. Incredibly, a total of 34 raions registered 99% 
vote shares for United Russia, 50% of which were found in Chechnya, 23% in Mordovia, 
11% in Kabardino Balkaria, 5% in each Dagestan and Ingushetia, and 2% in each 
Tatarstan and Karachay Cherkessia. With only one exception, all of those raions also 
reported voter turnout of 99%. From the perspective of United Russia, the exemplary 
raion was found in the republic of Karachay Cherkessia: this raion reported 100% turnout 
and a 100% vote share for United Russia. 
 
Figure 7.25: Voter Turnout and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2007 
 
 
According to the lower and higher stronghold measure, approximately 45% and, 
startlingly, nearly 98% of United Russia‟s strongholds were located in fraudulent areas, 
as revealed in Figure 7.23.  Compared to the 86% of dominant party strongholds found in 
high turnout raions according to the strict threshold in 2003, the share in 2007 was 
conspicuously higher. Figure 7.26 highlights the efficiency of fraud under United Russia, 
since nearly 100% of manipulated raions channeled immense support to the dominant 
party according to the relaxed threshold. From the 1990s through the 2000s, manipulated 
raions underwent a dramatic transformation that initially began with these raions splitting 
support between two and four parties in 1995 and 1999, respectively, and culminated 
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with universal support for one party once United Russia emerged. Yet, as mentioned, 
only roughly 45% of United Russia strongholds were found in fraudulent raions by the 
lower measure, indicating that the party captured significant support in non-manipulated 
raions as well. According to the strict measure, the percentages show the exact opposite: 
far fewer fraudulent raions were dominant party strongholds, due to the fact that 
fraudulent raions greatly outnumbered United Russia bastions when using the strict 
measure of stronghold, but nearly 100% of those higher threshold strongholds were found 
in manipulated raions. There was a dramatic increase in the percentage of United Russia 
strongholds that were housed in high turnout zones with the shift from the relaxed to the 
strict threshold. Compared to the first election United Russia contested, the share of 
fraudulent raions that were strongholds increased dramatically, from just less than 60% in 
2003 to nearly 100% in 2007 by the lower threshold. The number of fraudulent raions 
that were strongholds for opposition parties, but not United Russia, fell sharply, from 39 
raions in 2003 to just 11 raions out of 461 raions in 2007. Similarly, a smaller number of 
manipulated raions were not strongholds for any party in 2007 compared to 2003: 13 
raions in Sakha, 12 in Bashkortostan, seven in each Orlov and Chuvashia, six in Omsk, 
five in each Tatarstan, Samara, Kirov, and Mari El, four in each Kemerovo, Belgorod, 
and Voronezh, three in each Krasnodar and Volgograd, and one or two in a variety of 
other regions. Just in Bashkortostan alone, the number of raions that were not strongholds 
for any party fell from 37 in 2003 to 12 in 2007. Likewise, 17 high turnout raions failed 
to register stronghold level support for any party in Sakha in 2003 but this dropped to 13 
in 2007.  
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Figure 7.26: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are United Russia Strongholds vs. Percent 
United Russia Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2007 
 
 
Figure 7.27 uncovers the extent of United Russia‟s dominance vis-à-vis each opposition 
party in 2007: in every single one of Russia‟s more than 2,700 raions, United Russia beat 
the core party troika, and quite effortlessly in all but a few isolated cases. United Russia‟s 
distinct advantages in abnormally high turnout raions were not limited solely to that 
category of turnout, but spread into lower turnout raions that were significantly more 
competitive, if competitiveness is assessed by the difference in vote share between the 
party that won, i.e. United Russia, and the second place finisher. The level of dominance 
that United Russia enjoyed in 2007 was, as expected, much greater than in 2003, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the zones of convergence between United Russia and each 
member of the core party troika were nonexistent. United Russia‟s dominance was not 
limited solely to high turnout raions but was universal. There was much more daylight 
between the dominant party and opposition parties in the late 2000s, when United Russia 
was consolidated, than when it made its first foray into the electoral arena in 2003.   
 
 
 
 
 
 378 
Figure 7.27: Voter Turnout and United Russia vs. Opposition Parties‘ Vote Shares in 
2007 
 
 
 
Figure 7.27 demonstrates incontrovertibly the “Putin effect” on Russian legislative 
elections because, as president, Putin played an instrumental role in bringing the dozens 
of regions into line and leveraging the vast resources at the Kremlin‟s disposal to produce 
precisely the kind of overwhelming victory Putin wanted, not necessarily to secure 
victory in 2007, as the party likely would have won without such machinations, but to 
exaggerate United Russia‟s dominance and send a powerful signal to would-be political 
challengers. Dominating the election across thousands of raions provided evidence 
beyond dispute to supporters and challengers alike about the Kremlin‟s capacity to secure 
the electoral outcomes it wanted with surgical precision, reward supporters, and punish 
defectors. In short, the message was that United Russia was the only game in town.  
Conclusion 
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 United Russia reached its apex in 2007, achieving a vote share and dominance in 
the Russian political system to an extent not seen since the time of the Soviet Union. 
With a constitutional majority in the legislature and a self-avowed party supporter in the 
Kremlin, United Russia enjoyed free rein in the political arena and opposition parties 
were put on notice. United Russia was at the height of its power and opposition parties 
witnessed many of their unique pockets of electoral support wither under the weight of 
the dominant party. The booming economy meant that United Russia could more easily 
mobilize supporters and attract defectors from various opposition parties using the vast 
patronage resources available to those most closely associated with the Kremlin. In short 
order, United Russia established a firm chokehold on areas that previously served as 
long-standing constituencies for other parties, for example, areas with geographically 
concentrated ethnic minorities and the countryside in the case of the Communists. The 
dominant party squeezed opposition parties from every angle, confining the core party 
troika to the zones where patronage politics and blatant electoral manipulation were the 
most difficult to carry out, such as predominantly ethnic Russian areas and urban centers. 
To achieve overwhelming support in the election, the regime had leveraged not 
only economic resources but also the security situation in the years leading up to the 
election to refashion the political system in a manner conducive to United Russia‟s rapid 
advancement. The security situation had been overshadowed by the events at Beslan and 
other terrorist attacks, such as a suicide bombing on the subway in Moscow and two 
passenger planes flying to Volgograd and Sochi, which gave the Putin regime the leeway 
necessary to engage in sweeping reforms that touched several aspects of the political 
arena, notably party registration requirements and the electoral system for populating the 
State Duma. The swift centralization of power under Putin and United Russia paved the 
way for the party‟s astounding showing in the 2007 contest and foreshadowed its 
electoral trajectory in future elections. Unbeknownst to the regime at the time, United 
Russia‟s light would only grow dimmer in the future, not brighter.  
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Chapter 8: The 2011 Parliamentary Election: Signs of Opposition Party Inroads 
and Dominant Party Durability and Decay 
The 2011 legislative election was notably different from the one four years prior: 
first, it was the first legislative election that occurred in the 2000s in which Vladimir 
Putin was not the country‘s top executive; second, the scale of public protest in 
opposition to United Russia that emerged before the election was unprecedented in post-
communist Russian history; third, the dominant party‘s vote share dropped considerably 
for the first time. With public support for the dominant party softening markedly leading 
up to the election, opposition parties sought to capitalize on widespread popular 
discontent and members of the core party troika ultimately experienced some success in 
various pockets of support. Yet, at the national level, opposition parties remained 
hopelessly fragmented and proved patently incapable of coordinating with the aim of 
fashioning a genuine challenge against United Russia. The 2011 election represented a 
hard test for opposition parties in Russia and they failed to deliver a viable alternative to 
party dominance, thereby acquiescing in its perpetuation. The election results sent an 
unambiguous signal that United Russia was in decay and led many to question whether 
2011 was the beginning of the end for the party that reached its apex just one election 
before, capturing nearly two-thirds of the vote. Observers and citizens alike wondered if 
the results from the legislative election portended Putin‘s defeat in the presidential 
elections the following March. Over the course of the 2000s, United Russia‘s electoral 
trajectory reflected a full arc: the 2003 election witnessed the birth of the dominant party; 
United Russia ascended to the height of its power in 2007, and experienced substantial 
decline in the most recent election to the State Duma.  
The 2011 Legislative Election in Context  
The political setting of the first Duma elections of the 2010s was characterized 
chiefly by United Russia‘s continued dominance in the legislature and executive. The 
party‘s devastating victory in the contest four years prior provided an opportune moment 
for the government to reveal its chosen successor to Putin in the presidential elections in 
March 2008. Putin declared in September 2006 that he had no intention of pursuing a 
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constitutional amendment to remain president for longer than two consecutive terms: ―I 
don‘t believe that the country‘s stability can be insured by one man alone … If everyone 
is equal before the law, I cannot make an exception for myself [by ignoring constitutional 
term limits]‖ (Goldman 2008: 201). Nevertheless rampant speculation continued, but 
came to a close with Putin‘s announcement revealing the heir apparent. As in 1999, the 
Kremlin deftly resolved the question of presidential succession by forwarding Dmitri 
Medvedev as their presidential nominee, who was first deputy prime minister and one of 
Putin‘s longtime associates from St. Petersburg. Medvedev in short order proclaimed that 
he would nominate Putin as Prime Minister, were Medvedev successful in March (White 
2009).  
Like Putin four years earlier, Medvedev faced a limited slate of challengers in the 
presidential contest: the KPRF‘s Zyuganov, the LDPR‘s Zhirinovsky, and Andrei 
Bogdanov, an unknown independent candidate with a progressive platform. For the first 
time, the Kremlin‘s presidential candidate ran under the formal nomination of a political 
party, United Russia in Medvedev‘s case (Hale and Colton 2010). Ultimately, Medvedev 
snapped up the presidency in the first round with over 70% of the vote, just one percent 
shy of Putin‘s final share in the 2004 election, beating Zyuganov by over 50%. Medvedev 
duly appointed Putin as his prime minister, preserving the ruling tandem for at least 
another four years. Putin likely wanted to remain in the Kremlin in some capacity in 
order to manage Kremlin elites that were divided between the siloviki and the St. 
Petersburg faction, but realized that he could neither seek the presidency for a third term 
nor exit the political scene entirely, as, with his personal popularity ratings between 70 
and 80%, the latter would lead to widespread instability at the highest levels of Russian 
government (Goldman 2008: 201). As Prime Minister, Putin could manage the divided 
Kremlin elites and fill the role of Russia‘s own national leader, thereby reassuring the 
public that continuity of government would be at least partially preserved, all while 
avoiding a constitutional amendment (Ibid).  
The 2011 legislative election occurred in an environment characterized by 
heightened political awareness about the regime‘s evolving authoritarianism and reliance 
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on methods of manipulation to best opponents in the electoral arena. United Russia‘s 
showing in 2007, artificially augmented by widespread electoral malfeasance, signaled to 
opposition parties that the dominant party was the only game in town and those parties 
still struggling to remain outside the ruling party‘s orbit would be relegated to competing 
with each other for the support of the few defectors from United Russia in future 
elections. Especially after United Russia‘s astounding showing in 2007, the opposition 
operated in a political context that curbed their activity at seemingly every turn. 
Therefore, opposition parties widened the political opportunity structure within which 
they could act and encourage counter-mobilization against the regime.  
Opposition parties endeavored to cull supporters from the ruling party‘s ranks and 
mobilize their own ardent supporters by publicizing the regime‘s plans for electoral 
manipulation: video footage containing preparations for election day fraud was posted to 
the Internet, offering non-registered and extra-parliamentary parties, along with political 
activists, a propitious time to urge voters to spoil their ballots by marking an ‗x‘ through 
each party and across the entire ballot or voting for ‗anyone but‘ United Russia (OSCE 
2012). This burgeoning social movement soon acquired the appellation ―Nakh-Nakh: 
Vote Against All‖. The name was a word play on the names of the Russian three little 
pigs (and evoked an obscenity meaning, in polite speech, ―go away!‖); the concept of 
movement suggested that the little pig Nakh-Nakh could defeat the wolf simply by 
ignoring him (Arutuinova 2011; Gutterman 2011). As a cartoon character in a series of 
videos uploaded onto the Internet, Nakh-Nakh wore eyeglasses, a beret, and an orange 
scarf, evoking Ukraine‘s Orange Revolution of 2004-2005.  
As an electoral strategy, however, the Nakh-Nakh movement was clearly 
counterproductive: if opposition party supporters spoiled their ballots, opposition parties 
would be denied much needed votes to the benefit of United Russia. Large-scale ballot 
spoiling would simply further marginalize the opposition in the country‘s already 
uncompetitive political arena (Arutuinova 2011). The other recommendation, i.e. voting 
for ‗anyone but‘ United Russia, was equally poor because the opposition remained 
hopelessly divided as to which party the votes should be channeled toward, perilously 
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fragmenting the opposition vote across many parties rather than coalescing around a 
single alternative. The opposition was united around a shared desire to rid Russia of Putin 
and his St. Petersburg cronies, but lacked an alternative vision or coherent plan for a 
government without Putin and a more limited presence by United Russia would look like. 
The frenzy of opposition party activity prior to the 2011 election galvanized supporters 
and previously apolitical citizens alike and engendered the perception that the regime was 
teetering on the edge of electoral decline, if not outright defeat. Opposition parties thus 
helped create the conditions under which they might be more likely to succeed against an 
electoral juggernaut like United Russia.  
The economic backdrop of the 2011 election was less favorable than four years 
prior, as Russia was hit hard by the 2009 economic recession. Indeed, the economy 
plunged 7.8% in 2009, more than any other G-8 country or BRIC state (Chechel 2011). 
The price of Urals crude, Russia‘s chief oil blend, plummeted to as low as $32.34 in 
2008, a 77% drop from a high of $142.50 registered in July of that year (Ibid). President 
Medvedev called Russia‘s continued dependence on raw materials, such as oil and 
natural gas, ―humiliating‖ and ―primitive,‖ and left the economy defenseless in the face 
of falling demand (Ibid). Capital flight continued to burden the economy, reaching close 
to twice the forecast outflows. In addition, the country‘s export market was severely 
affected by the debt crisis in Europe, which drove down European demand for 
manufactured goods (Chechel 2011a). Overall, the Russian economy took twice as long 
to bounce back compared to the 1998 financial crisis that occurred after the government‘s 
default, largely due to the fact that the economy depended heavily on somewhat 
precarious energy prices (Ibid). The 2011 election would thus serve as a crucial test of 
United Russia‘s ability to maintain political control in the face of extensive economic 
downturn.   
Nevertheless, the economy registered considerable average annual growth of 
greater than four percent in 2011. Russia‘s GDP growth of 4.2% that year lagged behind 
only China, with 9.5%, and India, with 7.8%, and exceeded Russia‘s Economic 
Development Ministry‘s forecasts of 4.1% (Lapikova 2012; Nikolsky 2011). Russia 
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allocated fiscal surpluses accumulated in previous years to repay external debt and fortify 
its stabilization fund; during the recession, monies from the stabilization fund were used 
to infuse the economy with a fiscal stimulus to buffer against further downturn. 
Additionally, during the recession period, the government significantly increased 
expenditures on social assistance, including job creation, pensions and welfare payments, 
which prevented the decline in per capita income from diving below one percent 
(Zubarevich 2012). Unemployment continued its downward trajectory and fell to the 
lowest level in more than three years. The country‘s gross debt remained comparatively 
low a year before the Duma election, higher than only Estonia and Chile (OECD 2011). 
Therefore, the economy was slowly improving, but had yet to return to pre-recession 
levels.  
The legal framework governing the 2011 elections included notable amendments 
to the 2007 electoral law. For example, the law combated the development of 
independent power centers in the regions, made possible through the inclusion of regional 
candidates on various party lists, by increasing the number of positions for national 
candidates on party lists from three to ten at the expense of regional candidates. Although 
part lists could contain national candidates as well as those representing regional areas, 
nation-wide candidates would receive the mandate before regional candidates if the party 
overcame the seven percent threshold for representation. Regional groups, which are 
defined by the Central Election Commission, must then contend for the leftover mandates 
within the parties once the national positions have been allocated, especially within 
United Russia since it commands the largest regional system, to ensure that they receive a 
place in the party list (Kynev 2012). Competition among regional groups introduced a 
new method of manipulation into the Duma elections, as parties, notably United Russia, 
faced strong incentives to allocate remaining positions on the party list to candidates from 
small regions that could credibly promise high vote shares for a particular party in 
exchange for places on the list (Ibid). Less populated regions, such as Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, and Dagestan, received numerous positions on United Russia‘s party list 
while the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and other densely populated 
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regions saw their spots on the list contract (Ibid). Indeed, Dagestan and Nizhgorod both 
received nine and ten spots but the latter has almost twice as many voters as the former 
(Ibid). Essentially, rules pertaining to mandate distribution encourages electoral fraud 
because United Russia‘s success hinges critically on ―the support of the most 
authoritarian and corrupt regions in the country—simply because they are more efficient 
in manipulating the vote. It also severely inhibits the creation and consolidation of new 
parties which could, over time, evolve into a genuine alternative to the existing power 
structures (Kynev 2012: 12).  
Additionally, political parties that did not cross the seven percent threshold for 
representation, but captured more than five percent of the vote were granted 
‗compensatory‘ mandates and the privilege of appointing members to the election 
commission (OSCE 2011). Accordingly, parties that captured between five and six 
percent were allowed one seat in the Duma, and those harvesting between six and seven 
percent were allocated two seats. Compensatory mandates and the right to appoint 
members to the election commission was a positive change to electoral law for smaller 
parties. Furthermore, per a constitutional amendment passed in 2008, the Duma‘s term 
length was increased from four to five years (the same amendment increased the 
presidential term from four to six years). Notably, questionable provisions concerning 
absentee ballots and early voting, previously a key instrument of engaging in electoral 
manipulation via open voting, were clarified and toughened.  
Party finance regulations were amended to consolidate the state‘s control over 
political parties and benefit the strongest parties, primarily United Russia: beginning in 
2009, state support for parties garnering more than three percent of votes in the 
parliamentary elections was increased from 5 to 20 rubles per annum for each vote 
received and, furthermore, each party received a one-time payment from the state of 20 
rubles per vote if the party‘s candidate won more than three percent of the vote in the 
subsequent presidential election (Kynev 2012). With United Russia‘s strong showing in 
the 2007 elections, more than two thirds of state support for parties accrued to the 
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dominant party, creating an additional channel through which state resources could flow 
to the ruling party (Ibid).  
As noted in previous observation reports, however, the electoral framework 
guiding the contest to the State Duma was structurally labyrinthine, redundant, and 
subject to selective interpretation to the benefit of certain parties and at the expense of 
others (OSCE 2012). For example, complaints regarding United Russia‘s campaign 
activities were dismissed, but those concerning opposition parties were entertained and 
upheld (Ibid). Collectively, mazelike and restrictive electoral regulations that were 
sequentially introduced during the 2000s resulted in only one successful registration of a 
new political party since 2004, pro-Kremlin start-up The Right Cause (Kynev 2012). 
To be registered successfully as a political party in 2011, the Ministry of Justice 
required each party to have 45,000 members, distributed as follows: a party must have at 
least 450 members in more than half of the 83 regions, and at least 200 members in the 
remaining half. Collectively, the seven parties officially registered in the election had a 
membership of only slightly more than 3 million, roughly 2.8% of the electorate 
(Hutcheson 2013: 913). United Russia‘s membership base dwarfed that of the other 
parties with twice as many members as the remaining parties combined (Ibid). The 
number of signatures required of extra-parliamentary parties to complete the process of 
registration with the CEC was reduced from 200,000 to 150,000. The maximum number 
of signatures acquired in any given region was reduced from 5%, or 10,000 signatures, in 
2007 to 3.3%, or 5,000 signatures in 2011 (Hutcheson 2013: 912). Moreover, the 
minimum number of regions from which signatures must be collected was increased 
considerably, from 20 regions in 2007 to 42, or half of the 83 subjects, in 2011 (Ibid). 
Thus, although parties were obliged to collect fewer signatures in toto in 2011, the 
required geographic distribution erected more formidable obstacles for parties with 
geographically concentrated electoral support. The second route to registration, i.e. a cash 
payment to the tune of 60 million rubles in the case of the 2007 election, was abolished. 
Four months prior to the election, the Ministry of Justice denied registration to the 
People‘s Freedom Party (PARNAS) that was headed up by a quartet of liberal opposition 
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politicians, Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladimir Milov, and Vladimir Ryzhkov 
(Kynev 2012). Of the registered parties, four out of seven were represented in the 
outgoing Duma, including two members of the core party troika (the KPRF and LDPR) 
and United Russia.  
The KPRF was again well-positioned to score second place behind United Russia 
in 2011 despite the fact that the party‘s membership had dwindled from roughly half a 
million members in the mid-1990s to just over 150,000 in the early 2010s. Overall, the 
party‘s program, entitled ―The majority is destined to win. Return the Motherland stolen 
from us!‖, remained virtually unchanged from previous electoral campaigns, highlighting 
nationalization of strategic sectors including mineral resources, diversification of the 
economy to lessen natural resource dependence, agricultural development, constitutional 
reform aimed at the devolution of power to workers‘ councils, reintroduction of regional 
elections, and a shift in foreign policy that called for the dissolution of NATO and a more 
active rule for the United Nations (Kynev 2012).  
However, the party broke from previous campaigns in openly criticizing the 
current leadership under United Russia in one of its 2011 slogans, ―It‘s time for a change 
in power!‖ (Burghardt 2011). The party‘s website, however, offered a different slogan, 
―To protect Russians and recreate the friendship of the peoples,‖ which touched on the 
foreign policy aim of a reconstituted Soviet Union, called a ―Union of Brotherhood,‖ or a 
less expansive but still multinational Russian state in the future (Ibid). Further jabs at the 
ruling party appeared in other campaign materials, for example, with KPRF-leader 
Zyuganov standing with a clenched fist in front of the USSR‘s red flag and one of the 
Kremlin towers with the slogan, ―I will force them to return what was stolen!‖ (Ibid). The 
party siphoned off a few United Russia apostates and the KPRF‘s list featured an ex-
Putin associate who was head of the State Anti-Drugs Service until 2008 and another 
former United Russia member who acted as the head of the Transport Committee in the 
Duma (Astapkovich 2011). Zyuganov again topped the party‘s list, followed by an 
admiral who was a standing Duma deputy and the head of the KPRF‘s youth wing in 
second and third. Others populating the party list were the KPRF‘s Secretary for Ideology 
 388 
and the Secretary for Nationality Policy (Kynev 2012). Along with capturing part of the 
disaffected United Russia vote, the KPRF openly courted the LDPR‘s nationalist 
electorate by calling for the country to ―united around a Russian national idea and social 
justice‖ (In response, an LDPR deputy commented that the ―Communists are trying to 
copy the agenda that we have pursued for 20 years‖) (Bratersky 2011).  
The KPRF also tried to attract voters concerned with fighting rampant corruption 
in Russia by launching a website, called the Stalin Anti-Corruption Committee Website, 
to publicize officials‘ wrongdoings in the months before the legislative election (Koshkin 
2011a). The website displayed images of Stalin, presumably because there was little 
corruption during Stalin‘s reign, and urged citizens to investigate and report to KPRF 
leadership any shady financial dealings involving local and federal officials with the goal 
of discouraging officials from accepting bribes (Ibid). However, emblazoning the website 
with images of Stalin may have prevented the KPRF from expanding their electorate, 
particularly because the election year coincided with the 20
th
 anniversary of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Ibid). Although the KPRF‘s electorate was wooed from both sides 
by United Russia and Just Russia, the party‘s vote share increased considerably from four 
years prior, as it culled protests voters from a variety of sources, such as the middle class 
and former supporters of United Russia (Kuchma 2011). Despite its stronger showing, 
KPRF leader Zyuganov called the election the dirtiest since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991.  
The LDPR list again featured controversial figures, such as Andrei Lugovoi who 
was already a Duma deputy and the son of a well-known former Russian Colonel, Yuri 
Budanov. Budanov‘s father was best known for murdering a young woman in Chechnya, 
which earned him the staunch support of Russian nationalists (Astapkovich 2011). The 
party again relied on nationalist slogans and concepts in campaign materials, such as ―For 
Russians!‖, ―Vote for LDPR or suffer further!‖, and ―The LDPR is for Russians!‖ 
(Burghardt 2011; Bennetts 2011). Such slogans fall under the category of hate crimes in 
Russia, as nationalists parties claim that terrorism and other troubles befalling Russians 
originate with non-Russians (Burghardt 2011). One central feature of the party‘s 
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campaign was the ―Russian question,‖ which favored more expansive rights for ethnic 
Russians as the country‘s ―founding nationality‖ and prompted President Medvedev to 
urge election contenders to resist ―rude nationalistic rhetoric‖ (OSCE 2012: 10). The 
LDPR‘s campaign focuses on regional hot spots that ignite Russian nationalism, such as 
regions in the North Caucasus and the Far East. Less than a week before the election, an 
LDPR Duma deputy commented that the LDPR was the ―only party to have defended—
for the last 22 years—the interests of ethnic Russians…We call on everyone to stop 
humiliating the Russian people‖ (Bennetts 2011). In a televised debate, LDPR leader 
Zhirinovsky set his sights on the ruling party, calling it a party of crooks and thieves, a 
phrase popularized by opposition activist Alexei Navalny, to which the United Russia 
representative commented, ―it is better to be in a party of crooks and thieves than in a 
party of murderers, rapists and robbers‖ (Quoted in Nichol 2011: 4). The LDPR was the 
only party of the core party troika to maintain regional branches in all 83 subjects (the 
KPRF had 81 and Yabloko 75), and also eclipsed the KPRF in terms of its membership 
base of approximately 185,000 (Kynev 2012). Despite having the broadest regional 
network and largest membership base compared to the KPRF and Yabloko, the LDPR 
floated abolishing the ban on party cells in Russian colleges and universities in a fresh 
attempt to augment the party‘s popularity with young voters and increase its profile 
nationally (Koshkin 2011). The LDPR harvested roughly three percent more than four 
years earlier.  
 As the only non-parliamentary member of the core party troika competing in 
2011, Yabloko needed a significantly stronger showing than in 2007 if there was any 
hope of the party remaining viable in the long term. The party advanced an electoral 
program, entitled ―Russia Demands Changes!‖, opposed the political trajectory of Russia 
under the current leadership, which was leading the country via ―arbitrary rule to 
stagnation and degradation‖ (Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko 2011). 
Yabloko‘s platform insisted that Russia was at a stark critical juncture, in which the 
country could either choose the ―path of development in the 21st century‖ or the country 
could ―continue moving towards stagnation and will no longer exist within its current 
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borders by the middle of the 21
st
 century.‖ (Ibid). The party proposed eradicating the 
merger of the business sector and government by ending all ―gravy trains‖ that had been 
created and nurtured through the close relationship between state owned and quasi-state 
owned companies and government officials (Ibid). Aside from highlighting these macro 
themes, Yabloko slightly reoriented its campaign following its 2007 defeat and 
concentrated on smaller policy issues, such as local residential issues, in an attempt to 
appeal to voters‘ pragmatism (Kynev 2012). Unsurprisingly, given its non-parliamentary 
status, Yabloko advocated policies that would reduce the electoral burden on political 
parties seeking representation in the Duma, such as lowering the minimum threshold for 
legislative representation from seven percent to three. Additionally, Yabloko hoped to 
shepherd through reforms to other electoral rules that would increase political pluralism if 
the party gained representation in 2011, e.g. simplifying registration procedures 
pertaining to political parties by lowering the number of members required to 5,000 and 
allowing the creation of blocs and coalitions. Indeed, Yabloko‘s membership base was 
perilously gaunt at just over 50,000. Unlike the KPRF and LDPR, Yabloko advocated for 
a foreign policy that would develop new lines of cooperation between Russia and the 
European Union and NATO in terms of joint missile defense and other long-term issue 
items. The archetypal democratic opposition party also backed a key Kremlin foreign 
policy priority in its 2011 platform, abolishing the visa system between Russia and 
Europe, but criticized the country‘s continued dependence on raw materials at the 
expense of a more diversified economy.  
Despite the fact that Yabloko attracted some top-level United Russia members, 
such as the former mayor of Arkhangelsk and the former deputy head of the Federal 
Service for Environmental Protection, auditioned new party slogans, such as ―Tired of 
vegetables? Vote for Yabloko,‖ and had a new leader in Sergei Mitrokhin since 2008 
(although Grigory Yavlinsky sat atop the party‘s list), Yabloko was not deft enough to 
change the party‘s electoral tide in 2011. Additionally, the party‘s failure to form a viable 
opposition to the dominant party over the course of the 2000s became the cause of 
disillusionment among a large slice of the party‘s potential base of electoral support 
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(Astapkovich 2011). Yabloko was not eligible to receive free airtime on national media 
outlets in 2011 because the party received less than three percent of the vote in the 2007 
contest, but had not yet recompensed the government for the free airtime and space debts 
received during that campaign period.  
Although Yabloko failed in the third consecutive election to cross the hurdle for 
representation, the party‘s final showing was an improvement over 2007 and was enough, 
i.e. over three percent of the vote, to qualify it for state funding and free airtime in the 
next Duma contest. The party‘s showing was among the strongest at polling places in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France, with a 26.6%, 41% and 31.5% vote share, 
respectively (RIA Novosti 2011). After the official results were released, a high-ranking 
Yabloko official commented that the party had 1,500 observers and got about 3,000 
reports about falsification, which prevented the party from gaining legislative 
representation: ―our observers in Moscow showed us the results from the polling stations 
and we got about 20 or 25% in Moscow. The official [national] result for Yabloko was 
3.4%, but you must imagine that the falsification was very big. We think we got about 
7%‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National Organization 2011).  
Nevertheless, Yabloko undoubtedly benefitted from the fact that the Kremlin 
elected not to create a fake party designed to bring the substantial liberal and pro-Western 
segment of the electorate within the orbit of United Russia: with Yabloko confined to 
extra-parliamentary status, their natural electorate was orphaned and the Kremlin faced 
powerful incentives to supplant Yabloko with a liberal, and loyal, party of its own 
(Peregudov 2009). In the future, Yabloko may not be so lucky because the Kremlin may 
decide to channel the presently nonsystemic opposition forming among the liberal 
segments of Russian society through a more reliable avenue by creating such a party. A 
new Kremlin creation would ―reduce the already extremely poor chances of Yabloko 
occupying any appreciable place in the Russian party-political system, denying it even 
the hypothetical possibility of filling the as yet unfilled niche of a viable opposition‖ 
(Peregudov 2009: 63). Under that scenario, perhaps the best Yabloko could hope for 
would be forming a coalition with the democratic nonsystemic opposition and other small 
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liberal parties, although the Yabloko leadership has repeatedly turned down opportunities 
for coordination with other like-minded parties since the 1990s.  
 As the dominant party, United Russia competed in the election as the undisputed 
frontrunner and set its sights on preserving its overwhelming majority in the State Duma. 
In 2008, Prime Minister Putin became the first to occupy the post of United Russia‘s 
―party leader‖ and thereby became ―empowered both to decide the most important 
questions of personnel […] and to play the leading role in determining the party‘s 
political orientation and in making specific managerial and other decisions‖ (Peregudov 
2009: 56). Acting in his capacity as party leader, Putin urged the development of a broad 
popular front of like-minded political forces, consisting of United Russia, other political 
parties, unions, business associations, youth movements and women‘s and veterans‘ 
groups, to contest the elections. United Russia and those occupying the central executive 
apparatus publicly joined forces once more in September 2011: Prime Minister Putin 
announced at United Russia‘s annual convention that he would seek the presidency in the 
March election and reversed President Medvedev‘s statement four years prior, 
commenting that he would nominate Medvedev for the premiership if Putin was 
successful in March. For the public, this move laid bare the authoritarian nature of the 
political system and fomented widespread discontent with the regime and its party 
apparatus. In two November incidents, Prime Minister Putin was publicly rejected: he 
was booed at a boxing match and the KPRF and other parties refused to stand in respect 
when he entered the Duma to address the deputies. As president, Medvedev occupied the 
top spot on United Russia‘s federal party list; the remainder of the list featured almost 
200 non-party members, who would help the party appeal to a larger slice of the 
electorate. United Russia‘s party list also featured prominent cultural figures and 
celebrities, such as the director of the Hermitage Museum, a singer similar to Frank 
Sinatra in the U.S., a gymnast and a boxing champion.  
Medvedev argued that United Russia should receive a clear electoral endorsement 
in the legislative contest so the government could progress its agenda of stamping out 
corruption, developing civil society and modernizing the economy (Nichol 2011). A 
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month after the party‘s convention, United Russia released a ―Popular Front‖ program 
that advocated for larger pensions for those willingly deferring retirement, lowering taxes 
on businesses, increasing taxes on luxury items such as alcohol and tobacco (also 
increasing the minimum ages pertaining to these activities), and creating more humane 
criminal laws (Ibid). The ―Popular Front‖ was more than a political program but 
represented a full-scale ―relaunch‖ for United Russia in response to its falling ratings 
(Kara-Murza 2011: 54). Accordingly, United Russia would participate in the 2011 
elections as part of this movement, consisting of approximately 500 organizations that 
ranged from the Union of Women to the Union of Transport Workers (Ibid). At the time, 
critics of Putin and United Russia likened the ―Popular Front‖ to Stalin‘s construction of 
the ―Unbreakable Bloc of Communists and Non-Party People‖ that he formed before the 
Soviet elections in 1937 (Ibid). The drafters of the ―Popular Front‖ program furthered the 
analogy themselves by labeling it a ―five-year plan‖ (Ibid). The ―popular front‖ program 
did not act as United Russia‘s primary campaign material, however. Instead, the party 
opted to use a collection of speeches made by the prime minister and president. United 
Russia stressed anti-Americanism and a hard-line on negotiations with NATO concerning 
cooperative missile defense, which opposition leaders criticized as fear-mongering in 
attempt to gain popular support (Nichol 2011). Prime Minister Putin doubled-down on 
these efforts when he warned at United Russia‘s congress a week before the election that 
foreign countries were attempting to control the outcome of the election by financially 
backing several Russian groups, presumably Golos. Just two days before the election, 
President Medvedev made a final attempt to court voters by cautioning voters against 
electing an unmanageable Duma and called for them to support United Russia‘s list who 
would constitute a ―capable‖ legislature guided by ―national interests‖ (Quoted in Nichol 
2011: 4).  
The party successfully appropriated themes central to its primary opponent, the 
KPRF, such as supporting the revival of the Soviet Union in the form of a Eurasian 
Union that would help Russia achieve great power in its own neighborhood and global 
player status in the international arena (Babich 2011; Fischer 2012). United Russia also 
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courted traditionalist voters, who historically supported either the KPRF or the LDPR, by 
stirring fears of a new crisis in the future, without speculating as to what specific form 
such a crisis might take (Ibid). United Russia participated in televised debates for the first 
time in 2011.  
The final tally issued a blow to the dominant party compared to 2007: United 
Russia lost 77 of the 315 Duma seats it captured four years prior, but still garnered more 
than half of all seats with 238 in total and more than its showing in 2003, when it won 
224. The party‘s simple majority in the Duma was no longer sufficient to change the 
Constitution unilaterally, requiring United Russia to instead find coalition partners to 
impose its constitutional agenda on the legislature in the Sixth Duma.  However, its 
simple majority is sufficient to pass the majority of legislation, as a constitutional 
majority is necessary only to pass constitutional laws and amendments or to override a 
veto on the legislation by the upper house of the legislature, the Federation Council 
(Kuchma 2011). Just after the election, Prime Minister Putin addressed the suboptimal 
showing for the party, stating, ―United Russia has won a majority, a stable majority. 
True, there are losses, but they […] would be inevitable for any political force […] that 
has borne the burden of responsibility for the situation in the country for years‖ (Quoted 
in Nichol 2011: 6). Furthermore, the presidential chief of staff commented that, 
considering the country was ―far from being united,‖ United Russia‘s 50% showing was 
―an excellent result. Attempts to rock the boat and interpret the situation in a negative and 
provocative light are doomed to failure. Everything is under control. The system is 
working. Democratic institutions are working‖ (Ibid). Boris Gryzlov, one of the leaders 
of United Russia and the Speak of the State Duma at the time of the election, framed the 
outcome differently, instead blaming United Russia‘s comparatively poor showing on the 
opposition: the opposition ―threatened our voters, which is why voter turnout was so low‖ 
(Bidder 2011).  
The 2011 Legislative Election as an Uncompetitive Election 
 Like the two legislative elections in the 2000s, the 2011 contest fell far short of 
free and fair. Golos, a domestic election observation organization, reported that the 
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election was characterized by ―significant and massive violations in many key voting 
procedures‖ (Quoted in Nichol 2011: 5). Unlike four years prior, the OSCE/ODIHR 
accepted the invitation from the CEC to observe the election and deployed an election 
observation mission, albeit in numbers inadequate for a full assessment (approximately 
two-thirds fewer than deployed in 2003). The final report stated that the election was 
slanted to the advantage of United Russia and that there was not a level playing field for 
political competitors. Several political parties were also denied registration prior to the 
election, narrowing the choices available to voters. The Ministry of Justice‘s rationale 
ranged from overpaying registration fees and ―usage of extremist-like emblems‖ to 
inconsistencies in address information (OSCE 2012: 4). Although preparations for the 
legislative election were satisfactory, the election was again besmirched by convergence 
of the state and United Russia, a less than fully autonomous election commission, media 
bias, and inappropriate interference of state authorities at various levels of government 
(OSCE 2012).  
 The state and United Russia coincided to an undue degree during the electoral 
cycle. Manifestations of this included local governmental structures influencing voters 
and engaging in more nefarious forms of compulsion on behalf of the dominant party 
(OSCE 2012). In the majority of territorial, i.e. raion-level, election commissions (TECs) 
visited, observers noted that many TEC members were also local government 
administrators and were usually ―most actively involved in the administrative 
preparations‖ (OSCE 2012: 6). In Omsk, the regional executive transformed his regular 
TV show into a campaign show promoting United Russia and himself as a candidate on 
United Russia‘s party list; the KPRF filed a formal complaint with the Subject Election 
Commission (SEC) in Omsk but the complaint was dismissed (OSCE 2012). In Moscow, 
billboards stated that the local United Russia branch performed construction projects on 
the metro system, which other parties believed blurred the distinction between the state 
and dominant party, as the billboards were essentially party advertisements paid for by 
state funds (OSCE 2012).  
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Opposition parties faced multifarious obstacles in the 2011 campaign period. For 
example, the KRPF complained that contracts for billboard space were often not fulfilled 
or cancelled entirely after they had been signed in 13 different locales (OSCE 2012). In 
some areas, such as Saratov, Ufa and Pskov, the only visible billboards were United 
Russia‘s; in one instance, local authorities instructed a private company to permit only 
United Russia‘s posters (Ibid). As in previous elections, the police in several areas 
confiscated opposition parties‘ campaign materials. Furthermore, opposition parties 
reported that fictitious newspapers with incorrect or libelous information about various 
contenders were distributed and filed complaints with raion- and regional-level election 
commissions. In many instances, laws guaranteeing the right to peaceful assembly were 
effectively curbed, ostensibly due to public safety and order concerns, resulting in more 
attempted and actual rallies by political parties and activists under the banner of Article 
31 of the Russian Constitution. The police broke up and arrested participants at KPRF 
rallies in numerous cities.  
 Several concerns marred the process of voting on Election Day. More than six 
percent of voters registered their party preferences via ‗mobile voting‘ that allowed them 
to vote at home or other non-voting-station locations. In previous elections, the existence 
and scope of mobile voting concerned election observers, as it provided a vehicle with 
which to engage in electoral malfeasance in the absence of adequate safeguards (OSCE 
2012). Although the provisions governing mobile voting were tightened prior to the 2011 
election, mobile voting requests could be submitted on election day via third-parties, 
allowing for the possibility that requests were submitted lacking voter knowledge (Ibid). 
No security measures were adopted to thwart such practices. In the Chelyabinsk region, 
nurses filled out the ballots of hospital patients who were allowed to vote on location 
(RIA Novosti 2011a). Golos, the main domestic independent election observation 
organization, reported that it received over 2,000 complaints, including many from 
observers who were prohibited from monitoring the mobile voting services provided for 
disabled and elderly voters (Ibid). Group voting was observed in 14% of polling station 
visits and indications of vote buying were visible (OSCE 2012: 18). Yabloko reported 
 397 
that its party election observers witnessed approximately 40 carousels in Moscow, in 
which a United Russia representative standing outside a polling station would give a 
filled-in ballot to a voter, ask the voter to cast that ballot and bring out the blank ballot 
given to him or her by poll station workers, which would then be filled out by United 
Russia representatives and given to another voter (RIA Novosti 2011a). Videos uploaded 
to the Internet showed that pens furnished in voting booths in Moscow polling stations 
were easily erasable. Staff assigned specifically to assist voters with new voting 
technologies, based on ―non-disclosed proprietary software,‖ were able to see voters‘ 
preferences on the ballot or electronic touch screen, compromising the secrecy of the vote 
(OSCE 2012: 8). The new software was not subject to public independent assessment or 
formal certification (Ibid). In over half of the polling stations visited by observers, the 
secrecy of the vote was not fully preserved (Ibid).  
Echoing problems identified beginning in the early 2000s, election observers 
noted that procedures were followed overall during voting, but ―the quality of the process 
deteriorated considerably during the count, which was characterized by frequent 
procedural violations and instances of apparent manipulation, including several serious 
indications of ballot box stuffing‖ (OSCE 2012: 1). The count of the votes was evaluated 
as bad or very bad in one-third of the polling stations, primarily due to lack of 
transparency and counting procedures that did not conform to CEC guidelines (OSCE 
2012: 18). In nearly one-half of observed vote counts, marked ballots were not displayed 
to those observing the election (Ibid). Furthermore, in dozens of cases, the number of 
mobile ballot box ballots was greater than the number of applications but the ballots were 
not invalidated, per legal requirements (Ibid). Ballot stuffing was again suspected in the 
ethnic republics, with Chechnya reporting voter turnout of 99.51% and a 99.48% vote 
share for United Russia. Overall, OSCE observers found indications of ballot-stuffing in 
17% of polling stations visited (Nichol 2011: 5). A post-election investigation into ballot 
rigging in the Central Russian city of Vladimir found that about 6,000 so-called ―dead 
souls‖ voted in makeshift polling stations in which election monitors were prohibited 
(Tchalabov 2012). Subsequently, most of the documents at the local administration 
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building were burned in a fire deemed accidental (Ibid). Over one-third of polling stations 
did not publicly display their results protocols as required. Yabloko and the LDPR 
complained that their party election observers were prevented from adequately 
monitoring the election: observers were prevented from reviewing video footage of the 
election, were prohibited from observing the sealing of the ballot boxes, and were 
removed from polling stations without justification (RIA Novosti 2011a). The LDPR 
alleged that ballot boxes were sealed inappropriately and its observers were threatened 
with removal from the polling station if they filed complaints regarding the violations 
(Ibid).  
Figure 8.1 provides further evidence pointing to electoral malfeasance, most 
likely ballot-box stuffing or the illicit changing of results protocols, in the 2011 election. 
As was the case four years earlier, a suspicious peak was evident in the right-hand tail of 
the distribution of voter turnout, suggesting that participation figures were artificially 
augmented and that methods of manipulation were employed to achieve that end. The 
local peak in the zone of unusually high turnout in 2011 was less pronounced than in 
2007, however.  
 
Figure 8.1: Distribution of Voter Turnout in 2011 
 
 
While electoral observation reports supply anecdotal evidence of electoral 
manipulation, Table 8.1 quantifies the amount of electoral manipulation in the 2011 
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election by detailing the voter turnout threshold used to assess suspected malfeasance and 
the amount of raions that surpassed that threshold. In the most recent election to the State 
Duma, raion-level national turnout was 63.49% and the corresponding standard deviation 
was 14.38, higher than the standard deviation of 13.33 in 2007. Compared to the two 
elections in the 1990s, the distributions of turnout in the 2000s and 2010s displayed 
notably wider spreads as indicated by the significantly higher standard deviations and 
thus more raions recorded voter turnout, most frequently unusually high participation, 
that diverged from the mean to greater degrees. According to the threshold in 2011, just 
over 17% of all raions recorded unusually high voter turnout. The share of fraudulent 
raions was nearly identical four years prior, despite the slight smoothing out of the high 
turnout bump in 2011. When compared to the distribution of voter turnout presented in 
Figure 8.1 above, the 77.87 threshold takes into account all of the raions within the peak 
in the right tail, as well as some with slightly lower turnout figures. 
 
Table 8.1: Manipulated Raions in 2011 
Voter Turnout Threshold 
(1 Standard Deviation Above Raion-level National 
Turnout) 
Number Manipulated 
Raions 
% Total 
Raions 
77.87 466 17.05 
 
Taken together, Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1 strongly substantiate the findings from election 
observation missions. 
As in 2007, the CEC failed to adjudicate filed complaints in a timely manner, in 
many instances not responding to complaints in writing per legal provision, and the 
process generally lacked transparency (OSCE 2012). The CEC failed to address 
numerous complaints filed by individual voters and Yabloko concerning United Russia 
posters that were nearly identical to the Moscow City Election Commission, both of 
which were papered prominently around the city. The posters, observed firsthand by the 
author during fieldwork at the time of the election campaign and as noted in the OSCE 
report, used identical colors, images, overall design and word fonts, which could mislead 
voters unable to distinguish between voter information and United Russia party materials. 
In response to this issue, the mayor of Moscow (and a member of United Russia) 
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commented to the media that there was nothing concerning about the similarity of 
posters: ―when talking about United Russia, we mean that in the scale of Moscow the city 
and party authorities de facto act as a single entity, as we work on the same issues, 
solving common tasks‖ (Quoted in OSCE 2012: 7). Election observers also noted 
identical posters in St. Petersburg, Voronezh and Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan. In 
this instance, the CEC ―missed an opportunity to underline the importance of a clear 
separation between the activities of a state institution and a political party‖ (Ibid). 
Furthermore, the CEC considered only one post-election complaint that was filed by 
Yabloko before the final results were released: Yabloko disputed the results in the whole 
Moscow district and demanded recounts; the CEC debated whether it had the authority to 
order recounts and, although it did, per the Law on State Duma Elections, recounts were 
denied and Yabloko‘s complaint was dismissed (OSCE 2012). Yabloko and the KPRF 
stated that they would challenge the results in the whole country at the level of the 
Supreme Court. Ultimately all three parties forming the core party troika either 
challenged or censured the conduct of the elections. The Central Election Commission 
registered only 68 complaints, 45 of which were filed by political parties, by 4pm on 
voting day itself (RIA Novosti 2011a). The police received upwards of 1,100 complaints, 
most of which were filed in response to illegal campaigning (Ibid). However, the First 
Deputy Interior Minister Alexander Gurovoi stated, ―there are no serious violations and 
crimes which could affect the outcome of the elections‖ (Ibid). Furthermore, Vladimir 
Churov, the head of the Central Election Commission, stated that the election was 
―crystal clear and clean‖ (Bidder 2011).  
The aftermath of the 2011 election differed considerably from previous contests: 
large-scale public demonstrations and protest erupted across 130 cities in Russia in 
response to broadly publicized electoral fraud. The opposition rallies represented a 
―major watershed in Russia‘s post-Soviet social and political development‖ because there 
have been no such ―mass actions‖ after 1989 and the early 1990s (Filimonov 2011). The 
protests crushed enduring presumptions about the insouciance of Russian society and 
signaled to the executive that the implicit social contract between the government and 
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society, whereby the political leadership provided economic stability and ―income growth 
in exchange for political stability and society‘s passive acquiescence in government 
policies‖ was weakening (Zubarevich 2012: 25; Fischer 2012). The Golos website 
featured 200 precinct electoral commission results protocols that showcased 
inconsistencies between the precinct and higher levels; the CEC subsequently determined 
the allegations lacked foundation (OSCE 2012). The day after the election, thousands of 
protestors attempted to march to the CEC, but the police dispersed the gathering and 
arrested hundreds of participants. The largest protests occurred in Bolotnaya Square and 
Sakharov Avenue in central Moscow with tens of thousands participating, demanding the 
cancellation of the election results, dismissal of the chairman of the CEC, investigation of 
suspected manipulation, registration of previously banned parties, release of ‗political 
prisoners‘ and those detained for participating in protests, and the execution of new 
elections (OSCE 2012; Nichol 2011). Other rallies also emerged spontaneously in 
Moscow and resulted in numerous arrests of journalists covering the protests and 
opposition figures, as the gatherings were unauthorized in advance (Ibid).  
United Russia‘s youth wing, Nashi, and pro-government Youth Guard organized a 
series of counter-rallies in support of the dominant party, dubbed ‗clean victory,‘ just 
outside Red Square. Vladislav Surkov, Medvedev‘s chief of staff and the architect of 
―managed democracy‖ in Russia, called on Nashi members to ―train their muscles‖ in 
advance of the elections in order to fulfill the group‘s role as the ―combat detachment of 
our political system‖ (Kara-Murza 2011: 54). The ‗clean victory‘ gatherings made clear 
that minority groups, i.e. those constituting the opposition, would not be permitted to 
impose their will on the ‗majority‘ of the electorate (Nichol 2011). Police presence was 
overwhelming at the numerous opposition rallies, signaling the government‘s intention to 
stem any early suggestions of political activity resembling that which occurred prior to 
the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. KPRF leader Zyuganov 
criticized the protests, commenting that he was a man who ―is categorically against the 
Orange contagion that is able to paralyze a nuclear power on the eve of a severe winter‖ 
(Babich 2011b). Just Russia leader Sergei Mironov sent a similar signal to central 
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authorities, party activists, and voters, effectively distinguishing parties like the KPRF 
and Just Russia, i.e. the systemic opposition consisting of parliamentary parties and those 
recognized by the state, from more radical forms of non-systemic opposition, comprised 
primarily of non-parliamentary parties and those the state refuses to register and 
recognize (Babich 2011b; Kynev 2012).  
Analysis 
 The parties analyzed in 2011 remain unchanged from 2003 and 2007: the core 
party troika and United Russia. Table 8.2 indicates the parties‘ respective vote shares that 
met the relaxed and strict thresholds for party strongholds, the number of strongholds 
each party captured with regard to each threshold, and the percent of total raions 
accounted for by each. Despite the fact that the dominant party was against the ropes to 
some degree, the number of opposition party strongholds dipped from 2007 across both 
thresholds, save for the number of Yabloko‘s lower-level bastions of support. Compared 
to the previous election, United Russia gained strongholds according to both measures, 
but lower-level stronghold support swelled more notably than higher-level support. It is 
important to note that United Russia‘s vote share in 2011 declined from the all-time high 
reached in 2007. Consequently, the lower stronghold threshold was roughly 10% less 
than in the previous election, which may have eased the way for additional raions to 
register stronghold-level support for the dominant party.  
 
Table 8.2: Measuring the Dependent Variable: Party Strongholds in 2011 
 1 standard deviation 
above party‘s raion-
level national 
average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
2 standard deviations 
above party‘s raion-
level national 
average 
# 
Strongholds 
% 
Raions 
KPRF 26.50 371 13.70 34.18 40 1.48 
LDPR 18.49 345 12.72 24.66 31 1.14 
Yabloko 5.11 322 11.89 7.82 148 5.46 
United 
Russia 
69.90 430 15.90 87.95 178 6.58 
 
Figure 8.2 exhibits the distribution of each party‘s vote share, within which the two 
stronghold thresholds for each party can be roughly identified. The distribution of the 
KPRF‘s vote share better approximated a normal distribution than was the case four years 
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prior, although it still retained a ―step‖ in the left tail at the location of electoral defeat. 
The standard deviation of the KPRF‘s vote share actually increased from 4.56 in 2003 to 
7.68 in 2011, indicating that the distribution was more dispersed. The distribution of the 
nationalists‘ vote share in 2011 more closely resembled its distribution from 2007 than 
was the case with the KPRF, and again exhibited a sharp peak in the left tail at a null vote 
share. Mirroring the dynamics vis-à-vis the KPRF, the standard deviation corresponding 
to the distribution of the LDPR‘s vote share was 6.17, a marked increase from 4.87 in 
2003 and 3.10 in 2007. Rounding out the core party troika, the distribution of Yabloko‘s 
vote share in 2011 appeared strikingly similar to that in 2007, although the standard 
deviation increased from 1.43 in the prior election to 2.71 in the most recent contest. 
Finally, the distribution of the dominant party‘s vote share yet again exhibited an 
elongated right tail and a conspicuous bump around vote shares in the range 95 to 99%. 
The distribution was considerably more dispersed than in 2007, as the standard deviation 
was 18.05 compared to 12.12 before.  
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Figure 8.2: Distribution of Parties‘ Vote Shares in 2011 
 
 
 
See Appendix Tables 103-126 (pages 676-723) for Multilevel Model Results. 
Ethnicity and Opposition Parties 
The contours of opposition party support in the 2011 election reveal similarities 
but also striking differences from the contours that emerged in the 2000s during United 
Russia‘s rise and initial consolidation and also in the 1990s under conditions of more 
competitive contestation. Congruent with the findings from the analysis on the 1995 and 
1999 elections, higher densities of ethnic minorities increased the odds of a KPRF 
stronghold by one percent in a lower threshold model and by three percent in the higher 
specifications. These findings, however, were markedly less consistent than those in the 
first decade after the collapse of communism. Moreover, in one strict specification 
leveraging the other minority covariate, the odds lifted by five percent. In 2007, the effect 
of non-Russians and other minorities amplified the odds of a Communist stronghold in 
some models but depressed the odds in others. The fact that the findings were uniformly 
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positive in 2011 suggests that the KPRF may have harvested some genuine support from 
ethnic minority constituencies, after all these groups did record high support for the 
Communists in the 1990s, but, considering United Russia‘s tightening grip on these 
areas, it is also possible that the support represented a protest vote against United Russia. 
As discussed above, many opposition parties urged voters to cast ballots for any party but 
United Russia and ethnic minority constituencies may have voted for the most formidable 
opposition party rather than waste their votes on a party that would not surpass the 
threshold for representation. Mirroring the findings from four years prior, increases in 
titular minorities did not systematically affect the occurrence of party strongholds. In 
some contrast to the statistical results and notably different from the relationship 
prevailing in the 1990s, Figure 8.3 illustrates a downturn in KPRF support in areas with 
geographically concentrated ethnic minorities. However, when compared to the late 
2000s, the relationship between the KPRF‘s vote share and the proportion of ethnic 
minorities appears markedly less steep. The number of fanatical raions dwindled under 
the weight of United Russia but the roughly three that retained zealous support were 
found in an almost entirely ethnic Russian raion in Ivanovo Oblast on the Volga River in 
central Russia and a raion with a similar ethnic composition in Altai Krai bordering 
Mongolia, China and Kazakhstan, and a raion composed wholly of other minorities in 
Sverdlovsk on the eastern slope of the Ural Mountains.  
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Figure 8.3: Non-Russian Minorities and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 breaks down the percentage of KPRF strongholds by regional context and 
ethnic composition at the raion level, distinguishing between majority-Russian and 
majority-minority raions. For each dyad, the total number of raions in a given regional 
context is indicated. The denominator for each red and blue bar is the number of 
majority-Russian raions and majority-minority raions, respectively, that are in that 
specific regional context. Figure 8.4 substantiates the largely ethnic Russian picture of 
KPRF support, but also reveals subtle shifts from 2007: of majority-Russian raions, a 
slightly smaller percentage was KPRF strongholds in 2011 than 2007, suggesting that the 
Communists lost some ground in ethnic Russian areas, but when United Russia seemed to 
be against the ropes, the Communists made gains at its expense in majority-minority 
raions, as approximately double the share of majority-minority were KPRF bastions of 
support in 2011 than in the previous election. In nearly every regional context, the 
Communists captured a higher percentage of strongholds in majority-Russian than 
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majority-minority raions. Of majority-Russian raions in the Caucasus, the KPRF‘s share 
of strongholds plunged from 2007 to 2011: the Communists enjoyed strongholds in 
nearly 30% in the previous election, but less than half that percentage in 2011. In Muslim 
regions, the KPRF‘s bastions were limited to only majority-minority raions, a notable 
shift from 2007 when the party maintained a presence across ethnic Russian and minority 
environments. In contrast, the Communists drew support from both ethnic Russian and 
minority constituencies housed in poorer regions, a mainstay of the party since the 1990s. 
Of Russian raions in resource-rich regions, the share that channeled high levels of support 
lifted from just over five percent in 2007 to more than 10% in 2011. With the shift from 
the relaxed to the strict threshold, the percentage of KPRF support plummeted sharply in 
all contexts but retained the overall contours evident in the lower threshold.  
 
Figure 8.4: KPRF Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2011 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Consistent with the picture portrayed by the scatterplots and bar charts, descriptive 
statistics in Table 8.3 suggest that the KPRF may have struggled to maintain ethnic 
minority support during United Russia‘s political reign: in majority-minority raions, the 
KPRF‘s average vote share dropped by more than five percent below its raion-level 
national average, a showing that was slightly worse than in the late 2000s.  
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Table 8.3: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the KPRF’s Electoral Performance in the 2011 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
18.82 17.41 13.28 
 
9.42 13.03 9.97 15.91 19.01 15.41 
Min 
 
.032 .051 .032 .032 .032 .032 .032 .508 .508 
Max 89.48 89.48 78.63 
 
32.89 32.89 32.89 51.94 78.63 35.55 
SD 
 
7.68 7.82 8.76 6.72 8.03 7.51 8.75 7.54 7.93 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
The KPRF faced its fiercest competitor, United Russia, in seeking the ethnic minority 
vote. Location in an ethnic republic did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, an improvement over the 99% free fall in the odds in 2007. However, the 
KPRF‘s mean vote share in ethnic regions was nearly six percent less than its 
countrywide take, a drop that was two percent farther than four years prior. Per Table 8.4, 
the party had few strongholds in ethnic regions, 7% according to the relaxed measure and 
none according to the strict threshold. While the share of KPRF strongholds according to 
the lower threshold actually increased by a few percent compared to 2007, the party was 
wiped out when higher votes were concerned.  
 
 
 409 
 
Comparing the most distant bookend election to the most recent contest, the share of the 
KPRF‘s pockets of support in ethnic republics withered all but entirely in the span of 
about a decade and a half, shrinking from a high of roughly 24% and 40%, according to 
the relaxed and strict threshold, in 1995 to merely 7% and zero percent in 2011. If the 
general downward trend continues into the next Duma contest, the KPRF will likely lose 
all remaining lower-level strongholds and United Russia will have finally delivered the 
coup de grace, in the ethnic republics at least. Muslim region status, on the other hand, 
shrunk the odds of a stronghold by more than 99% in a lower threshold model, a stark 
reversal from the effect of Muslim populations on the KPRF‘s performance in the two 
elections in the 1990s, when the odds hiked by dozens to thousands of times across the 
models, and even from 2007 when Muslim region status did not exercise a systematic 
effect. The KPRF was challenged in Muslim regions even when a weak party of power 
competed in the mid-1990s, but United Russia accomplished a feat that would have been 
next to impossible for the infrastructurally- and resource-challenged Our Home is Russia: 
squeezing the Communists out of Muslim regions. The KPRF‘s poor showing in Muslim 
areas is corroborated by descriptive statistics indicating that the party‘s average was only 
half that of its national showing, which was a hit three percent below its already poor 
performance in the area in 2007. When competing against the inept Our Home is Russia 
in 1995, the KPRF garnered average support in Muslim regions that was six percent 
Table 8.4: KPRF Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2011 
 
 
 
# of KPRF 
Strongholds  
(Lower 
Threshold) 
(371 Total) 
% of    KPRF 
Strongholds 
# of  KPRF 
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(40 Total) 
% of    KPRF 
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
26 7.03 
0 0 
Russian federal 
regions 
344 92.97 
40 100 
Muslim regions 6 1.62 0 0 
Caucasus regions 26 7.03 1 2.50 
Poorer Regions 148 39.89 13 32.50 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
34 9.19 
1 2.50 
Fraudulent raions 8 2.16 0 0 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
362 97.84 
40 100 
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higher than its national vote share, but the entry into the political ring of competing 
parties of power and subsequently United Russia with robust support from ethnic 
minorities in Muslim regions rapidly chipped away at the Communists‘ former base. The 
KPRF had less than two percent and no strongholds in Muslim regions in 2011 by the 
lower and higher threshold, a notable deterioration from the one-quarter to two-fifths of 
strongholds housed in these areas in the 1990s. By the first election of the 2010s, United 
Russia had succeeded to greater extent in stamping out the Communist presence in 
Muslim regions than ethnic republics, but it appears that the writing is already on the 
wall. In the absence of United Russia‘s electoral defeat or implosion due to other 
unforeseen factors, the Communists will likely not be able to preserve what paltry ethnic 
minority support remains in future elections.  
 Analogous to the KPRF, the statistical results reveal that Yabloko benefitted from 
clusters of ethnic minorities at the raion level: unit increases in the percent minority and 
other minority covariates amplified the odds of a stronghold by two to five percent and 
by three to nearly five percent, respectively, across the models. When United Russia was 
struggling to maintain its chokehold on electoral politics, the magnitude of the positive 
effect for Yabloko was greater than was the case in 2007, when these ethnic composition 
covariates boosted the odds by one to three percent. However, denser titular minority 
populations reduced the odds by five percent in a lower threshold model, which was a 
decline from the lack of a systematic effect in 2007. The finding that larger proportions of 
non-Russian minorities, particularly Indo-European groups, contributed to Yabloko‘s 
electoral success represents a sea change in the patterns of support identified the 1990s. 
In the mid-1990s, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities had no connection to the 
occurrence of Yabloko‘s strongholds and, in the late 1990s, clusters of non-Russian 
groups of any kind sharply depressed the odds. As a non-parliamentary party, Yabloko 
was largely consigned to the political wilderness yet still primed fresh constituencies for 
support, or, more likely, harvested a share of disaffected voters incidentally. Mirroring 
the KPRF, ethnic minority communities may have supported the liberal party genuinely, 
as Yabloko had resolutely defended liberal democracy since its inception in 1993, or 
 411 
voted for it merely to protest against the party of power. For Yabloko more than the 
KRPF, it seems that the protest vote explanation is more plausible because the liberal 
party did not have a history of capturing support in these areas before the rise of United 
Russia. While the statistical results indicate that Yabloko performed well in areas with 
geographically concentrated ethnic non-Russians and other minorities, Figure 8.5 
illustrates declining support, to varying degrees, with increases in these groups. 
Corroborating the model results, Figure 5 also shows a sharp drop off in Yabloko‘s vote 
share with denser titular minority populations. There is a fair share of raions with sizable 
minority populations that recorded above average support for the party and a few isolated 
cases of raions with wholly other minority populations reporting tremendously high vote 
shares for the party. The most enthusiastic raion with a purely other minority population 
recorded over 22% for the liberal party and was found in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The most 
zealous blended raion was found in Moscow city, in the raion that houses the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, which had formal ties to the party, as the third spot on Yabloko‘s 
party list was suitably named Alexei Yablokov, a member of the Academy. The chain of 
blended raions in the scatterplots detailing non-Russians and other minorities, some of 
which supported Yabloko at stronghold-levels, were all located in the federal cities of 
Moscow or St. Petersburg.  
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Figure 8.5: Non-Russian Minorities and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 shows that, by percentages, majority-Russian raions in each regional 
environment accounted for a higher share of Yabloko strongholds than their majority-
minority counterparts. Roughly 14% of majority-Russian raions channeled unusually 
high vote totals to Yabloko, an increase of about two percent over the previous election. 
Although Yabloko carved out more support in ethnic Russian areas when United Russia 
was vulnerable, yet again only a minuscule share of majority-minority raions registered 
zealous support. Of the majority-Russian raions in economically disadvantaged and 
resource-dependent regions, Yabloko‘s share increased by a few percentage points over 
the previous election. Of the ethnic minority raions in resource rich regions, the 
percentage that were Yabloko strongholds increased from zero in 2007 to a small share in 
2011. A conspicuous shift from 2007 occurred in Muslim regions and those with 
abundant natural resources: Yabloko gained new footholds in majority-minority and 
majority-Russian raions that were previously roped off entirely from the liberal party 
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when United Russia was at the height of its power. Indeed, nearly four percent of Russian 
raions in Muslim regions churned out high vote shares for Yabloko. In the Caucasus by 
the lower measure and in all regional contexts according to the higher threshold, the 
liberal party failed to garner high levels of support from majority-minority raions. 
Nevertheless, the percentage of Russian raions in these restive regions that were 
strongholds more than doubled from 2007.  
 
Figure 8.6: Yabloko Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2011 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 8.5 further substantiate that the party struggled in raions 
with a preponderance of ethnic minorities: Yabloko‘s average was less than one percent 
below its national mean, which was a significant toll since the party‘s national vote share 
was a mere 2.40%. Nonetheless, the small liberal party‘s showing in majority-minority 
raions was nearly three times its performance in these areas when United Russia was at 
the height of its power.  
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Table 8.5: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of Yabloko’s Electoral Performance in the 2011 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
2.40 1.19 .972 
 
.530 1.02 2.50 1.22 2.97 1.68 
Min 
 
0 0 9.00 0 0 0 0 .012 .012 
Max 22.21 8.79 22.21 
 
7.88 11.67 5.56 7.09 22.21 10.89 
SD 
 
2.71 .951 1.48 .680 1.27 .804 1.31 3.24 1.66 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
At the regional level, the value for raions located in ethnic republics was 91 to 96% less 
than the value of the odds for raions situated elsewhere across the relaxed models, a blow 
comparable to the one suffered in 2007. The magnitude of the effect of ethnic republic 
status on Yabloko strongholds in 2011 was also roughly equivalent to that pinpointed in 
the mid-1990s. The party‘s average level of support in ethnic republics was as abysmal as 
its showing in majority-minority raions, but was still more than double its mean from 
four years prior. Yabloko strongholds were quite scarce in ethnic republics, as three 
percent and one percent of its bastions of support were found in such areas, a drop from 
2007 with regards to the strict threshold, as shown in Table 8.6. Surprisingly, Yabloko 
was able to preserve a couple strongholds in ethnic republics according to both the 
relaxed and the strict threshold, where the KPRF proved powerless in maintaining the 
latter. But United Russia was likely unruffled by Yabloko‘s few successes in ethnic 
republics for at least two reasons. First, Yabloko did not represent formidable opposition 
to the dominant party. After all, the party had been living in the political wilderness as a 
non-parliamentary party since 2003, whereas the KPRF came in second place in every 
Duma election that United Russia itself had competed in. Furthermore, it was more than 
likely that Yabloko would again fail to cross the threshold in 2011, so allowing Yabloko 
to receive a few votes here and there would not backfire, as it may have if the party did 
gain representation and then openly challenged United Russia in the Duma. Thus, United 
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Russia simply did not face a strategic imperative necessitating the complete eradication 
of the feeble liberal party from the dominant party‘s most prized electoral turf. Second, if 
Yabloko performed well in the most unlikely areas, precisely those areas most dominated 
by United Russia and where Yabloko had not experienced historical success even before 
the emergence of United Russia, it would allow the Kremlin to claim that the Duma 
elections were at least pluralistic, even if not competitive. Therefore, although United 
Russia and the Kremlin surely did not help Yabloko during the campaign, or engage in 
electoral manipulation on Yabloko‘s behalf, the liberal party‘s few electoral successes 
may have also become United Russia‘s. Thus, with even roughly a dozen Yabloko 
strongholds in these regions notorious for producing unbelievable electoral results since 
the 1990s, United Russia could leverage the results to achieve its own political ends, if 
backed into a corner by either opposition parties themselves or political protestors.   
 
 
Interestingly, given the effect of ethnic republic status, raions nested within Muslim 
regions did not systematically affect the occurrence of a Yabloko stronghold. 
Unexpectedly, Yabloko outperformed its national showing in Muslim regions, albeit by a 
slight amount. According to both thresholds, less than one percent of the party‘s 
Table 8.6: Yabloko Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2011 
 
 
 
# of Yabloko 
Strongholds  
(Lower 
Threshold) 
(322 Total) 
% of      Yabloko   
Strongholds 
# of Yabloko   
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(148 Total) 
% of      Yabloko   
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
10 3.11 
2 1.35 
Russian federal 
regions 
312 96.89 
146 98.65 
Muslim regions 2 0.62 0 0 
Caucasus regions 6 1.86 0 0 
Poorer Regions 59 18.32 16 10.81 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
23 7.14 
7 4.73 
Fraudulent raions 2 0.62 1 0.68 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
320 99.38 
147 99.32 
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strongholds were situated in predominantly Muslim regions. The contours of Yabloko 
support thus persisted in their ethnic Russian definition at the regional level into the 
2010s. 
The ultra-nationalist LDPR suffered from high densities of ethnic minorities at the 
raion level, as was the case in the 1990s. In the lower threshold models, the odds of a 
bastion of support diminished by two to five percent due to increases in the percent non-
Russian covariate. Higher proportions of titular minorities damaged the odds even more, 
by five to six percent in the relaxed threshold models and by 11% in a strict specification. 
The effect of other minorities was decidedly mixed, reducing the odds by three percent in 
one lower model and increasing the odds by two percent in one upper model. Contingent 
on the model and the ethnic composition covariate, the magnitude of the negative effect 
of non-Russians and titular minorities was larger in some cases than was found in 2007, 
when the odds diminished by two to four percent. Barring the varied effect of other 
minorities in 2011, which diverged from the consistently negative effect in the previous 
election, ethnic Russian patterns of support for the LDPR at the raion level largely 
endured from the mid-1990s to the early 2010s. Figure 8.7 corroborates the statistical 
findings and highlights the unmistakably inverse association between the growing 
proportion of ethnic minorities of any kind and the party‘s vote share. The scatterplot 
regarding other minorities reveals a less steep inverse relationship than was the case in 
2007. Raions recording the most zealous support for the nationalists were scarce. The 
highest supporters were found in a raion with a population of purely other minorities in 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, two almost entirely ethnic Russian raions in Altai Krai and Ivanovo 
Oblast, and a sizable cluster of majority-Russian raions in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug in western Siberia. The raions with a preponderance of titular minorities that voted 
for the LDPR at stronghold-levels were nearly all nested within the republic of Udmurtia, 
bordering Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to the south. The most fanatical raion, registering 
an over 85% vote share for the nationalists, was found in Sverdlovsk Oblast. 
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Figure 8.7: Non-Russian Minorities and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8 closely resembles the corresponding figures from the 1990s and provides 
additional evidence of the ethnic Russian contours of the LDPR‘s support that held across 
thresholds. Unlike the liberals, there are indications that the nationalists lost some ethnic 
Russian support in 2011 because less than 15% of majority-Russian raions served as 
strongholds whereas greater than 15% channeled similar levels of support in the previous 
election. On the other hand, majority-minority raions remained steadfastly opposed to the 
LDPR once again. Compared to 2007, the nationalists appeared to lose some ground in 
majority-Russian raions in ethnic republics and economically disadvantaged regions 
because the percentage of raions that delivered high vote totals to the party plunged from 
nearly 25% to roughly 15% in the former and dropped from close to 20% to less than 
15% in the latter. In each regional setting, the balance between the percentage of 
majority-Russian and majority-minority raions that were strongholds strongly favored the 
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former. In the Caucasus, the LDPR only harvested support from majority-Russian areas, 
which was also true in the last contest.  
 
Figure 8.8: LDPR Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 2011 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
As indicated in Table 8.7, the LDPR‘s average in majority-minority raions was nearly six 
percent less than its national showing, a drop one percent farther from 2007.  
 
Table 8.7: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of the LDPR’s Electoral Performance in the 2011 
Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development 
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
12.32 11.23 6.52 
 
4.07 6.74 2.10 8.65 12.53 11.68 
Min 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 
 
85.80 56.26 85.80 32.49 29.89 12.73 31.58 85.80 29.89 
SD 
 
6.17 6.36 7.58 4.52 6.98 2.73 7.89 5.98 7.51 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
 
The effects of location in ethnic republics and Muslim regions produced surprising 
results, especially when considered in conjunction with the raion level ethnic composition 
predictors: ethnic republic status did not reach standard levels of statistical significance in 
the lower threshold models but demonstrated a robust and positive effect in the upper 
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threshold specifications, augmenting the odds of a stronghold by five to 23 times. This 
finding represented a significant break from the past because the value for raions located 
in ethnic republics were a tiny percentage of the value of the odds for raions situated in 
Russian federal regions in the 1990s and in the 2000s. In the four previous contests, the 
ethnic Russian contours of LDPR support held at both the raion and regional level, but 
incongruity emerged in the early 2010s when higher densities of ethnic minorities at the 
raion level damaged the odds and boosted the odds at the regional level. The LDPR thus 
gained new footholds in ethnic republics against all the odds, as United Russia kept a 
firm grip on these areas. Given the dominant party‘s unshakable presence, the LDPR 
managed to capture an astonishingly large number of strongholds compared to the rest of 
the core party troika: one-tenth and one-quarter of the nationalist‘s bastions were found in 
ethnic regions, by the relaxed and strict measure, as shown in Table 8.8. The share of 
strongholds found in ethnic republics increased sharply along the strict threshold, from 
four percent in 2007 to over 25% in 2011. Interestingly, the LDPR was also the only 
opposition party under investigation that saw its percentage of strongholds in ethnic 
republics actually increase with the shift from the lower to the higher threshold. 
 
  
Table 8.8: LDPR Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2011 
 
 
 
# of LDPR 
Strongholds  
(Lower 
Threshold) 
(345 Total) 
% of     LDPR  
Strongholds 
# of LDPR  
Strongholds 
(Higher 
Threshold) 
(31 Total) 
% of     LDPR  
Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
36 10.43 
8 25.81 
Russian federal 
regions 
309 89.57 
23 74.19 
Muslim regions 0 0 0 0 
Caucasus regions 26 7.54 4 12.90 
Poorer Regions 142 41.16 10 32.26 
Natural Resource 
Regions 
89 25.88 
11 35.48 
Fraudulent raions 3 0.86 2 6.45 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
341 98.84 
29 93.55 
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Notwithstanding the model results and data presented above, descriptive statistics show 
that the LDPR‘s mean level of support in ethnic regions was nearly six percent less than 
its national average, a precipitous decline from the party‘s already poor performance in 
2007. In contrast to the robust and positive effect of ethnic republic status, a 
predominantly Muslim population did not have a systematic effect on the occurrence of 
LDPR strongholds in any of the models, a finding consistent with those from the previous 
election. However, descriptive statistics suggest that the nationalists fared incredibly 
poorly in these regions: raions in Muslim regions recorded average support that was more 
than 10% below its national showing, a dive of an additional four percent compared to 
2007, and, yet again, the party had no strongholds in these areas according to either 
measure of stronghold. Thus, while the LDPR flourished in ethnic republics compared to 
the KPRF and Yabloko, the party seemed to fall short in Muslim regions according to the 
more descriptive data.  
The Urban-rural Divide and Opposition Parties 
 The configuration of support for opposition parties continued to be strongly 
defined by the urban-rural divide into the 2010s. The odds of a Communist stronghold 
dwindled by three percent across all of the lower threshold models, generally consistent 
with the findings from 2007. Furthermore, the KPRF‘s average in predominantly rural 
raions was again less than one percent below its raion-level national mean. Figure 8.9 
illustrates the downturn in KPRF support with the movement from city centers to the 
countryside. The obvious urban outlier was located in Sverdlovsk Oblast, while the two 
fanatical raions in the countryside were found in Altai Krai and Ivanovo Oblast.  
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Figure 8.9: Rural Inhabitants and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Figure 8.10 demonstrates the percentage of majority-urban raions that delivered 
tremendous vote shares to the Communists was almost 10% higher, reaching nearly 30%, 
than when United Russia was at its apex, suggesting that the KPRF adapted rather deftly 
to the fact that United Russia had squeezed it out of the countryside. Despite 
consolidating gains in urban areas, the share of majority-rural raions that were bastions of 
support hovered around 10%, comparable to the previous contest. The KPRF captured a 
higher percentage of strongholds in urban centers than the countryside, except for in 
regions with resource wealth and predominantly Muslim populations, where the 
traditional rural contours prevailed to varying degrees. Compared to 2007, the 
Communists made gains in urban raions in poorer regions and, surprisingly, rural raions 
in ethnic republics and Muslim regions. However, the party suffered losses in Muslim 
regions and the Caucasus: no urban raions in Muslim regions were KPRF strongholds 
any longer and, of the urban raions in the Caucasus, the percentage that were Communist 
strongholds plunged from nearly 25% in 2007 to roughly 10% in 2011. Moreover, the 
percentage of both urban and rural raions in resource-dependent regions dipped from the 
late 2000s to the early 2010s. With the shift to the strict threshold, the party again 
captured a higher percentage of bastions in urban areas overall and in the specific setting 
of poorer regions, but retained trace support in rural areas in the Caucasus, economically 
disadvantaged regions and resource regions.  
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Figure 8.10: KPRF Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 2011 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Collectively, these data reveal the progressing erosion of the Communist vote in the 
countryside. With the sweeping defection of rural voters to United Russia in the 2000s, 
the KPRF faces a daunting challenge in trying to win back the support of the countryside 
in future legislative elections.  
Experiencing a fate similar to the Communists in rural areas, the odds of a 
nationalist strongholds diminished by one to two percent across the lower threshold 
models, congruent with the findings from 2007. Predominantly rural areas again 
registered support for the LDPR that was less than one percent under its national take. 
Figure 8.11 showcases the downturn in LDPR support as the level of rurality increased at 
the raion level. Compared to 2007, however, the inverse association appears markedly 
less steep. The most enthusiastic countryside raion was located in Altai Krai and its urban 
counterpart was in Sverdlovsk Oblast.  
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Figure 8.11: Rural Inhabitants and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Figure 8.12 illustrates the LDPR‘s urban base. Of all urban raions, the nationalists carved 
out strongholds in roughly 20%, preserving but not expanding its share from 2007. 
Likewise, approximately 10% of rural raions registered unusual devotion for the party, 
also consistent with the previous election. A higher percentage of urban centers were 
nationalist strongholds in each regional environment except in the Caucasus. In poorer 
regions and those in the Caucasus, the percentage of urban and rural areas that were 
LDPR strongholds was more balanced than in the other regional environments. With the 
shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold, the percentage of strongholds in urban raions 
fell to zero in the Caucasus. Compared to the previous contest, a higher percentage of 
rural raions in resource regions were bastions of support, from less than 10% in 2007 to 
more than 15% in 2011, and surprisingly, the share of countryside raions in the Caucasus 
that were strongholds more than doubled. However, the party lost ground in urban raions 
in economically disadvantaged regions and those in the Caucasus.  
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Figure 8.12: LDPR Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 2011 
(lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Compared to the KPRF and LDPR, Yabloko made the deepest inroads outside of 
the countryside in more urban areas, as had been the case since before the accession of 
United Russia. With unit increases in rurality, the odds of a stronghold plummeted seven 
to nine percent across the relaxed threshold models and eight to ten percent across the 
strict specifications. The magnitude of the negative effect was less in some models than 
in the previous election, when the odds tumbled by six to 17%. The liberal party‘s 
average showing in predominantly rural areas was a full half its national mean, 
comparable to 2007. Figure 8.13 clearly shows the inverse association between 
Yabloko‘s vote share and the level of ruralness at the raion level. Compared to the 
scatterplots for the KPRF and LDPR on this dimension, Yabloko‘s support plummeted 
more steeply, verging on zero in the most rural areas. The figure also reveals that 
Yabloko captured approximately twice its raion-level national average in urban centers. 
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Figure 8.13: Rural Inhabitants and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
As in the previous elections, Figure 8.14 shows once again the urban contours of 
Yabloko‘s electoral support. Alongside the Communists, Yabloko captured strongholds 
in a higher share of majority-urban raions when United Russia was seemingly in decline 
than when it was at the height of its power. Indeed, of urban raions, the percentage that 
were bastions of support for the liberals increased by more than five percent from 2007 to 
2011. Unexpectedly, the traditionally urban liberals also performed better in the 
countryside: of rural raions, less than one percent were strongholds in 2007 but the 
party‘s share had jumped to close to 10% by 2011. In terms of percentages, there is a vast 
disparity between the share of urban areas and those in the countryside in each regional 
environment that were strongholds, with the largest divergence evident in poorer regions. 
With the shift from the relaxed to the strict threshold, Yabloko lost support from rural 
raions but preserved a degree of urban support in ethnic republics, and support from 
urban and rural raions alike dissolved in Muslim regions and those in the Caucasus. Of 
urban raions, the share that was strongholds increased in every single regional setting 
compared to 2007. For example, Yabloko failed to capture any strongholds in Muslim 
regions when United Russia was at its apex, but roughly five percent of urban raions in 
those regions were strongholds when United Russia was showing signs of decay. 
Additionally, of urban raions in poorer regions, the percentage that delivered high vote 
totals to the non-parliamentary party more than doubled from 2007 to 2011. Yabloko also 
demonstrated growth in parts of United Russia‘s heartland: of the countryside raions in 
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the Caucasus and resource-dependent regions, Yabloko‘s share increased from zero in the 
previous election to a small percentage in 2011.  
 
Figure 8.14: Yabloko Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts in 
2011 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
In the next election to the State Duma, the Communists and nationalists may try to 
capitalize on United Russia‘s perceived weakening, as evidenced by its loss in vote share 
from 2007 to 2011, and struggle to recoup lost territory in the countryside, surrendering 
urban centers to Yabloko once again.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and Opposition Parties   
Regional variables produced interesting results in the most recent legislative 
election. As in the previous election, location in the Caucasus did not exercise a 
systematic effect on the occurrence of Communist strongholds in the early 2010s. 
Descriptive statistics, however, indicate that the KPRF faced an uphill battle to win back 
the support it enjoyed in the 1990s: the Communists average vote share in the area was 
almost three percent less than nationally, a shift from 2007 when its vote share in the 
Caucasus closely approximated its countrywide mean and, more starkly, from the mid-
1990s, when its mean was more than eight percent higher at the height of the party‘s 
performance. Moreover, few bastions of support were found in the Caucasus, seven and 
two percent by the relaxed and strict measure, a decline from the 12% and four percent in 
2007. While Caucasus location had drastically reduced the odds by at least 88% in 2007, 
this correlate had no connection to the occurrence of LDPR strongholds in 2011. The 
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LDPR‘s average in the Caucasus was less than its national showing and by roughly the 
same amount as the KPRF‘s, but the ultra-nationalists had more strongholds in the area 
than the Communists, seven and 12% according to the lower and higher threshold. The 
share of LDPR strongholds in the restive regions increased compared to the late 2000s, 
when five percent and two percent, respectively, were found there. These findings run 
counter to expectations that opposition parties, especially the strongest of the core party 
troika, would languish in the Caucasus due to United Russia‘s steadfast presence. For 
Yabloko‘s part, the early 2010s looked much like the late 2000s, as the value for raions 
situated in the area were roughly one-tenth the value of the odds for raions located 
outside in 2011, closely mirroring the magnitude of the negative effect from the previous 
election. The liberal party eked out little more than one percent on average in the area and 
Yabloko had hardly any strongholds there according to both thresholds. For Yabloko, 
future elections will likely reinforce the damaging effect of the Caucasus on strongholds 
but it is more difficult to forecast the trajectories of the other two parties due to the lack 
of a relationship between their bastions of support and location in the area.  
Variables distinguishing degrees of socioeconomic welfare at the regional level 
produced effects more consistent with the contours of the KPRF and LPDR vote in the 
1990s than the 2000s. Unit increases in gross regional product decreased the odds of a 
KPRF stronghold by 21% at the least and 29% at the most across the lower threshold 
models in 2011, but had failed to achieve statistical significance in 2007. A fair portion of 
the KPRF‘s bastions of support, roughly 40% and nearly one-third, was located in poorer 
regions, but the approximately 33% share according to the strict threshold was a large 
drop from the 50% in 2007.  Despite this, the party‘s showing in regions with larger than 
average economies was slightly higher than its countrywide performance. Even as the 
Communists lost ground in the countryside, they clung on to support in economically 
disadvantaged areas, another long-standing constituency. Similar to the KPRF and 
mirroring the party‘s weak performance in these areas in the 1990s and 2000s, the LDPR 
again suffered electorally as gross regional product grew, with odds decreasing by 24 to 
41% in 2011, approximating the magnitude of the effect in the previous contest. 
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Although the party‘s average in economically advantaged regions was within one percent 
of its national showing, numerous LDPR strongholds were housed in poorer regions, 41% 
and 32% according to the relaxed and strict measure, a significant drop from the nearly 
50% and almost two-thirds in the late 2000s. United Russia‘s presence did not affect the 
KPRF and LDPR‘s performance in poorer locales to the extent anticipated, as both 
parties‘ electoral trajectories remained relatively stable before and after the dominant 
party‘s arrival. In notable contrast to the KPRF and LDPR, Yabloko‘s electoral 
performance again improved with increases in gross regional product, augmenting the 
odds of a stronghold by 16 to 30% across the relaxed threshold models and by 18% in a 
strict specification. Contingent on the model, the magnitude of the positive effect was 
lesser in some cases than in 2007, when odds jumped by 12 to 39%. Yabloko‘s average in 
economically developed regions was higher than its national showing and was, in fact, 
Yabloko‘s best showing out of any raion or regional context considered. The party still 
captured a fair share of strongholds in poorer regions though: 18% and 10% of Yabloko‘s 
bastions were found in economically depressed areas. Thus, Yabloko preserved the niche 
that it carved out for itself in the 1990s and continued to distinguish itself from the other 
members of the core party troika and the dominant party by prospering wealthier regions.  
Findings concerning resource abundance in 2011 exhibited striking continuity 
with those from the previous election. Mirroring the final election of the 2000s, resource-
abundance at the regional level took a toll on KPRF support: the value for raions in 
resource regions was one-fifth the value of the odds for raions situated in economically 
diverse regions in one lower threshold model. Raions in resource regions registered 
average support for the party that was again more than three percent below than its 
national level and few strongholds were housed in these areas. For the nationalists, 
resource-dependence again ballooned the odds across all models, by 16 to 23 times in the 
lower threshold models and by 8 to 12 times in the higher measure specifications. The 
magnitude of the effect was considerably greater in 2011 than in the previous election, 
when the odds reached four and capped off at over five. The party‘s average in these 
areas was within one percent of its national average and a sizable share of the LDPR‘s 
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strongholds were found in resource regions, about 26% according to the lower threshold 
and roughly 35% by the strict measure. The effect of resource-abundance on the LDPR‘s 
performance is especially intriguing because United Russia also captured a sizable boost 
in these areas, suggesting that the LDPR and United Russia not only tussled over the 
same electoral turf but that the LDPR competed with the dominant party without being 
crushed completely. As in 2007, Yabloko‘s bastions were not connected to resource 
abundance in 2011. Yabloko‘s average in resource-rich regions was nearly one percent 
less than its national showing, as was true four years prior, and the party had few 
strongholds in these areas, seven and two percent by the relaxed and strict threshold.  
Electoral Manipulation and Opposition Parties 
Unsurprisingly, levels of voter turnout that surpassed thresholds for suspected 
electoral manipulation severely diminished the odds of opposition party strongholds 
across the board. With the shift from the non-manipulated to the fraudulent class, the 
likelihood of a KPRF stronghold contracted by 93 to 96%, a blow comparable to 2007. 
Ex ante, the KPRF was decently positioned to capture unusually high vote shares in 
abnormally high turnout raions for at least two reasons. First, the Communists still served 
as United Russia‘s most formidable competitor. If the executives and administrators 
sitting atop local government structures believed they were not adequately compensated 
for their efforts to turn out the vote for the dominant party, through voter mobilization or 
more nefarious methods, in previous elections, they might be susceptible to Communist 
co-optation under the right conditions. Second, and more importantly, United Russia‘s 
widely perceived weakening leading up to the elections may have infected a few high 
turnout areas with a sense of uncertainty as to the final distribution of the votes that may 
have incentivized these areas to distribute their electoral eggs more evenly in various 
parties‘ baskets rather than run the risk of being on the wrong side of history when United 
Russia was defeated electorally. Economic downturn leading up to the 2011 election 
undoubtedly affected United Russia‘s resource endowments and regional elites 
recognized that the party would be forced to do more, as a result of its perceived 
weakening, with less. As such, it was not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the 
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KPRF would not benefit in some way from high voter turnout in the most recent election. 
Nevertheless, fraudulent raions recorded average support for the KPRF that was more 
than nine percent under its national level, roughly halving its vote share. The nine percent 
fall was a four percent farther drop than the KPRF experienced in 2007. Moreover, the 
occurrence of KPRF strongholds in manipulated areas was incredibly rare: only two 
percent of the Communists‘ bastions of support were found in fraudulent raions by the 
lower measure, and none according to the higher one. Figure 8.15 illustrates the steep 
deterioration in the KPRF‘s vote share with increasing levels of voter turnout, as was 
evident in 2007 as well. Interestingly, the three most enthusiastic raions reported turnout 
that was below the national average, but still relatively close to it. Even in 2011, there 
were still a few lingering high supporters that registered turnout approaching 100%; these 
raions were located in the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, and 
Krasnodar Krai.  
 
Figure 8.15: Voter Turnout and KPRF‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Figure 8.16 corroborates the near-total absence of the Communist party in the presence of 
electoral manipulation, but also indicates an improvement over the party‘s performance 
in these areas in 2007. Of the close to 400 KPRF strongholds according to the lower 
threshold, merely two percent were housed in fraudulent raions and these few bastions of 
support evaporated entirely with the ratcheting up of the stronghold measure. Of the more 
than 450 raions suspected for nefarious practices, less than two percent were KPRF 
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strongholds by the relaxed measure and none by the strict threshold. From both angles, 
the Communists performed better in high turnout raions in 2011 than in the previous 
election, when both the percent of fraudulent raions that were KPRF strongholds and the 
percent of KPRF strongholds in fraudulent raions fell under one percent. Indeed, the 
number of KPRF strongholds in manipulated raions doubled from 2007 to 2011 
according to the lower measure, suggesting that United Russia‘s biggest rival may be 
staging a very gradual comeback in these areas.  
 
Figure 8.16: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are KPRF Strongholds vs. Percent KPRF 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2011 
 
 
Paralleling the KPRF‘s trajectory in high turnout areas, the LDPR suffered to a 
similar degree, as the odds of a bastion of support plummeted by 91-94% in 2011. 
However, in sharp contrast to the Communists, the nationalists excelled in manipulated 
raions in the previous election according to the strict threshold, with odds jumping from 
three to six times, indicating a dramatic reversal of fortune. With United Russia 
seemingly on the ropes before the election, the authorities could no longer afford to 
channel such comparatively large quantities of the votes stolen in fraudulent raions to the 
Kremlin-friendly nationalists to preserve the appearance of multiparty competition, but 
there is some evidence that this practice still occurred in 2011, albeit to a more limited 
degree. The ultra-nationalists‘ average in manipulated areas was less than eight percent 
below its national mean, cutting its vote share by approximately two-thirds. The eight 
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percent drop was a worse showing than in 2007 by three percent. Indeed, LDPR 
strongholds located in manipulated areas were rare, approximately one and six percent 
according to the relaxed and strict threshold. Figure 8.17 showcases the inverse 
relationship between voter turnout and the LDPR‘s performance and appears strikingly 
similar to the KPRF‘s scatterplot above, with the minor distinction that the LDPR‘s level 
of support is a great deal lower than the KPRF‘s when turnout approaches 100%. The 
three most ardent supporters recorded turnout that was below the national mean, but the 
nationalists also captured some, albeit scarce, stronghold-level support in high turnout 
raions. These raions were located in the republic of Karelia, along the border with 
Finland, and Kemerovo Oblast in southwestern Siberia. 
 
Figure 8.17: Voter Turnout and LDPR‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Figure 8.18 indicates that, unlike the Communists, the nationalists fared worse in 
fraudulent raions in the most recent election to the State Duma than in 2007, although the 
share of LDPR strongholds in manipulated raions was still the highest of the core party 
troika in 2011. With the threshold increase, the proportion of LDPR strongholds in 
fraudulent raions jumped from less than one percent to nearly seven percent, closely 
mirroring dynamics prevailing in 2007 when the dominant party likely redistributed some 
of the votes in these raions to the nationalists. However, the extent of the reallocation was 
seemingly more limited than in the previous election, as made clear by the fact that the 
effect of electoral manipulation in the statistical models was negative when the variable 
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did reach statistical significance in 2011 and the data supplied by Figure 8.18. As 
mentioned, with widespread speculation that United Russia‘s days were numbered, the 
dominant party was forced to double down in fraudulent raions to ensure a solid showing 
and the nationalists suffered as a result. Of the hundreds of raions registering abnormally 
high political participation, the LDPR‘s share fell from more than two percent and one 
percent in 2007 to under one percent by both stronghold measures in 2011.  
 
Figure 8.18: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are LDPR Strongholds vs. Percent LDPR 
Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2011 
 
 
The trajectory of the KRPF and LDPR in high turnout raions points to a key difference 
between the competitive elections in the 1990s and the uncompetitive contests in the 
2000s: multiple political parties, including the Communists and nationalists, benefitted 
from high turnout in the 1990s but were effectively shut out of these areas, albeit to 
drastically different degrees, when United Russia came onto the scene and seized the 
electoral windfalls for itself. In the end, high turnout raions were just one more in a long 
list of areas that the dominant party adeptly roped off from competition with opposition 
parties.  
In contrast to the KPRF and LDPR, Yabloko‘s fate in high turnout raions was 
only slightly bleaker under United Russia than it had been during the competitive 
elections when Our Home is Russia was active. Yabloko succumbed to a rout in high 
turnout zones in 2011: the odds of a bastion collapsed, diminishing by 87 to 97% in the 
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relaxed threshold models, comparable to the drop in 2007. The magnitude of the negative 
effect in 2011 was greater than that found in the mid-1990s, when the odds plummeted by 
70 to 75%. The party barely managed to capture average support of one-half percent in 
manipulated raions, slashing its vote share by more than three-quarters and taking the 
largest toll relative any other party‘s national showing. Less than one percent of 
Yabloko‘s strongholds were found in fraudulent raions according to the lower and higher 
threshold alike. Figure 8.19 portrays a clear inverse relationship between voter turnout 
and Yabloko‘s vote share. The most zealous support for the liberals came from raions 
reporting turnout that was closest to the national average and those with higher turnout 
levels were located in almost exclusively in the federal city of Moscow and Tula Oblast, 
bordering Moscow Oblast, with one exception found in Samara Oblast. 
 
Figure 8.19: Voter Turnout and Yabloko‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Figure 8.20 reveals that, compared to the previous election, the share of Yabloko 
strongholds housed in fraudulent raions in fact doubled from 2007 to 2011 according to 
both measures, although the absolute number of strongholds remained paltry. Against the 
Communists and nationalists, the non-parliamentary Yabloko was undeniably the least 
capable of competing effectively in raions suspected for electoral manipulation, but even 
the weakest of the core party troika was able to make identifiable inroads in these raions 
when the dominant party was still in play. Another indicator of Yabloko‘s relative 
success under conditions of contracted contestation in 2011 compared to 2007 was the 
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fact that, not only did the party maintain a share of strongholds in fraudulent raions 
according to both measures, but also the proportion increased with the shift in thresholds. 
Accordingly, of the hundreds of manipulated raions, Yabloko preserved a presence by 
both thresholds and the party‘s share of fraudulent raions was higher in 2011 than in the 
final contest of the 2000s.  
 
Figure 8.20: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are Yabloko Strongholds vs. Percent 
Yabloko Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2011 
 
 
Thus, each member of the core party troika performed best under conditions of 
more limited turnout in the early 2010s. When voter participation exceeded one standard 
deviation above the raion-level national average, opposition parties were essentially 
frozen out, but not to equal degrees. For example, although the KPRF‘s average in 
fraudulent raions was halved when compared to its raion-level national mean, the 
nationalists and liberals experienced significantly greater losses relative to their national 
showings in these areas. Furthermore, the fact that the KPRF was able to secure an 
average vote share of greater than nine percent in high turnout zones indicates that the 
party was at least partly successful at gnawing away at United Russia‘s near-universal 
dominance, even in the areas where the dominant party was most likely to succeed. Other 
sources of data suggest that the nationalists fared better than the Communists and liberals 
with regards to the relative share of LDPR strongholds that were found in fraudulent 
raions, at least concerning the strict threshold. In future legislative contests, there may be 
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a more observable resurgent Communist presence in manipulated raions, but only if 
United Russia‘s forceful grip on these areas softens. It seems comparatively less likely, 
however, that the nationalists would be able to restore the position they occupied in high 
turnout raions in the late 1990s and even in the late 2000s in the future unless United 
Russia stages a comeback that the LDPR could profit from. The configuration of the 
party system in the late 1990s involving multiple potential parties of power may have 
been more favorable to a nationalist infiltration of high turnout areas since these raions 
had not yet coalesced around one party to the exclusion of all others, as occurred in short 
order after United Russia‘s rise. Furthermore, as mentioned, the LPDR may have 
benefitted from fraud perpetrated by the Kremlin because the nationalists were preferred 
over both Fatherland-All Russia and the KRPF and votes for the Kremlin‘s most despised 
foes may have been channeled to the LDPR instead. To secure more support in fraudulent 
raions in the future, the Communists and nationalists therefore depend on different 
dominant party trajectories: the KPRF‘s success in high turnout raions seems to hinge on 
continued dominant party decay, which would open up space in these areas for the 
Communists to fill, while the LDPR‘s electoral fortunes in these areas hinges on the 
ability of United Russia to renew its strength, allowing the nationalists to prosper by 
association. In contrast to the nationalists and Communists, Yabloko never enjoyed even 
a short-term lease in manipulated raions in the 1990s and therefore has no position to 
reclaim in the future. For this reason, it appears Yabloko‘s future trajectory in high 
turnout raions will consist of more of the same: doom and gloom.  
Ethnicity and the Dominant Party 
For its part, the contours of United Russia‘s support remained remarkably stable 
from the late 2000s to the early 2010s. United Russia again scored substantial support in 
zones with geographically concentrated ethnic minorities. Increases in the non-Russian 
population at the raion level augmented the odds of a stronghold by one to nearly four 
percent in the lower threshold models and by two to five percent in the upper 
specifications. The magnitude of the effect of minority populations on dominant party 
windfalls in 2011 was strikingly similar to four years prior. Similarly, higher proportions 
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of titular minorities hiked the odds by two to ten percent and three to four percent, 
according to the relaxed and strict measure, which represented a stronger effect than in 
2007. This finding represented one of the key differences separating United Russia from 
the opposition regarding the ethnic parameters of electoral support in 2011: titular 
minority populations caused the odds of a dominant party stronghold to swell, but 
damaged the odds for the LDPR and Yabloko and did not reach statistical significance for 
the KPRF. United Russia clamped down on titular minority communities and insulated 
them from opposition party interference precisely because those areas were organized 
around powerful patronage-based political machines following ethnic lines that could be 
leveraged to the advantage of one party at election time. United Russia‘s steadfast 
monopoly on the titular minority constituency proved decisive in producing dominant 
party victories in election after election. Figure 8.21 demonstrates the positive association 
between higher densities of non-Russians, particularly titular minorities, and United 
Russia‘s vote share. The figure also reveals a positive relationship between the United 
Russia‘s electoral performance and increases in other minorities, but this variable did not 
exercise a systematic effect on the party‘s strongholds in any of the statistical models, 
congruent with the findings from 2007 In each scatterplot, but especially in those 
concerning non-Russians and titular minorities, there are distinct clusters of raions in the 
upper right quadrants at the intersections of near full voter participation and dominant 
party vote shares approaching 100%. Nearly all of these raions were located in the ethnic 
republics of Chechnya, Mordovia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Dagestan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, 
Karachay-Cherkessia, with a few outliers in Tyumen Oblast in western Siberia.  
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Figure 8.21: Non-Russian Minorities and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 8.22 substantiates the statistical results and shows a conspicuous pattern of ethnic 
minority support. Surprisingly, given United Russia‘s widely perceived weakness, of 
majority-minority and majority-Russian raions, the shares that were dominant party 
strongholds remained remarkably close to those in 2007. Without exception, a higher 
percentage of majority-minority raions were United Russia strongholds than majority-
Russian areas and this contour held across thresholds. The greatest disparity between 
majority-minority and majority-Russian support for United Russia was in regions in the 
Caucasus. Mirroring 2007, in Muslim regions, the balance between majority-minority 
and minority-Russian raions that were strongholds was more level than in the other 
regional environments. A more pronounced peak emerged in majority-minority raions in 
the Caucasus in 2011 than was evident four years prior, when Muslim and Caucasus 
regions were more on par with each other. Compared to the core party troika, the pattern 
of United Russia support with regards to different ethnic contexts changed to a more 
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limited degree from the late 2000s to the early 2010s. A subtle shift is evident in Muslim 
and resource-dependent regions, as the percentage of majority-minority raions that 
channeled immense support to the dominant party dipped slightly from when United 
Russia was at its finest. 
 
Figure 8.22: United Russia Strongholds by Ethnicity in Different Regional Contexts in 
2011 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
Strikingly, Table 8.9 shows that majority-minority raions recorded average support for 
United Russia that was nearly 19% higher than the party‘s national mean, a boost of an 
additional three percent compared to 2007.  
 
Table 8.9: Raion- and Regional-Level Comparison of United Russia’s Electoral Performance in the 
2011 Legislative Elections 
 National 
(Raion-
level) 
 
Rural Ethnicity 
 
Fraud Ethnic 
Region 
Muslim 
Region 
Caucasus 
Region 
Economic 
Development  
 
Resource 
Region 
Mean 
 
51.85 57.52 70.44 
 
81.18 70.49 84.22 65.61 50.52 56.36 
Min 
 
7.71 25.63 20.49 27.72 25.99 41.15 27.18 18.35 22.93 
Max 99.83 99.83 99.83 
 
99.83 99.83 99.75 99.75 99.18 99.18 
SD 
 
18.05 17.80 20.10 13.28 20.40 12.98 22.28 17.11 21.29 
 Percent rural exceeds 50%. 
 Percent non-Russian exceeds 50%. 
 Regional share of total Gross Domestic Product exceeds the median, .9. 
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Geographically concentrated ethnic minorities at the raion level as well as the regional 
level anchored United Russia. The dominant party captured electoral windfalls in raions 
situated within ethnic republics: the value for raions located in ethnic republics was 
between 23 and 44 times the value of the odds for raions located in Russian federal 
regions in the lower models and between 13 and 286 times in the higher ones. In most of 
the strict specifications, raions in ethnic republics exercised a more intense effect on 
United Russia strongholds than was the case in the previous election. This finding may 
suggest that the dominant party hardened its grip on these areas over time, either because 
it was concerned that its hold had actually weakened and therefore wanted to make a 
renewed show of strength and/or because the LDPR was subtly creeping in on the its turf. 
As discussed earlier, the LDPR received an unexpected and sizable boost from location in 
ethnic republics in the strict specifications, hiking the odds of a nationalist stronghold by 
between 5 and 23 times. Therefore, in some of the models, the magnitude of the effect of 
ethnic republic status for the LDPR was actually stronger than that for the dominant 
party. An explanation for this finding is not readily apparent and will require future 
research to fully disentangle. Descriptive statistics demonstrate that United Russia‘s 
average in ethnic republics far exceeded its national take, with almost 19% greater 
support, a boost of an additional six percent compared to four years prior. According to 
both thresholds, the vast majority of dominant party strongholds were located in these 
regions, 67% by the relaxed measure and nearly 92% by the strict threshold, as shown in 
Table 8. 10. The share of lower-level strongholds that were housed in ethnic republics fell 
from 75% in 2007.  
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Mirroring the effects of ethnic republic status, a shift from the reference group to the 
indicator group of the Muslim region variable skyrocketed the odds from between 186 
and 769 in the relaxed specifications and from between 27 and 304 in the strict models. 
In the relaxed models, Muslim region status exerted a stronger effect than was the case in 
2007. United Russia‘s showing in Muslim regions was even more astonishing than in 
majority-minority raions and ethnic republics: the party‘s average was 32% higher than 
nationally, a nine percent improvement over the 23% jump in the party‘s mean in 2007. 
Moreover, nearly 47% and more than 70% were found in Muslim regions, according to 
the lower and higher measure, comparable to 2007. United Russia successfully guarded 
its ethnic pockets of support at both the raion and the regional level in 2011, which 
powerfully signaled to domestic audiences that the dominant party may have lost ground 
in terms of its final vote share and the distribution of seats in the Duma, but maintained 
its dominance where it really counted. With ethnic areas essentially hermetically sealed 
off from other political parties, United Russia will likely be able to maintain its position 
in the Duma in future elections, as these areas hold the promise of electoral windfalls.  
The Urban-rural Divide and the Dominant Party 
 In addition to areas with high densities of ethnic minorities, the dominant party 
received a boost outside cities and towns. Higher degrees of rurality increased the odds of 
Table 8.10: United Russia Strongholds and Different Electoral Environments in 2011 
 
 
 
# of  United Russia 
Strongholds  
(Lower Threshold) 
(430 Total) 
% of   United 
Russia  Strongholds 
# of   United Russia  
Strongholds 
(Higher Threshold) 
(178 Total) 
% of   United 
Russia Strongholds 
Ethnic federal 
regions 
289 67.21 
163 91.57 
Russian federal 
regions 
141 32.79 
15 8.43 
Muslim regions 202 46.98 127 71.35 
Caucasus 
regions 
114 26.51 
81 45.51 
Poorer Regions 232 53.95 116 65.17 
Natural 
Resource 
Regions 
140 32.56 
65 36.52 
Fraudulent 
raions 
173 40.23 
177 99.44 
Non-Fraudulent 
raions 
257 59.77 
1 0.56 
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a bastion of support slightly in the relaxed models and by one to two percent in the strict 
specifications, which represented effect magnitudes roughly equivalent to 2007. 
Descriptive statistics reveal that United Russia‘s average vote share in predominantly 
rural areas was nearly six percent higher than the party‘s raion-level national mean, a 
boost of an additional one percent compared to 2007. Furthermore, Figure 8.23 
corroborates these findings by highlighting the positive relationship between more rural 
areas and United Russia‘s electoral gains and looks strikingly similar to the scatterplot 
pertaining to the late 2000s. There were numerous especially enthusiastic raions in both 
the most urban and the most rural areas, although those populating the right edge of the 
scatterplot were packed in more densely. As expected, the vast majority of the outliers 
were found in ethnic republics. The bulk of zealous urban raions were found in the capital 
cities, for example, Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, Makhachkala, the capital of 
Dagestan, and Cherkessk, the capital of Karachay-Cherkessia.  
 
Figure 8.23: Rural Inhabitants and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Figure 8.24 reveals that a higher percentage of predominantly rural areas than urban 
centers were United Russia strongholds. Approximately 20% of rural raions reported 
unusually high vote shares for the dominant party while roughly half that percentage of 
urban areas churned out similar figures, congruent with the findings from when the party 
had reached the pinnacle of its strength in the late 2000s. Despite the rural contours, there 
seemed to be an evening out of some of the more noticeable disparities between rural and 
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urban raions in specific regional contexts compared to four years earlier. As in 2007, a 
distinct peak was evident in Muslim regions: roughly 90% of rural raions and upwards of 
60% of their urban counterparts in these regions delivered stronghold-level vote shares to 
the dominant party. Indeed, a higher percentage of urban raions in Muslim regions were 
United Russia strongholds than rural raions in any other regional environment. United 
Russia gained some ground in urban raions in the Caucasus: the percentage of these 
raions that were strongholds increased by a few percentage points over 2007.  
 
Figure 8.24: United Russia Strongholds by Urban-Rural in Different Regional Contexts 
in 2011 (lower threshold on the left) 
 
 
The trend in the countryside evolved from the 1990s to the 2000s and 2010s in a 
strikingly similar fashion to that in high turnout raions: in the mid-1990s, the countryside 
was divided between the KPRF, and the LDPR and Our Home is Russia to some extent, 
and in the late-1990s, was carved up by the KPRF, LDPR, Fatherland-All Russia and 
Unity, but the accession of United Russia in the 2000s quickly purged this plurality and 
the dominant party established exclusive control over rural districts. In the mid-1990s, the 
effect of rurality on the Our Home is Russia vote was inconsistent, increasing the odds in 
some models while decreasing them in others. One of Our Home‘s more conspicuous 
weaknesses when compared to United Russia, then, was its relative inability to lock down 
rural areas. United Russia clearly distinguished itself from its party of power predecessor 
in harvesting rural support categorically, greatly contributing to its ability to contest 
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legislative elections victoriously. The dominant party‘s ability to retain its hold on the 
countryside will prove decisive in future contests.  
Regional Geographic and Socioeconomic Indicators and the Dominant Party 
 The variables assessing different regional characteristics highlight continuity but 
also some shifts in the contours of United Russia‘s electoral support in the 2000s and 
2010s. Raions in the Caucasus were significantly more likely to be bastions of support for 
the dominant party, between 17 and 33 times more likely in the relaxed models and 
between 94 and 255 times in the strict specifications. Compared to the previous contest, 
the magnitude of the effect diminished somewhat in the lower threshold models and some 
of the higher specifications, which was unexpected because United Russia did not 
confront new challenges from opposition parties in these regions that may have 
accounted for the dampening. Nevertheless, these raions registered an average vote share 
for United Russia that was almost 14% higher than its national take, a significant 
improvement over the party‘s showing in the area four years earlier, when Caucasian 
raions recorded an average vote share approximately 8% greater. The discussion of the 
scatterplots detailing the relationship between ethnic minorities and rurality and United 
Russia‘s vote share above made reference to outliers populating the upper right quadrant 
and many of those fanatical raions were located in the Caucasus, particularly Chechnya 
and Dagestan. Roughly one-quarter and nearly one-half of United Russia‘s strongholds 
were located in the Caucasus, according to the lower and higher measure. The Caucasus 
proved once again to be a hotbed of dominant party support. As in the countryside, the 
dominant party reinforced its standing vis-à-vis opposition parties as the only party that 
profited in the Caucasus.  
Mirroring the findings from 2007, the odds of a United Russia stronghold were 
damaged by 78% based on a unit increase in regional wealth in one higher threshold 
specification. Contingent on the model, the magnitude of the negative effect was greater 
than in 2007, when the odds plunged by up to 86%. Unexpectedly, the dominant party 
suffered to a greater degree than the KPRF or LDPR with rises in gross regional product. 
Moreover, more than half of the United Russia‘s strongholds, approximately 54% and 
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65% by the lower and higher measure, were located in economically disadvantaged 
regions. The share of strongholds located in poorer regions was larger than four years 
prior, when half were found there across thresholds. Raions located in regions with larger 
than average economies produced an average vote share that was more than one percent 
under United Russia‘s national mean. In poorer regions, United Russia competed head-
to-head with both the KPRF and LDPR for support. Impoverished areas, therefore, 
seemed to be one of only two areas where a meaningful plurality of political competitors 
prevailed when United Russia partook.  
While resource dependence did not systematically affect the occurrence of a 
dominant party stronghold in any of the models specified for 2007, the value for raions 
located in resource-rich regions was between eight and 19 times the value of the odds for 
raions located in regions with more diversified economies across the relaxed models. 
United Russia‘s mean showing in resource-abundant areas was more than four percent 
higher than nationally and approximately one-third of dominant party strongholds were 
located in resource regions by both measures. Like the LDPR and paradoxically for both 
parties, United Russia succeeded in two diametrically opposed regional contexts: poorer 
regions and those endowed with abundant natural resources. Resource-rich regions 
represented the second area where the opposition, exclusively the LDPR in this case, 
competed with United Russia and drew results, making some inroads into dominant party 
territory. In some cases, the magnitude of the effect of resource abundance on the 
occurrence of LDPR strongholds was actually stronger than that of United Russia. Unlike 
regions with higher gross regional products, which damaged the likelihood of KPRF and 
LDPR strongholds even in the 1990s, however, the LPDR‘s gains in resource-abundant 
regions came only after United Russia‘s rise to power.  
Electoral Manipulation and the Dominant Party 
 As was the case four years prior, United Russia captured electoral windfalls in 
raions suspected for electoral malfeasance, but the magnitude of the effect increased 
markedly. A shift from the non-manipulated to the fraudulent category increased the odds 
of a dominant party bastion of support by 65 to 84 times across the lower threshold 
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models, and by 232 to 1,098 times across the higher specifications. While these findings 
corroborate existing research indicating that United Russia engaged in and benefited from 
electoral manipulation, they also provide new evidence regarding the role of malfeasance 
in generating dominant party electoral windfalls across the thousands of raions in Russia 
from one election to the next. Fraudulent raions reported an even higher average vote 
share for United Russia in 2011, astonishingly 30% greater than nationally, than in the 
previous contest, when the party‘s mean level of support was 15% greater. Figure 8.25 
demonstrates the robust and positive association between increasing voter turnout and 
United Russia‘s vote share; the scatterplot looks strikingly similar to that from 2007. 
Astonishingly, 33 high turnout raions recorded vote shares for United Russia between 95 
and 97%, an additional 13 reported vote shares of 98% and a further 29 registered 99% 
for the dominant party. Of the 99% raions, 62% were located in Chechnya, 31% in 
Mordovia and 3% in each Tatarstan and Tuva. Surprisingly, the one raion that reported 
100% turnout was located in an oblast (Arkhangelsk), rather than an ethnic republic, and 
registered a 75% vote share for United Russia. 
 
Figure 8.25: Voter Turnout and United Russia‘s Vote Share in 2011 
 
 
Approximately 40% and just fewer than 100% of United Russia‘s strongholds were found 
in fraudulent raions in 2011, according to the relaxed and strict thresholds. Figure 8.26 
looks nearly identical to the chart for 2007 and underscores the continuity in United 
Russia‘s patterns of support over time. However, a few subtle distinctions emerge 
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between 2007 and 2011. First, approximately five percent fewer of United Russia‘s 
bastions of support, according to the lower threshold, were found in fraudulent raions 
than was the case four years prior. Second, regarding the strict measure, there was only 
one dominant party stronghold in 2011 that was located in a non-manipulated raion, 
whereas there were four such strongholds in 2007. Finally, of the hundreds of fraudulent 
raions, approximately two percent more were dominant party strongholds in 2011, 
according to the higher threshold, than in 2007. The number of high turnout raions that 
delivered high levels of support to opposition parties, but not the dominant party, 
remained stable at just 11 raions from 2007 to 2011. The number fraudulent raions that 
were not strongholds for any party in 2011, however, dropped in many instances from the 
previous election. For example, there were 12 such raions in Bashkortostan in 2007 but 
only nine in 2011; while 13 high turnout raions in Sakha were not strongholds for any 
party in 2007, the same was true of only six raions in 2011; the five raions like this in 
Tatarstan in the late 2000s dropped to two in the early 2010s; the six such raions in Omsk 
in 2007 fell to two in 2011.  
 
Figure 8.26: Percent Fraudulent Raions that are United Russia Strongholds vs. Percent 
United Russia Strongholds in Fraudulent Raions in 2011 
 
 
From a different angle, Figure 8.27 provides additional evidence that United Russia 
generally ruled in high turnout raions as was the case in the previous election, but also 
reveals that opposition parties received higher vote shares than the dominant party in a 
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few isolated cases. In sharp contrast to 2007, opposition parties managed to chip away at 
United Russia‘s supremacy in raions with more limited turnout: significant zones of 
convergence are apparent between United Russia‘s performance and that of opposition 
parties when voter turnout fell under thresholds for suspected electoral manipulation in 
2011. Interestingly, even Yabloko, a party that had been frozen out of parliament since 
2003 and received a paltry 2.40% vote share in 2011, managed to outperform United 
Russia in a few raions with lower voter turnout. The notable absence of similar areas of 
convergence in 2007 strongly suggests the dominant party started to lose its grip on 
elections in lower turnout areas as it strengthened its hold on those in high turnout raions.  
 
Figure 8.27: Voter Turnout and United Russia vs. Opposition Parties‘ Vote Shares in 
2011 
 
 
 
In future elections to the State Duma, United Russia may double-down on its efforts in 
the thousands of raions that have reported more limited turnout, where the dominant party 
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faces competitors with the potential to outperform it. If zones of convergence evident in 
2011 are successfully eradicated, the scatterplots from the 2015 contest will resemble 
those from 2007 more closely. Alternately, if the dominant party is unable to exercise its 
control in lower turnout raions as effectively as in high turnout raions in 2015, the areas 
of convergence present in 2011 may reappear and swell and those figures from 2011 may 
have offered the first sign of a progressing trend away from United Russia‘s dominance 
in the legislature and Russian politics more broadly. In either scenario, opposition party 
inroads are seemingly most likely to be carved out in raions with more limited turnout in 
future elections.  
Conclusion 
 The 2011 election offered the first evidence of dominant party decay: the party‘s 
vote share dropped precipitously and opposition parties began to make some electoral 
gains at the expense of United Russia, especially in lower turnout raions. The first 
election in the 2010s brought forth United Russia‘s decline, rounding out the party‘s 
electoral arc that began in 2003 with its birth and initial consolidation and reached its 
apex in 2007. Although the dominant party continued to win overwhelmingly in high 
turnout raions suspected for electoral malfeasance, each party in the core party troika 
increased its vote share at the national level, despite the fact that the liberal Yabloko still 
faced an uphill climb to restore its presence in the lower house of the legislature. In the 
wake of the global recession of 2009, United Russia‘s patronage reserves in 2011 were 
more limited than at the time of the previous two elections and voters turned against the 
party when it could no longer provide economic deliverables. Furthermore, opposition 
parties exploited the fact that the regime was in dire straits economically and sought to 
mobilize the public against United Russia and the Kremlin before the polls were opened, 
and continued to do so long after they had closed. The combination of economic 
downturn and the broad public exposure of plans for electoral manipulation generated a 
type of political unrest and protest voting against the dominant party hitherto not 
witnessed by current power holders. But opposition parties did not succeed in completely 
unseating United Russia in 2011 as they had perhaps quixotically hoped. United Russia 
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emerged from the 2011 contest significantly weaker than in 2007, but also stronger than 
in 2003, and the party would surely live to fight another day.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Key Findings and Implications 
The Social Bases of Party Dominance 
 The preceding analysis of Russian legislative elections from 1995 through 2011 
yields several conclusions that advance our understanding of the dominant party system 
in Russia as well as dominant party authoritarian regimes outside the post-communist 
region. The first central finding that emerges from this investigation highlights that 
dominant parties rely on distinct social bases of support, much like other political parties, 
to remain in power. Rather than performing well across the country in a uniform fashion, 
considerable diversity manifest in United Russia‘s electoral outcomes due to structural or 
environmental factors. Even with an unparalleled war chest that could be leveraged to 
achieve an overwhelming victory at the national level, electoral outcomes at the sub-
national level reveal heterogeneity in the dominant party‘s ability to win elections by a 
landslide.  
These findings indicate that dominant parties do not dominate everywhere, as 
United Russia‘s vote share fell precipitously in precisely those electoral environments 
that proved less conducive to machine politics and other machinations. The dominant 
party has overachieved in legislative elections in areas with dense populations of ethnic 
minorities, particularly titular minorities, but has continually struggled in predominantly 
ethnic Russian areas. United Russia targeted ethnic minority constituencies, particularly 
titular minorities, because ethnic- and patronage-based voter mobilization could be 
carried out with surgical precision to the dominant party‘s benefit in exchange for 
political and economic resources channeled from the central authorities. Ethnic minority 
areas have also been susceptible to increased dominant party penetration during national 
elections because the federal government seeks to establish its political dominance over 
unruly regions to signal its invincibility to potential challengers. Ethnic Russian areas are, 
by comparison, poorly equipped to deliver immense vote shares to the dominant party 
and, moreover, the party faces few incentives to dominate these groups politically. 
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 The influence of the countryside in propping up party dominance also comes to 
the fore. In the early 2000s, the Russian countryside was rapidly transformed from a 
mainstay of the Communist Party to one of the key bases of support for the ruling party. 
The prevalence of one-company towns and the comparative ease with which United 
Russia can monitor voters in rural localities ensures that the countryside is a chief target 
of dominant party machinations in the electoral arena. These findings lend substantiation 
to existing theories of party dominance, which indicate that the countryside is an 
important pillar of dominant party strength because rural areas are more dependent on the 
ruling party for their continued survival and the party‘s ―punishment regime‖ is more 
effective there due to local knowledge (Magaloni 2006). However, rural areas exercised a 
more moderate effect compared to other factors, namely areas with geographically 
concentrated ethnic minorities, in undergirding party dominance, suggesting that the 
countryside may be of secondary importance in the presence of other social structures 
that may deliver the vote more reliably and may be more vulnerable to dominant party 
power politics. Indeed, when United Russia experienced declining support, the party 
turned its efforts toward locking down ethnic minority constituencies more firmly instead 
of trying to eke out a higher electoral return in the countryside.  
 Economic determinants appear comparatively less important than the social bases 
of party dominance, particularly ethnicity and rurality. Although recent scholarship on 
the resource curse postulates a connection between resource abundance and 
authoritarianism, the empirical findings indicate a weaker relationship when assessed at 
the sub-national level. Both within and across elections, the effect of resource wealth on 
the likelihood of dominant party strongholds was checkered: when attaining a positive 
sign, the magnitude of the effect was considerably smaller than the effect size connected 
to social correlates and, in many cases, the sign was statistically significant and negative. 
Thus, when assessed at the sub-national and sub-regional level, the influence of natural 
resource wealth in fueling authoritarianism presents a different picture than existing 
analyses oriented primarily at the national level. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that 
economic dynamics operating at the national level are less influential than social 
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parameters in explaining dominant party support because they cannot fully account for 
the diversity of the dominant party‘s electoral outcomes across both space and time. For 
example, Russia experienced a protracted economic windfall produced by high world oil 
prices across most of the 2000s but the dominant party‘s performance in the early 2000s 
paled in comparison to the electoral prowess it displayed in the late 2000s. Rather than 
the economic environment operating at the national level, the electoral environment at the 
sub-national and sub-regional level, particularly in areas with geographically 
concentrated ethnic minorities and in the countryside, proved decisive.  
 The Russian case underscores that the success or failure of ruling parties, in this 
case Our Home is Russia and United Russia, hinges on social structures that can be 
activated with greater or lesser efficacy to achieve partisan ends. While the cohesiveness 
of the elite is undoubtedly crucial to maintaining party dominance as Brownlee (2007) 
suggests, the analysis offered here sheds light on a different dimension: the effect of 
structural conditions at the sub-national and sub-regional level.  
The Role of Weak Party Systems  
In addition to uncovering the crucial social bases undergirding party dominance 
once in power, the role of a weak party system in creating the initial conditions ripe for 
party dominance emerges as a key factor. Existing scholarship on dominant party 
emergence has attached little importance to party system dynamics immediately 
preceding the ascension of ruling parties, focusing instead on significant periods of nation 
building in the wake of decolonization, social revolution, or wars of liberation. The case 
of dominant party emergence in Russia suggests that a revision of this conventional 
wisdom is warranted: in the absence of cataclysmic events, conditions prevailing in the 
Russian party system itself acquired newfound importance and precipitated the rise of a 
dominant party in circumstances largely unexpected by established theories.  
In the mid-1990s, nearly four dozen parties and electoral blocs contested the 
parliamentary election. With dozens of ―apartment parties‖ entering the electoral fray, 
more than 48% of the votes were wasted on parties that did not cross the threshold for 
representation or were votes against all the parties contesting the election. The late 1990s 
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offered a repeat of 1995, but to a lesser degree: more than two dozen parties threw their 
hats into the electoral ring and more than 16% of votes were wasted. Opposition parties 
in the 1990s mushroomed out of control, and although a lack of coordination plagued the 
opposition at large, the prevalence and persistence of programmatically niche parties 
created an opportunity for a catch-all dominant party to fill the void and marginalize the 
opposition rather expeditiously.  
Importantly, each member of the core party troika remained relatively niche 
throughout the 2000s and 2010s: the Communists, nationalists and liberals repeatedly 
captured exceedingly narrow electorates and altered their ideological appeals only at the 
margins in response to significant changes in the macro political landscape. These parties 
were niche in general but also compared to each other, as there was comparatively 
limited overlap in their platforms and pockets of support. As a collective, these parties 
lacked an ideological basis for coordination and were therefore patently incapable of 
uniting to oppose United Russia, a party with a charismatic leader and a broad-based 
institutional appeal. One political analyst commented that the opposition was fragmented 
from the beginning of the 1990s to the current period because they have ―nothing in 
common and they have no such aim, to […] govern Russia in reality (Senior Political 
Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). For example, the KPRF is ―afraid of being a ruling 
party and the LDPR excluded such a possibility‖ (Ibid). Another politician argued 
similarly that the ―Communists do not want to come to power. They were able to come to 
power in the 1990s but they didn‘t want to get it‖ (Politician Formerly Affiliated with 
United Russia 2011). Therefore, the structural underpinnings in the party system that 
facilitated United Russia‘s rise also contributed to its perpetuation once in power.  
Although the opposition remained virtually unchanged over time, only when other 
conditions fell into place were the opportunities for opposition marginalization expanded 
and a well institutionalized dominant party became possible. The persistence of precisely 
these types of niche opposition parties forestalls the development of a genuine alternative 
to United Russia, at least generated from the existing array of parties, in the foreseeable 
future. Yet the results from the most recent election to the State Duma provided some 
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indication that United Russia‘s grip on political power was weakening, despite the largely 
static opposition. 
The Aftermath of the 2011 Legislative Elections: Crisis and Survival  
 The fact that United Russia‘s vote share in 2011 slipped considerably from 2007 
despite widespread electoral manipulation ―convey[ed] weakness […] emboldening 
social and political actors to step up demands and political challenges, and in 
consequence reduce[d] the party‘s scope for action while in office, as well as its ability to 
retain power in the future‖ (Simpser 2013: 5). Although United Russia still won the 
election by a landslide, the result revealed that the ruling party was more vulnerable than 
commonly believed because even blatant and excessive manipulation could not secure 
the kind of overwhelming victory the party was expected to achieve, which broadened the 
opportunity structure for political mobilization in opposition to the regime. The large-
scale public protests that erupted across Russia in response to widely publicized electoral 
fraud in the December Duma elections sent a shockwave through the Kremlin. A high-
ranking Yabloko party official commented after the election, ―the big events on 
Bolotnaya [Square] show that society exists‖ (Senior Official in Yabloko‘s National 
Organization 2011). Cultural figures published a letter in 2011 warning the regime that, 
―unless the system is liberalized from above, it will be inevitably—and maybe 
violently—brought down from below‖ (Kara-Murza 2011: 55). In response, what some 
have called ―liberalizing concessions‖ concerning party registration rules and the 
selection process of regional governors were granted in early 2012 (Golosov 2012). The 
Kremlin claimed that the reforms were in the works prior to the Duma contest and did not 
represent a concession to protestors, however the timing of Medvedev‘s announcement, 
on the eve of yet another major political protest in Moscow, suggested that United 
Russia‘s comparatively poor performance combined with increasingly undeniable public 
dissent provided the immediate impetus for action (Ibid). In his annual address to the 
Federal Assembly in late December 2011, Medvedev did not propose a sweeping 
overhaul of the existing laws on political parties, but rather limited changes that targeted 
two of the most restrictive elements: reducing the required membership minimum from 
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40,000 to 500 and removing the signature requirement for registered political parties to 
participate in elections (Golosov 2012: 6). In this instance, the government signaled its 
readiness for reform by authorizing the law to take effect immediately upon signing 
rather than on the date originally set, January 1, 2013 (Ibid).  
 Yet this unilateral ―concession‖ on behalf of the Kremlin to the public and 
opposition political parties may actually prove advantageous for United Russia in future 
legislative elections and therefore may turn out to be less of a concession than originally 
believed. The Kremlin‘s ultimate goal of preserving United Russia‘s dominance is best 
served by a highly fragmented party system in which the opposition remains divided 
against itself. The electoral law governing the 2007 contest had already prohibited 
electoral coalitions, preventing opposition party coordination against the common enemy 
of United Russia, and the additional change to party membership requirements may 
further propel the party system backwards in time toward the ―wild east‖ kind of chaos 
that prevailed in the 1990s. Recognizing the dangers inherent in the reduced membership 
requirement before it was signed into law, the KPRF and LDPR lobbied for a 5,000-
member requirement for party registration to restrict factions from dividing into new 
parties (Herszenhorn 2012). The new membership requirements will surely make it easier 
for new parties with minuscule followings to register. Without the reauthorization of 
electoral coalitions, the entry of numerous parties, including apartment parties, may 
further splinter the opposition already crippled by the struggle to survive under a 
dominant party. Indeed, since the law went into effect, numerous parties have sought 
registration, including the Republican Party and the People‘s Freedom Party, both of 
which are lead in part by Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the organizers of the post-election 
protests; Mikhail Prokhorov, the billionaire businessman who owns the Brooklyn Nets 
professional basketball team, and Mikhail Gorbachev also each expressed their intention 
of forming parties in the near future (Ibid). Widespread discontent in the electorate with 
the current party system may allow ―even minor and little-known parties [to attract] 
voters seeking fresh alternatives‖ (Golosov 2012: 6). Therefore, the KPRF, LDPR and 
Yabloko, if the liberal party attempts to fight its way out of the political wilderness yet 
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again, may be forced to compete not only against each other and Kremlin-created spoiler 
parties in future elections, but with newcomers endeavoring to siphon off their votes. One 
Duma Deputy from the opposition commented, ―the main goal of the law is to drive our 
political system to new levels of absurdity‖ (Clover 2012). Although some have argued, 
―with regard to the law on political parties, the regime did make a meaningful liberalizing 
concession,‖ it seems more likely that this change will serve first and foremost to 
reinforce United Russia‘s dominance at the expense of the opposition (Golosov 2012: 
12).  
 The second major change in the package of reforms announced by Medvedev 
after the 2011 Duma contest was the return to elections of the regional governors, which 
had been subject to presidential appointment since 2004. The candidates were to be 
selected in ―voluntary consultations‖ between registered political parties and the Russian 
president, and only those candidates selected through that process would not be obliged 
to fulfill the signature collection requirements that were established by regional 
parliaments (RIA Novosti 2012). Specifically, Putin described the process as follows: ―all 
parties achieving representation in the regional parliament by direct secret ballot will 
nominate their candidates for governor […] all their proposals will then pass through the 
presidential ‗filter‘; and he [the president] will pass along these candidates [for 
confirmation] not by the deputies of the legislative assemblies but by direct secret ballot 
by the entire regional population‖ (Golosov 2012: 10). What Putin described as a 
―presidential filter‖ for candidates was an ―integral part of the proposal‖ and amounted to 
the presidential ―preselection of candidates,‖ giving the president ―unrestricted power to 
establish the rules of the game for the operation of the ‗filter‘‖ (Golosov 2012: 10, 11). 
Ultimately, the proposal was changed to allow any registered party the ability to 
nominate candidates, rather than exclusively those represented in the regional parliaments 
(Golosov 2012). The bill also permitted citizens to seek the resignation of their regional 
governor through a referendum carried out by the regional legislature, but nevertheless 
allowed the recalled governor the ability to appeal to the Supreme Court (RIA Novosti 
2012).  
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As was the case with new party registration requirements, the reform stipulating 
the reversion to elections as the method for selecting regional governors may have been 
somewhat of a concession to the electorate, albeit one that was not demanded by 
protestors, but also a move designed to help the Kremlin find a much-needed way out of 
a sticky situation. The introduction of gubernatorial appointment proved to be one of the 
most disliked authoritarian measures implemented by Putin, as revealed in repeated 
public opinion surveys (Golosov 2012). While mostly discounting increasing restrictions 
on political parties, the public focused on gubernatorial appointment as a key indicator of 
the regime‘s growing authoritarianism and the attitude toward this law decayed over time 
(Ibid). The Kremlin could thus reasonably expect that the public would view the return to 
elections favorably.  
But the Kremlin also profited from this measure. The Kremlin had ―ran up against 
an organizational and personnel problem created by previous appointments […] 
numerous governors who are now serving out their fourth or fifth term and approaching 
retirement age must be replaced‖ (Petrov 2011: 49). However, the absence of elections 
for regional governors also eliminated the mechanism for training new political leaders 
and exposing them to the public and, therefore, the Kremlin would have had ―no choice 
in many regions except to appoint people who [were] poorly prepared for such a 
prominent role‖ if the appointment system was preserved (Ibid). By avoiding the 
appointment of poor candidates, the Kremlin expected that elections would increase the 
quality of regional executives and their legitimacy, and, of paramount importance, 
provide regional governors with direct experience in the electoral arena that could be 
leveraged to the Kremlin‘s advantage in future national elections (Petrov 2011; Golosov 
2012). The reform also guaranteed the Kremlin and Putin specifically substantial control 
over the process of nomination, which protected the Kremlin‘s ability to control the 
alternatives to its favored candidates, thereby reducing the meaning of regional elections 
under the new format. Moreover, in reinstating elections, the Kremlin would be able to 
avoid taking full responsibility for the actions of regional executives in office and instead 
distribute the blame among the regional electorate in the event of governor‘s 
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wrongdoings (Ibid). Gubernatorial appointment was ―potentially dangerous for the 
Kremlin, as it close[d] off the possibility of localizing and absorbing public protest in the 
event of dissatisfaction with local authorities and redirect[ed] it against those at the top‖ 
(Petrov 2011: 57). Without an institutionalized mechanism for the public to release steam 
by ―exposing at the same time reducing social tension,‖ the citizenry operated within a 
political environment akin to a pressure cooker susceptible to explosion at any moment 
and the regime was forced to rely more heavily on crude forms of repression to thwart 
nonsystemic protest (Ibid). Thus, the return to elections provided a mechanism of 
resolving what would have amounted to an intractable problem for the Kremlin moving 
forward.  
The turbulent wake of the Duma contest may have been a crisis point for the Putin 
regime, but the Kremlin quickly regrouped for the presidential elections three months 
later and successfully pulled off Putin‘s return to the presidency. The Kremlin proved a 
quick learner: when public protests erupted again around the time of Putin‘s inauguration 
in May, the authorities opted for police repression rather than tolerance of dissent, which 
resulted in violent clashes between protestors and the police and hundreds detained. In 
2012, Putin became the first person in post-Soviet history to re-claim the presidency after 
already serving two terms in office. While the 1993 Russian constitution proscribes an 
individual from serving more than two consecutive terms as president, there is no 
stipulation regarding a limit on total terms served. Thus, Putin was eligible to re-run for 
president after serving as prime minister. With voter turnout of over 64% and nearly the 
same percentage of votes cast in support of his candidacy, Putin ascended to the 
presidency once again in the first round. The KPRF‘s Zyuganov found himself in second 
place, capturing merely 17%, for the fourth time since the 1996 presidential election. 
During Medvedev‘s brief stint as president, he approved a bill that extended the length of 
the presidential term from four years to six. Interestingly, in 2012, Putin commented that 
he would support an amendment to Russian law that would establish a two-term 
maximum, but the law would not apply to him because it would not operate retroactively 
(Sonne 2013).   
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With the new six-year term in effect, if Putin wins re-election for a third time in 
2018 and serves as president for the full term until 2024, he would become the country‘s 
longest-serving leader since Josef Stalin, surpassing Leonid Brezhnev by only two years. 
Even before Putin won the presidency, observers began likening Putin and his regime to 
that of Brezhnev, who ruled for 18 years and began to be seen as ―depressingly immortal‖ 
in the 1970s (Reddaway 2012: 98). For its part, the Kremlin provided its own 
interpretation of the ―Brezhnevization of Putin‖ that ran against the widespread view that 
the Brezhnev era was synonymous with stagnation: the Kremlin argued that Brezhnev 
was not a negative figure, but rather one who constructed the foundations of the economy 
and represents ―political stability and a calm and steady development‖ (Ibid). Dismissing 
the parallels between himself and Brezhnev, Putin has preferred to compare himself to 
Franklin Roosevelt, who was elected four times as U.S. President (Ibid).  
The Future of United Russia and the Putin Regime 
 In future elections to the State Duma, the next of which is scheduled for 2016, 
United Russia will likely remain a viable contender but will also likely face new 
challenges based on the slowly shifting tide of public opinion. United Russia‘s staying 
power is reinforced by a mix of genuine public support for the party, a lack of available 
alternatives, the party‘s capacity to carry out widespread electoral manipulation to retain 
its position in the legislature, and continual performance on the economic front. First, 
Putin and United Russia enjoy some genuine popular support. In the Russian Election 
Studies Survey of 2012, respondents attributed positive leadership traits to Putin, 
specifically intelligence (97% of respondents) and strength (93%), and, compared to the 
other candidates running for president in 2012, Putin was seen as the most capable of 
managing major issues of the day by a wide margin (Colton and Hale 2014: 11, 7). For its 
part, United Russia towered above the other registered parties when respondents were 
asked which party would do the best job of improving the economy, safeguarding human 
rights and democratic freedoms, and promoting Russia‘s international interests (Colton 
and Hale 2014: 11). The world financial crisis in the late 2000s impacted citizens‘ 
assessments of economic performance under the Putin regime, but not nearly as much as 
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one would expect if the regime‘s popularity depended solely on economic growth, 
strongly suggesting that there are other key causes of regime stability (Colton and Hale 
2014). Although Putin continues to receive high marks from the public concerning his 
personal leadership, enduring public support for the current regime is also not based 
exclusively on Putin himself. United Russia‘s position as the dominant party continues to 
shore up support for the regime: astonishingly, 70% of Russians believe that United 
Russia has had some degree of positive influence on the condition Russia is in today, 
while only 14% believe that the party has had no influence and only 9% believe that its 
influence has been negative to some degree (Colton et. al 2014).  
What explains high public approval for the regime despite economic downturn 
and political brouhaha in the wake of the 2011 legislative elections is the fact that the 
regime ―retains most of the broad and deep connections with the electorate that have 
helped sustain it for a dozen years‖ (Colton and Hale 2014: 4). Unlike other parties 
competing in recent elections to the State Duma, there is significant congruence between 
the policy stands that Russians believe United Russia represents and those held by 
Russians themselves: when presented with a 0-10 left-right scale, Russians‘ average self-
placement was 6.1, or somewhat right of center, and United Russia was the only 
parliamentary party that Russians also placed right of center with an average of 7.3, as 
opposed to Just Russia (average of 4.5), the LDPR (3.9) and the KPRF (3.2) (Colton and 
Hale 2014: 14). The congruence in policy orientation between United Russia and the 
citizenry will undoubtedly help the dominant party preserve its viability in the party 
system, because even if the public does not approve of United Russia‘s methods of 
winning legislative elections, they do largely agree with the party‘s policy positions once 
in the Duma. In short, Putin and United Russia have retained public support on a number 
of dimensions and that support will translate into votes come election time. These data 
also provide evidence showcasing how niche opposition parties are, e.g. the Communists 
and ultra-nationalists, compared to the more centrist United Russia. Even the most 
formidable opposition parties have remained perilously out of step with average voter, 
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who is more than two points to the right of the ultra-nationalists and nearly three points to 
the right of the Communists.  
Second, United Russia‘s position in future contests will be fortified by the 
regime‘s ability to ―stave off challenges by shaping people‘s sense of available 
alternatives. That is, even if people are not enthusiastic about their leaders, they can come 
to believe that no serious alternative exists, that no opposition party […] has the 
necessary experience or knowledge to run the country any more effectively than the 
incumbents‖ (Colton and Hale 2014: 7). While opposition parties certainly do not do 
themselves any favors by preserving niche orientations, United Russia has also cultivated 
a sense that no alternatives exist by further marginalizing opposition parties after the 
election is long over. Bracketing soft and hard coercion employed against opposition 
parties during electoral cycles that raises the cost of their participation, United Russia has 
fostered its own indispensability and undermined the potential alternatives by controlling 
access to opportunities for those parties already in the Duma, i.e. United Russia‘s most 
formidable competitors. While the Kremlin allows multiparty competition during 
legislative elections, opposition parties are systematically marginalized once in the 
Duma, as they are rarely granted opportunities to manage public matters independently, 
effectively preventing the accumulation of both experience and reputational capital to 
leverage in future elections (Ibid). One political analyst concurred, ―if you have a party 
[like United Russia] that does not give success to other political parties, these political 
parties are marginals. They have no experience of working with authorities or in [a] 
governmental body‖ and therefore cannot become a viable challenger to the ruling party 
(Senior Political Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). Opposition parties face a difficult 
choice between cooperating with the dominant party and therefore abandoning their 
claim to offer a genuine alternative to it, or preserving their position as the opposition but 
sacrificing the few opportunities afforded that would lend much-needed experience and 
skills to their public profiles (Colton and Hale 2014). Regardless of their choice, 
opposition parties are further emasculated once in the legislature, which diminishes their 
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credibility in future legislative elections because voters are unlikely to support parties 
with little real experience despite the fact that they were members of the outgoing Duma.  
United Russia‘s tactics vis-à-vis opposition parties in the legislature appear to be 
producing the desired effect in the electorate: less than one-third of survey respondents 
reported that any registered party other than the dominant party had a chance to come to 
power in the next decade and two-thirds of respondents reported that additional parties 
should not be allowed to contest future elections (Colton and Hale 2014: 8). The regime‘s 
changes to party registration requirements may not have enjoyed broad public support 
but, because many Russians reported that other parties have little chance of coming to 
power in the coming decade, the change may have offered the regime a low-cost way of 
placating a relatively small group of dissenters. Furthermore, United Russia also controls 
the availability of alternatives by co-opting political elites and enforcing prostration from 
within the party. The very existence of United Russia, i.e. a strong ruling party, ensures 
that ―there is no serious opposition in Russia […] while the political elite is united‖ 
(Reddaway 2012: 110). United Russia can thus preserve its position in the legislature and 
in the political arena more generally by controlling the alternatives to it in various ways.  
Third, United Russia‘s position will be bolstered due to its capacity to carry out 
widespread electoral manipulation to produce the electoral outcomes it desires. 
Importantly, Russians widely believed that the dominant party would have won a 
legislative majority in the 2011 Duma contest even if it were completely fair, providing 
additional evidence to the notion that United Russia was not seeking to engage in 
outcome changing electoral fraud but rather to exaggerate their dominance in the election 
for domestic political reasons (Colton and Hale 2014: 18). The capacity to engage in 
electoral manipulation also effects the electorate‘s perceptions of available alternatives 
since United Russia‘s dominance in legislative elections, with voter participation and 
United Russia‘s vote share both reaching into the high 90% range in some areas, creates a 
pervasive sense that the dominant party is the only game in town. Moreover, United 
Russia‘s show of dominance through fraud effectively deters potential challengers: when 
opposition parties face little hope of making it into the Duma and will face a barrage of 
 464 
dominant party tactics during the campaign, some of which may include violence, the 
costs of participation are raised and the supply of parties narrows considerably. By 
engaging in illicit activities in future legislative elections, United Russia‘s invincibility 
will be on full display, which will send a powerful signal to voters and opposition parties 
alike.  
Finally, with support for the regime dependent on the economy and the economy 
dependent on natural resources, the regime is extraordinarily vulnerable to the 
inescapable price cycles of oil and gas that buoy the regime in the good times but sour the 
public on current power holders in the bad (Goldman 2008: 88). Despite the economy‘s 
vulnerability to drastic changes in world prices of oil and gas, there is evidence that the 
price of natural resources will remain high in the future, undergirding United Russia‘s 
dominance. From 2000 to 2006, international demand for energy increased by 10 million 
barrels per day (Goldman 2008: 90). With higher international demand for oil led by 
China and India, the world‘s excess oil production capacity has been stretched to its limit: 
the International Energy Agency estimates that the world needs 5 million barrels per day 
of excess oil production to ―avoid energy disruption,‖ which is nearly half of Russia‘s 
yearly production (Goldman 2008: 89). By the mid-2000s, the world‘s excess petroleum 
capacity plunged from 15% of international consumption to merely two to three percent, 
strongly suggesting that energy prices are likely to remain high in the future (Ibid). The 
combination of record-setting demand and shrinking excess capacity furnishes the 
Kremlin with an enormous war chest that facilitates the supply of economic deliverables 
to the population and patronage resources to give or withhold as needed at election time.  
 While genuine public support, the absence of available alternatives, the capacity 
to conduct electoral fraud and high economic performance will likely aggrandize United 
Russia in the future, there are also indications that the tide of public opinion is slowly 
turning against the regime and the ruling party, the 2011-2012 protests offering one 
conspicuous manifestation. Survey data show that ―after a dozen years in power some of 
the bloom is off the Putin rose‖: compared to 2008, considerably more Russians reported 
that they believed corruption and inequality had increased since 2000, when Putin 
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initially stepped into the presidency, and noticeably fewer Russians reported that 
stability, Russia‘s influence in the world, and personal freedom had increased under his 
reign (Colton and Hale 2014: 9). The regime‘s public approval ratings soared in the 
2000s before the international financial crisis, but more recently, Russians are beginning 
to re-appraise their position vis-à-vis the state and the standard of living of the 
population. Sizable shares of Russians are drawing conclusions that do not portend a 
bright future for Putin or United Russia: 63% of respondents believe that the state‘s 
responsiveness to the needs of the population has either remained unchanged or 
decreased since 2000, and, strikingly, given the impressive rate of economic growth 
sustained under Putin, the same percentage believe that the standard of living of the 
population has remained unchanged or decreased since Putin took office (Colton and 
Hale 2014: 11). Given the ―direct relationship between the popularity of the Russian 
president […] and income growth, both in the economy as a whole and of citizens,‖ 
citizens‘ lackluster appraisals of their own standard of living do not bode well for the 
continuation of the Putin regime (Petrov 2011: 66).  
In addition to a dimmer view of life in Russia, survey results from 2012 revealed 
for the first time a decline in the percentage of Russians who believed Putin, as a leader 
personally, is honest and trustworthy and really cares about people, even though he 
continues to make a positive impression with regard to intelligence and strength (Colton 
and Hale 2014: 10). Because Putin‘s popularity rating is of paramount importance to the 
Kremlin, the government will be compelled to ―spend colossal sums on populist 
measures like […] increases in wages and pensions‖ to maintain the current system with 
Putin at the helm, despite the fact that the economy has been crippled by the international 
financial crisis (Petrov 2011: 66). If the economy fails to bounce back, the government 
may be forced to pull back on some of its key policies or else risk pursuing populist 
policies that are ultimately unsustainable, but either situation will likely result in 
depressed approval ratings for Putin.  
Along with the President, United Russia has also made out poorly concerning a 
particular question included in a recent survey: more than one-third of respondents 
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believe that United Russia is a party of swindlers and thieves (Colton et. al 2014). 
However, when considered in conjunction with the widespread positive evaluation of the 
party‘s influence on the condition of Russia, it appears that Russians currently approve of 
United Russia more than the Putin regime writ large, suggesting that United Russia may 
be able to weather downward trends in Putin‘s popularity if the leadership can identify a 
viable successor. These survey results provide some evidence of erosion of the regime‘s 
popular support, which undoubtedly catalyzed the large-scale protests that erupted during 
the 2011-2012 election cycle. Although the political system constructed since the early 
2000s has been designed to ensure the current regime‘s continued power, the system may 
―guarantee its own failure as hostility to the system gradually develops among the 
population‖ (Gorenburg 2011: 5). Lacking the ability to change the political system from 
within, anti-regime sentiment accumulates in the population until such beliefs ―reach an 
‗explosive‘ level that may bring down both the leadership and the entire system of highly 
managed democracy‖ (Ibid). One political analyst commented that the system that Putin 
and United Russia built in the early 2000s was ―survivable‖, but it ―became too rigid in 
the late 2000s and there are few possibilities for the system to change without completely 
collapsing first‖ (Senior Political Analyst at INDEM Foundation 2011). With early signs 
of erosion becoming more conspicuous, the ruling party may be forced to depend more 
heavily on electoral manipulation in future legislative elections, potentially to actually 
win elections rather than to artificially exaggerate United Russia‘s supremacy in contests 
the party would have likely clinched without such machinations.   
 In addition to the triumphant success of the Sochi Olympics in early 2014, in 
which Russia won the most medals for the first time in history, Putin and the Kremlin 
turned the tide of public opinion back in the regime‘s favor by pursing the annexation of 
the autonomous Republic of Crimea, a region in Ukraine in the Black Sea. The pro-
Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, was ousted in early 2014 and fled to 
Russia amidst anti-government protests in Kiev that turned violent. The Kremlin then 
moved quickly to seize control of Crimea, the only majority ethnic Russian region in 
Ukraine, in response to threats against ethnic Russians by radical nationalists in the 
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country. Ultimately, a March referendum in Crimea, with turnout of 83%, revealed that 
over 97% of residents favored reunifying Crimea with Russia. The Kremlin‘s 
intervention and annexation rallied support for the regime, skyrocketing President Putin‘s 
personal approval rating in a poll conducted by the Levada Center to upwards of 80%, 
close to the high of his first two terms in office from 2000 to 2008 when the Russian 
economy was booming (RIA Novosti 2014). In comparison, Putin‘s rating reached a low 
of 54% in December 2011 during the post-election protests and was 68.8% when he was 
inaugurated for the third time in May 2012  (RIA Novosti 2014b; RIA Novosti 2014a). A 
mere 18% of respondents disapproved of Putin‘s performance as president (RIA Novosti 
2014a). Moreover, revealing the highest level of agreement since the poll began in the 
2000s, 63% of respondents agreed that ―modern Russia has regained the status of a 
superpower,‖ one of Putin‘s primary goals for the country since first taking office in 2000 
(Ibid). The majority of respondents believed that Russia had a right to intervene in former 
Soviet states to protect ethnic Russians while a paltry four percent reported that the 
intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea was illegal and a violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty (Reuters 2014).  
The widespread public support for the intervention in Crimea may embolden the 
Putin regime to make additional forays into the near abroad. As the Communist and ultra-
nationalist parties both favor reconstituting the territory of the former Soviet Union in 
some fashion, the ruling party, claiming to be the party with the most concrete nationalist 
credentials, would likely poach supporters from these parties as a result of such 
international ventures. The combination of the grand slam in Sochi and the reclaiming of 
the Crimea have largely taken the wind out of the sails of the protest movement that 
previously haunted the Kremlin, with polls conducted in April 2014 showing that less 
than 20% of respondents anticipated more popular protests, a drastic decline from late 
2013 (Ibid). Undoubtedly, Putin and United Russia will use these recent successes that 
have regenerated Russian national pride and seemingly strengthened Russia‘s position in 
the international system to garner support in the 2016 Duma election.  
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 The recent events in Crimea provide one indication that authoritarianism in 
Russia is evolving not only domestically, but on the foreign policy front as well. Russia 
has a history of supporting separatist movements in the near abroad and continues to 
occupy the formally Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia that it invaded in 
2008. At that time, Zbigniew Brzezinski commented, ―Putin is putting Russia on a course 
that is ominously similar to Stalin‘s and Hitler‘s in the late 1930‘s [...] Putin‘s 
‗justification‘ for dismembering Georgia—because of the Russians in South Ossetia [is 
correctly analogized to] Hitler‘s tactics vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia to ‗free‘ the Sudeten 
Deutsch‖ (Gardel 2008). Putin‘s rationale for intervening in Crimea was identical to that 
employed in the Georgian case years earlier, i.e. the protection of ethnic Russians, but 
unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the capture of Crimea marks the first time that Russia 
has formally annexed a territory it occupies and thus represents an ―unprecedented step‖ 
in Russia‘s post-communist foreign policy (Mankoff 2014). Indeed, at the time of the 
Russian invasion of Georgia, Brzezinski predicted that if Putin did not face resistance 
concerning Georgia, ―we can logically anticipate that Putin […] will use the same tactics 
toward the Ukraine‖ (Gardel 2008). With the domestic political situation stabilized after 
the protests during the 2011-2012 election cycle, a new era of Russian authoritarianism 
seems to be on the horizon, characterized primarily by an increasing willingness to raise 
the stakes of international conflicts to arguably reckless levels: ―Russia‘s willingness to 
go further in Crimea than in earlier cases appears driven by both Ukraine‘s strategic 
importance to Russia and by Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s newfound willingness to 
ratchet up his confrontation with a West that Russian elites increasingly see as 
hypocritical and antagonistic to their interests‖ (Mankoff 2014). The Kremlin‘s 
willingness to flout both international law and norms of state sovereignty signals that the 
Putin regime now believes the benefits of ―open confrontation‖ outweigh those of 
cooperation with the West (Ibid). In short, under Putin, Russia has ―developed a new 
hubris that is not based on mere bluster‖ (Goldman 2008: 207). The international 
community thus waits to see if Russia‘s unprecedented step in Crimea will become a 
foreign policy precedent for similar breaches in the future.  
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 One additional consideration that bears upon the future of the current regime and 
United Russia only after the next Duma election in 2016 is presidential succession. The 
party may be able to revitalize the regime with a fresh face at the top if Putin decides to 
forego a fourth presidential term in 2018. Recent survey data reveal that 75% of Russians 
believe Putin is a man primarily of the present or someone who is needed right now but 
60% judged that Prokhorov‘s time had yet to come (Colton and Hale 2014: 8). By 
comparison, merely two percent thought Putin‘s time was yet to come and only 12% 
thought the same about Medvedev (Ibid). Prokhorov entered the national political scene 
in 2011, framing his candidacy for president a year later as an alternative to Putin rather 
than in opposition to the Kremlin strongman. But because Prokhorov acquired his wealth 
from working within the system, he is believed to be ―broadly supportive of it‖ (Colton 
and Hale 2014: 7). Prokhorov essentially makes ―no secret of his loyalty to Putin and 
Medvedev‖ (Kara-Murza 2011: 52). Political analyst Alexander Kynev believes 
Prokhorov may be considered for appointment to a position of power even before the 
next presidential election (Soldak 2013). The combination of Prokhorov‘s future 
prospects, as revealed by public opinion surveys, and his general political posture that is 
far from outwardly hostile to the Putin regime may make him a viable successor when the 
time comes for Putin to pass the torch. It is also within the realm of possibility that the 
Kremlin will pluck a successor from political obscurity yet again, rather than promote 
someone with independent wealth and an independent base of support, because he or she 
would be more dependent on the Kremlin politically.  
 While the electorate undoubtedly expects United Russia to win in the future and 
cannot identify any viable alternatives, a potential succession crisis could provide 
precisely the type of shock to the system needed to precipitate more wholesale change. 
For example, if President Putin preserves his white-knuckled grip on political power at 
the highest level of Russian government rather than anointing a successor, his death 
would greatly destabilize Russia and remove an obstacle to greater democracy there, 
although some form of re-democratization would not be inevitable (Huntington 1991). 
Given Putin‘s inveterate commitment to maintaining authoritarianism in Russia, it is 
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highly unlikely that he would reverse course and voluntarily lead the country back down 
the road that he spent years systematically closing off.  
Putin‘s death would likely unleash a bitter factional struggle between the two 
clans currently at odds within the Kremlin elite, i.e. the liberals and the siloviki. In short, 
the first faction includes Dmitry Medvedev and Boris Gryzlov, the former Chairman of 
the State Duma as well as United Russia, and this group may be more likely to reinstate 
some democratic measures in the future if they win a contest for supremacy because they 
are ―committed to Western values […] and support what they regard as a democratic path 
of development‖ (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005: 1069). It is important to note that, 
despite a greater orientation towards the West, the liberal clan is also not hostile to 
authoritarianism in Russia, believing that the body politic is simply not ready for the 
types of democratic reforms that might be necessary, suggesting that the execution of 
reforms from above is the only option (Ibid). The second faction includes President Putin 
and would be comparatively less likely to reinstate democratic reforms, if they succeeded 
in marginalizing the liberals in the post-Putin era. The siloviki clan believes that ―the state 
is the basis of society; therefore, the state should be strong. A strong state controls 
everything […] Pluralism of opinions is dangerous and undermines the state from within 
[…] Society should be passive and obedient‖ (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005: 1073). 
The siloviki are increasing in number in both houses of the legislature and in the central 
government more broadly, and are generally believed to be the stronger of the dueling 
clans  (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005). If Putin appoints a successor rather than 
retaining power himself, a member of the siloviki would likely secure the nomination; for 
example, the former Minister of Defense and one of Putin‘s closest allies, Sergei Ivanov, 
has been named the most likely heir by some analysts of the Kremlin elite (Ibid).  
The future course of Russian politics is far from certain. On the eve of WWII, 
Winston Churchill commented that Russia is a ―riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma‖ and this statement remains as true today as in 1939. The Putin regime remains in 
power, but its future survival depends on how it will adapt to changing domestic 
circumstances, particularly growing disillusionment with the regime and the fact that its 
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methods of manipulation are becoming simultaneously more indispensable and somewhat 
less effective over time. Furthermore, the regime‘s continuation depends on oil and gas 
prices in the future, which determine the Kremlin‘s capacity to deliver patronage goods 
and social services to a population already critical of the powers that be. Opposition 
parties can play a potentially pivotal role in determining the regime‘s fate and possibly 
reversing the course of the political system, moving it from monopoly to competition, but 
integral to process of change will be opposition parties moving in leaps and bounds 
toward the ideological center and attempting to expand their bases of support beyond 
their narrow electorates. Without significant movement, opposition parties will remain at 
the periphery of politics and will not be able to muster a genuine challenge to the regime, 
leaving United Russia as the only game in town and Putin at the helm, deciding Russia‘s 
future course more or less unilaterally.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1 
Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.677 
(.8679)*** 
-6.271 
(.8218)*** 
-5.570 
(.7665)*** 
-4.906 
(1.013)*** 
-4.896 
(.7155)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0419 (.0097)*** 
OR 1.042 
.0237 
(.0076)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0166 
(.0074)** 
OR 1.016 
.0279 
(.0105)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0253 
(.0071)*** 
OR 1.025 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0202 (.0043)*** 
OR 1.020 
.0195 
(.0039)*** 
OR 1.019 
.0130 
(.0037)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0130 
(.0050)*** 
 OR 1.103 
.0146 
(.0033)*** 
OR 1.014 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.5360 (.2952)* 
OR .5850 
-.3570 (.2910) 
OR .6997 
-.4978 
(.2947)* 
OR .6078 
-.5391 
(.3020)* 
OR .5832 
-.3957 (.2981) 
OR .6731 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
1.378 (1.346) 
OR 3.969 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.674 
(2.040)*** 
OR 291.249 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.954 (1.589)* 
OR 19.197 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1555 (.5905) 
OR .8559 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.8309 (1.709) 
OR .4356 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0326 (.0143)** 
OR .9678 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0159 (.0178) 
OR .9841 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0117 (.0168) 
OR 1.011 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0064 (.0067) 
OR .9935 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0063 (.0243) 
OR .9936 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0234 
(.0065)*** 
OR .9767 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0334 
(.0080)*** 
OR .9671 
   
      *Caucasus Region   -.0066 (.0064)   
 473 
 OR .9933 
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0017 (.0031) 
OR .9982 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0353 (.0103) 
OR .9652 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.421 (.5672) 
 
3.462 (.5766) 
 
3.038 (.5204) 
 
3.282 (.5734) 
 
3.126 (.5394) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 482.20*** 492.57*** 375.84*** 418.60*** 409.27*** 
   AIC 749.526 748.946 772.776 734.657 753.155 
   Wald statistic (df) 48.78 (6)*** 49.42 (6)*** 33.89 (6)*** 30.16 (6)*** 49.96 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1 
Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.939 
(.5398)*** 
-5.146 
(.5125)*** 
-4.894 
(.5034)*** 
-3.100 
(.6428)*** 
-4.449 
(.4812)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-2.015 (5.804) 
OR .1332 
-.0082 (.0098) 
OR .9917 
-.0172 
(.0093)* 
OR .9828 
-.0070 (.0080) 
OR .9929 
-.0097 (.0063) 
OR .9903 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0174 (.0028)*** 
OR 1.017 
.0174 
(.0027)*** 
OR 1.017 
.0138 
(.0027)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0141 
(.0039)*** 
OR 1.014 
.0158 
(.0025)*** 
OR 1.015 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.1835 (.2119) 
OR 1.201 
.2404 (.2123) 
OR 1.271 
.2043 (.2136) 
OR 1.226 
.2065 (.2150) 
OR 1.229 
.2497 (.2148) 
OR 1.283 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
1.232 (.9245) 
OR 3.429 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.101 
(1.447)*** 
OR 164.21 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.612 
(1.209)*** 
OR 37.046 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.076 
(.4180)*** 
OR .3407 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.9098 (1.301) 
OR .4025 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
2.009 (5.804) 
OR 7.460 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0023 (.0123) 
OR .9976 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0060 (.0122) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0094 (.0088) 
OR .9906 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0094 (.0230) 
OR 1.009 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0179 
(.0053)*** 
OR .9821 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0287 
(.0065)*** 
OR .9716 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0047 (.0058) 
OR .9952 
  
      *Economic    -.0015 (.0027)  
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Development    
 
OR .9984 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0354 
(.0086)*** 
OR .9651 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.035 (.3811) 
 
2.977 (.3740) 
 
2.860 (.3634) 
 
2.940 (.3996) 
 
2.951 (.3798) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 763.91*** 740.32*** 682.67*** 661.49*** 680.67*** 
   AIC 1261.331 1245.534 1262.839 1207.686 1247.23 
   Wald statistic (df) 43.29 (6)*** 57.11 (6)*** 43.70 (6)*** 42.46 (6)*** 56.17 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 3: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1 
Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.679 
(.8701)*** 
-6.159 
(.7903)*** 
-5.619 
(.7400)*** 
-4.478 
(.9316)*** 
-4.646 
(.6816)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0419 (.0097)*** 
OR 1.042 
.0408 
(.0090)*** 
OR 1.041 
.0344 
(.0082)*** 
OR 1.035 
.0339 
(.0099)*** 
OR 1.034 
.0322 
(.0068)*** 
OR 1.032 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0201 (.0043)*** 
OR 1.020 
.0194 
(.0039)*** 
OR 1.019 
.0126 
(.0036)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0176 
(.0050)*** 
OR 1.017 
.0168 
(.0033)*** 
OR 1.017 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.5056 (.2948)* 
OR .6031 
-.4261 (.2961) 
OR .6530 
-.5188 
(.2989)* 
OR .5952 
-.5087 
(.3009)* 
OR .6012 
-.3587 (.2968) 
OR .6985 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
1.601 (1.262) 
OR 4.961 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.765 
(1.814)*** 
OR 319.243 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.917 
(1.420)*** 
OR 50.257 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3300 (.5552) 
OR .7189 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.8092 (1.591) 
OF .4451 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0304 (.0123)** 
OR .9699 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0322 
(.0120)*** 
OF .9682 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0166 (.0122) 
OR .9834 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0042 (.0063) 
OR .9957 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0154 (.0228) 
OR .9847 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0212 
(.0061)*** 
OR .9790 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0134 
(.0073)*** 
OR .9690 
   
      *Caucasus Region   -.0031 (.0064)   
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 OR .9968 
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0039 (.0030) 
OR .9960 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0342 
(.0084)*** 
OR .9663 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.434 (.5682) 
 
3.410 (.5628) 
 
3.045 (.5089) 
 
3.222 (.5621) 
 
3.089 (.5316) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 487.07*** 490.79*** 425.39*** 406.65*** 392.01*** 
   AIC 748.029 736.134 759.080 722.120 742.012 
   Wald statistic (df) 50.31 (6)*** 59.76 (6)*** 45.92 (6)*** 38.46 (6)*** 55.89 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 478 
 
Table 4: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1 
Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.823 
(.5504)*** 
X -2.239 
(.5130)*** 
-1.463 
(.7535)** 
-2.094 
(.5118)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0499 
(.0125)*** 
OR .9512 
 -.0351 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9654 
-.0270 
(.0124)** 
OR .9733 
-.0340 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9665 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0037 (.0027) 
OR 1.003 
 .0021 (.0028) 
OR 1.002 
-.0063 (.0056) 
OR .9936 
.0028 (.0027) 
OR 1.002 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.3458 (.2962) 
OR 1.413 
 .3467 (.2956) 
OR 1.414 
.4223 (.2991) 
OR 1.525 
.3276 (.2945) 
OR 1.387 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.474 (1.202)** 
OR .0841 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.2338 (1.564) 
OR .7914 
  
   Economic 
Development    
 
   -.5316 (.4348) 
OR .5876 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.8070 (1.495) 
OR .4461 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0345 (.0178)* 
OR 1.035 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0740 (.0509) 
OR .9286 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0195 (.0114)* 
OR .9806 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0653 (.0404) 
OR .9367 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0072 (.0084) 
OR .9927 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0068 (.0076) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0062 (.0034)* 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0044 (.0097) 
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Wealth 
 
OR 1.004 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.397 (.4234) 
  
2.268 (.3962) 
 
2.054 (.3853) 
 
2.249 (.3960) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 248.82***  236.67*** 197.13*** 217.13*** 
   AIC  890.400  892.834 841.600 889.995 
   Wald statistic (df) 28.79 (6)***  24.89 (6)*** 32.11 (6)*** 26.23 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1.  
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Table 5: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1 
Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.242 
(.3623)*** 
X -3.253 
(.3463)*** 
-2.287 
(.5172)*** 
-3.262 
(.3528)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
3.833 (4.514) 
OR 46.207 
 -.0072 (.0076) 
OR .9927 
-.0186 (.0114) 
OR .9815 
-.0124 (.0082) 
OR .9875 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0076 
(.0021)*** 
OR 1.007 
 .0053 
(.0021)** 
OR 1.005 
.0009 (.0039) 
OR 1.000 
.0074 
(.0021)*** 
OR 1.007 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.0609 (.2238) 
OR .9408 
 -.0364 (.2239) 
OR .9641 
-.0669 (.2259) 
OR .9352 
-.0817 (.2244) 
OR .9215 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.3623 (.7471) 
OR .6960 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.7602 (1.205) 
OR .4675 
  
   Economic 
Development    
 
   -.8031 
(.2958)*** 
OR .4479 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.4981 (.8896) 
OR .6076 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-3.829 (4.514) 
OR .0217 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0096 (.0229) 
OR .9904 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0068 (.0110) 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0240 (.0170) 
OR 1.024 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0142 
(.0061)** 
OR .9858 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0047 (.0064) 
OR 1.004 
  
      *Economic    .0039 (.0023)  
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Development    
 
OR 1.003 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0138 
(.0064)** 
OR .9862 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.242 (.2813) 
  
2.233 (.2811) 
 
2.224 (.2978) 
 
2.235 (.2818) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 463.64***  455.62*** 418.97*** 444.73*** 
   AIC  1583.718  1589.942 1496.52 1584.725 
   Wald statistic (df) 16.87 (6)***  10.42 (6) 18.37 (6)*** 15.67 (6)** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1.  
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Table 6: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1 
Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.803 
(.5367)*** 
X -2.658 
(.5536)*** 
-2.182 
(.8299)*** 
-2.568 
(.5535)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0497 
(.0125)*** 
OR .9514 
 -.0471 
(.0119)*** 
OR .9539 
-.0333 (.0209) 
OR .9672 
-.0446 
(.0122)*** 
OR .9563 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0038 (.0027) 
OR 1.003 
 .0011 (.0027) 
OR 1.001 
-.0103 (.0055)* 
OR .9896 
.0018 (.0026) 
OR 1.001 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.3061 (.2982) 
OR 1.358 
 .3369 (.2995) 
OR 1.400 
.3998 (.3009) 
OR 1.491 
.3162 (.2979) 
OR 1.371 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.974 (1.165)* 
OR .1388 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.798 (1.484) 
OR .1656 
  
   Economic 
Development    
 
   -.5937 (.4801) 
OR .5522 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.018 (1.481) 
OR .1328 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0412 (.0436) 
OR .9595 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0391 (.0501) 
OR .9616 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0124 (.0146) 
OR .9876 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0347 (.0399) 
OR .9658 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0138 (.0080)* 
OR .9862 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0067 (.0075) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0081 (.0034)** 
OR 1.008 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0036 (.0095) 
OR 1.003 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.323 (.4128) 
  
2.565 (.4438) 
 
2.593 (.4686) 
 
2.575 (.4533) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 237.73***  260.37*** 248.41*** 228.25*** 
   AIC  884.400  898.445 852.222 896.944 
   Wald statistic (df) 30.59 (6)***  21.66 (6)*** 23.46 (6)*** 21.83 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1.  
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Table 7: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.496 
(.8188)*** 
-3.183 
(.8135)*** 
-2.806 
(.7932)*** 
-3.975 
(1.416)*** 
-3.379 
(.9475)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0098 (.0155) 
OR 1.009 
.0081 (.0131) 
OR 1.008 
.0038 (.0012) 
OR 1.003 
.0099 (.0252) 
OR 1.009 
-.0015 (.0157) 
OR .9984 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0649 
(.0088)*** 
OR .9371 
-.0587 
(.0078)*** 
OR .9429 
-.0590 
(.0077)*** 
OR .9426 
-.0349 
(.0148)** 
OR .9656 
-.0562 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9452 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.307 (.8238) 
OR .2704 
-1.207 (.8295) 
OR .2990 
-1.210 (.8291) 
OR .2979 
-1.170 (.8297) 
OR .3100 
-1.226 (.8316) 
OR .2913 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.387 (1.616) 
OR .2498 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 2.132 (2.761) 
OR 8.432 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.219 (2.498) 
OR .1086 
  
   Economic 
Development  
   
   .7279 (.7010) 
OR 2.070 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.500 (1.747) 
OR 4.483 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0230 (.0267) 
OR .9772 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0498 (.0383) 
OR .9513 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0175 (.0391) 
OR .9826 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   -.0064 (.0129) 
OR .9935 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0010 (.0263) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
 .0345 
(.0149)** 
OR 1.035 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0171 (.0103)* 
OR .9829 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0119 (.0200) 
OR .9881 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.207 (.6226) 
 
3.297 (.6334) 
 
3.313 (.655) 
 
3.190 (.6180) 
 
3.366 (.6633) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 219.52*** 217.36*** 219.70*** 211.62*** 213.73*** 
   AIC 410.018 411.940 411.531 408.112 414.707 
   Wald statistic (df) 69.59 (6)*** 65.50 (5)*** 65.72 (5)*** 60.22 (6)*** 63.85 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 8: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.423 
(.4507)*** 
-1.659 
(.4296)*** 
-1.552 
(.4313)*** 
-2.759 
(.6674)*** 
-1.419 
(.4432)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0148 (.0206) 
OR .9852 
-.0185 (.0215) 
OR .9815 
-.0257 (.0186) 
OR .9745 
.0036 (.0240) 
OR 1.003 
-.0568 
(.0286)** 
OR .9447 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0617 
(.0055)*** 
OR .9401 
-.0619 
(.0055)*** 
OR .9399 
-.0620 
(.0055)*** 
OR .9398 
-.0689 
(.0101)*** 
OR .9333 
-.0614 
(.0057)*** 
OR .9403 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.239 (.6811)* 
OR .2893 
-1.246 (.6827)* 
OR .2875 
-1.236 
(.6820)* 
OR .2904 
-1.242 (.6855)* 
OR .2887 
-1.229 
(.6814)* 
OR .2925 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.385 (1.086) 
OR .2502 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -.3122 (2.146) 
OR .7318 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.926 (1.603) 
OR .1456 
  
   Economic 
Development  
   
   .7507 (.2945)** 
OR 2.118 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.390 (1.189) 
OR .2490 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0265 (.0444) 
OR .9737 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   -.0181 (.0168) 
OR .9819 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0681 (.0379)* 
OR 1.070 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic    .0043 (.0045)  
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Development    
 
OR 1.004 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0031 (.0176) 
OR .9968 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.116 (.4184) 
 
3.146 (.4155) 
 
3.169 (.4212) 
 
2.974 (.4054) 
 
3.089 (.4225) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 369.45*** 383.04*** 384.97*** 346.95*** 360.29*** 
   AIC 880.482 883.462 880.597 865.382 882.274 
   Wald statistic (df) 137.35 (4)*** 136.56 (5)*** 136.14 (4)*** 138.85 (6)*** 137.56 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 9: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.497 
(.8196)*** 
-3.234 
(.7816)*** 
-2.947 
(.7699)*** 
-4.448 
(1.268)*** 
-3.697 
(.8985)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0098 (.0155) 
OR 1.009 
.0171 (.0147) 
OR 1.017 
.0155 (.0146) 
OR 1.015 
.0437 (.0308) 
OR 1.044 
.0201 (.0172) 
OR 1.020 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0649 
(.0088)*** 
OR .9371 
-.0594 
(.0077)*** 
OR .9422 
-.0598 
(.0078)*** 
OR .9419 
-.0358 
(.0145)** 
OR .9647 
-.0582 
(.0084)*** 
OR .9434 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.332 (.8269) 
OR .2637 
-1.180 (.8290) 
OR .3069 
-1.206 (.8275) 
OR .2991 
-1.217 (.8314) 
OR .2958 
-1.208 (.8287) 
OR .2986 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.393 (1.416)* 
OR .0912 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .0726 (2.206) 
OR 1.075 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.723 (2.218) 
OR .0656 
  
   Economic 
Development  
   
   .8888 (.6496) 
OR 2.432 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.881 (1.626) 
OR 6.564 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0158 (.0320) 
OR 1.016 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0259 (.0413) 
OR .9743 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0111 (.0444) 
OR .9889 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   -.0163 (.0150) 
OR .9837 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0246 (.0317) 
OR .9756 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0293 (.0145)** 
OR 1.029 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
   -.0176 (.0102)* 
OR .9824 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0105 (.0201) 
OR .9894 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.209 (.6249) 
 
3.328 (.6395) 
 
3.361 (.6597) 
 
3.255 (.6262) 
 
3.413 (.6574) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 219.66*** 233.80*** 234.34*** 227.20*** 233.32*** 
   AIC 409.582 412.534 410.654 406.363 413.330 
   Wald statistic (df) 69.19 (6)*** 65.84 (5)*** 65.67 (5)*** 59.32 (6)*** 63.80 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 10: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Our Home is Russia Strongholds in the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.069 
(.9253)*** 
-5.737 
(.7293)*** 
-5.180 
(.7001)*** 
-5.127 
(.9329)*** 
-6.577 
(.8028)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0381 (.0213)* 
OR 1.038 
.0294 
(.0093)*** 
OR 1.029 
.0246 (.0083)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0299 
(.0107)*** 
OR 1.030 
.0365 
(.0093)*** 
OR 1.037 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0207 (.0107)* 
OR .9794 
-.0005 (.0057) 
OR .9994 
-.0026 (.0045) 
OR .9973 
.0045 (.0054) 
OR 1.004 
.0036 (.0048) 
OR 1.003 
   Electoral 
Manipulation 
 
.5392 (.3245)* 
OR 1.714 
.4921 (.3270) 
OR 1.635 
.4963 (.3239) 
OR 1.642 
.6282 (.3287)* 
OR 1.874 
.6225 (.3230)* 
OR 1.863 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
2.773 
(1.081)*** 
OR 16.007 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 2.780 (1.589)* 
OR 16.126 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -12.263 (6.626)* 
OR 4.72e-06 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4119 (.5666) 
OR .6623 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    3.585 
(1.225)*** 
OR 36.080 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0167 (.0225) 
OR .9834 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0001 (.0157) 
OR .9998 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .1558 (.0757)** 
OR 1.168 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0020 (.0066) 
OR 1.002 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0115 (.0148) 
OR .9885 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0230 
(.0113)** 
OR 1.023 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0007 (.0074) 
OR .9992 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0005 (.0093) 
OR 1.000 
  
      *Economic    -.0051 (.0031)  
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Development   
  
OR .9948 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0121 
(.0072)* 
OR .9879 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.925 (.4541) 
 
2.449 (.5309) 
 
2.674 (.5502) 
 
2.373 (.5289) 
 
2.398 (.5191) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 106.58*** 116.50*** 148.92*** 134.95*** 126.07*** 
   AIC  542.773 558.959 438.634 531.731 552.729 
   Wald statistic (df) 50.42 (6)*** 35.23 (6)*** 28.34 (6)*** 34.02 (6)*** 39.04 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Our Home is 
Russia‘s vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 11: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Our Home is Russia Strongholds in the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.337 
(.6220)*** 
-5.576 
(.5839)*** 
-5.565 
(.6047)*** 
-5.234 
(.7414)*** 
-6.301 
(.6696)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0102 
(.0046)** 
OR 1.010 
.0246 
(.0079)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0200 (.0068)*** 
OR 1.020 
.0100 (.0066) 
OR 1.010 
.0156 
(.0057)*** 
OR 1.015 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0010 (.0031) 
OR 1.001 
-.0002 (.0045) 
OR .9997 
-.0014 (.0038) 
OR .9985 
.0066 (.0049) 
OR 1.006 
.0072 (.0041)* 
OR 1.007 
   Electoral 
Manipulation 
 
.6852 
(.2992)** 
OR 1.984 
.5904 (.3034)* 
OR 1.804 
.6227 (.3032)** 
OR 1.864 
.6581 
(.3121)** 
OR 1.931 
.6829 
(.3022)** 
OR 1.979 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.872 
(.7033)*** 
OR 48.079 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 4.595 
(1.246)*** 
OR 99.085 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.589 (1.294) 
OR 4.900 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2693 (.3666) 
OR .7639 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    3.534 
(1.075)*** 
OR 34.265 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0160 (.0097) 
OR .9840 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0092 (.0094) 
OR .9907 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0062 (.0048) 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0016 (.0110) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0018 (.0061) 
OR 1.001 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0083 (.0070) 
OR 1.008 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
   -.0032 (.0028) 
OR .9957 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0146 
(.0062)** 
OR .9854 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.084 (.3959) 
 
2.441 (.4186) 
 
2.819 (.4319) 
 
2.728 (.4539) 
 
2.803 (.4420) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 126.93*** 134.13*** 204.69*** 156.21*** 174.89*** 
   AIC  693.624 712.252 723.255 664.291 713.827 
   Wald statistic (df) 59.05 (4)*** 42.51 (6)*** 26.96 (6)*** 27.01 (6)*** 35.56 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Our Home is 
Russia‘s vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 12: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Our Home is Russia Strongholds in the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.252 
(.9803)*** 
-5.674 
(.8758)*** 
-5.102 
(.8423)*** 
-4.486 
(1.030)*** 
-6.336 
(.9638)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0369 (.0218)* 
OR 1.037 
-.0026 (.0130) 
OR .9973 
-.0045 (.0093) 
OR .9954 
.0047 (.0077) 
OR 1.004 
.0014 (.0065) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0210 (.0108)* 
OR .9792 
.0074 (.0050) 
OR 1.007 
.0033 (.0040) 
OR 1.003 
.0094 (.0050)* 
OR 1.009 
.0105 
(.0045)** 
OR 1.010 
   Electoral 
Manipulation 
 
.6649 
(.3190)** 
OR 1.944 
.6824 
(.3169)** 
OR 1.978 
.7210 (.3169)** 
OR 2.056 
.8286 
(.3231)*** 
OR 2.290 
.7986 
(.3187)** 
OR 2.222 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.909 
(1.067)*** 
OR 49.857 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 4.367 
(1.751)** 
OR 78.836 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .1210 (1.751) 
OR 1.128 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6932 (.6699) 
OR .4999 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    3.976 
(1.471)*** 
OR 53.356 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0375 (.0226)* 
OR .9631 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0017 (.0143) 
OR 1.001 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0065 (.0117) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   -.0063 (.0057) 
OR .9937 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0064 (.0131) 
OR .9935 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0279 
(.0113)** 
OR 1.028 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0041 (.0065) 
OR .9959 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0067 (.0074) 
OR 1.006 
  
 495 
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0036 (.0027) 
OR .9963 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0132 
(.0064)** 
OR .9868 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.133 (.4905) 
 
3.226 (.5728) 
 
3.512 (.6105) 
 
3.302 (.6063) 
 
3.377 (.5840) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 124.36*** 230.74*** 380.54*** 373.56*** 324.76*** 
   AIC  550.953 574.066 579.164 548.198 571.197 
   Wald statistic (df) 39.86 (6)*** 17.52 (6)*** 12.45 (6)* 16.89 (6)*** 19.47 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Our Home is 
Russia‘s vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 13: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-9.591 
(1.890)*** 
-11.026 
(2.343)*** 
-8.717 
(1.632)*** 
-8.449 
(1.616)*** 
-8.238 
(1.387)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0322 (.0162)** 
OR 1.032 
.0365 
(.0141)*** 
OR 1.037 
.0163 (.0137) 
OR 1.016 
.0549 
(.0165)*** 
OR 1.056 
.0387 
(.0119)*** 
OR 1.039 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0123 (.0073)* 
OR 1.012 
.0122 (.0070)* 
OR 1.012 
.0096 (.0067) 
OR 1.009 
.0044 (.0066) 
OR 1.004 
.0060 (.0047) 
OR 1.006 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.1384 (.4362) 
OR 1.148 
.1621 (.4371) 
OR 1.176 
.2264 (.4350) 
OR 1.254 
.1859 (.4371) 
OR 1.204 
.1900 (.4389) 
OR 1.209 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
1.480 (2.067) 
OR 4.393 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 7.650 (3.215)** 
OR 2102.064 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.347 (2.434) 
OR 10.457 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2158 (.7425) 
OR 1.240 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.879 (3.148) 
OR 6.553 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0011 (.0238) 
OR .9988 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0287 (.0237) 
OR .9716 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0368 (.0263) 
OR 1.037 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0338 
(.0166)** 
OR .9666 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0831 (.0797) 
OR .9201 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0124 (.0093) 
OR .9876 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0117 (.0093) 
OR .9882 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0089 (.0091) 
OR .9911 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0009 (.0040) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0434 (.0517) 
OR .9574 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.737 (.8540) 
 
4.206 (1.181) 
 
3.210 (.8116) 
 
3.479 (.8109) 
 
3.453 (.7661) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 253.89*** 262.29*** 171.06*** 191.64*** 236.06*** 
   AIC 320.003 313.339 313.952 314.485 312.829 
   Wald statistic (df) 14.88 (6)** 16.71 (6)** 19.29 (6)*** 18.07 (6)*** 18.68 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 14: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.743 
(.9561)*** 
-8.438 
(1.102)*** 
-7.656 
(.9391)*** 
-5.636 
(.9349)*** 
-6.955 
(.8511)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0074 (.0065) 
OR .9925 
.0213 (.0152) 
OR 1.021 
-.0224 (.0204) 
OR .9777 
.0064 (.0130) 
OR 1.006 
-.0043 (.0065) 
OR .9956 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0095 (.0038)** 
OR 1.009 
.0142 
(.0051)*** 
OR 1.014 
.0132 
(.0050)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0116 
(.0054)** 
OR 1.011 
.0098 
(.0038)*** 
OR 1.009 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.8056 (.3338)** 
OR 2.238 
.8274 (.3361)** 
OR 2.287 
.7889 
(.3334)** 
OR 2.201 
.7732 
(.3294)** 
OR 2.166 
.7888 
(.3316)** 
OR 2.200 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
1.194 (1.099) 
OR 3.302 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.614 
(1.823)*** 
OR 274.448 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  4.121 
(1.448)*** 
OR 61.624 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.112 
(.6480)* 
OR .3288 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.250 (1.997) 
OR .1053 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0338 
(.0168)** 
OR .9667 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0172 (.0215) 
OR 1.017 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0389 (.0360) 
OR .9617 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0502 (.0714) 
OR .9509 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0132 (.0078)* 
OR .9868 
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      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0089 (.0076) 
OR .9910 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0020 (.0038) 
OR .9979 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.217 (.5404) 
 
3.277 (.5989) 
 
3.003 (.5476) 
 
3.205 (.5169) 
 
3.159 (.5370) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 381.38*** 350.50*** 305.40*** 345.98*** 350.21*** 
   AIC 507.483 498.231 502.948 500.361 506.765 
   Wald statistic (df) 17.32 (4)*** 26.57 (6)*** 24.54 (6)*** 22.85 (6)*** 18.68 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 15: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-9.660 
(1.909)*** 
-10.143 
(2.427)*** 
-9.121 
(1.706)*** 
-6.338 
(1.423)*** 
-7.251 
(1.254)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0311 (.0162)* 
OR 1.031 
.0219 (.0152) 
OR 1.022 
.0278 (.0148)* 
OR 1.028 
.0180 (.0098)* 
OR 1.018 
.0170 
(.0066)*** 
OR 1.017 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0119 (.0073) 
OR 1.011 
.0139 (.0069)** 
OR 1.014 
.0088 (.0067) 
OR 1.008 
.0099 (.0063) 
OR 1.010 
.0091 
(.0046)** 
OR 1.009 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.3097 (.4421) 
OR 1.363 
.3443 (.4422) 
OR 1.411 
5.279 
(2.027)*** 
OR 1.433 
.4492 (.4309) 
OR 1.567 
.5062 (.4350) 
OR 1.659 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.082 (1.775)* 
OR 21.817 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 6.883 (3.008)** 
OR 975.989 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.279 
(2.027)*** 
OR 196.320 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.9621 (.8793) 
OR .3793 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .3288 (2.768) 
OR 1.389 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0196 (.0179) 
OR .9805 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0099 (.0170) 
OR .9900 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0157 (.0167) 
OR .9843 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0037 (.0157) 
OR .9962 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0693 (.0969) 
OR .9330 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0083 (.0091) 
OR .9916 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0126 (.0091) 
OR .9874 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0034 (.0088) 
OR .9965 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   -.0021 (.0040) 
OR .9978 
 
 501 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0569 (.0471) 
OR .9446 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.790 (.8613) 
 
4.170 (1.259) 
 
3.546 (.8992) 
 
3.467 (.7386) 
 
3.564 (.7505) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 266.23*** 260.90*** 223.89*** 209.53*** 238.73*** 
   AIC 320.816 315.706 316.064 320.585 317.672 
   Wald statistic (df) 14.34 (6)** 15.62 (6)** 17.70 (6)*** 13.68 (6)** 15.01 (6)** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 16: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.850 
(.5156)*** 
X -3.120 
(.4664)*** 
-3.035 
(.7662)*** 
-3.100 
(.4579)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0584 (.0305)* 
OR .9432 
 -.0278 
(.0130)** 
OR .9725 
-.0108 (.0154) 
OR .9891 
-.0244 
(.0126)* 
OR .9758 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0053 (.0050) 
OR .9946 
 -.0041 (.0047) 
OR .9958 
-.0015 (.0089) 
OR .9984 
-.0053 (.0048) 
OR .9946 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.3172 (.6660) 
OR .7281 
 -.4051 (.6608) 
OR .6668 
-.2887 (.6605) 
OR .7491 
-.3279 (.6620) 
OR .7203 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.010 (1.382) 
OR .1338 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .2981 (2.120) 
OR 1.347 
  
   Economic 
Development    
 
   .1906 (.4709) 
OR 1.209 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.6140 (1.649) 
OR .5411 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0504 (.0366) 
OR 1.051 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0993 (.2130) 
OR .9054 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0400 (.0238)* 
OR .9607 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0252 (.0483) 
OR .9750 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0049 (.0137) 
OR 1.004 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0335 (.0464) 
OR .9669 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0019 (.0056) 
OR .9980 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0014 (.0173) 
OR 1.001 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.177 (.3388) 
  
1.053 (.2976) 
 
.9828 (.2796) 
 
1.048 (.2967) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 17.58***  15.47*** 14.09*** 15.54*** 
   AIC  330.059  329.346 324.245 331.098 
   Wald statistic (df) 12.14 (6)*  8.84 (6) 10.97 (6)* 9.99 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1.  
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Table 17: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.497 
(.4490)*** 
X -4.549 
(.4467)*** 
-3.720 
(.5968)*** 
-4.448 
(.4425)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0105 (.0159) 
OR 1.010 
 -.0055 (.0117) 
OR .9944 
-.0016 (.0150) 
OR .9983 
-.0062 (.0111) 
OR .9937 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0007 (.0038) 
OR .9992 
 -.0004 (.0038) 
OR .9995 
-.0033 (.0066) 
OR .9966 
-.0004 (.0038) 
OR .9995 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.1889 (.4195) 
OR .8278 
 -.1855 (.4191) 
OR .8306 
-.1787 (.4185) 
OR .8363 
-.1805 (.4176) 
OR .8348 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.723 (1.087) 
OR .1783 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.951 (1.397) 
OR .1420 
  
   Economic 
Development    
 
   -.5783 (.3590) 
OR .5608 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.639 
(.9926)* 
OR .1941 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0176 (.0245) 
OR .9825 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0019 (.0044) 
OR 1.001 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.687 (.3395) 
  
1.634 (.3295) 
 
1.566 (.3195) 
 
1.591 (.3235) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 62.04***  58.80*** 54.91*** 56.32*** 
   AIC  559.744  560.345 558.315 559.636 
   Wald statistic (df) 3.33 (4)  2.61 (4) 4.60 (6) 3.49 (4) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1.  
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Table 18: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.831 
(.5088)*** 
X -3.076 
(.4944)*** 
-3.150 
(.8330)*** 
-2.938 
(.5003)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0582 (.0303)* 
OR .9433 
 -.0574 
(.0267)** 
OR .9441 
-.0294 (.0386) 
OR .9710 
-.0650 
(.0311)** 
OR .9370 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0053 (.0050) 
OR .9946 
 -.0050 (.0047) 
OR .9949 
-.0055 (.0085) 
OR .9944 
-.0061 (.0047) 
OR .9939 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.3431 (.6655) 
OR .7095 
 -.4396 (.6639) 
OR .6442 
-.3828 (.6640) 
OR .6818 
-.3779 (.6619) 
OR .6852 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.145 (1.323) 
OR .3179 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0885 (2.117) 
OR .9152 
  
   Economic 
Development    
 
   .0237 (.5113) 
OR 1.023 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.956 (1.525) 
OR .1413 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0528 (.1020) 
OR .9485 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0645 (.2061) 
OR .9375 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0250 (.0320) 
OR .9752 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0558 (.0548) 
OR 1.057 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0007 (.0133) 
OR .9992 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0391 (.0467) 
OR .9615 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0003 (.0053) 
OR .9996 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0004 (.0169) 
OR 1.000 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.141 (.3298) 
  
1.122 (.3186) 
 
1.142 (.3166) 
 
1.079 (.3153) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 16.97***  17.56*** 18.59*** 15.64*** 
   AIC  327.385  328.813 329.432 330.407 
   Wald statistic (df) 11.44 (6)*  9.22 (6) 9.01 (6) 11.27 (6)* 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1.  
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Table 19: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X -13.099 
(7.555)* 
-15.740 
(8.286)* 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
   -.0440 (.1002) 
OR .9569 
.0498 (.0343) 
OR 1.051 
   Percent Rural 
 
   -.0980 
(.0453)** 
OR .9065 
-.0744 
(.0169)*** 
OR .9282 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
   X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development  
   
   -1.657 (2.349) 
OR .1906 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    11.063 (7.084) 
OR 63804.5 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0407 (.0499) 
OR 1.041 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.5523 (.4443) 
OR .5755 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0130 (.0211) 
OR 1.013 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.0749 (.1506) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .9277 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
    
9.079 (5.815) 
 
8.628 (5.616) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test    87.26*** 89.19*** 
   AIC    131.299 126.790 
   Wald statistic (df)    22.05 (5)*** 21.09 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 20: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.278 
(.7205)*** 
X X -6.056 
(1.262)*** 
-4.373 
(.7362)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0112 (.0348) 
OR 1.011 
  .0156 (.0375) 
OR 1.015 
-.0218 (.0279) 
OR .9783 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0633 
(.0090)*** 
OR .9386 
  -.0908 
(.0174)*** 
OR .9131 
-.0635 
(.0090)*** 
OR .9383 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X   X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.440 (1.725) 
OR .0870 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development  
   
   .8048 (.3992)** 
OR 2.236 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.178 (1.545) 
OR .1131 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   -.0287 (.0415) 
OR .9716 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0120 (.0054)** 
OR 1.012 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.993 (.5491) 
   
3.015 (.6192) 
 
3.057 (.5498) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 127.49***   127.86*** 130.54*** 
   AIC 381.409   374.393 381.614 
   Wald statistic (df) 51.85 (3)***   48.18 (5)*** 51.10 (3)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 21: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1995 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X -13.331 
(6.319)** 
-14.528 
(5.857)** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
   -.0168 (.0872) 
OR .9833 
.0719 
(.0310)** 
OR 1.074 
   Percent Rural 
 
   -.0948 
(.0363)*** 
OR .9095 
-.0804 
(.0181)*** 
OR .9226 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
   X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development  
   
   -1.079 (1.715) 
OR .3396 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    7.641 (6.676) 
OR 2082.14 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0326 (.0451) 
OR 1.033 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.5356 (.5265) 
OR .5853 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0103 (.0162) 
OR 1.010 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0566 (.1374) 
OR .9448 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
    
8.562 (4.679) 
 
8.111 (4.271) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test    99.46*** 104.53*** 
   AIC    130.824 126.415 
   Wald statistic (df)    21.85 (5)*** 20.42 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 22: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Our Home is Russia Strongholds in the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-10.000 
(1.957)*** 
-8.071 
(1.132)*** 
-8.415 
(1.041)*** 
-6.063 
(1.197)*** 
-7.430 
(.9971)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0308 (.0396) 
OR 1.031 
.0309 
(.0114)*** 
OR 1.031 
.0342 (.0099)*** 
OR 1.034 
.0317 
(.0133)** 
OR 1.032 
.0380 
(.0112)*** 
OR 1.038 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0083 (.0054) 
OR 1.008 
.0095 (.0080) 
OR 1.009 
.0163 (.0066)** 
OR 1.016 
-.0014 (.0073) 
OR .9985 
-.0003 (.0063) 
OR .9996 
   Electoral 
Manipulation 
 
.9980 
(.3852)*** 
OR 2.713 
.8658 
(.3960)** 
OR 2.376 
.8966 (.3970)** 
OR 2.451 
.8552 
(.3991)** 
OR 2.351 
.8590 
(.3992)** 
OR 2.360 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
4.323 
(2.017)** 
OR 75.481 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .1325 (2.214) 
OR 1.141 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -3.629 (4.917) 
OR .0265 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.644 
(.7930)** 
OR .1930 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.184 (1.742) 
OR .3060 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0000 (.0407) 
OR .9999 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0336 (.0233) 
OR 1.034 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0836 (.0572) 
OR 1.087 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0106 (.0087) 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0137 (.0201) 
OR 1.013 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0051 (.0107) 
OR .9948 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0324 
(.0112)*** 
OR .9680 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0076 (.0047) 
OR 1.007 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0200 (.0112)* 
OR 1.020 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.926 (.4905) 
 
2.632 (.6643) 
 
2.520 (.6107) 
 
2.279 (.5839) 
 
2.411 (.6061) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 98.68*** 113.78*** 125.87*** 123.61*** 118.49*** 
   AIC  338.585 349.607 344.318 329.599 347.594 
   Wald statistic (df) 48.46 (5)*** 45.45 (6)*** 46.16 (6)*** 44.47 (6)*** 46.55 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Our Home is 
Russia‘s vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 23: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Our Home is Russia Strongholds in the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-8.729 
(.9963)*** 
-7.424 
(.8839)*** 
-8.260 
(.9458)*** 
-6.524 
(1.122)*** 
-7.519 
(1.012)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0107 (.0057)* 
OR 1.010 
.0342 
(.0097)*** 
OR 1.034 
.0270 (.0086)*** 
OR 1.027 
.0105 (.0084) 
OR 1.010 
.0177 
(.0076)** 
OR 1.017 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0103 
(.0045)** 
OR 1.010 
.0091 (.0068) 
OR 1.009 
.0181 (.0058)*** 
OR 1.018 
.0024 (.0070) 
OR 1.002 
.0042 (.0055) 
OR 1.004 
   Electoral 
Manipulation 
 
1.017 
(.3515)*** 
OR 2.766 
.8846 
(.3524)** 
OR 2.422 
.8051 (.3634)** 
OR 2.237 
.9054 
(.3794)** 
OR 2.473 
.8242 
(.3642)** 
OR 2.280 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
4.553 
(.9618)*** 
OR 94.953 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 4.419 
(1.376)*** 
OR 83.028 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  4.603 (1.400)*** 
OR 99.817 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.071 
(.5499)* 
OR .3425 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.062 (1.371) 
OR 2.894 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0263 
(.0119)** 
OR .9739 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0166 (.0118) 
OR .9834 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0087 (.0061) 
OR 1.008 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0046 (.0135) 
OR 1.004 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0014 (.0088) 
OR 1.001 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0255 
(.0092)*** 
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OR .9747 
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0081 (.0043)* 
OR 1.008 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0167 (.0093)* 
OR 1.016 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
`1.859 (.4418) 
 
2.181 (.5586) 
 
2.656 (.5817) 
 
2.820 (.6392) 
 
2.867 (.6414) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 81.60*** 80.90*** 110.46*** 96.51*** 93.38*** 
   AIC  417.792 436.467 435.792 391.33 442.593 
   Wald statistic (df) 62.11 (4)*** 57.91 (6)*** 47.64 (6)*** 37.70 (6)*** 43.46 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Our Home is 
Russia‘s vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 24: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Our Home is Russia Strongholds in the 1995 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-10.751 
(2.045)*** 
-7.895 
(1.414)*** 
-8.445 
(1.265)*** 
-5.644 
(1.337)*** 
-7.442 
(1.306)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0285 (.0407) 
OR 1.028 
-.0175 (.0208) 
OR .9825 
.0035 (.0129) 
OR 1.003 
.0046 (.0103) 
OR 1.004 
.0040 (.0086) 
OR 1.004 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0143 
(.0051)*** 
OR 1.014 
.0157 
(.0075)** 
OR 1.015 
.0228 (.0063)*** 
OR 1.023 
.0038 (.0069) 
OR 1.003 
.0061 (.0059) 
OR 1.006 
   Electoral 
Manipulation 
 
1.189 
(.3773)*** 
OR 3.285 
1.126 
(.3825)*** 
OR 3.085 
1.138 (.3868)*** 
OR 3.121 
1.109 
(.3903)*** 
OR 3.032 
1.100 
(.3905)*** 
OR 3.005 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
6.490 
(1.980)*** 
OR 659.022 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.713 (2.172)* 
OR 40.990 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.538 (1.946)* 
OR 34.415 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.669 
(.7784)** 
OR .1883 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0452 (1.836) 
OR 1.046 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0212 (.0414) 
OR .9789 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0286 (.0228) 
OR 1.029 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0033 (.0163) 
OR 1.003 
  
      *Economic 
Development  
   
   .0024 (.0078) 
OR 1.002 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0073 (.0186) 
OR 1.007 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0012 (.0099) 
OR .9987 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0270 
(.0099)*** 
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OR .9733 
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0096 
(.0045)** 
OR 1.009 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0231 
(.0106)** 
OR 1.023 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.106 (.5363) 
 
3.414 (.7223) 
 
3.460 (.6814) 
 
3.309 (.6789) 
 
3.499 (.7035) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 98.97*** 167.17*** 231.83*** 234.09*** 208.89*** 
   AIC  348.989 368.500 367.884 352.278 368.331 
   Wald statistic (df) 40.14 (5)*** 33.05 (6)*** 31.12 (6)*** 29.22 (6)*** 29.82 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Our Home is 
Russia‘s vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 25: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.636 
(.6183)*** 
-4.859 
(.5629)*** 
-4.964 
(.5710)*** 
-3.433 
(.8087)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0146 (.0077)* 
OR 1.014 
.0067 (.0061) 
OR 1.006 
.0070 (.0064) 
OR 1.007 
.0085 (.0090) 
OR 1.008 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0268 (.0035)*** 
OR 1.027 
.0262 
(.0032)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0223 
(.0034)*** 
OR 1.022 
.0189 
(.0053)*** 
OR 1.019 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.0235 (.2795) 
OR 1.023 
.0078 (.2799) 
OR 1.007 
-.0083 (.2833) 
OR .9917 
-.0160 (.2796) 
OR .9840 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.3744 (1.055) 
OR 1.454 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 2.314 (1.885) 
OR 10.122 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.316 
(1.227)*** 
OR 27.559 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.036 
(.5357)* 
OR .3547 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0140 (.0122) 
OR .9860 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0122 (.0201) 
OR .9877 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0146 (.0155) 
OR .9854 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0012 (.0067) 
OR .9987 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0083 (.0061) 
OR .9916 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0100 (.0074) 
OR .9900 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0072 (.0063) 
OR 1.007 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0049 (.0038) 
OR 1.004 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.504 (.3997) 
 
2.536 (.4070) 
 
2.234 (.3785) 
 
2.476 (.4234) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 256.22 365.56*** 268.43*** 298.39***  
   AIC 931.269 933.476 922.754 877.874  
   Wald statistic (df) 83.34 (6)*** 81.15 (6)*** 88.80 (6)*** 78.82 (6)***  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 26: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.462 
(.4556)*** 
-4.694 
(.4301)*** 
-4.694 
(.4171)*** 
-3.246 
(.5920)*** 
-4.089 
(.4112)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0703 (3.816) 
OR 1.072 
-.0084 (.0083) 
OR .9915 
-.0179 
(.0088)** 
OR .9822 
.0047 (.0083) 
OR 1.004 
-.0016 (.0055) 
OR .9983 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0265 (.0025)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0263 
(.0024)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0251 
(.0025)*** 
OR 1.025 
.0240 
(.0041)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0258 
(.0023)*** 
OR 1.026 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.1902 (.2435) 
OR 1.209 
.1669 (.2439) 
OR 1.181 
.1455 (.2457) 
OR 1.156 
.1826 (.2450) 
OR 1.200 
.1678 (.2460) 
OR 1.182 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.3532 (.8688) 
OR .7024 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 1.628 (1.456) 
OR 5.098 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.821 
(1.014)*** 
OR 16.799 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.065 
(.4413)** 
OR .3445 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -5.457 
(1.128)*** 
OR .0042 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0689 (3.816) 
OR .9333 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0104 (.0109) 
OR 1.010 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0221 (.0114)* 
OR 1.022 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0204 (.0159) 
OR .9797 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0084 (.0055) 
OR .9916 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0113 (.0069) 
OR .9887 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0007 (.0054) 
OR 1.000 
  
      *Economic    .0011 (.0029)  
 523 
Development    
 
OR 1.001 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.637 (.3351) 
 
2.653 (.3373) 
 
2.356 (.3033) 
 
2.515 (.3456) 
 
2.653 (.3545) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 592.85*** 619.02*** 520.84*** 501.57 553.12 
   AIC 1482.277 1482.133 1470.202 1416.155 1443.556 
   Wald statistic (df) 129.77 (6)*** 129.57 (6)*** 140.26 (6)*** 129.56 (6)*** 145.56 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 27: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.636 
(.6185)*** 
-4.869 
(.5407)*** 
-5.018 
(.5333)*** 
-3.164 
(.7450)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0146 (.0077)* 
OR 1.014 
.0146 (.0071)** 
OR 1.014 
.0204 
(.0072)*** 
OR 1.020 
.0043 (.0076) 
OR 1.004 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0268 (.0035)*** 
OR 1.027 
.0261 
(.0031)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0218 
(.0034)*** 
OR 1.022 
.0200 
(.0052)*** 
OR 1.020 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.0246 (.2792) 
OR 1.024 
-.0037 (.2795) 
OR .9962 
-.0306 (.2838) 
OR .9697 
-.0025 (.0052) 
OR .9974 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.4240 (.9548) 
OR 1.528 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 2.059 (1.429) 
OR 7.842 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.179 
(1.020)*** 
OR 24.044 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.180 
(.5143)** 
OR .3070 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0158 (.0104) 
OR .9843 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0177 (.0103)* 
OR .9823 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0278 
(.0107)*** 
OR .9725 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0040 (.0063) 
OR 1.004 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0082 (.0059) 
OR .9917 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0104 (.0071) 
OR .9895 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0074 (.0062) 
OR 1.007 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0043 (.0038) 
OR 1.004 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.505 (.3995) 
 
2.528 (.4034) 
 
2.172 (.3540) 
 
2.449 (.4120) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 363.15*** 372.23*** 291.12*** 313.37***  
   AIC 931.247 930.501 915.644 876.821  
   Wald statistic (df) 83.36 (6)*** 83.76 (6)*** 95.24 (6)*** 79.96 (6)***  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 28: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.211 
(.7662)*** 
X -2.696 
(.6283)*** 
-2.387 
(1.012)** 
-3.351 
(.7315)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0619 
(.0166)*** 
OR .9399 
 -.0511 
(.0101)*** 
OR .9501 
-.0276 
(.0162)* 
OR .9726 
-.0522 
(.0133)*** 
OR .9490 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0266 (.0041)*** 
OR 1.026 
 .0239 
(.0036)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0093 (.0073) 
OR 1.009 
.0232 
(.0042)*** 
OR 1.023 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.0985 (.4457) 
OR 1.103 
 .1002 (.4399) 
OR 1.105 
.0961 (.4422) 
OR 1.100 
.1341 (.4426) 
OR 1.143 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.0267 (1.314) 
OR 1.027 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.497 (2.537) 
OR .0822 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6930 (.5972) 
OR .5000 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .7875 (1.444) 
OR 2.198 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0264 (.0218) 
OR 1.026 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.2967 (.4857) 
OR .7432 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0239 
(.0119)** 
OR .9763 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0003 (.0206) 
OR .9996 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0162 (.0083)* 
OR .9839 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0104 
(.0050)** 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    -.0002 (.0077) 
OR .9997 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.236 (.5131) 
  
3.018 (.4909) 
 
2.844 (.4864) 
 
3.197 (.5098) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 407.72***  363.70*** 330.68*** 392.91*** 
   AIC 660.408  649.696 625.268 664.058 
   Wald statistic (df) 56.36 (6)***  57.40 (5)*** 56.27 (6)*** 55.42 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 528 
 
Table 29: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.879 
(.4769)*** 
X -3.700 
(.4197)*** 
-4.198 
(.6239)*** 
-4.105 
(.4793)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-5.641 (6.033) 
OR .0035 
 -.0164 
(.0083)** 
OR .9836 
-.0332 
(.0160)** 
OR .9672 
-.0431 
(.0144)*** 
OR .9577 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0184 (.0025)*** 
OR 1.018 
 .0180 
(.0023)*** 
OR 1.018 
.0214 
(.0036)*** 
OR 1.021 
.0173 
(.0027)*** 
OR 1.017 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.3820 (.3061) 
OR 1.465 
 .3907 (.3055) 
OR 1.478 
.3194 (.3121) 
OR 1.376 
.4390 (.3091) 
OR 1.551 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.2659 (.9059) 
OR .7664 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -4.376 
(1.637)*** 
OR .0125 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .1111 (.3255) 
OR 1.117 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.089 (.8428) 
OR 2.972 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
5.629 (6.033) 
OR 278.411 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0129 (.0129) 
OR 1.013  
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0468 
(.0190)** 
OR 1.048 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0053 (.0064) 
OR .9946 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0017 (.0014) 
OR .9982 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0005 (.0052) 
OR 1.000 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.876 (.3571) 
  
2.789 (.3504) 
 
2.831 (.3656) 
 
2.996 (.3796) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 617.38***  587.80*** 575.71*** 615.66*** 
   AIC 1360.264  1346.9 1304.167 1350.521 
   Wald statistic (df) 63.76 (6)***  68.66 (4)*** 64.95 (6)*** 69.42 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 30: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.262 
(.7926)*** 
X -3.482 
(.6538)*** 
-3.718 
(1.051)*** 
-4.424 
(.7576)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0621 
(.0166)*** 
OR .9397 
 -.0383 
(.0126)*** 
OR .9623 
.0234 (.0224) 
OR 1.023 
-.0196 (.0147) 
OR .9805 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0269 (.0041)*** 
OR 1.027 
 .0210 
(.0035)*** 
OR 1.021 
.0040 (.0072) 
OR 1.004 
.0200 
(.0040)*** 
OR 1.020 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.0146 (.4406) 
OR .9854 
 -.1389 (.4336) 
OR .8702 
-.1797 (.4353) 
OR .8355 
-.1252 (.4353) 
OR .8822 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.336 (1.324) 
OR .2626 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -4.961 
(2.725)* 
OR .0070 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4413 (.6217) 
OR .6431 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.448 (1.490) 
OR 4.225 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0663 (.0271)** 
OR 1.068 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0894 (.2605) 
OR .9144 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0422 
(.0154)*** 
OR .9586 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0504 
(.0275)* 
OR .9508 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0246 
(.0076)*** 
OR .9756 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0120 
(.0050)** 
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 OR 1.012 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0010 (.0076) 
OR .9989 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.378 (.5359) 
  
3.257 (.5366) 
 
3.254 (.5468) 
 
3.466 (.5565) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 422.87***  410.50*** 409.38*** 451.25*** 
   AIC 667.015  671.128 643.617 682.181 
   Wald statistic (df) 50.61 (6)***  45.98 (5)*** 41.02 (6)*** 41.26 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 31: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-.3705 (.6300) -.7110 (.5924) -.7043 (.6029) -1.928 
(1.011)* 
-.8877 (.5930) 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0503 (.0254)** 
OR .9509 
-.0385 
(.0182)** 
OR .9621 
-.0131 
(.0168)* 
OR .9692 
-.0348 (.0228) 
OR .9657 
-.0361 
(.0197)* 
OR .9644 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0693 
(.0087)*** 
OR .9330 
-.0672 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9349 
-.0675 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9347 
-.0124 (.0125) 
OR .9876 
-.0761 
(.0104)*** 
OR .9266 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.032 (1.176) 
OR .3559 
-1.041 (1.234) 
OR .3529 
-.6136 (1.145) 
OR .5413 
-.6749 (1.157) 
OR .5091 
-.7311 (1.156) 
OR .4813 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.388 (1.443)* 
OR .0917 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -2.577 (2.703) 
OR .0759 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.147 (1.647) 
OR .3174 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .7877 (5740) 
OR 2.198 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .5540 (1.217) 
OR 1.740 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0544 (.0352) 
OR 1.055 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0551 (.0419) 
OR 1.056 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0152 (.0339) 
OR 1.015 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0016 (.0127) 
OR .9983 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0188 (.0270) 
OR 1.019 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0127 (.0202) 
OR 1.012 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0457 
(.0117)*** 
OR .9552 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    .0297 
(.0145)** 
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 OR 1.030 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.530 (.4565) 
 
2.617 (.4750) 
 
2.565 (.4648) 
 
2.337 (.4301) 
 
2.269 (.4333) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 134.89*** 134.40*** 133.75*** 130.63*** 99.00*** 
   AIC 435.85 435.948 437.206 405.755 432.648 
   Wald statistic (df) 76.53 (6)*** 75.21 (5)*** 75.27 (5)*** 68.92 (6)*** 76.12 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 32: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -.9386 
(.3062)*** 
-.8671 
(.3107)*** 
-1.497 
(.4735)*** 
-1.119 
(.3019)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
 -.0315 (.0211) 
OR .9689 
-.0353 
(.0201)* 
OR .9652 
-.0030 (.0206) 
OR .9969 
-.0173 (.0188) 
OR .9828 
   Percent Rural 
 
 -.0666 
(.0052)*** 
OR .9355 
-.0667 
(.0052)*** 
OR .9354 
-.0749 
(.0085)*** 
OR .9277 
-.0719 
(.0060)*** 
OR .9305 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 -1.231 (.8437) 
OR .2917 
-1.195 (.8444) 
OR .3025 
-.9762 (.8476) 
OR .3767 
-1.161 (.8443) 
OR .3130 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.121 (1.636) 
OR .3257 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.433 (1.140) 
OR .2385 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .3386 (.2456) 
OR 1.403 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.334 (.6956)* 
OR 3.799 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0299 (.0398) 
OR 1.030 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0451 (.0359) 
OR 1.046 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0174 (.0170) 
OR .9826 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0411 (.0348) 
OR .9596 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0048 (.0029)* 
OR 1.004 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0268 
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Wealth 
 
(.0101)*** 
OR 1.027 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
2.063 (2.715) 
 
2.058 (.2728) 
 
2.086 (.2918) 
 
1.809 (.2508) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  242.78*** 238.96*** 205.27*** 211.34*** 
   AIC  986.854 985.293 947.212 977.486 
   Wald statistic (df)  172.63 (5)*** 172.85 (5)*** 165.68 (6)*** 177.02 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 33: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-.2722 (.6322) -1.059 (.5664)* -1.144 
(.5541)** 
-1.947 
(1.041)* 
-.7601 (.6007) 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0504 (.0255)** 
OR .9508 
-.0314 (.0204) 
OR .9690 
-.0158 (.0172) 
OR .9842 
-.0638 (.0446) 
OR .9381 
-.0818 
(.0362)** 
OR .9214 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0693 
(.0087)*** 
OR .9330 
-.0683 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9338 
-.0683 
(.0081)*** 
OR .9339 
-.0214 
(.0124)* 
OR .9787 
-.0756 
(.0105)*** 
OR .9271 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.206 (1.180) 
OR .2993 
-1.033 (1.161) 
OR .3555 
-.8827 (1.132) 
OR .4136 
-1.132 (1.154) 
OR .3223 
-1.089 (1.143) 
OR .3362 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.862 (1.151)** 
OR .0571 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.703 (1.806) 
OR .1820 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.2441 (1.485) 
OR .7833 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .5550 (.5799) 
OR 1.741 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0853 (.0403) 
OR .7813 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0881 (.0382)** 
OR 1.092 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0486 (.0418) 
OR 1.049 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0500 (.0586) 
OR .9511 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0160 (.0190) 
OR 1.016 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0853 
(.0403)** 
OR 1.089 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0110 (.0196) 
OR 1.011 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0388 
(.0115)*** 
OR .9618 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0298 
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Wealth 
 
(.0144)** 
OR 1.030 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.541 (.4593) 
 
2.662 (.4751) 
 
2.579 (.4562) 
 
2.520 (.4517) 
 
2.369 (.4401) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 134.63*** 145.75*** 142.72*** 148.26*** 117.28*** 
   AIC 434.137 438.775 438.880 409.101 430.661 
   Wald statistic (df) 76.06 (6)*** 73.98 (5)*** 76.10 (5)*** 66.92 (6)*** 76.16 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 538 
 
Table 34: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in the 1999 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -14.916 
(4.595)*** 
-13.103 
(3.619)*** 
-8.407 
(2.185)*** 
-10.132 
(2.246)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
 .0096 (.0168) 
OR 1.009 
.0244 (.0139)* 
OR 1.024 
.0174 (.0153) 
OR 1.017 
.0218 (.0133) 
OR 1.022 
   Percent Rural 
 
 .0331 (.0157)** 
OR 1.033 
.0221 
(.0079)*** 
OR 1.022 
-.0017 (.0075) 
OR .9982 
-.0013 (.0067) 
OR .9986 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 2.051 
(.4523)*** 
OR 7.783 
2.140 
(.4452)*** 
OR 8.504 
2.084 
(.4443)*** 
OR 8.038 
2.108 
(.4532)*** 
OR 8.237 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 6.962 (5.045) 
OR 1056.104 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.641 (3.261) 
OR 5.160 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.622 
(.9398)* 
OR .1974 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.235 (2.637) 
OR .2907 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0727 (.0296)** 
OR 1.075 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0798 (.0450)* 
OR 1.083 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0265 
(.0120)** 
OR 1.026 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0781 
(.0306)** 
OR 1.081 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0345 
(.0166)** 
OR .9660 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0402 
(.0110)*** 
OR .9605 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0043 (.0041) 
OR 1.004 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0133 (.0105) 
OR 1.013 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
5.585 (2.714) 
 
4.988 (2.084) 
 
4.135 (1.134) 
 
4.063 (1.302) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  130.87*** 202.70*** 149.33*** 110.53*** 
   AIC  264.878 265.775 272.825 265.172 
   Wald statistic (df)  60.17 (6)*** 67.78 (6)*** 56.97 (6)*** 59.53 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 35: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in the 1999 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-11.673 
(1.820)*** 
-10.474 
(2.241)*** 
-12.410 
(3.491)*** 
-14.783 
(4.242)*** 
-11.092 
(2.671)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0030 (.0062) 
OR .9969 
.0302 (.0133)** 
OR 1.030 
.0284 
(.0126)** 
OR 1.028 
-.0219 
(.0084)*** 
OR .9782 
-.0093 (.0068) 
OR .9906 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0054 (.0044) 
OR 1.005 
-.0041 (.0070) 
OR .9959 
.0066 (.0057) 
OR 1.006 
.0063 (.0070) 
OR 1.006 
-.0031 (.0052) 
OR .9968 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
2.262 (.4104)*** 
OR 13.826 
2.704 
(.4207)*** 
OR 14.593 
2.587 
(.4170)*** 
OR 13.303 
2.412 
(.4137)*** 
OR 11.159 
2.315 
(.4182)*** 
OR 10.131 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
5.517 (1.734)*** 
248.960 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 8.190 
(2.899)*** 
OR 3607.681 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  6.988 
(3.276)** 
OR 1084.492 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0496 (.7410) 
OR .9515 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .8031 (2.523) 
OR 2.232 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0404 
(.0153)*** 
OR .9604 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0423 
(.0148)*** 
OR .9584 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0341 
(.0099)*** 
OR 1.034 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0800 
(.0254)*** 
OR 1.083 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0131 (.0085) 
OR 1.013 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0149 
(.0088)* 
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OR .9851 
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0018 (.0031) 
OR .9981 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0187 
(.0090)** 
OR 1.018 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
4.346 (1.014) 
 
4.366 (1.374) 
 
5.442 (2.221) 
 
7.815 (2.882) 
 
5.185 (.1663) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 389.83*** 310.44*** 444.02*** 351.94*** 359.13*** 
   AIC 433.043 428.548 429.656 430.700 420.455 
   Wald statistic (df) 72.99 (4)*** 75.94 (6)*** 70.29 (6)*** 60.42 (6)*** 62.90 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 36: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in the 1999 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -15.132 
(4.925)*** 
-18.184 
(5.143)*** 
-15.483 
(5.751)*** 
-15.985 
(5.288)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
 -.0150 (.0316) 
OR .9850 
.0143 (.0205) 
OR 1.014 
.0223 
(.0100)** 
OR 1.022 
.0215 
(.0082)*** 
OR 1.021 
   Percent Rural 
 
 .0348 (.0152)** 
OR 1.035 
.0284 
(.0073)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0009 (.0071) 
OR 1.000 
.0023 (.0064) 
OR 1.002 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 2.519 
(.4403)*** 
OR 12.422 
2.220 
(.4432)*** 
OR 9.210 
2.254 
(.4359)*** 
OR 9.528 
2.253 
(.4400)*** 
OR 9.518 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 11.562 
(5.252)** 
OR 105078.5 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  10.320 
(4.834)** 
OR 30345.54 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.093 (.9862) 
OR .3349 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    6.057 (4.091) 
OR 427.231 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0405 (.0328) 
OR 1.041 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0105 (.0226) 
OR 1.010 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0006 (.0106) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0120 (.0275) 
OR 1.012 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0262 (.0160) 
OR .9741 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0370 
(.0098)*** 
OR .9636 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0085 
(.0039)** 
OR 1.008 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0244 
(.0098)** 
OR 1.024 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
5.893 (2.783) 
 
8.460 (3.561) 
 
8.778 (3.965) 
 
8.124 (3.805) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  148.21*** 316.91*** 289.37*** 200.89*** 
   AIC  271.512 270.433 282.377 276.176 
   Wald statistic (df)  69.80 (6)*** 68.53 (6)*** 66.68 (6)*** 68.41 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 37: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Unity Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.892 
(.5363)*** 
-2.614 
(.4341)*** 
-2.791 
(.4744)*** 
-2.127 
(.6411)*** 
-2.709 
(.4811)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0040 (.0092) 
OR 1.004 
.0010 (.0064) 
OR 1.001 
.0009 (.0066) 
OR 1.000 
.0152 (.0091)* 
OR 1.015 
.0086 (.0069) 
OR 1.008 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0049 (.0030) 
OR 1.005 
.0047 (.0027)* 
OR 1.004 
.0062 
(.0029)** 
OR 1.006 
-.0038 (.0047) 
OR .9961 
.0025 (.0028) 
OR 1.002 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.2885 (.3211) 
OR 1.334 
.2286 (.3254) 
OR 1.256 
.2869 (.3202) 
OR 1.332 
.2254 (.3180) 
OR 1.252 
.2555 (.3186) 
OR 1.291 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.2791 (.9403) 
OR 1.322 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -33.664 
(18.775)* 
OR 2.40e-15 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.3768 (1.323) 
OR .6860 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4256 (.3674) 
OR .6533 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.4213 (1.082) 
OR .6561 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0016 (.0134) 
OR .9983 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .3646 (.2020)* 
OR 1.440 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0057 (.0187) 
OR 1.005 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0132 
(.0068)* 
OR .9868 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0325 
(.0160)** 
OR .9679 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0053 (.0058) 
OR .9946 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0312 
(.0139)** 
OR .9692 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0152 
(.0066)** 
OR .9848 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0054 (.0028)* 
OR 1.005 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0078 (.0077) 
OR 1.007 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.306 (.3659) 
 
2.143 (.3464) 
 
2.899 (.3638) 
 
1.035 (.3427) 
 
2.190 (.3484) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 253.34*** 221.31*** 250.84*** 193.65*** 242.34*** 
   AIC 927.034 914.187 921.460 902.837 922.099 
   Wald statistic (df) 4.96 (6) 8.52 (6) 10.19 (6) 11.26 (6)* 9.37 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Unity‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 38: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Unity Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.881 
(.3555)*** 
-.2660 
(.3097)*** 
-2.755 
(.3212)*** 
-2.480 
(.4371)*** 
-2.724 
(.3305)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-7.884 (3.178)** 
OR .0003 
.0015 (.0066) 
OR 1.001 
.0023 (.0068) 
OR 1.002 
.0151 
(.0073)** 
OR 1.015 
.0039 (.0056) 
OR 1.003 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0064 (.0021)*** 
OR 1.006 
.0063 
(.0020)*** 
OR 1.006 
.0075 
(.0021)*** 
OR 1.007 
.0043 (.0031) 
OR 1.004 
.0048 
(.0021)** 
OR 1.004 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.1631 (.2499) 
OR 1.177 
.2223 (.2508) 
OR 1.248 
.1834 (.2497) 
OR 1.201 
.1808 (.2521) 
OR 1.198 
.1790 (.2511) 
OR 1.196 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.5740 (.6650) 
OR 1.775 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.658 (1.386) 
OR .1903 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.2870 (1.000) 
OR .7505 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1618 (.2482) 
OR .8505 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1545 (.7131) 
OR .8568 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
7.886 (3.178)** 
OR 2662.418 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0052 (.0103) 
OR 1.005 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0014 (.0101) 
OR 1.001 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0218 
(.0097)** 
OR .9783 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0123 (.0125) 
OR .9877 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0038 (.0047) 
OR .9961 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0108 (.0075) 
OR .9891 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0138 
(.0055)** 
OR .9862 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0008 (.0015) 
OR 1.000 
 
 547 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0063 (.0056) 
OR 1.006 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.196 (.2654) 
 
2.179 (.2623) 
 
2.205 (.2655) 
 
2.056 (.2550) 
 
2.211 (.2693) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 446.98*** 439.44*** 455.34*** 384.14*** 445.98 
   AIC 1643.449 1639.304 1636.785 1596.332 1642.937 
   Wald statistic (df) 18.04 (6)*** 15.98 (6)** 18.40 (6)*** 15.97 (6)** 12.37 (6)* 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Unity‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 39: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Unity Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.89 (.5366)*** -2.669 
(.4373)*** 
-2.805 
(.4629)*** 
-1.743 
(.6131)*** 
-2.528 
(.4476)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0040 (.0092) 
OR 1.004 
.0036 (.0082) 
OR 1.003 
.0024 (.0083) 
OR 1.002 
.0010 (.0076) 
OR 1.001 
.0039 (.0059) 
OR 1.003 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0049 (.0030) 
OR 1.004 
.0045 (.0026)* 
OR 1.004 
.0062 
(.0028)** 
OR 1.006 
-.0022 (.0045) 
OR .9977 
.0033 (.0027) 
OR 1.003 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.2972 (.3184) 
OR 1.346 
.3516 (.3182) 
OR 1.421 
.3076 (.3170) 
OR 1.360 
.2565 (.3175) 
OR 1.292 
.2747 (.3170) 
OR 1.316 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.4361 (.8439) 
OR 1.546 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.398 (1.447) 
OR .2470 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0202 (1.088) 
OR .9799 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6693 
(.3658)* 
OR .5120 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.2965 (1.111) 
OR .7433 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0068 (.0117) 
OR .9931 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0058 (.0114) 
OR .9941 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0055 (.0115) 
OR .9944 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0013 (.0058) 
OR .9986 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0481 
(.0272)* 
OR .9529 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0049 (.0054) 
OR .9951 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0085 (.0075) 
OR .9914 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0148 (.0064) 
OR .9852 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0044 (.0028) 
OR 1.004 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0016 (.0070) 
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Wealth 
 
OR 1.001 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.308 (.3661) 
 
2.246 (.3558) 
 
2.311 (.3657) 
 
2.177 (.3551) 
 
2.206 (.3536) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 255.19*** 244.50*** 251.32*** 230.84*** 237.42*** 
   AIC 926.937 923.991 921.388 907.119 922.706 
   Wald statistic (df) 5.06 (6) 7.77 (6) 10.29 (6) 7.47 (6) 8.32 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Unity‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 40: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-11.292 
(1.907)*** 
-11.598 
(2.028)*** 
-10.330 
(2.021)*** 
-9.326 
(2.064)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0519 (.0175)*** 
OR 1.053 
.0483 
(.0153)*** 
OR 1.049 
.0433 
(.0172)** 
OR 1.044 
.0727 
(.0217)*** 
OR 1.075 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0376 (.0131)*** 
OR 1.038 
.0295 
(.0106)*** 
OR 1.029 
.0191 (.0148) 
OR 1.019 
.0105 (.0115) 
OR 1.010 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.0112 (.5327) 
OR .9888 
-.0555 (.5437) 
OR .9460 
-.1400 (.5461) 
OR .8693 
-.0431 (.5279) 
OR .9577 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.3260 (2.733) 
OR 1.385 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 4.001 (3.294) 
OR 54.697 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.757 (2.410) 
OR 42.824 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.133 (1.331) 
OR .3220 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0042 (.0302) 
OR 1.004 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0162 (.0306) 
OR .9839 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0062 (.0249) 
OR .9937 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0361 
(.0200)* 
OR .9645 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0229 (.0165) 
OR .9773 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0079 (.0162) 
OR .9920 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0096 (.0177) 
OR 1.009 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0155 (.0113) 
OR 1.015 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.327 (.7499) 
 
3.569 (.8696) 
 
2.691 (.8059) 
 
3.276 (.8876) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 85.72*** 90.40*** 37.31*** 68.56***  
   AIC 277.777 278.789 270.232 270.084  
   Wald statistic (df) 25.09 (6)*** 23.13 (6)*** 25.96 (6)*** 24.12 (6)***  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 41: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-8.761 
(1.014)*** 
-9.038 
(1.090)*** 
-8.489 
(1.004)*** 
-5.086 
(1.162)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
2.508 (4.970) 
OR 12.283 
.0155 (.0146) 
OR 1.015 
-.0132 (.0163) 
OR .9868 
.0156 (.0141) 
OR 1.015 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0310 (.0068)*** 
OR 1.031 
.0284 
(.0063)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0277 
(.0070)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0134 (.0097) 
OR 1.013 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.7302 (.4108)* 
OR 2.075 
.6701 (.4103) 
OR 1.954 
.7123 (.4088)* 
OR 2.038 
.7447 (.4056)* 
OR 2.105 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.9758 (1.439) 
OR 2.653 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.546 (2.114)* 
OR 34.681 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.574 
(1.557)** 
OR 35.684 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -3.750 
(1.429)*** 
OR .0234 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-2.501 (4.970) 
OR .0819 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0131 (.0164) 
OR .9869 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0208 (.0178) 
OR 1.021 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0337 (.0394) 
OR .9668 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0126 (.0116) 
OR .9873 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0065 (.0135) 
OR .9934 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0006 (.0116) 
OR .9993 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0207 (.0129) 
OR 1.020 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.082 (.5264) 
 
3.160 (.5644) 
 
2.704 (.5230) 
 
2.939 (.5862) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 195.14*** 197.94*** 137.89*** 146.52***  
   AIC 474.483 472.226 464.198 456.568  
   Wald statistic (df) 32.41 (6)*** 33.55 (6)*** 40.98 (6)*** 33.57 (6)***  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 42: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-22.786 
(5.778)*** 
-10.409 
(1.783)*** 
-10.012 
(1.829)*** 
-18.009 
(8.171)** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0617 (.0202)*** 
OR1.063 
.0418 
(.0161)*** 
OR 1.042 
.0586 
(.0170)*** 
OR 1.060 
-.0053 (.0134) 
OR .9946 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0415 (.0142)*** 
OR 1.042 
.0304 
(.0102)*** 
OR 1.030 
.0214 (.0150) 
OR 1.021 
.0201 (.0127) 
OR 1.020 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.3108 (.5520) 
OR 1.364 
.1078 (.5272) 
OR 1.113 
.1061 (.5300) 
OR 1.112 
.3389 (.5406) 
OR 1.403 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
2.862 (11.728) 
OR 17.509 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.039 (2.542)** 
OR 154.410 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.529 
(2.065)*** 
OR 251.899 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -3.202 (4.832) 
OR .0406 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0623 
(.0216)*** 
OR .9395 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0417 
(.0178)** 
OR .9591 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0610 
(.0186)*** 
OR .9407 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0336 (.0273) 
OR 1.034 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0182 (.0180) 
OR .9819 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0066 (.0158) 
OR .9933 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0069 (.0177) 
OR 1.006 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0137 (.0119) 
OR 1.013 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
96.783 (1.484) 
 
3.445 (.8136) 
 
2.598 (.7383) 
 
97.537 (1.728) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 52.54*** 94.50*** 46.99*** 18.55***  
   AIC 330.947 285.375 269.684 335.911  
   Wald statistic (df) 21.91 (6)*** 21.19 (6)*** 29.95 (6)*** 16.12 (6)**  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 43: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.375 
(1.154)*** 
X X -2.664 (1.662) X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0047 (.0198) 
OR .9952 
  -.0825 
(.0431)* 
OR .9208 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0105 (.0060)* 
OR 1.010 
  -.0024 (.0120) 
OR .9975 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.156 (.6519)* 
OR 3.177 
  1.083 (.6560)* 
OR 2.954 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.416 (2.113) 
OR .0328 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -2.308 
(1.179)** 
OR .0994 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0115 (.0306) 
OR 1.011 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0134 (.0106) 
OR 1.013 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.219 (.7747) 
   
2.436 (.6792) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 101.48***   67.13***  
   AIC 248.000   230.798  
   Wald statistic (df) 11.58 (4)**   15.81 (6)**  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 44: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.270 
(.7447)*** 
X -6.486 
(.7706)*** 
-5.587 
(1.014)*** 
-6.487 
(.7807)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0283 (.0259) 
OR 1.028 
 -.0060 (.0153) 
OR .9939 
-.0394 (.0406) 
OR .9613 
-.0066 (.0148) 
OR .9934 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0079 (.0048)* 
OR 1.008 
 .0080 (.0047)* 
OR 1.008 
.0048 (.0082) 
OR 1.004 
.0080 (.0047)* 
OR .1008 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.093 (.5219)** 
OR 2.985 
 1.051 
(.5190)** 
OR 2.861 
1.149 
(.5174)** 
OR 3.157 
1.058 
(.5201)** 
OR 2.881 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.799 (2.074)* 
OR .0223 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.851 (1.874) 
OR .1569 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4243 (.5548) 
OR .6542 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.8542 (1.040) 
OR .4255 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0166 (.0455) 
OR .9834 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0019 (.0054) 
OR 1.001 
 
      *Natural Resource      
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Wealth 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.735 (.5033) 
  
2.657 (.4858) 
 
2.396 (115.41) 
 
2.645 (.4843) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 133.50***  132.57*** 115.41*** 132.61*** 
   AIC 400.047  404.094 389.509 404.559 
   Wald statistic (df) 12.41 (4)**  10.19 (4)** 11.97 (6)* 9.94 (4)** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 45: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X -5.422 
(1.781)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
   -.0247 (.0450) 
OR .9755 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
   -.0044 (.0119) 
OR .9955 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
   .9327 (.6597) 
OR 2.541 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.656 (1.155) 
OR .1908 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0045 (.0359) 
OR .9954 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0140 (.0105) 
OR 1.14 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
    
3.166 (.7790) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test    104.00***  
   AIC    239.439  
   Wald statistic (df)    9.47 (6)  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 46: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.388 (1.162)** -2.801 
(1.202)** 
X -.4979 (2.560) -2.326 
(1.371)* 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0938 (.0570) 
OR .9104 
-.1173 
(.0537)** 
OR .8892 
 -.3458 
(.1477)** 
OR .7075 
-.2092 
(.0986)** 
OR .8112 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0953 
(.0184)*** 
OR .9090 
-.0938 
(.0179)*** 
OR .9104 
 -.0374 (.0508) 
OR .9632 
-.2857 
(.1311)** 
OR .7514 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X X  X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-6.174 (3.830) 
OR .0020 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -2.131 (4.790) 
OR .1186 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.216 (1.455) 
OR .2962 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.4069 (2.461) 
OR .6656 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0954 (.0824) 
OR 1.100 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0903 (.0884) 
OR 1.094 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .1125 (.0597)* 
OR 1.119 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .1792 (.1077)* 
OR 1.196 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0563 (.0492) 
OR .9451 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    .2289 (.1316)* 
OR 1.257 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.995 (1.070) 
 
3.872 (.9338) 
  
3.964 (1.077) 
 
3.964 (1.014) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 85.31*** 86.93***  83.34*** 80.36*** 
   AIC 204.743 207.481  196.137 192.903 
   Wald statistic (df) 28.02 (4)*** 28.04 (4)***  19.56 (5)*** 19.79 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 47: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -2.881 
(.4632)*** 
-2.786 
(.4608)*** 
-3.805 
(.7497)*** 
-3.022 
(.4993)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
 -.1806 (.1359) 
OR .8347 
-.1280 
(.0747)* 
OR .8797 
-.2136 (.2032) 
OR .8075 
-.2236 (.2162) 
OR .7995 
   Percent Rural 
 
 -.0809 
(.0114)*** 
OR .9222 
-.0813 
(.0114)*** 
OR .9218 
-.0622 
(.0227)*** 
OR .9396 
-.1064 
(.0192)*** 
OR .8990 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 X X X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 1.041 (2.768) 
OR 2.832 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.395 (1.588) 
OR .2478 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .5670 (.3116)* 
OR 1.763 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.630 (.9195)* 
OR 5.107 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0431 (.1920) 
OR 1.044 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0421 (.0828) 
OR 1.043 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0706 (.2331) 
OR 1.073 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0124 (.0149) 
OR .9876 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0571 
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Wealth 
 
(.0228)** 
OR 1.058 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
2.259 (.4188) 
 
2.247 (.4190) 
 
2.315 (.4449) 
 
2.094 (.3942) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  91.94*** 90.26*** 91.21*** 87.11*** 
   AIC  502.570 500.168 474.450 492.522 
   Wald statistic (df)  52.63 (4)*** 52.84 (3)*** 52.42 (5)*** 48.16 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 48: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.369 (1.146)** -3.560 
(1.216)*** 
X -3.300 (2.589) -3.285 
(1.419)** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0926 (.0565) 
OR .9114 
-.0906 (.0560) 
OR .9133 
 -.3032 
(.1670)* 
OR .7383 
-.1808 
(.1042)* 
OR .8345 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0948 
(.0182)*** 
OR .9094 
-.0930 
(.0175)*** 
OR .9111 
 -.0540 (.0417) 
OR .9473 
-.2857 
(.1314)** 
OR .7514 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X X  X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-7.162 (3.164)** 
OR .0007 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -3.946 (3.617) 
OR .0193 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2320 (1.303) 
OR .7929 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.4361 (2.209) 
OR .6465 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1428 (.0880) 
OR 1.153 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .1256 (.0873) 
OR 1.133 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .1046 (.0675) 
OR 1.110 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .1812 (.1092)* 
OR 1.198 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0392 (.0385) 
OR .9614 
 
      *Natural Resource     .2308 (.1319)* 
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Wealth 
 
OR 1.259 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.935 (1.035) 
 
3.920 (.9084) 
  
4.260 (1.128) 
 
4.007 (.9659) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 85.16*** 94.16***  98.66*** 95.98*** 
   AIC 204.133 211.168  202.691 197.490 
   Wald statistic (df) 28.80 (4)*** 28.53 (4)***  20.63 (5)*** 19.51 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 49: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in the 1999 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -19.133 
(6.686)*** 
-13.938 
(2.762)*** 
-9.107 
(2.989)*** 
-9.326 
(1.875)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
 .0034 (.0196) 
OR 1.003 
.0401 
(.0139)*** 
OR 1.040 
.0095 (.0178) 
OR 1.009 
.0176 (.0149) 
OR 1.017 
   Percent Rural 
 
 .0405 (.0185)** 
OR 1.041 
.0223 
(.0093)** 
OR 1.022 
-.0103 (.0107) 
OR .9897 
-.0093 (.0093) 
OR .9907 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 3.515 
(.7752)*** 
OR 33.636 
3.539 
(.6880)*** 
OR 34.466 
3.323 
(.6830)*** 
OR 27.760 
3.592 
(.7211)*** 
OR 36.335 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 8.292 (6.513) 
OR 3992.459 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  4.798 (2.898)* 
OR 121.334 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -2.035 
(1.168)* 
OR .1305 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.222 (2.519) 
OR .1083 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0696 (.0291)** 
OR 1.072 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0027 (.0301) 
OR 1.002 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0253 
(.0110)** 
OR 1.025 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0673 (.0264)* 
OR 1.069 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0460 
(.0203)** 
OR .9550 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0539 
(.0148)*** 
OR .9474 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0099 (.0058)* 
OR 1.010 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0264 (.0141)* 
OR 1.026 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
7.280 (4.572) 
 
4.294 (1.541) 
 
4.331 (1.662) 
 
2.864 (1.112) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  119.55*** 124.73*** 87.46*** 43.26*** 
   AIC  199.052 197.695 201.341 194.271 
   Wald statistic (df)  55.28 (6)*** 52.14 (6)*** 46.87 (6)*** 52.45 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 570 
 
Table 50: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in the 1999 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -20.465 
(7.359)*** 
-18.487 
(6.605)*** 
-16.685 
(6.337)*** 
-11.213 
(2.372)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
 .0158 (.0190) 
OR 1.015 
.0323 
(.0150)** 
OR 1.032 
.0014 (.0117) 
OR 1.001 
.0086 (.0106) 
OR 1.008 
   Percent Rural 
 
 .0301 (.0176)* 
OR 1.030 
.0184 
(.0088)** 
OR 1.018 
-.0094 (.0105) 
OR .9906 
-.0075 (.0093) 
OR .9924 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 3.973 
(.7565)*** 
OR 53.165 
3.537 
(.6572)*** 
OR 34.364 
3.398 
(.6490)*** 
OR 29.912 
3.747 
(.6949)*** 
OR 42.395 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 13.353 
(6.572)** 
OR 630188.7 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.734 
(2.565)** 
OR 309.372 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.8556 (1.014) 
OR .4250 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.875 (2.109) 
OR 6.523 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0013 (.0215) 
OR .9986 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0257 (.0199) 
OR .9746 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0170 
(.0086)** 
OR 1.017 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0507 
(.0208)** 
OR 1.052 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0304 (.0192) 
OR .9699 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0450 
(.0139)*** 
OR .9559 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0089 (.0052)* 
OR 1.009 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0195 (.0128) 
OR 1.019 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
8.272 (4.969) 
 
7.922 (4.652) 
 
8.943 (4.585) 
 
3.973 (1.523) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  112.19*** 166.71*** 111.16*** 50.73*** 
   AIC  220.620 212.611 219.942 214.719 
   Wald statistic (df)  58.21 (6)*** 52.55 (6)*** 48.43 (6)**** 54.56 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 51: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Fatherland-All Russia Strongholds in the 1999 Russian 
Parliamentary Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -18.242 
(6.492)*** 
-19.988 
(6.285)*** 
-16.065 
(6.483)** 
-11.477 
(3.098)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
 -.0474 (.0416) 
OR .9536 
.0011 (.0163) 
OR 1.001 
-.0032 (.0140) 
OR .9967 
-.0008 (.0123) 
OR .9991 
   Percent Rural 
 
 .0383 (.0178)** 
OR 1.039 
.0280 
(.0089)*** 
OR 1.028 
-.0098 (.0104) 
OR .9902 
-.0070 (.0091) 
OR .9930 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 4.201 
(.8045)*** 
OR 66.759 
3.685 
(.7183)*** 
OR 39.881 
3.600 
(.6890)*** 
OR 36.615 
3.790 
(.7132)*** 
OR 44.258 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 11.737 (6.070)* 
OR 125191.9 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  6.009 
(2.717)** 
OR 407.209 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.485 (1.115) 
OR .2264 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.557 (2.848) 
OR 12.907 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0546 (.0429) 
OR 1.056 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0067 (.0241) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0056 (.0089) 
OR 1.005 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0108 (.0224) 
OR 1.010 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0352 (.0197)* 
OR .9653 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0541 
(.0137)*** 
OR .9473 
  
      *Economic    .0126  
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Development    
 
(.0053)** 
OR 1.012 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0321 
(.0130)** 
OR 1.032 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
6.945 (3.984) 
 
9.034 (4.476) 
 
9.216 (4.632) 
 
4.392 (1.882) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  111.00*** 205.04*** 166.20*** 82.18*** 
   AIC  212.228 207.582 217.921 213.848 
   Wald statistic (df)  53.28 (6)*** 48.19 (6)*** 46.13 (6)*** 49.72 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Fatherland-All 
Russia‘s vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 52: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Unity Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-11.800 
(3.826)*** 
X X -9.608 
(2.886)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0144 (.0306) 
OR 1.014 
  .0631 
(.0287)** 
OR 1.065 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0056 (.0141) 
OR 1.005 
  -.0023 (.0165) 
OR .9976 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.704 (.9686)* 
OR 5.496 
  1.577 (.8967)* 
OR 4.842 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.737 (4.460) 
OR .0238 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6562 (1.330) 
OR .5187 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0592 (.0593) 
OR 1.061 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0423 (.0271) 
OR .5187 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0070 (.0287) 
OR 1.007 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0095 (.0121) 
OR 1.009 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
 575 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
5.262 (2.244) 
   
4.076 (1.298) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 116.31***   56.85***  
   AIC 153.620   148.855  
   Wald statistic (df) 7.12 (6)   11.87 (6)*  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Unity‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 576 
 
Table 53: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Unity Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.961 
(1.224)*** 
-7.667 
(1.116)*** 
X -6.201 
(1.282)*** 
-7.776 
(1.170)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0208 (.0136) 
OR 1.021 
.0313 (.0147)** 
OR 1.031 
 .0694 
(.0231)*** 
OR 1.071 
.0339 
(.0136)** 
OR 1.034 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0012 (.0072) 
OR 1.001 
.0005 (.0072) 
OR 1.000 
 -.0062 (.0113) 
OR .9937 
.0016 (.0079) 
OR 1.001 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.139 (.6423)* 
OR 3.124 
1.192 (.6430)* 
OR 3.294 
 1.090 (.6351)* 
OR 2.976 
1.156 (.6475)* 
OR 3.179 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.4720 (1.318) 
OR 1.603 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.067 (2.563) 
OR .3437 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.9005 (.8037) 
OR .4063 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .6681 (1.890) 
OR 1.950 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0152 (.0239) 
OR .9849 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1631 
(.0817)** 
OR .8494 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1556 (.1474) 
OR .8558 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0070 (.0084) 
OR 1.007 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    .0023 (.0203) 
OR 1.002 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.197 (.6926) 
 
3.070 (.6705) 
  
2.752 (.6881) 
 
3.100 (.6813) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 103.55*** 89.88***  43.45*** 88.93*** 
   AIC 252.436 253.546  242.067 250.819 
   Wald statistic (df) 9.32 (4)* 10.32 (5)*  17.40 (6)*** 12.27 (6)* 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Unity‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 54: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Unity Strongholds in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-11.294 
(3.648)*** 
-12.873 (9.219) -11.211 
(5.414)** 
-7.033 
(2.450)*** 
X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0148 (.0306) 
OR 1.014 
.0042 (.0280) 
OR 1.004 
.0016 (.0279) 
OR 1.001 
-.0140 (.0197) 
OR .9860 
 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0049 (.0141) 
OR 1.004 
.0148 (.0127) 
OR 1.015 
.0143 (.0119) 
OR 1.014 
.0125 (.0164) 
OR 1.012 
 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.812 (.9303)* 
OR 6.125 
1.765 (.8883)** 
OR 5.846 
1.786 
(.8855)** 
OR 5.966 
1.735 
(.8836)** 
OR 5.673 
 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.1860 (2.935) 
OR 1.204 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -.6580 (4.465) 
OR .5178 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.6056 (2.662) 
OR .5456 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -2.098 (1.414) 
OR .1226 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0260 (.0348) 
OR .9742 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0162 (.0333) 
OR .9838 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0130 (.0333) 
OR .9870 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0104 (.0224) 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0232 (.0274) 
OR 1.023 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0004 (.0121) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource      
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Wealth 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
4.943 (2.079) 
 
5.999 (5.640) 
 
5.097 (2.921) 
 
3.972 (1.106) 
 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 117.83*** 131.97*** 133.95*** 85.86***  
   AIC 156.971 156.629 156.608 154.203  
   Wald statistic (df) 8.02 (6) 7.66 (5) 7.82 (5) 9.66 (6)  
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Unity‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 55: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.412 
(.3753)*** 
-3.532 
(.3659)*** 
-3.498 
(.3725)*** 
-2.715 
(.4985)*** 
-3.141 
(.3545)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0013 (.0069) 
OR 1.001 
-.0048 (.0056) 
OR .9951 
-.0069 (.0058) 
OR .9930 
.0040 (.0082) 
OR 1.004 
-.0038 (.0055) 
OR .9961 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0129 (.0019)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0120 
(.0018)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0101 
(.0020)*** 
OR 1.010 
.0029 (.0032) 
OR 1.002 
.0098 
(.0018)*** 
OR 1.009 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.8124 
(.2998)*** 
OR .4437 
-.8032 
(.3030)*** 
OR .4478 
-.9097 
(.3018)*** 
OR .4026 
-.8416 
(.2973)*** 
OR .4309 
-.8772 
(.2998)*** 
OR .4159 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.2262 (.8561) 
OR .7975 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .8831 (1.742) 
OR 2.418 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.068 (1.085) 
OR 2.911 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.5864 (.3873) 
OR .5563 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.371 
(1.126)** 
OR .0933 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0032 (.0120) 
OR 1.003 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0050 (.0208) 
OR 1.005 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0032 (.0134) 
OR 1.003 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0097 (.0074) 
OR .9902 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0011 (.0156) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0202 
(.0050)*** 
OR .9799 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0228 
(.0065)*** 
OR .9774 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0005 (.0043) 
OR 1.000 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0063 
(.0025)** 
OR 1.006 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0029 (.0064) 
OR 1.002 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.240 (.2889) 
 
2.255 (.2899) 
 
2.189 (.2832) 
 
2.134 (.2783) 
 
2.177 (.2800) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 511.57*** 511.94*** 495.14*** 490.65*** 518.22*** 
   AIC 1708.137 1715.243 1726.265 1715.28 1722.306 
   Wald statistic (df) 55.41 (6)*** 48.97 (6)*** 39.15 (6)*** 43.70 (6)*** 42.19 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 56: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.217 
(.3646)*** 
-3.526 
(.3552)*** 
-3.454 
(.3563)*** 
-2.579 
(.4604)*** 
-3.141 
(.3355)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0044 (.0055) 
OR .9955 
-.0127 (.0084) 
OR .9873 
-.0245 
(.0093)*** 
OR .9757 
.0002 (.0095) 
OR 1.000 
-.0052 (.0052) 
OR .9947 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0100 (.0017)*** 
OR 1.010 
.0120 
(.0018)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0104 
(.0019)*** 
OR 1.010 
.0031 (.0032) 
OR 1.003 
.0097 
(.0018)*** 
OR 1.009 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.8691 
(.2969)*** 
OR .4193 
-.8256 
(.2977)*** 
OR .4379 
-.9652 
(.2987)*** 
OR .3808 
-.8667 
(.2938)*** 
OR .4202 
-.8533 
(.2968)*** 
OR .4260 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.9963 (.7061) 
OR .3692 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .9634 (1.125) 
OR 2.260 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .8461 (.9070) 
OR 2.330 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.7254 
(.3580)** 
OR .4841 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.594 (1.049) 
OR .2030 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0111 (.0109) 
OR 1.011 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0245 
(.0113)** 
OR 1.024 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0123 (.0132) 
OR .9877 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0903 (.0766) 
OR .9136 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0226 
(.0063)*** 
OR .9776 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0002 (.0043) 
OR 1.000 
  
      *Economic    .0060  
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Development    
 
(.0024)** 
OR 1.006 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0037 (.0061) 
OR 1.003 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.240 (.2886 
 
2.256 (.2892) 
 
2.180 (.2801) 
 
2.089 (.2725) 
 
2.123 (.2759) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 520.93*** 520.28*** 494.61*** 467.22*** 482.62*** 
   AIC 1721.298 1713.578 1720.174 1714.83 1717.713 
   Wald statistic (df) 39.85 (4)*** 50.50 (6)*** 44.57 (6)*** 44.78 (6)*** 42.08 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 57: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.415 
(.3767)*** 
-3.621 
(.3611)*** 
-3.689 
(.3698)*** 
-2.794 
(.4751)*** 
-3.213 
(.3410)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0013 (.0069) 
OR 1.001 
.0005 (.0066) 
OR 1.000 
.0051 (.0066) 
OR 1.005 
.0169 (.0104) 
OR 1.017 
.0012 (.0050) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0129 (.0019)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0116 
(.0018)*** 
OR 1.011 
.0094 
(.0019)*** 
OR 1.009 
.0026 (.0032) 
OR 1.002 
.0095 
(.0018)*** 
OR 1.009 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.7991 
(.2983)*** 
OR .4497 
-.8245 
(.2979)*** 
OR .4384 
-.9776 
(.2981)*** 
OR .3762 
-.8904 
(.2951)*** 
OR .4104 
-.9119 
(.2971)*** 
OR .4017 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.0276 (.7235) 
OR 1.028 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .9379 (1.106) 
OR 2.554 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.134 (.9132) 
OR 3.108 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6164 (.3796) 
OR .5398 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.613 
(1.051)** 
OR .0732 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0015 (.0096) 
OR .9984 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0012 (.0098) 
OR 1.001 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0071 (.0095) 
OR .9928 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0149 (.0095) 
OR .9851 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0119 (.0163) 
OR 1.011 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0197 
(.0046)*** 
OR .9804 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0223 
(.0063)*** 
OR .9778 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0009 (.0043) 
OR 1.000 
  
      *Economic    .0063  
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Development    
 
(.0024)** 
OR 1.006 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0017 (.0063) 
OR 1.001 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.250 (.2900) 
 
2.271 (.2920) 
 
2.240 (.2883) 
 
2.160 (.2805) 
 
2.163 (.2803) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 507.25*** 512.48*** 509.97*** 483.25*** 493.97*** 
   AIC 1707.073 1715.254 1726.307 1714.172 1721.290 
   Wald statistic (df) 55.41 (6)*** 47.99 (6)*** 38.05 (6)*** 43.82 (6)*** 42.21 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 58: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.802 
(.3255)*** 
-1.770 
(.2978)*** 
-1.754 
(.3046)*** 
-1.170 
(.3544)*** 
-1.903 
(.3302)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0251 
(.0086)*** 
OR .9751 
-.0216 
(.0064)*** 
OR .9786 
-.0220 
(.0065)*** 
OR .9782 
-.0498 
(.0100)*** 
OR .9513 
-.0357 
(.0087)*** 
OR .9648 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0049 (.0020)** 
OR .9950 
-.0060 
(.0019)*** 
OR .9939 
-.0064 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9935 
-.0025 (.0032) 
OR .9974 
-.0048 
(.0021)** 
OR .9951 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.7970 (.4266)* 
OR .4506 
-.7488 (.4317)* 
OR .4729 
-.7794 
(.4250)* 
OR .4586 
-.9115 
(.4355)** 
OR .4019 
-.8522 
(.4283)** 
OR .4264 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.1887 (.7833) 
OR .8279 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.163 (2.412) 
OR .3124 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.7117 (1.239) 
OR .4907 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.5102 
(.1717)*** 
OR .6003 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .7999 (.7612) 
OR 2.225 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0064 (.0139) 
OR 1.006 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0219 (.0386) 
OR .9782 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0247 (.0276) 
OR .9755 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0174 
(.0053)*** 
OR 1.017 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0233 (.0131)* 
OR 1.023 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0077 (.0059) 
OR .9922 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0088 (.0171) 
OR 1.008 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0062 (.0064) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0023 (.0022) 
OR .9976 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.0034 (.0044) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .9965 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.049 (.2381) 
 
2.021 (.2312) 
 
2.026 (.2312) 
 
1.966 (.2263) 
 
2.007 (.2280) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 485.14*** 501.86*** 502.51*** 446.70*** 495.33*** 
   AIC 1535.806 1534.694 1534.700 1519.162 1530.535 
   Wald statistic (df) 37.42 (6)*** 37.17 (6)*** 37.16 (6)*** 47.51 (6)*** 41.07 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 588 
 
Table 59: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.022 
(.3001)*** 
-1.935 
(.2770)*** 
-1.928 
(.2815)*** 
-1.703 
(.3142)*** 
-2.126 
(.3048)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0437 
(.0138)*** 
OR .9571 
-.0376 
(.0131)*** 
OR .9630 
-.0414 
(.0125)*** 
OR .9594 
-.0439 
(.0156)*** 
OR .9569 
-.0744 
(.0265)*** 
OR .9282 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0059 
(.0018)*** 
OR .9940 
-.0061 
(.0019)*** 
OR .9938 
-.0059 
(.0018)*** 
OR .9940 
-.0042 (.0033) 
OR .9957 
-.0055 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9944 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.8664 (.4211)** 
OR .4204 
-.8008 (.4286)* 
OR .4489 
-.8431 
(.4198)** 
OR .4303 
-.8486 
(.4211)** 
OR .4280 
-.8860 
(.4235)** 
OR .4122 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.1251 (.6477) 
OR 1.133 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.999 (1.859) 
OR .1353 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.026 (.9639) 
OR .3583 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2314 
(.1320)* 
OR .7933 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .9098 (.6830) 
OR 2.484 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
 -.0012 (.0411) 
OR .9987 
   
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0004 (.0127) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0495 (.0310) 
OR 1.050 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
 .0055 (.0164) 
OR 1.005 
   
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0016 (.0023) 
OR .9983 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0019 (.0044) 
OR .9980 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.942 (.2247) 
 
1.943 (.2230) 
 
1.947 (.2235) 
 
1.880 (.2171) 
 
1.932 (.2210) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 469.85*** 481.09*** 477.96*** 430.54*** 471.38*** 
   AIC 1532.256 1534.169 1531.11 1531.273 1530.072 
   Wald statistic (df) 31.53 (4)*** 33.91 (6)*** 32.44 (4)*** 35.89 (6)*** 31.82 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 60: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.813 
(.3342)*** 
-1.988 
(.2945)*** 
-2.010 
(.3051)*** 
-1.567 
(.3571)*** 
-2.278 
(.3312)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0253 
(.0086)*** 
OR .9749 
-.0117 (.0070)* 
OR .9883 
-.0113 (.0071) 
OR .9886 
-.0429 
(.0125)*** 
OR .9579 
-.0221 
(.0095)** 
OR .9781 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0049 (.0020)** 
OR .9950 
-.0069 
(.0018)*** 
OR .9931 
-.0073 
(.0019)*** 
OR .9926 
-.0054 
(.0031)* 
OR .9945 
-.0057 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9942 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.9450 (.4345)** 
OR .3886 
-.8415 (.4329)* 
OR .4310 
-.9526 
(.4258)** 
OR .3857 
-1.105 
(.4384)** 
OR .3309 
-1.015 
(.4298)** 
OR .3620 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.396 (.7261)* 
OR .2473 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -3.445 
(1.730)** 
OR .0318 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.741 (1.095) 
OR .1752 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4865 
(.1711)*** 
OR .6147 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .7890 (.7473) 
OR 2.201 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0482 (.0168)*** 
OR 1.049 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0179 (.0374) 
OR 1.018 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0073 (.0302) 
OR .9926 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0187 
(.0063)*** 
OR 1.018 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0215 (.0143) 
OR 1.021 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0098 (.0057)* 
OR .9902 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0021 (.0163) 
OR 1.002 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0060 (.0063) 
OR 1.006 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   -.0006 (.0022) 
OR .9993 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0034 (.0043) 
OR .9965 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.118 (.2446) 
 
2.050 (.2370) 
 
2.099 (.2423) 
 
2.087 (.2443) 
 
2.099 (.2415) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 500.29*** 497.79*** 504.30*** 459.06*** 502.80*** 
   AIC 1534.200 1543.594 1546.478 1535.037 1545.124 
   Wald statistic (df) 37.53 (6)*** 30.69 (6)*** 29.24 (6)*** 36.07 (6)*** 30.25 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 61: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.120 
(.2836)*** 
-1.184 
(.2827)*** 
-1.074 
(.2785)*** 
-1.472 
(.3104)*** 
-1.278 
(.3007)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0167 (.0094)* 
OR 1.016 
.0016 (.0075) 
OR 1.001 
.0019 (.0074) 
OR 1.001 
-.0027 (.0098) 
OR .9972 
.0020 (.0075) 
OR 1.002 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0605 
(.0050)*** 
OR .9412 
-.0587 
(.0047)*** 
OR .9429 
-.0589 
(.0047)*** 
OR .9427 
-.0651 
(.0069)*** 
OR .9369 
-.0572 
(.0049)*** 
OR .9443 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.1726 (.5994) 
OR .8413 
-.4516 (.6534) 
OR .6365 
-.2693 (.6035) 
OR .7638 
-.4662 (.5898) 
OR .6273 
-.3428 (.6014) 
OR .7090 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.3679 (.7853) 
OR .6921 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.676 (2.002) 
OR .1870 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.992 
(1.347)** 
OR .0501 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2302 
(.1112)** 
OR 1.258 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .3891 (.8217) 
OR 1.475 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0336 (.0161)** 
OR .9669 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0069 (.0270) 
OR 1.007 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0132 (.0202) 
OR 1.013 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0017 (.0048) 
OR 1.001 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0141 (.0170) 
OR .9859 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0208 (.0102)** 
OR 1.021 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0182 (.0141) 
OR 1.018 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0285 
(.0140)** 
OR 1.028 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0068 
(.0031)** 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0010 (.0120) 
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Wealth 
 
OR 1.001 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.667 (.2178) 
 
1.741 (.2250) 
 
1.675 (.2203) 
 
1.557 (.2266) 
 
1.735 (.2260) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 299.40*** 337.10*** 305.07*** 109.86*** 331.85*** 
   AIC 1110.364 1118.98 1112.769 1105.392 1121.421 
   Wald statistic (df) 176.63 (6)*** 169.76 (6)*** 171.99 (6)*** 169.52 (6)*** 163.56 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 62: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-.9836 
(.2683)*** 
-1.073 
(.2561)*** 
-.9324 
(.2492)*** 
-1.391 
(.2564)*** 
-1.081 
(.2698)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0112 (.0137) 
OR .9888 
-.0205 (.0167) 
OR .9796 
-.0235 (.0157) 
OR .9767 
-.0093 (.0128) 
OR .9907  
-.0283 
(.0154)* 
OR .9720 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0570 
(.0045)*** 
OR .9445 
-.0583 
(.0047)*** 
OR .9433 
-.0585 
(.0047)*** 
OR .9431 
-.0648 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9372 
-.0568 
(.0049)*** 
OR .9447 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.1517 (.5896) 
OR .8592 
-.3191 (.6188) 
OR .7268 
-.0678 (.5935) 
OR .9344 
-.2155 (.5819) 
OR .8060 
-.2589 (.5950) 
OR .7718 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.7730 (.6599) 
OR .4616 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -.4341 (1.222) 
OR .6478 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.508 
(1.038)** 
OR .0813 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2549 
(.0746)*** 
OR 1.290 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1376 (.6612) 
OR .8713 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0025 (.0264) 
OR 1.002 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0282 (.0238) 
OR 1.028 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0129 (.0132) 
OR .9871 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0225 (.0249) 
OR 1.022 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0218 (.0132)* 
OR 1.022 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0283 
(.0140)** 
OR 1.028 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0067 
(.0031)** 
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 OR 1.006 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0008 (.0117) 
OR 1.000 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.707 (.2217) 
 
1.713 (.2232) 
 
1.634 (.2176) 
 
1.499 (.2185) 
 
1.688 (.2195) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 321.38*** 324.11*** 286.82*** 109.40*** 318.95*** 
   AIC 1113.094 1116.41 1110.648 1101.783 1117.65 
   Wald statistic (df) 166.19 (4)*** 170.46 (6)*** 172.10 (6)*** 170.67 (6)*** 166.21 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 63: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.122 
(.2849)*** 
-1.246 
(.2726)*** 
-1.168 
(.2669)*** 
-1.661 
(.3120)*** 
-1.408 
(.2842)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0168 (.0094)* 
OR 1.016 
.0079 (.0084) 
OR 1.008 
.0104 (.0083) 
OR 1.010 
.0124 (.0151) 
OR 1.012 
.0165 (.0093)* 
OR 1.016 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0604 
(.0050)*** 
OR .9413 
-.0587 
(.0047)*** 
OR .9429 
-.0590 
(.0047)*** 
OR .9426 
-.0653 
(.0069)*** 
OR .9367 
-.0574 
(.0049)*** 
OR .9441 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.3534 (.5907) 
OR .7022 
-.5446 (.6398) 
OR .5800 
-.2534 (.5881) 
OR .7761 
-.5732 (.5769) 
OR .5637 
-.4948 (.5880) 
OR .6096 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.9939 (.6478) 
OR .3701 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.803 (1.105) 
OR .1646 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.450 
(1.043)** 
OR .0862 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2789 
(.1229)** 
OR 1.321 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .4061 (.7345) 
OR 1.500 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0216 (.0205) 
OR .9785 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0254 (.0252) 
OR 1.025 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0079 (.0278) 
OR 1.008 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0016 (.0063) 
OR .9983 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0298 (.0213) 
OR .9705 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0180 (.0101)* 
OR 1.018 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0175 (.0136) 
OR 1.017 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0287 
(.0139)** 
OR 1.029 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0069 
(.0031)** 
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 OR 1.006 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0009 (.0119) 
OR 1.000 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.677 (.2181) 
 
1.734 (.2237) 
 
1.674 (.2195) 
 
1.549 (.2239) 
 
1.710 (.2218) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 302.87*** 333.79*** 303.75*** 111.57*** 322.82*** 
   AIC 1111.592 1115.778 1111.134 1103.586 1117.895 
   Wald statistic (df) 176.19 (6)*** 170.63 (6)*** 173.13 (6)*** 170.72 (6)*** 166.82 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 64: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.755 
(.7259)*** 
-6.834 
(.5830)*** 
-7.128 
(.6063)*** 
-5.448 
(.6919)*** 
-5.948 
(.5400)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0323 (.0107)*** 
OR 1.032 
.0279 
(.0072)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0274 
(.0069)*** 
OR 1.027 
.0409 
(.0093)*** 
OR 1.041 
.0296 
(.0072)*** 
OR 1.030 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0233 (.0053)*** 
OR 1.023 
.0213 
(.0041)*** 
OR 1.021 
.0264 
(.0042)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0023 (.0047) 
OR 1.002 
.0105 
(.0034)*** 
OR 1.010 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
2.413 (.2979)*** 
OR 11.174 
2.349 
(1.462)*** 
OR 10.483 
2.349 
(.3060)*** 
OR 10.479 
2.396 
(.3018)*** 
OR 10.985 
2.445 
(.3050)*** 
OR 11.541 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
4.046 (1.000)*** 
OR 57.174 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.127 (1.462)** 
OR 22.820 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.887 (1.520)* 
OR 17.953 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.7860 (.5197) 
OR .4556 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.276 
(1.360)* 
OR .1026 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0141 (.0132) 
OR .9859 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0012 (.0143) 
OR 1.001 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0107 (.0169) 
OR 1.010 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0083 (.0074) 
OR .9916 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0117 (.0146) 
OR 1.011 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0105 (.0065) 
OR .9894 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0135 
(.0064)** 
OR .9865 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0337 
(.0074)*** 
OR .9668 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0129 
(.0039)*** 
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 OR 1.013 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0271 
(.0088)*** 
OR 1.027 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.549 (.3539) 
 
2.678 (.3739) 
 
2.784 (.3871) 
 
2.608 (.3660) 
 
2.721 (.3832) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 449.05*** 442.49*** 457.25*** 426.61*** 448.25*** 
   AIC 865.339 875.019 859.893 866.745 871.444 
   Wald statistic (df) 161.83 (6)*** 158.41 (6)*** 155.16 (6)*** 154.14 (6)*** 147.20 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 65: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.918 
(.6198)*** 
-6.477 
(.5845)*** 
-6.934 
(.6145)*** 
-4.594 
(.6798)*** 
-5.545 
(.5779)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0065 (.0056) 
OR 1.006 
.0137 (.0088) 
OR 1.013 
.0264 
(.0078)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0100 (.0088) 
OR 1.010 
-.0007 (.0067) 
OR .9992 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0182 (.0030)*** 
OR 1.018 
.0232 
(.0041)*** 
OR 1.023 
.0272 
(.0043)*** 
OR 1.027 
.0057 (.0047) 
OR 1.005 
.0135 
(.0033)*** 
OR 1.013 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
2.519 (.2952)*** 
OR 12.416 
2.490 
(.2982)*** 
OR 12.061 
2.577 
(.3080)*** 
OR 13.157 
2.528 
(.3016)*** 
OR 12.533 
2.610 
(.3088)*** 
OR 13.599 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.666 (.8047)*** 
OR 39.112 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 4.260 
(1.281)*** 
OR 70.854 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.069 
(1.254)*** 
OR 159.057 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.155 
(.5256)** 
OR .3149 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.317 
(1.376)* 
OR .0985 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0034 (.0115) 
OR .9965 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0311 
(.0107)*** 
OR .9692 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0051 (.0076) 
OR 1.005 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0534 
(.0145)*** 
OR 1.054 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0135 
(.0063)** 
OR .9865 
   
      *Caucasus Region   -.0313   
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 (.0071)*** 
OR .9691 
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0122 
(.0041)*** 
OR 1.012 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0242 
(.0093)*** 
OR 1.024 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.551 (.3567) 
 
2.828 (.4101) 
 
2.974 (.4113) 
 
2.968 (.4332) 
 
3.253 (.4613) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 435.09*** 425.55*** 452.57*** 422.11*** 442.69*** 
   AIC 876.823 890.889 869.029 889.413 877.564 
   Wald statistic (df) 157.14 (4)*** 147.53 (6)*** 145.60 (6)*** 132.13 (6)*** 135.50 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 66: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.832 
(.7377)*** 
-6.922 
(.6327)*** 
-6.995 
(.6502)*** 
-5.170 
(.7573)*** 
-5.924 
(.6007)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0323 (.0108)*** 
OR 1.032 
.0259 
(.0088)*** 
OR 1.026 
.0050 (.0081) 
OR 1.005 
.0441 
(.0126)*** 
OR 1.045 
.0258 
(.0069)*** 
OR 1.026 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0233 (.0053)*** 
OR 1.023 
.0243 
(.0041)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0298 
(.0042)*** 
OR 1.030 
.0059 (.0047) 
OR 1.006 
.0128 
(.0034)*** 
OR 1.012 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
2.499 (.2966)*** 
OR 12.181 
2.454 
(.2998)*** 
OR 11.638 
2.572 
(.3121)*** 
OR 13.094 
2.623 
(.3088)*** 
OR 13.781 
2.682 
(.3114)*** 
OR 14.620 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
5.026 (.9229)*** 
OR 152.366 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.220 
(1.334)*** 
OR 184.975 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  4.552 
(1.329)*** 
OR 94.889 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.8432 (.5720) 
OR .4302 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1538 (1.325) 
OR .8574 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0293 (.0130)** 
OR .9711 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0249 
(.0119)** 
OR .9753 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0138 (.0121) 
OR 1.013 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0277 
(.0103)*** 
OR .9726 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0548 
(.0161)*** 
OR .9465 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0079 (.0064) 
OR .9920 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0138 
(.0062)** 
OR .9862 
   
      *Caucasus Region   -.0344   
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 (.0072)*** 
OR .9661 
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0133 
(.0042)*** 
OR 1.013 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0272 
(.0087)*** 
OR 1.027 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.610 (.3610) 
 
3.089 (.4118) 
 
3.292 (.4374) 
 
3.343 (.4518) 
 
3.316 (.4389) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 450.18*** 523.18*** 534.11*** 515.46*** 513.84*** 
   AIC 870.527 886.741 875.403 882.736 879.852 
   Wald statistic (df) 157.77 (6)*** 147.01 (6)*** 139.48 (6)*** 130.79 (6)*** 138.36 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 67: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.749 
(.5243)*** 
-5.915 
(.5673)*** 
-5.831 
(.5801)*** 
-4.974 
(.7280)*** 
-5.774 
(.5509)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0192 (.0101)* 
OR 1.019 
.0056 (.0089) 
OR 1.005 
-.0003 (.0095) 
OR .9996 
-.0137 (.0120) 
OR .9863 
.0044 (.0090) 
OR 1.004 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0124 (.0039)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0133 
(.0038)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0136 
(.0039)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0116 (.0060)* 
OR 1.011 
.0138 
(.0038)*** 
OR 1.013 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.0994 (.4733) 
OR 1.104 
.0655 (.4794) 
OR 1.067 
-.1089 (.4795) 
OR .8968 
-.1229 (.4754) 
OR .8842 
-.0769 (.4816) 
OR .9259 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.0022 (1.295) 
OR 1.002 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 1.283 (2.502) 
OR 3.608 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.212 (1.410) 
OR 3.361 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6737 (.5292) 
OR .5097 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1163 (1.270) 
OR .8901 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0293 (.0206) 
OR .9710 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0203 (.0322) 
OR .9798 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0005 (.0208) 
OR 1.000 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0150 (.0082)* 
OR 1.015 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0052 (.0201) 
OR .9947 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0037 (.0084) 
OR .9962 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0093 (.0091) 
OR .9906 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0072 (.0079) 
OR .9928 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0001 (.0047) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0107 (.0085) 
OR .9893 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.982 (.3604) 
 
2.033 (.3789) 
 
1.923 (.3682) 
 
1.937 (.3620) 
 
1.957 (.3568) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 126.98*** 118.92*** 108.63*** 124.31*** 128.42*** 
   AIC 646.178 650.269 651.210 648.155 649.572 
   Wald statistic (df) 19.23 (6)*** 14.60 (6)** 13.76 (6)** 15.20 (6)** 15.35 (6)** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 68: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.449 
(.4884)*** 
-5.624 
(.5002)*** 
-5.519 
(.4916)*** 
-5.199 
(.5953)*** 
-5.453 
(.4859)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0051 (.0076) 
OR .9948 
-.0170 (.0157) 
OR .9830 
-.0670 
(.0381)* 
OR .9351 
-.0051 (.0135) 
OR .9948 
-.0082 (.0070) 
OR .9918 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0123 (.0034)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0141 
(.0037)*** 
OR 1.014 
.0147 
(.0039)*** 
OR 1.014 
.0113 (.0058)* 
OR 1.011 
.0124 
(.0034)*** 
OR 1.012 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.0774 (.4691) 
OR 1.080 
.0695 (.4663) 
OR 1.072 
.0282 (.4596) 
OR 1.028 
.0128 (.4579) 
OR 1.012 
.0274 (.4626) 
OR 1.027 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.9071 (.8675) 
OR .4036 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .2961 (1.394) 
OR 1.344 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.063 (1.022) 
OR 2.895 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2466 (.3137) 
OR .7814 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.9332 (.9502) 
OR .3932 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0121 (.0178) 
OR 1.012 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0643 (.0388)* 
OR 1.066 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0058 (.0166) 
OR .9942 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0110 (.0086) 
OR .9889 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0082 (.0078) 
OR .9917 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0006 (.0046) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource      
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Wealth 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.952 (.3588) 
 
1.902 (.3488) 
 
1.779 (.3228) 
 
1.824 (.3369) 
 
1.895 (.3448) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 124.52*** 117.50*** 108.93*** 116.30*** 125.43*** 
   AIC 645.908 649.154 643.668 649.311 646.063 
   Wald statistic (df) 15.04 (4)*** 15.70 (6)** 17.79 (6)*** 14.71 (6)** 14.97 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 69: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.735 
(.5224)*** 
-5.931 
(.5248)*** 
-6.041 
(.5487)*** 
-5.066 
(.6945)*** 
-5.742 
(.5100)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0192 (.0101)* 
OR 1.019 
.0167 (.0099)* 
OR 1.016 
.0177 (.0099)* 
OR 1.017 
-.0064 (.0110) 
OR .9935 
.0090 (.0069) 
OR 1.009 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0124 (.0039)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0130 
(.0037)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0127 
(.0039)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0098 (.0060) 
OR 1.009 
.0138 
(.0038)*** 
OR 1.013 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.0377 (.4646) 
OR 1.038 
-.0100 (.4649) 
OR .9900 
-.1547 (.4584) 
OR .8566 
-.1449 (.4585) 
OR .8650 
-.0490 (.4672) 
OR .9521 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.5355 (.9934) 
OR .5853 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .2359 (1.394) 
OR 1.266 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.398 (1.069) 
OR 4.050 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6508 (.5063) 
OR .5216 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.4164 (1.163) 
OR .6594 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0163 (.0129) 
OR .9837 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0129 (.0130) 
OR .9871 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0152 (.0128) 
OR .9848 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0151 (.0083)* 
OR 1.015 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0056 (.0201) 
OR 1.005 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0051 (.0080) 
OR .9948 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0102 (.0086) 
OR .9898 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0063 (.0078) 
OR .9936 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0015 (.0049) 
OR 1.001 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.0120 (.0085) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .9880 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.965 (.3600) 
 
1.958 (.3566) 
 
1.941 (.3543) 
 
1.884 (.3560) 
 
1.901 (.3488) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 114.36*** 113.97*** 112.68*** 107.61*** 114.94*** 
   AIC 646.293 647.935 648.071 646.328 647.440 
   Wald statistic (df) 19.09 (6)*** 17.17 (6)*** 17.08 (6)*** 17.29 (6)*** 17.46 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 70: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.452 
(.6799)*** 
X X -4.798 
(.7492)*** 
-5.560 
(.7356)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0046 (.0175) 
OR 1.004 
  -.0372 
(.0205)* 
OR .9634 
-.0192 (.0176) 
OR .9809 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0076 (.0047) 
OR .9923 
  -.0043 (.0075) 
OR .9956 
-.0027 (.0050) 
OR .9972 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.1965 (.8905) 
OR 1.217 
  .0277 (.8864) 
OR 1.028 
.0836 (.8806) 
OR 1.087 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-4.117 (2.350)* 
OR .0162 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4178 
(.2473)* 
OR .6584 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.2025 (1.453) 
OR .8166 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0245 (.0318) 
OR 1.024 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0177 
(.0072)** 
OR 1.017 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0428 (.0284) 
OR 1.043 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0016 (.0055) 
OR .9983 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1236 (.1741) 
OR .8837 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.426 (.4713) 
   
2.164 (.4360) 
 
2.340 (.4648) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 93.17***   80.79*** 90.75*** 
   AIC 364.594   364.059 362.548 
   Wald statistic (df) 6.33 (5)   8.71 (6) 4.49 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 71: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X X X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
     
   Percent Rural 
 
     
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
     
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
     
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
     
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test      
   AIC      
   Wald statistic (df)      
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 72: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.544 
(.6449)*** 
X -5.733 
(.6718)*** 
-5.284 
(.7576)*** 
-5.843 
(.7208)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0200 (.0122) 
OR 1.020 
 .0175 (.0121) 
OR 1.017 
-.0109 (.0210) 
OR .9890 
.0013 (.0177) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0081 (.0047)* 
OR .9918 
 -.0078 
(.0047)* 
OR .9921 
-.0074 (.0074) 
OR .9925 
-.0037 (.0049) 
OR .9962 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
.2593 (.8709) 
OR 1.296 
 -.0499 (.8698) 
OR .9512 
-.2038 (.8743) 
OR .8156 
-.0399 (.8731) 
OR .9607 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.472 (1.348)* 
OR .0843 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.779 (1.678) 
OR .1686 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3422 (.2386) 
OR .7101 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1435 (1.367) 
OR .8663 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0134 (.0075)* 
OR 1.013 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0408 (.0304) 
OR 1.041 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0005 (.0056) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.1118 (.1676) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .8942 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.315 (.4496) 
  
2.279 (.4533) 
 
2.214 (.4549) 
 
2.319 (.4650) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 90.97***  88.40*** 81.49*** 88.35*** 
   AIC 361.361  364.598 365.581 361.608 
   Wald statistic (df) 7.73 (4)  5.59 (4) 7.60 (6) 5.44 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 73: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.743 
(.6023)*** 
X X -3.948 
(.6670)*** 
-4.129 
(.6786)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0006 (.0157) 
OR .9993 
  -.0116 (.0226) 
OR .9883 
-.0035 (.0154) 
OR .9964 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0718 
(.0151)*** 
OR .9306 
  -.0957 
(.0275)*** 
OR .9087 
-.0641 
(.0146)*** 
OR .9378 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.8104 (1.335) 
OR .4446 
  -.8252 (1.309) 
OR .4381 
-.7879 (1.346) 
OR .4547 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.984 (1.241) 
OR .1374 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .3038 (.1699)* 
OR 1.355 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.471 (1.293)* 
OR 11.844 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0019 (.0095) 
OR .9980 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0727 
(.0430)* 
OR .9298 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0122 (.0083) 
OR 1.012 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.4949 (.4419) 
OR .6096 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.133 (.4522) 
   
1.668 (.4095) 
 
2.117 (.4470) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 245.15***   52.82*** 263.28*** 
   AIC 535.491   529.236 534.971 
   Wald statistic (df) 26.22 (4)***   31.81 (6)*** 26.03 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 74: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.738 
(.5695)*** 
X X -3.827 
(.5286)*** 
-3.894 
(.5995)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.2166 (.2290) 
OR .8051 
  -.0212 (.1754) 
OR .9789 
-.2536 (.2028) 
OR .7759 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0715 
(.0151)*** 
OR .9309 
  -.0972 
(.0279)*** 
OR .9073 
-.0711 
(.0151)*** 
OR .9313 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.7088 (1.367) 
OR .4922 
  -.5884 (1.371) 
OR .5551 
-.7205 (1.356) 
OR .4864 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.2086 (1.478) 
OR .8117 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2535 
(.0802)*** 
OR 1.288 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .8859 (.9973) 
OR 2.425 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4208 (.7460) 
OR .6564 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0136 (.0086) 
OR 1.013 
 
      *Natural Resource      
 619 
Wealth 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.116 (.4475) 
   
1.622 (.4003) 
 
2.110 (.4455) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 247.08***   49.12*** 249.99*** 
   AIC 532.453   523.720 531.684 
   Wald statistic (df) 24.07 (4)***   30.15 (6)*** 24.69 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 75: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.827 
(.5975)*** 
X X -4.559 
(.7639)*** 
-4.446 
(.6850)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0068 (.0149) 
OR 1.006 
  .0246 (.0327) 
OR 1.024 
.0112 (.0161) 
OR 1.011 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0716 
(.0151)*** 
OR .9308 
  -.0944 
(.0273)*** 
OR .9098 
-.0639 
(.0146)*** 
OR .9380 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.8465 (1.322) 
OR .4288 
  -1.147 (1.250) 
OR .3175 
-1.087 (1.273) 
OR .3370 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.050 (1.145)* 
OR .1286 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .4451 
(.2220)** 
OR 1.560 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.674 (1.217) 
OR 5.334 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0110 (.0134) 
OR .9890 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0586 (.0444) 
OR .9429 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0117 (.0083) 
OR 1.011 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.4209 (.4224) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .6563 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.129 (.4514) 
   
1.763 (.4320) 
 
2.248 (.4674) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 243.91***   54.99*** 264.03*** 
   AIC 535.175   529.442 537.386 
   Wald statistic (df) 26.49 (4)***   30.51 (6)*** 23.77 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 76: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-11.584 
(1.597)*** 
-10.928 
(1.406)*** 
-11.195 
(1.267)*** 
-9.022 
(1.297)*** 
-9.563 
(1.131)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0376 (.0186)** 
OR 1.038 
.0363 
(.0135)*** 
OR 1.037 
.0357 
(.0111)*** 
OR 1.036 
.0573 
(.0137)*** 
OR 1.059 
.0508 
(.0113)*** 
OR 1.052 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0321 (.0134)** 
OR 1.032 
.0209 (.0089)** 
OR 1.021 
.0273 
(.0069)*** 
OR 1.027 
-.0059 (.0064) 
OR .9940 
.0006 (.0049) 
OR 1.000 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
3.421 (.5326)*** 
OR 30.607 
3.295 
(.5329)*** 
OR 26.990 
3.325 
(.5368)*** 
OR 27.818 
3.649 
(.5486)*** 
OR 38.468 
3.832 
(.5650)*** 
OR 46.155 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
2.749 (1.814) 
OR 15.642 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.978 (2.082)* 
OR 53.441 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.782 (2.195) 
OR 16.159 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.6323 (.7399) 
OR .5313 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.642 (1.889) 
OR .1935 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0054 (.0223) 
OR 1.005 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0029 (.0192) 
OR 1.002 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0224 (.0236) 
OR 1.022 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0122 (.0088) 
OR .9878 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0165 (.0204) 
OR .9835 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0283 (.0141)** 
OR .9720 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0171 (.0100)* 
OR .9830 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0367 
(.0092)*** 
OR .9639 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0118 
(.0044)*** 
OR 1.011 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0243 
(.0100)** 
OR 1.024 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.946 (.5866) 
 
3.165 (.6497) 
 
3.184 (.6111) 
 
2.957 (.5917) 
 
3.090 (.6128) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 224.48*** 239.46*** 260.08*** 247.06*** 243.49*** 
   AIC 420.014 418.508 406.494 415.753 418.415 
   Wald statistic (df) 79.02 (6)*** 79.06 (6)*** 83.47 (6)*** 83.40 (6)*** 80.45 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 77: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-9.469 
(1.088)*** 
-10.263 
(1.313)*** 
-11.000 
(1.243)*** 
-7.095 
(1.094)*** 
-8.336 
(1.015)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.0046 (.0057) 
OR .9953 
.0345 (.0159)** 
OR 1.035 
.0396 
(.0124)*** 
OR 1.040 
.0000 (.0091) 
OR 1.000 
-.0061 (.0062) 
OR .9938 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0113 (.0041)*** 
OR 1.011 
.0209 (.0088)** 
OR 1.021 
.0278 
(.0070)*** 
OR 1.028 
-.0011 (.0061) 
OR .9988 
.0053 (.0047) 
OR 1.005 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
3.758 (.5270)*** 
OR 42.867 
3.519 
(.5194)*** 
OR 33.781 
3.634 
(.5423)*** 
OR 37.887 
4.000 
(.5589)*** 
OR 54.603 
4.125 
(.5737)*** 
OR 61.881 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.211 (1.082)*** 
OR 24.815 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 6.667 
(1.749)*** 
OR 786.695 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  7.127 
(1.658)*** 
OR 1245.867 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.358 
(.7011)* 
OR .2571 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.642 (1.751) 
OR .0711 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0438 
(.0170)*** 
OR .9570 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0554 
(.0143)*** 
OR .9460 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0008 (.0079) 
OR .9991 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0406 
(.0170)** 
OR 1.041 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0131 (.0100) 
OR .9868 
   
      *Caucasus Region   -.0326   
 625 
 (.0091)*** 
OR .9679 
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0108 
(.0044)** 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0209 
(.0100)** 
OR 1.021 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.952 (.5909) 
 
3.017 (.6289) 
 
3.264 (.6326) 
 
3.131 (.5659) 
 
3.301 (.5897) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 215.76*** 217.26*** 225.33*** 232.10*** 227.90*** 
   AIC 437.356 427.500 409.861 442.440 438.721 
   Wald statistic (df) 77.80 (4)*** 78.82 (6)*** 83.86 (6)*** 70.93 (6)*** 72.04 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 78: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia Strongholds in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-11.803 
(1.632)*** 
-10.670 
(1.382)*** 
-10.605 
(1.219)*** 
-7.739 
(1.158)*** 
-8.959 
(1.050)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0387 (.0190)** 
OR 1.039 
.0208 (.0177) 
OR 1.021 
.0019 (.0156) 
OR 1.001 
.0366 
(.0154)** 
OR 1.037 
.0295 
(.0079)*** 
OR 1.030 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0318 (.0136)** 
OR 1.032 
.0242 
(.0086)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0303 
(.0067)*** 
OR 1.030 
-.0005 (.0061) 
OR .9994 
.0052 (.0048) 
OR 1.005 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
3.639 (.5318)*** 
OR 38.074 
3.480 
(.5221)*** 
OR 32.475 
3.629 
(.5367)*** 
OR 37.711 
3.997 
(.5565)*** 
OR 54.460 
4.090 
(.5645)*** 
OR 59.777 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
5.148 (1.659)*** 
OR 172.096 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 6.014 
(1.840)*** 
OR 409.486 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.407 
(1.644)*** 
OR 223.148 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.223 
(.7461)* 
OR .2913 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.7170 (1.656) 
OR .4881 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0172 (.0203) 
OR .9829 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0035 (.0192) 
OR 1.003 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0290 (.0180) 
OR 1.029 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0124 (.0146) 
OR .9875 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0419 
(.0235)* 
OR .9588 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0234 (.0143) 
OR .9768 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0168 (.0098)* 
OR .9832 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0360 
(.0090)*** 
OR .9645 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0107 
(.0043)** 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0227 
(.0098)** 
OR 1.022 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.043 (.5928) 
 
3.305 (.6406) 
 
3.317 (.6060) 
 
3.321 (.5613) 
 
3.395 (.5873) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 225.42*** 274.08*** 276.42*** 299.75*** 282.54*** 
   AIC 414.603 421.820 411.19 427.820 427.908 
   Wald statistic (df) 77.49 (6)*** 82.48 (6)*** 88.18 (6)*** 80.16 (6)*** 81.10 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 79: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.317 
(.2846)*** 
-1.432 
(.2733)*** 
-1.429 
(.2887)*** 
-1.299 
(.3174)*** 
-1.177 
(.2789)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0148 (.0095) 
OR .9852 
-.0149 
(.0074)** 
OR .9852 
-.0111 (.0078) 
OR .9888 
-.0174 
(.0101)* 
OR .9827 
-.0154 
(.0078)** 
OR .9846 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0197 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9804 
-.0197 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9804 
-.0242 
(.0023)*** 
OR .9760 
-.0262 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9740 
-.0219 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9783 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.573 
(.5863)*** 
OR .0762 
-2.697 
(.6145)*** 
OR .0673 
-2.595 
(.5992)*** 
OR .0746 
-2.622 
(.5914)*** 
OR .0726 
-2.628 
(.5907)*** 
OR .0722 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.027 (.8015) 
OR .3580 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -.2969 (1.946) 
OR .7430 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .2358 (1.009) 
OR 1.265 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1002 (.1306) 
OR .9045 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.938 
(.8308)*** 
OR .1439 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0143 (.0161) 
OR 1.014 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0100 (.0269) 
OR 1.010 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0087 (.0172) 
OR .9913 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0050 (.0063) 
OR 1.005 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0127 (.0162) 
OR 1.012 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0013 (.0078) 
OR .9986 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0064 (.0138) 
OR 1.006 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0217 
(.0048)*** 
OR 1.021 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0049 
(.0019)** 
OR 1.004 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0171 
(.0059)*** 
OR 1.017 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.689 (.2091) 
 
1.689 (.2070) 
 
1.739 (.2127) 
 
1.753 (.2193) 
 
1.650 (.2036) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 360.81*** 369.70*** 370.44*** 371.22*** 357.35*** 
   AIC 1712.638 1713.777 1692.983 1707.638 1701.98 
   Wald statistic (df) 129.72 (6)*** 129.75 (6)*** 138.45 (6)*** 130.34 (6)*** 136.38 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 80: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.475 
(.2670)*** 
-1.630 
(.2563)*** 
-1.579 
(.2693)*** 
-1.567 
(.2862)*** 
-1.372 
(.2613)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.1361 (.6791) 
OR .8726 
-.0094 (.0113) 
OR .9906 
-.0080 (.0121) 
OR .9920 
-.0070 (.0120) 
OR .9929 
-.0094 (.0106) 
OR .9905 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0200 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9801 
-.0201 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9800 
-.0246 
(.0023)*** 
OR .9756 
-.0268 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9735 
-.0222 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9779 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.615 
(.5841)*** 
OR .0731 
-2.753 
(.6174)*** 
OR .0637 
-2.717 
(.6083)*** 
OR .0660 
-2.740 
(.5965)*** 
OR .0645 
-2.738 
(.5961)*** 
OR .0646 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.048 (.6817) 
OR .3505 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -.5814 (1.514) 
OR .5591 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.3131 (.9343) 
OR .7311 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0228 (.0800) 
OR .9773 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.943 
(.7555)*** 
OR .1431 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1418 (.6792) 
OR 1.152 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0134 (.0252) 
OR 1.013 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0036 (.0206) 
OR 1.003 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0037 (.0117) 
OR 1.003 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0177 (.0218) 
OR 1.017 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0023 (.0078) 
OR .9976 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0064 (.0136) 
OR 1.006 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0220 
(.0048)*** 
OR 1.022 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0050 
(.0019)*** 
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 OR 1.005 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0168 
(.0058)*** 
OR 1.017 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.697 (.2098) 
 
1.719 (.2100) 
 
1.775 (.2161) 
 
1.774 (.2201) 
 
1.675 (.2052) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 364.25*** 378.84*** 383.49*** 382.38*** 369.24*** 
   AIC 1714.76 1717.172 1696.184 1710.847 1705.088 
   Wald statistic (df) 129.01 (6)*** 128.52 (6)*** 136.71 (6)*** 129.68 (6)*** 135.43 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 81: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.314 
(.2825)*** 
-1.473 
(.2703)*** 
-1.486 
(.2826)*** 
-1.222 
(.3200)*** 
-1.210 
(.2772)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0147 (.0095) 
OR .9853 
-.0177 (.0094)* 
OR .9824 
-.0114 (.0023) 
OR .9885 
-.0330 
(.0149)** 
OR .9675 
-.0208 
(.0110)* 
OR .9793 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0197 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9804 
-.0200 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9801 
-.0244 
(.0023)*** 
OR .9758 
-.0268 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9735 
-.0221 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9781 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.541 
(.5831)*** 
OR .0787 
-2.747 
(.6169)*** 
OR .0640 
-2.789 
(.6118)*** 
OR .0614 
-2.743 
(.5932)*** 
OR .0643 
-2.751 
(.5907)*** 
OR .0638 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.4201 (.7424) 
OR .6569 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -.2406 (1.279) 
OR .7861 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .1989 (.9004) 
OR 1.220 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1718 (.1363) 
OR .8421 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.819 
(.7614)** 
OR .1620 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0286 (.0366) 
OR .9717 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0003 (.0385) 
OR 1.000 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0364 (.0312) 
OR .9642 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0106 (.0071) 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0117 (.0202) 
OR 1.011 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0027 (.0075) 
OR .9972 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0072 (.0138) 
OR 1.007 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0213 
(.0048)*** 
OR 1.021 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0053 
(.0019)*** 
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 OR 1.005 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0176 
(.0059)*** 
OR 1.017 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.672 (.2070) 
 
1.706 (.2078) 
 
1.761 (.2138) 
 
1.761 (.2170) 
 
1.661 (.2039) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 358.15*** 386.12*** 386.50*** 387.88*** 363.45*** 
   AIC 1710.298 1713.422 1691.562 1705.233 1701.353 
   Wald statistic (df) 130.34 (6)*** 130.30 (6)*** 138.87 (6)*** 132.22 (6)*** 136.88 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 82: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.604 
(.3662)*** 
X -1.488 
(.3403)*** 
-1.347 
(.3981)*** 
-1.723 
(.3640)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0192 (.0089)** 
OR .9809 
 -.0210 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9791 
-.0175 
(.0093)* 
OR .9826 
-.0354 
(.0094)*** 
OR .9651 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0186 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9815 
 -.0182 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9819 
-.0188 
(.0034)*** 
OR .9813 
-.0177 
(.0024)*** 
OR .9823 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.6552 (.4399) 
OR .5193 
 -.5922 (.4348) 
OR .5530 
-.7088 (.4374) 
OR .4922 
-.7304 
(.4404)* 
OR .4817 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.1392 (.8370) 
OR 1.149 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.323 (1.546) 
OR .2662 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1927 (.1752) 
OR .8247 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.515 (.8228)* 
OR 4.551 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0107 (.0143) 
OR .9893 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0257 (.0389) 
OR .9745 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0038 (.0047) 
OR .9961 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0222 (.0138) 
OR 1.022 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0031 (.0060) 
OR 1.003 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0013 (.0075) 
OR .9986 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0002 (.0022) 
OR 1.000 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.0012 (.0045) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .9987 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.321 (.2711) 
  
2.306 (.2682) 
 
2.270 (.2652) 
 
2.212 (.2596) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 623.78***  629.98*** 562.64*** 562.01*** 
   AIC 1403.696  1400.735 1399.915 1394.126 
   Wald statistic (df) 101.28 (6)***  100.75 (6)*** 105.01 (6)*** 107.62 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 636 
 
Table 83: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.814 
(.3530)*** 
X -1.739 
(.3237)*** 
-1.476 
(.3622)*** 
-2.095 
(.3439)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.4364 (3.832) 
OR .6463 
 -.0207 
(.0101)** 
OR .9794 
-.0215 (.0132) 
OR .9787 
-.0366 
(.0161)** 
OR .9640 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0187 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9814 
 -.0183 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9818 
-.0197 
(.0035)*** 
OR .9804 
-.0189 
(.0024)*** 
OR .9821 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.7067 (.4401) 
OR .4932 
 -.6430 (.4347) 
OR .5256 
-.7301 
(.4374)* 
OR .4818 
-.7764 
(.4408)* 
OR .4600 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.3233 (.7537) 
OR .7237 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.119 
(1.217)* 
OR .1201 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2850 
(.1587)* 
OR .7519 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.664 
(.7569)** 
OR 5.284 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.4139 (3.832) 
OR 1.512 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0041 (.0134) 
OR .9958 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0209 (.0211) 
OR 1.021 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0030 (.0062) 
OR 1.003 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0012 (.0023) 
OR 1.001 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0006 (.0046) 
OR .9993 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.320 (.2716) 
  
2.294 (.2677) 
 
2.214 (.2586) 
 
2.201 (.2582) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 618.94***  632.13*** 565.15*** 567.90*** 
   AIC 1407.338  1401.451 1404.245 1401.647 
   Wald statistic (df) 96.05 (6)***  97.92 (4)*** 99.54 (6)*** 100.51 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 84: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.636 
(.3754)*** 
X -1.637 
(.3421)*** 
-1.634 
(.3977)*** 
-1.991 
(.3659)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0182 (.0089)** 
OR .9819 
 -.0179 
(.0080)** 
OR .9821 
-.0069 (.0034) 
OR .9930 
-.0314 
(.0112)*** 
OR .9690 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0186 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9815 
 -.0193 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9808 
-.0197 
(.0034)*** 
OR .9804 
-.0184 
(.0024)*** 
OR 9816 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.7229 (.4431) 
OR .4853 
 -.7209 
(.4356)* 
OR .4862 
-.8578 
(.4403)* 
OR .4240 
-.9023 
(.4433)** 
OR .4056 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.6503 (.7963) 
OR .5218 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.390 
(1.372)* 
OR .0915 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1617 (.1756) 
OR .8506 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.486 (.8136)* 
OR 4.421 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0019 (.0199) 
OR .9980 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0005 (.0445) 
OR .9994 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0052 (.0052) 
OR .9948 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0270 (.0167) 
OR 1.027 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0044 (.0059) 
OR .9955 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0005 (.0074) 
OR .9994 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0001 (.0022) 
OR 1.000 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0017 (.0045) 
OR .9982 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.391 (.2801) 
  
2.363 (.2766) 
 
2.328 (.2736) 
 
2.283 (.2685) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 632.96***  638.73*** 568.80*** 582.07*** 
   AIC 1407.065  1404.515 1404.92 1400.165 
   Wald statistic (df) 97.96 (6)***  100.03 (6)*** 100.99 (6)*** 104.36 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 85: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.010 (.3756) X -2.266 
(.4161)*** 
-2.465 
(.4351)*** 
-2.264 
(.4061)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0353 (.0129)*** 
OR 1.036 
 .0137 (.0097) 
OR 1.013 
-.0025 (.0145) 
OR .9974 
.0183 (.0096)* 
OR 1.018 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1743 
(.0293)*** 
OR .8400 
 -.1093 
(.0133)*** 
OR .8963 
-.0970 
(.0176)*** 
OR .9075 
-.1066 
(.0133)*** 
OR .8988 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.304 (1.159) 
OR .2713 
 -2.609 
(1.310)** 
OR .0735 
-2.869 
(1.237)** 
OR .0567 
-3.117 
(1.334)** 
OR .0442 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.188 (1.400) 
OR .3046 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.7461 (2.298) 
OR .4741 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2215 (.1305)* 
OR 1.124 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.422 (1.190) 
OR 4.148 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1041 
(.0394)*** 
OR .9011 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.1449 (.1628) 
OR .8650 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0043 (.0060) 
OR 1.004 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1082 
(.0419)*** 
OR .8974 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1654 (.0326)*** 
OR 1.179 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0055 (.0088) 
OR .9944 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.3349 (.3029) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .7153 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.995 (.3035) 
  
2.148 (.3323) 
 
1.839 (.3049) 
 
2.032 (.3128) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 341.51***  363.37*** 113.77*** 355.13*** 
   AIC 666.905  711.318 708.701 707.303 
   Wald statistic (df) 60.42 (6)***  71.29 (5)*** 81.05 (6)*** 73.13 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 86: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.589 
(.3335)*** 
X -1.786 
(.3384)*** 
-2.211 
(.3315)*** 
-1.801 
(.3552)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.1473 (.9159) 
OR 1.158 
 -.0514 (.0330) 
OR .9498 
-.0084 (.0379) 
OR .9916 
-.0504 (.0309) 
OR .9507 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1762 
(.0297)*** 
OR .8384 
 -.1071 
(.0131)*** 
OR .8983 
-.0934 
(.0171)*** 
OR .9107 
-.1077 
(.0132)*** 
OR .8978 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.427 (1.151) 
OR .2399 
 -2.511 
(1.343)* 
OR .0811 
-2.339 
(1.274)* 
OR .0963 
-2.667 
(1.342)** 
OR .0694 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.068 
(1.140)*** 
OR .0465 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.526 
(1.522)* 
OR .0799 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2795 
(.0794)*** 
OR 1.322 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.9035 (.8514) 
OR .4051 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1805 (.9164) 
OR .8347 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1088 (.1307) 
OR .8968 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1637 (.0239)*** 
OR 1.177 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic    -.0068 (.0089)  
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Development    
 
OR .9932 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.959 (.2980) 
  
1.941 (.2917) 
 
1.658 (.2692) 
 
1.999 (.2959) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 340.85***  338.19*** 109.85*** 354.93*** 
   AIC 679.353  708.801 702.727 710.775 
   Wald statistic (df) 56.62 (6)***  73.50 (4)*** 84.66 (6)*** 72.36 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 87: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.069 
(.3960)*** 
X -2.316 
(.3865)*** 
-2.750 
(.4368)*** 
-2.374 
(.3906)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0359 (.0130)*** 
OR 1.036 
 .0245 
(.0107)** 
OR 1.024 
.0220 (.0199) 
OR 1.022 
.0359 
(.0127)*** 
OR 1.036 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1748 
(.0294)*** 
OR .8396 
 -.1089 
(.0132)*** 
OR .8968 
-.0976 
(.0176)*** 
OR .9069 
-.1065 
(.0132)*** 
OR .8988 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-1.674 (1.177) 
OR .1873 
 -2.741 
(1.299)** 
OR .0645 
-3.039 
(1.224)** 
OR .0478 
-3.145 
(1.312)** 
OR .0430 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.628 (1.370) 
OR .1962 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.9684 (2.147) 
OR .3796 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .3075 
(.1423)** 
OR 1.360 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .5235 (1.081) 
OR 1.688 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1780 (.0954)* 
OR .8368 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.1488 (.1555) 
OR .8616 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0015 (.0074) 
OR .9984 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0971 
(.0432)** 
OR .9074 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1536 (.0325)*** 
OR 1.166 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0054 (.0088) 
OR .9945 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.2701 (.2863) 
OR .7632 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.133 (.3326) 
  
2.099 (.3165) 
 
1.841 (.2995) 
 
2.044 (.3067) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 350.55***  364.52*** 117.64*** 350.83*** 
   AIC 667.986  708.006 705. 877 705.203 
   Wald statistic (df) 63.34 (6)***  76.10 (5)*** 83.08 (6)*** 75.98 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 88: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.672 
(.7791)*** 
-6.572 
(.5942)*** 
-7.001 
(.6038)*** 
-5.238 
(.7835)*** 
-6.470 
(.6146)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0089 (.0139) 
OR .9910 
.0139 (.0082)* 
OR 1.014 
.0162 
(.0077)** 
OR 1.016 
.0409 
(.0111)*** 
OR 1.041 
.0246 
(.0085)*** 
OR 1.024 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0163 (.0050)*** 
OR 1.016 
.0101 (.0041)** 
OR 1.010 
.0161 
(.0037)*** 
OR 1.016 
-.0065 (.0066) 
OR .9934 
.0075 (.0041)* 
OR 1.007 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
3.972 (.3724)*** 
OR 53.125 
3.926 
(.3645)*** 
OR 50.710 
4.006 
(.3729)*** 
OR 54.977 
4.037 
(.3720)*** 
OR 56.688 
4.024 
(.3704)*** 
OR 55.962 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.010 (1.121)*** 
OR 20.302 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 2.981 (1.578)* 
OR 19.720 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.140 (1.800) 
OR 3.129 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.168 
(.5839)** 
OR .3109 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.3701 (1.260) 
OR .6906 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0334 (.0168)** 
OR 1.033 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0239 (.0174) 
OR 1.024 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0606 
(.0256)** 
OR 1.062 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0155 
(.0084)* 
OR .9845 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0027 (.0162) 
OR 1.002 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0049 (.0070) 
OR .9950 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0093 (.0075) 
OR 1.009 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0233 
(.0119)* 
OR .9769 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0144 
(.0044)*** 
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 OR 1.014 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0143 (.0073)* 
OR 1.014 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.805 (.4264) 
 
2.581 (.4080) 
 
2.758 (.4191) 
 
2.733 (.4126) 
 
2.842 (.4381) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 281.78*** 244.23*** 263.58*** 276.83*** 273.01*** 
   AIC 639.588 639.316 645.349 644.689 656.789 
   Wald statistic (df) 169.88 (6)*** 179.69 (6)*** 168.29 (6)*** 173.09 (6)*** 168.36 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 89: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.711 
(.7475)*** 
-6.494 
(.5817)*** 
-6.940 
(.6114)*** 
-5.011 
(.7721)*** 
-6.373 
(.6147)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0195 (.0081)** 
OR 1.019 
.0271 
(.0097)*** 
OR 1.027 
.0219 
(.0088)** 
OR 1.022 
.0453 
(.0119)*** 
OR 1.046 
.0327 
(.0097)*** 
OR 1.033 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0144 (.0034)*** 
OR 1.014 
.0097 (.0041)** 
OR 1.009 
.0162 
(.0037)*** 
OR 1.016 
-.0041 (.0066) 
OR .9958 
.0091 
(.0041)** 
OR 1.009 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
3.952 (.3692)*** 
OR 52.088 
3.910 
(.3597)*** 
OR 49.944 
4.008 
(.3731)*** 
OR 55.058 
4.057 
(.3720)*** 
OR 57.843 
4.029 
(.3691)*** 
OR 56.205 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.499 (.9761)*** 
OR 33.083 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.940 
(1.369)*** 
OR 51.421 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.367 (1.624) 
OR 10.675 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.262 
(.5596)** 
OR .2830 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0375 (1.171) 
OR 1.038 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0056 (.0172) 
OR 1.005 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0151 (.0268)* 
OR 1.052 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0155 
(.0094)* 
OR .9845 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0012 (.0179) 
OR .9987 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0131 (.0073)* 
OR 1.013 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0120 (.0121) 
OR .9879 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0132 
(.0043)*** 
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 OR 1.013 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0125 (.0073)* 
OR 1.012 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.858 (.4285) 
 
2.512 (.3863) 
 
2.880 (.4263) 
 
2.836 (.4105) 
 
2.865 (.4218) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 292.47*** 248.00*** 291.73*** 303.16*** 294.73*** 
   AIC 636.730 634.456 642.718 641.656 652.181 
   Wald statistic (df) 169.43 (4)*** 182.81 (6)*** 166.77 (6)*** 173.64 (6)*** 169.84 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 90: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-7.809 
(.8054)*** 
-6.339 
(.6166)*** 
-7.048 
(.6718)*** 
-4.208 
(.8236)*** 
-6.180 
(.6668)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0094 (.0141) 
OR .9906 
-.0113 (.0110) 
OR 9.887 
-.0036 (.0096) 
OR .9963 
-.0081 (.0166) 
OR .9919 
-.0063 (.0109) 
OR .9936 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0164 (.0050)*** 
OR 1.016 
.0118 
(.0041)*** 
OR 1.011 
.0189 
(.0037)*** 
OR 1.019 
-.0017 (.0064) 
OR .9982 
.0102 
(.0042)** 
OR 1.010 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
4.017 (.3751)*** 
OR 55.542 
4.025 
(.3719)*** 
OR 56.014 
4.069 
(.3817)*** 
OR 58.504 
4.166 
(.3841)*** 
OR 64.464 
4.138 
(.3836)*** 
OR 62.682 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
4.427 (1.047)*** 
OR 83.745 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.239 
(1.428)*** 
OR 188.597 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.602 
(1.571)*** 
OR 270.984 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.913 
(.6631)*** 
OR .1475 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0337 (1.341) 
OR 1.034 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0040 (.0179) 
OR 1.004 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0033 (.0201) 
OR 1.003 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0192 (.0276) 
OR .9809 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0029 (.0122) 
OR 1.002 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0024 (.0198) 
OR 1.004 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0002 (.0068) 
OR .9997 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0143 (.0073)** 
OR 1.014 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0184 (.0112) 
OR .9817 
  
      *Economic    .0131  
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Development    
 
(.0042)*** 
OR 1.013 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0168 (.0072) 
OR 1.017 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.928 (.4439) 
 
2.814 (.4254) 
 
3.293 (.4734) 
 
3.404 (.4892) 
 
3.449 (.4919) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 287.70*** 256.57*** 329.79*** 349.31*** 333.71*** 
   AIC 646.175 646.801 660.136 659.379 667.583 
   Wald statistic (df) 163.11 (6)*** 171.32 (6)*** 154.23 (6)*** 152.96 (6)*** 150.23 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 91: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.742 
(.6410)*** 
X -5.003 
(.7603)*** 
-4.208 
(.8518)*** 
-4.707 
(.6940)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0261 (.0131)** 
OR 1.024 
 .0082 (.0145) 
OR 1.008 
-.0070 (.0160) 
OR .9929 
.0096 (.0120) 
OR 1.009 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0262 
(.0040)*** 
OR .9741 
 -.0275 
(.0042)*** 
OR .9728  
-.0301 
(.0066)*** 
OR .9703 
-.0254 
(.0040)*** 
OR .9748 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X  X X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.549 (1.421)** 
OR .0141 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.099 (2.222) 
OR .1224 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.5630 (.4403) 
OR .5694 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -2.918 
(1.631)* 
OR .0540 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0030 (.0313) 
OR .9969 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0102 (.0094) 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0340 
(.0157)** 
OR 1.034 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0050 (.0051) 
OR 1.005 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.499 (.4728) 
  
2.580 (.4897) 
 
2.401 (.4812) 
 
2.424 (.4748) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 118.23***  117.15*** 98.53*** 111.21*** 
   AIC 505.897  512.547 513.998 509.411 
   Wald statistic (df) 44.54 (3)***  43.54 (5)*** 42.99 (5)*** 42.77 (3)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 92: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.334 
(.5689)*** 
X -4.538 
(.6122)*** 
-4.145 
(.6796)*** 
-4.343 
(.5773)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0395 (.0290) 
OR 1.040 
 -.0434 (.0412) 
OR .9574 
.0013 (.0222) 
OR 1.001 
-.0104 (.0189) 
OR .9895 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0250 
(.0039)*** 
OR .9752 
 -.0266 
(.0041)*** 
OR .9737 
-.0301 
(.0065)*** 
OR .9703 
-.0248 
(.0039)*** 
OR .9754 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
  X X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-4.215 (2.169)* 
OR .0147 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.693 (1.954) 
OR .0676 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3084 (.2848) 
OR .7345 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -3.403 
(2.002)* 
OR .0332 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0584 (.0479) 
OR 1.060 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0360 (.0508) 
OR .9645 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0377 (.0437) 
OR 1.038 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0327 
(.0156)** 
OR 1.033 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0056 (.0051) 
OR 1.005 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.350 (.4448) 
  
2.398 (.4496) 
 
2.245 (.4380) 
 
2.291 (.4377) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 115.55***  117.84*** 98.13*** 111.29*** 
   AIC 507.464  510.798 513.744 511.292 
   Wald statistic (df) 43.40 (3)***  43.26 (5)*** 42.37 (5)*** 42.59 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 656 
 
Table 93: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.691 
(.6404)*** 
X -5.164 
(.7086)*** 
-4.261 
(.8024)*** 
-4.766 
(.6431)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0249 (.0145)* 
OR 1.025 
 .0227 (.0147) 
OR 1.022 
-.0056 (.0239) 
OR .9943 
.0212 (.0144) 
OR 1.021 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0267 
(.0041)*** 
OR .9736 
 -.0281 
(.0042)*** 
OR .9722 
-.0307 
(.0067)*** 
OR .9697 
-.0259 
(.0040)*** 
OR .9743 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X  X X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.070 (2.074) 
OR .3428 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.5003 (2.064) 
OR .6063 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.5942 (.4324) 
OR .5519 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.9562 (2.257) 
OR .3843 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1656 (.1693) 
OR .8473 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.1522 (.1609) 
OR .8587 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0125 (.0109) 
OR 1.012 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1385 (.1654) 
OR .8706 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0126 (.0202) 
OR 1.012 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0345 
(.0161)** 
OR 1.035 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0054 (.0052) 
OR 1.005 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.477 (.4681) 
  
2.615 (.4773) 
 
2.428 (.4692) 
 
2.442 (.4605) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 117.45***  127.08*** 105.98*** 116.36*** 
   AIC 508.282  509.295 512.660 509.083 
   Wald statistic (df) 44.89 (5)***  44.76 (5)*** 44.06 (5)*** 43.19 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 94: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.006 
(.8329)*** 
X -6.170 
(.9146)*** 
-5.699 
(.9905)*** 
-6.326 
(.9667)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0030 (.0168) 
OR 1.003 
 -.0117 (.0152) 
OR .9883 
-.0343 
(.0200)* 
OR .9662 
-.0185 (.0168) 
OR .9816 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0088 (.0047)* 
OR .9911 
 -.0086 
(.0047)* 
OR .9914 
-.0035 (.0079) 
OR .9964 
-.0058 (.0051) 
OR .9941 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.753 (.6982)** 
OR 5.777 
 1.618 
(.7024)** 
OR 5.044 
1.567 
(.7024)** 
OR 4.794 
1.534 
(.7026)** 
OR 4.637 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.9359 (2.084) 
OR .3922 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0604 (2.703) 
OR .9413 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3246 (.2933) 
OR .7227 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .6589 (1.655) 
OR 1.932 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0353 (.0406) 
OR .9652 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0628 (.1024) 
OR .9390 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0113 (.0085) 
OR 1.011 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0000 (.0344) 
OR .9999 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0043 (.0062) 
OR .9956 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.0144 (.0135) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .9856 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.744 (.5388) 
  
2.814 (.5479) 
 
2.744 (.5506) 
 
2.833 (.5589) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 121.08***  120.88*** 110.32*** 121.74*** 
   AIC 373.369  375.52 376.616 377.789 
   Wald statistic (df) 10.75 (5)*  8.49 (5) 9.98 (6) 8.76 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 95: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.989 
(.8064)*** 
X -5.863 
(.7864)*** 
-5.643 
(.8518)*** 
-6.063 
(.8327)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.2785 (.2649) 
OR .7568 
 -.2669 (.2241) 
OR .7657 
-.1333 (.3223) 
OR .8751 
-.2784 (.2248) 
OR .7569 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0084 (.0047)* 
OR .9915 
 -.0085 
(.0047)* 
OR .9915 
-.0052 (.0085) 
OR .9947 
-.0084 
(.0047)* 
OR .9915 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.848 (.7027)*** 
OR 6.351 
 1.877 
(.7013)*** 
OR 6.538 
1.800 
(.6949)*** 
OR 6.055 
1.850 
(.7024)*** 
OR 6.364 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.1106 (1.689) 
OR 1.117 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.416 (2.019) 
OR .2425 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1705 (.2350) 
OR .8432 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .5394 (1.355) 
OR 1.715 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3953 (1.121) 
OR .6734 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0034 (.0070) 
OR .9965 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.739 (.5288) 
  
2.710 (.5274) 
 
2.647 (.5238) 
 
2.746 (.5315) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 121.02***  118.05*** 105.63*** 120.98*** 
   AIC 366.990  366.478 369.443 366.836 
   Wald statistic (df) 9.79 (4)**  10.23 (4)** 10.40 (6) 9.92 (4)** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 96: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.073 
(.8546)*** 
X -6.554 
(.9223)*** 
-6.459 
(1.030)*** 
-6.847 
(1.001)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0034 (.0168) 
OR 1.003 
 .0081 (.0147) 
OR 1.008 
-.0013 (.0225) 
OR .9986 
.0058 (.0175) 
OR 1.005 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0090 (.0047)* 
OR .9909 
 -.0092 
(.0046)** 
OR .9907 
-.0061 (.0077) 
OR .9938 
-.0066 (.0051) 
OR .9933 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
1.706 (.7126)** 
OR 5.507 
 1.448 
(.7070)** 
OR 4.255 
1.313 (.7141)* 
OR 3.719 
1.344 (.7094)* 
OR 3.834 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.288 (1.703)* 
OR .0373 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.546 (2.180) 
OR .2130 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1921 (.2683) 
OR .8251 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .3029 (1.524) 
OR 1.353 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0260 (.0356) 
OR 1.026 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0294 (.0855) 
OR .9709 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0042 (.0092) 
OR 1.004 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0011 (.0331) 
OR 1.001 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0028 (.0061) 
OR .9971 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0140 (.0133) 
OR .9860 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.818 (.5478) 
  
2.895 (.5688) 
 
2.892 (.5775) 
 
2.956 (.5796) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 122.37***  125.29*** 114.74*** 127.54*** 
   AIC 373.368  376.926 379.548 379.209 
   Wald statistic (df) 10.61 (5)*  7.87 (5) 7.35 (6) 7.39 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 97: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.828 
(.7379)*** 
X X -5.230 
(.8246)*** 
-5.384 
(.8738)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0285 (.0159)* 
OR 1.028 
  -.0118 (.0206) 
OR .9882 
.0166 (.0134) 
OR 1.016 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1510 (.0611)** 
OR .8597 
  -.0181 (.0168) 
OR .9819 
-.0527 
(.0120)*** 
OR .9785 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X   X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-1.739 (1.948) 
OR .1755 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2136 (.1634) 
OR 1.238 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.376 (1.694) 
OR 10.764 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0681 (.0369)* 
OR .9340 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0086 (.0085) 
1.008 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1174 (.0715) 
OR .8892 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1609 (.0634)** 
OR 1.174 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0361 
(.0216)* 
OR .9645 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1199 (.2429) 
OR .8869 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.440 (.5090) 
   
2.076 (.5193) 
 
2.517 (.5273) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 323.30***   79.15*** 357.17*** 
   AIC 433.172   439.822 452.783 
   Wald statistic (df) 15.98 (5)***   29.61 (5)*** 22.41 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 98: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-4.933 
(.7678)*** 
X X -5.027 
(.6835)*** 
-5.017 
(.8077)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0144 (.0318) 
OR 1.014 
  .0019 (.0309) 
OR 1.001 
-.0139 (.0269) 
OR .9861 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0535 
(.0119)*** 
OR .9478 
  -.0194 (.0165) 
OR .9807 
-.0527 
(.0118)*** 
OR .9486 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X   X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.235 (1.779) 
OR .1069 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .3337 
(.0932)*** 
OR 1.396 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.1894 (1.184) 
OR .8274 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0541 (.0912) 
OR .9473 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0353 
(.0213)* 
OR .9652 
 
      *Natural Resource      
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Wealth 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.660 (.5466) 
   
1.863 (.4406) 
 
2.532 (.5236) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 362.60***   75.07*** 347.75*** 
   AIC 451.69   439.229 453.687 
   Wald statistic (df) 22.05 (3)***   32.04 (5)*** 20.50 (3)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 99: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.053 
(.8102)*** 
X X -5.317 
(.8159)*** 
-5.399 
(.8218)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0288 (.0161)* 
OR 1.029 
  -.0081 (.0310) 
OR .9919 
.0255 (.0155) 
OR 1.025 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1508 (.0611)** 
OR .8599 
  -.0202 (.0161) 
OR .9799 
-.0519 
(.0119)*** 
OR .9494 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
X   X X 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.016 (1.986) 
OR .1331 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2096 (.1852) 
OR 1.233 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.349 (1.586) 
OR 3.854 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1536 (.1256) 
OR .8575 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0090 (.0107) 
OR 1.009 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0969 (.0779) 
OR .9075 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.1524 (.0634)** 
OR 1.164 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0344 (.0209) 
OR .9661 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.1039 (.2143) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .9012 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.661 (.5645) 
   
2.086 (.5269) 
 
2.523 (.5233) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 330.66***   81.08*** 354.88*** 
   AIC 433.130   439.377 453.830 
   Wald statistic (df) 15.25 (5)***   30.07 (5)*** 22.29 (5)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 100: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-10.766 
(1.630)*** 
-10.319 
(1.336)*** 
-11.272 
(1.200)*** 
-10.273 
(1.493)*** 
-10.961 
(1.338)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0192 (.0261) 
OR 1.019 
.0344 (.0139)** 
OR 1.035 
.0402 
(.0097)*** 
OR 1.041 
.0626 
(.0157)*** 
OR 1.064 
.0552 
(.0131)*** 
OR 1.056 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0015 (.0115) 
OR .9984 
.0049 (.0077) 
OR 1.004 
.0180 
(.0056)*** 
OR 1.018 
.0005 (.0077) 
OR 1.000 
.0055 (.0057) 
OR 1.005 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
3.850 (.7590)*** 
OR 47.002 
3.563 
(.6947)*** 
OR 35.297 
3.764 
(.7029)*** 
OR 43.158 
3.848 
(.7100)*** 
OR 49.908 
3.955 
(.7266)*** 
OR 52.206 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.8663 (1.769) 
OR 2.378 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.241 (2.027) 
OR 25.582 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.305 (2.102) 
OR 10.032 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4398 (.7816) 
OR .6441 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .7936 (1.704) 
OR 2.211 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0260 (.0281) 
OR 1.026 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0128 (.0184) 
OR 1.012 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0302 (.0250) 
OR 1.030 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0095 (.0088) 
OR .9905 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0123 (.0179) 
OR .9877 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0195 (.0126) 
OR 1.019 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0168 (.0099)* 
OR 1.016 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0075 (.0097) 
OR .9924 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0096 
(.0045)** 
OR 1.009 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0209 (.0095) 
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Wealth 
 
OR 1.021 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.169 (.7266) 
 
2.828 (.6661) 
 
2.809 (.6162) 
 
2.897 (.6384) 
 
2.980 (.6577) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 151.34*** 162.84*** 167.07*** 158.73*** 153.80*** 
   AIC 423.277 411.999 421.776 426.504 424.964 
   Wald statistic (df) 84.17 (6)*** 89.34 (6)*** 87.55 (6)*** 86.36 (6)*** 83.96 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 101: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X -9.748 
(1.273)*** 
-10.376 
(1.114)*** 
-8.350 
(1.170)*** 
-9.413 
(1.104)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
 .0399 
(.0149)*** 
OR 1.040 
.0231 
(.0084)*** 
OR 1.023 
.0294 
(.0098)*** 
OR 1.029 
.0230 
(.0070)*** 
OR 1.023 
   Percent Rural 
 
 .0037 (.0080) 
OR 1.003 
.0209 
(.0055)*** 
OR 1.021 
.0033 (.0075) 
OR 1.003 
.0079 (.0058) 
OR 1.008 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
 3.609 
(.7047)*** 
OR 36.956 
3.943 
(.7211)*** 
OR 51.602 
4.037 
(.6998)*** 
OR 56.682 
4.123 
(.7332)*** 
OR 61.795 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.190 
(1.831)*** 
OR 179.585 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  4.991 
(1.530)*** 
OR 147.158 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.8601 (.6640) 
OR .4231 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .6976 (1.438) 
OR 2.009 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0264 (.0162) 
OR .9738 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0064 (.0111) 
OR .9936 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0068 (.0067) 
OR .9931 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0048 (.0119) 
OR .9952 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0222 (.0099)** 
OR 1.022 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0083 (.0093) 
OR .9916 
  
      *Economic    .0101  
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Development    
 
(.0044)** 
OR 1.010 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0216 
(.0093)** 
OR 1.021 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
  
2.741 (.6784) 
 
2.684 (.6704) 
 
2.836 (.6761) 
 
2.945 (.7128) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test  116.99*** 118.17*** 112.35*** 109.31*** 
   AIC  422.630 439.785 447.075 444.406 
   Wald statistic (df)  86.80 (6)*** 88.03 (6)*** 80.35 (6)*** 80.15 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
 674 
 
Table 102: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2007 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-10.936 
(1.664)*** 
-9.700 
(1.333)*** 
-11.174 
(1.279)*** 
-8.330 
(1.325)*** 
-9.971 
(1.301)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0198 (.0264) 
OR 1.020 
-.0029 (.0204) 
OR .9970 
.0143 (.0104) 
OR 1.014 
-.0180 (.0129) 
OR .9821 
-.0071 (.0074) 
OR .9928 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0030 (.0118) 
OR .9969 
.0090 (.0077) 
OR 1.009 
.0250 
(.0053)*** 
OR 1.025 
.0081 (.0074) 
OR 1.008 
.0112 
(.0056)** 
OR 1.011 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
4.146 (.7634)*** 
OR 63.226 
3.715 
(.7020)*** 
OR 41.070 
3.965 
(.7273)*** 
OR 52.740 
4.239 
(.7080)*** 
OR 69.393 
4.197 
(.7384)*** 
OR 66.498 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.470 (1.664)** 
OR 32.165 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.725 
(1.937)*** 
OR 306.682 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  6.436 
(1.753)*** 
OR 624.296 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.515 
(.7711)** 
OR .2196 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .5850 (1.746) 
OR 1.795 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0204 (.0271) 
OR .9797 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0026 (.0213) 
OR 1.002 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0217 
(.0128)* 
OR .9784 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0162 (.0099) 
OR 1.016 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0233 (.0135)* 
OR 1.023 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0278 (.0128)** 
OR 1.028 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0193 (.0096)** 
OR 1.019 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0101 (.0092) 
OR .9898 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0090 
(.0043)** 
OR 1.009 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0220 
(.0092)** 
OR 1.022 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.202 (.7294) 
 
2.993 (.7627) 
 
3.273 (.7756) 
 
3.533 (.6915) 
 
3.675 (.7589) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 123.44*** 134.66*** 164.50*** 188.87*** 187.55*** 
   AIC 444.067 435.206 449.485 459.829 455.744 
   Wald statistic (df) 72.76 (6)*** 80.94 (6)*** 76.13 (6)*** 66.33 (6)*** 69.49 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 103: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.295 
(.3377)*** 
-2.356 
(.3246)*** 
-2.437 
(.3376)*** 
-1.695 
(.3290)*** 
-2.244 
(.3281)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0106 (.0080) 
OR 1.010 
.0081 (.0065) 
OR 1.008 
.0081 (.0067) 
OR 1.008 
.0092 (.0085) 
OR 1.009 
.0126 (.0066)* 
OR 1.012 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0218 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9783 
-.0210 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9791 
-.0218 
(.0023)*** 
OR .9783 
-.0251 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9751 
-.0227 
(.0023)*** 
OR .9775 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.729 
(.5900)*** 
OR .0652 
-3.167 
(.6712)*** 
OR .0420 
-3.081 
(.6693)*** 
OR .0458 
-2.827 
(.5915)*** 
OR .0591 
-2.817 
(.5976)*** 
OR .0597 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.8794 (.8483) 
OR .4149 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -6.445 (3.698)* 
OR .0015 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0910 (1.234) 
OR .9130 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2580 
(.1233)** 
OR .7725 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.384 (.9310) 
OR .2504 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0015 (.0136) 
OR .9984 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0618 (.0416) 
OR 1.063 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0137 (.0175) 
OR 1.013 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0012 (.0060) 
OR 1.001 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0086 (.0153) 
OR .9913 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0139 (.0066)** 
OR 1.014 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0330 (.0171)* 
OR 1.033 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0146 
(.0061)** 
OR 1.014 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0036 (.0021)* 
OR 1.003 
 
      *Natural Resource     .0182 
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Wealth 
 
(.0058)*** 
OR 1.018 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.073 (.2631) 
 
2.092 (.2643) 
 
2.087 (.2642) 
 
1.880 (.2453) 
 
2.050 (.2594) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 397.00*** 401.18*** 400.60*** 345.94*** 393.61*** 
   AIC 1509.506 1502.669 1506.183 1493.194 1503.542 
   Wald statistic (df) 116.53 (6)*** 118.26 (6)*** 114.85 (6)*** 124.45 (6)*** 118.97 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 104: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.156 
(.3158)*** 
-2.232 
(.2979)*** 
-2.327 
(.3111)*** 
-1.572 
(.2908)*** 
-2.083 
(.3039)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0053 (.0237) 
OR 1.005 
.0067 (.0093) 
OR 1.006 
.0081 (.0098) 
OR 1.008 
.0144 (.0101) 
OR 1.014 
.0114 (.0082) 
OR 1.011 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0213 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9789 
-.0206 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9795 
-.0215 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9786 
-.0248 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9754 
-.0223 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9779 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.689 
(.5811)*** 
OR .0679 
-2.931 
(.6241)*** 
OR .0533 
-2.934 
(.6338)*** 
OR .0531 
-2.818 
(.5910)*** 
OR .0597 
-2.790 
(.5916)*** 
OR .0613 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.8060 (.7303) 
OR .4466 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -2.406 (1.858) 
OR .0901 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .4995 (1.027) 
OR 1.648 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2268 
(.0688)*** 
OR .7970 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.586 
(.8545)* 
OR .2045 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0023 (.0257) 
OR 1.002 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0120 (.0200) 
OR 1.012 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0025 (.0163) 
OR 1.002 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0081 (.0128) 
OR .9919 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0033 (.0212) 
OR 1.003 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0133 (.0067)** 
OR 1.013 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0372 (.0159)** 
OR 1.037 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0148 
(.0061)** 
OR 1.015 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0038 (.0021)* 
OR 1.003 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0175 
(.0057)*** 
OR 1.017 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.033 (.2579) 
 
2.039 (.2569) 
 
2.058 (.2595) 
 
1.807 (.2326) 
 
2.021 (.2578) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 397.07*** 404.12*** 403.91*** 356.15*** 394.41*** 
   AIC 1511.141 1507.003 1508.064 1494.177 1504.827 
   Wald statistic (df) 115.79 (6)*** 118.14 (6)*** 114.84 (6)*** 124.30 (6)*** 118.78 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 105: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.301 
(.3396)*** 
-2.312 
(.3203)*** 
-2.388 
(.3301)*** 
-1.497 
(.3244)*** 
-2.139 
(.3232)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0109 (.0084) 
OR 1.010 
.0071 (.0080) 
OR 1.007 
.0065 (.0082) 
OR 1.006 
-.0013 (.0123) 
OR .9986 
.0093 (.0087) 
OR 1.009 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0217 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9784 
-.0206 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9795 
-.0214 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9787 
-.0243 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9759 
-.0221 
(.0022)*** 
OR .9781 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.662 
(.5811)*** 
OR .0698 
-2.873 
(.6225)*** 
OR .0565 
-2.862 
(.6292)*** 
OR .0571 
-2.663 
(.5688)*** 
OR .0696 
-2.658 
(.5800)*** 
OR .0700 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.4730 (.7527) 
OR .6231 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.533 (1.616) 
OR .2158 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .7393 (.9980) 
OR 2.094 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3389 
(.1302)*** 
OR .7124 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.300 (.8775) 
OR .2723 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0116 (.0185) 
OR .9884 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0020 (.0217) 
OR .9979 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0023 (.0209) 
OR 1.002 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0063 (.0068) 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0133 (.0182) 
OR .9867 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0158 (.0061)*** 
OR 1.015 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0391 
(.0151)*** 
OR 1.039 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0151 
(.0060)** 
OR 1.015 
  
      *Economic    .0035 (.0021)*  
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Development    
 
OR 1.003 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0183 
(.0057)*** 
OR 1.018 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.073 (.2641) 
 
2.081 (.2649) 
 
2.087 (.2632) 
 
1.868 (.2430) 
 
2.052 (.2632) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 395.25*** 404.35*** 411.39*** 355.30*** 379.91*** 
   AIC 1510.23 1507.987 1508.651 1494.611 1506.083 
   Wald statistic (df) 116.28 (6)*** 117.55 (6)*** 113.98 (6)*** 124.02 (6)*** 117.93 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 106: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.700 
(.3865)*** 
X -2.652 
(.3803)*** 
-1.653 
(.4054)*** 
-3.050 
(.3836)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0211 
(.0079)*** 
OR .9791 
 -.0201 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9800 
-.0468 
(.0123)*** 
OR .9542 
-.0210 
(.0080)*** 
OR .9791 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0064 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9935 
 -.0091 
(.0021)*** 
OR .9909 
-.0075 
(.0034)** 
OR .9924 
-.0047 
(.0022)** 
OR .9952 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.530 
(.7014)*** 
OR .0796 
 -2.500 
(.6980)*** 
OR .0820 
-2.662 
(.7109)*** 
OR .0697 
-2.614 
(.7012)*** 
OR .0732 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.1384 (1.009) 
OR 1.148 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.1271 (1.523) 
OR .8806 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.5216 
(.1541)*** 
OR .5935 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    3.164 
(.8690)*** 
OR 23.683 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0035 (.0168) 
OR 1.003 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0345 (.0341) 
OR .9660 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0168 
(.0066)** 
OR 1.017 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0125 (.0150) 
OR .9875 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0135 (.0085) 
OR .9865 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0146 
(.0060)** 
OR 1.014 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0002 (.0021) 
OR 1.000 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0095 
(.0045)** 
OR .9905 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.389 (.3080) 
  
2.417 (.3078) 
 
2.231 (.2897) 
 
2.168 (.2818) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 447.96***  465.43*** 399.34*** 377.80*** 
   AIC 1371.422  1367.731 1354.285 1358.676 
   Wald statistic (df) 45.76 (6)***  50.17 (6)*** 54.80 (6)*** 58.46 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 107: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.912 
(.3704)*** 
X -2.848 
(.3578)*** 
-2.131 
(.3644)*** 
-3.190 
(.3610)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-1.851 (9.472) 
OR .1570 
 -.0534 
(.0169)*** 
OR .9479 
-.0587 
(.0233)** 
OR .9429 
-.0552 
(.0217)** 
OR .9462 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0065 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9934 
 -.0070 
(.0019)*** 
OR .9930 
-.0086 
(.0035)** 
OR .9914 
-.0045 
(.0022)** 
OR .9954 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.506 
(.6972)*** 
OR .0815 
 -2.502 
(.6971)*** 
OR .0819 
-2.546 
(.6940)*** 
OR .0783 
-2.486 
(.6921)*** 
OR .0832 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.2565 (.8717) 
OR 1.292 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.1169 (1.261) 
OR .8896 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2697 
(.1099)** 
OR .7635 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.746 
(.7795)*** 
OR 15.591 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
1.817 (9.472) 
OR 6.155 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0032 (.0169) 
OR 1.003 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0066 (.0370) 
OR .9933 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0091 (.0088) 
OR .9909 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0008 (.0023) 
OR 1.000 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0090 
(.0045)** 
OR .9910 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.328 (.3023) 
  
2.325 (.2987) 
 
2.167 (.2806) 
 
2.107 (.2761) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 425.09***  442.60*** 408.52*** 362.84*** 
   AIC 1363.901  1364.588 1354.247 1354.734 
   Wald statistic (df) 37.34 (6)***  41.71 (4)*** 49.28 (6)*** 52.93 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 108: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.780 
(.3853)*** 
X -2.891 
(.3800)*** 
-2.083 
(.4086)*** 
-3.331 
(.3913)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0128 (.0081) 
OR .9872 
 -.0071 (.0075) 
OR .9928 
-.0244 
(.0144)* 
OR .9758 
-.0063 (.0088) 
OR .9937 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0068 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9931 
 -.0098 
(.0020)*** 
OR .9901 
-.0101 
(.0033)*** 
OR .9898 
-.0055 
(.0022)** 
OR .9944 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.604 
(.6997)*** 
OR .0739 
 -2.712 
(.6956)*** 
OR .0663 
-2.906 
(.6980)*** 
OR .0546 
-2.818 
(.6953)*** 
OR .0596 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-.7213 (.9437) 
OR .4860 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -.9010 (1.322) 
OR .4061 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4070 
(.1538)*** 
OR .6656 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.810 
(.8454)*** 
OR 16.626 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0268 (.0232) 
OR 1.027 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0322 (.0358) 
OR .9682 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0101 (.0071) 
OR 1.010 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0128 (.0161) 
OR .9872 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0154 (.0081)* 
OR .9846 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0147 
(.0060)** 
OR 1.014 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0014 (.0022) 
OR 1.001 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0097 
(.0045)** 
OR .9902 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.364 (.3068) 
  
2.430 (.3118) 
 
2.247 (.2935) 
 
2.238 (.2902) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 434.77***  460.02*** 399.54*** 401.22*** 
   AIC 1377.74  1378.423 1370.513 1371.619 
   Wald statistic (df) 41.75 (6)***  44.27 (6)*** 46.74 (6)*** 50.22 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 109: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.066 
(.3231)*** 
-1.341 
(.3395)*** 
-1.269 
(.3432)*** 
-1.798 
(.3513)*** 
-1.205 
(.3435)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0474 (.0127)*** 
OR 1.048 
.0239 
(.0091)*** 
OR 1.024 
.0208 
(.0089)** 
OR 1.021 
.0061 (.0129) 
OR 1.006 
.0248 
(.0095)*** 
OR 1.025 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0878 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9158 
-.0755 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9272 
-.0748 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9278 
-.0705 
(.0093)*** 
OR .9318 
-.0788 
(.0074)*** 
OR .9241 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.047 (.8383)** 
OR .1291 
-2.400 
(.8810)*** 
OR .0906 
-2.272 
(.8684)*** 
OR .1030 
-2.581 
(.8859)*** 
OR .0756 
-3.306 
(1.012)*** 
OR .0366 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.315 (1.098)** 
OR .0987 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 .2027 (3.578) 
OR 1.224 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -1.712 (1.791) 
OR .1803 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .1511 (.0897)* 
OR 1.163 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.6571 (1.013) 
OR .5183 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0641 
(.0235)*** 
OR .9378 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0666 (.0640) 
OR .9354 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0423 (.0482) 
OR .9585 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0029 (.0054) 
OR 1.002 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0360 (.0228) 
OR .9645 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0741 (.0136)*** 
OR 1.077 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0375 (.1064) 
OR .9631 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0000 (.0045) 
OR 1.000 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0223 (.0177) 
OR 1.022 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.997 (.2746) 
 
2.229 (.3078) 
 
2.232 (.3094) 
 
1.642 (.2508) 
 
2.115 (.2970) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 211.11*** 232.86*** 220.78*** 102.80*** 212.65*** 
   AIC 929.420 968.974 971.156 943.344 970.489 
   Wald statistic (df) 152.64 (6)*** 133.30 (5)*** 132.05 (6)*** 157.97 (6)*** 133.68 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 110: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-.5534 (.2793)** -.8336 
(.2780)*** 
-.7379 
(.2741)*** 
-1.484 
(.2590)*** 
-.6758 
(.2853)** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0004 (.0232) 
OR 1.000 
-.0338 (.0283) 
OR .9666 
-.0416 
(.0245)* 
OR .9591 
-.0314 (.0280) 
OR .9689 
-.0456 (.0302) 
OR .9556 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0750 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9277 
-.0745 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9281 
-.0744 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9282 
-.0690 
(.0092)*** 
OR .9332 
-.0774 
(.0074)*** 
OR .9254 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.026 (.8478)** 
OR .1317 
-2.087 
(.8516)** 
OR .1239 
-1.998 
(.8368)** 
OR .1355 
-2.007 
(.8226)** 
OR .1342 
-2.247 
(.8607)*** 
OR .1056 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.828 
(.9341)*** 
OR .0596 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -1.589 (2.212) 
OR .2041 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.409 
(1.281)* 
OR .0898 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .1822 
(.0310)*** 
OR 1.199 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.257 (.7925) 
OR .2843 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0037 (.0601) 
OR 1.003 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0032 (.0174) 
OR .9967 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0187 (.0462) 
OR 1.018 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic    -.0005 (.0045)  
 691 
Development    
 
OR .9994 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0220 (.0175) 
OR 1.022 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.000 (.2749) 
 
2.038 (.2806) 
 
1.978 (.2759) 
 
1.469 (.2231) 
 
1.974 (.2711) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 206.38*** 213.19*** 195.72*** 99.32*** 203.16*** 
   AIC 962.599 974.266 969.259 941.597 973.711 
   Wald statistic (df) 138.17 (4)*** 129.22 (5)*** 130.09 (4)*** 163.50 (6)*** 132.21 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 111: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.078 
(.3252)*** 
-1.390 
(.3225)*** 
-1.340 
(.3231)*** 
-2.119 
(.3570)*** 
-1.351 
(.3277)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0486 (.0129)*** 
OR 1.049 
.0341 
(.0103)*** 
OR 1.034 
.0330 
(.0103)*** 
OR 1.033 
.0353 
(.0172)** 
OR 1.035 
.0463 
(.0124)*** 
OR 1.047 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0875 
(.0082)*** 
OR .9161 
-.0749 
(.0067)*** 
OR .9278 
-.0744 
(.0068)*** 
OR .9282 
-.0704 
(.0093)*** 
OR .9319 
-.0786 
(.0073)*** 
OR .9243 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-2.128 (.8397)** 
OR .1189 
-2.233 
(.8561)*** 
OR .1071 
-2.249 
(.8549)*** 
OR .1054 
.2634 
(.1072)** 
OR .0758 
-2.945 
(.9357)*** 
OR .0525 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-3.030 
(.9739)*** 
OR .0480 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 -2.003 (1.974) 
OR .1348 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  -2.329 (1.668) 
OR .0973 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .2634 
(.1072)** 
OR 1.301 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.7434 (.9117) 
OR .4754 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0448 (.0278) 
OR .9561 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0415 (.0655) 
OR .9593 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0244 (.0577) 
OR .9758 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0048 (.0068) 
OR .9951 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0502 
(.0262)* 
OR .9509 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0706 (.0132)*** 
OR 1.073 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0385 (.1081) 
OR .9622 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   -.0001 (.0045) 
OR .9998 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0224 (.0175) 
OR 1.022 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.005 (.2756) 
 
2.154 (.2919) 
 
2.149 (.2926) 
 
1.632 (.2445) 
 
2.021 (.2790) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 212.32*** 234.87*** 227.43*** 105.93*** 210.07*** 
   AIC 929.750 964.684 965.634 937.775 961.344 
   Wald statistic (df) 153.83 (6)*** 139.17 (5)*** 138.27 (6)*** 161.73 (6)*** 141.63 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 112: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.145 
(.5630)*** 
-5.875 
(.4832)*** 
-5.639 
(.4750)*** 
-5.158 
(.5827)*** 
-6.055 
(.5174)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0041 (.0117) 
OR 1.004 
.0202 
(.0073)*** 
 OR 1.020 
.0129 (.0070)* 
OR 1.013 
.0370 
(.0093)*** 
OR 1.037 
.0294 
(.0074)*** 
OR 1.029 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0077 (.0038)** 
OR 1.007 
.0066 (.0034)* 
OR 1.006 
.0072 
(.0034)** 
OR 1.007 
-.0003 (.0051) 
OR .9996 
.0062 (.0037)* 
OR 1.006 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
4.190 (.3211)*** 
OR 66.035 
4.282 
(.3278)*** 
OR 72.405 
4.211 
(.3223)*** 
OR 67.474 
4.298 
(.3271)*** 
OR 73.615 
4.387 
(.3312)*** 
OR 80.411 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.280 (.9433)*** 
OR 26.589 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 6.645 
(1.533)*** 
OR 769.539 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.107 (1.414) 
OR 8.227 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0109 (.3341) 
OR .9891 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.992 
(1.037)*** 
OR 19.932 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0034 (.0147) 
OR 1.003 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0391 
(.0171)** 
OR .9616 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0164 (.0176) 
OR 1.016 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0217 
(.0079)*** 
OR .9784 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0436 
(.0148)*** 
OR .9572 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0043 (.0065) 
OR .9956 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0018 (.0086) 
OR .9981 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0101 (.0088) 
OR .9898 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
   .0045 (.0034) 
OR 1.004 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0012 (.0069) 
OR .9987 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.262 (.3252) 
 
2.200 (.3129) 
 
2.307 (.3324) 
 
2.313 (.3308) 
 
2.356 (.3334) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 263.71*** 256.86*** 254.96*** 265.21*** 270.76*** 
   AIC 760.523 757.375 772.066 764.534 767.864 
   Wald statistic (df) 228.11 (6)*** 231.02 (6)*** 221.51 (6)*** 216.73 (6)*** 221.02 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 113: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.020 
(.5264)*** 
-5.676 
(.4680)*** 
-5.546 
(.4688)*** 
-4.605 
(.5612)*** 
-5.697 
(.4892)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0061 (.0072) 
OR 1.006 
.0284 
(.0091)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0161 
(.0081)** 
OR 1.106 
.0284 
(.0094)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0306 
(.0084)*** 
OR 1.031 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0063 (.0031)** 
OR 1.006 
.0068 (.0034)** 
OR 1.006 
.0075 
(.0033)** 
OR 1.007 
.0020 (.0050) 
OR 1.002 
.0074 
(.0036)** 
OR 1.007 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
4.184 (.3189)*** 
OR 65.662 
4.230 
(.3238)*** 
OR 68.736 
4.237 
(.3241)*** 
OR 69.264 
4.280 
(.3238)*** 
OR 72.242 
4.366 
(.3286)*** 
OR 78.740 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.157 (.7897)*** 
OR 23.506 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.709 
(1.303)*** 
OR 301.586 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.854 
(1.235)** 
OR 17.370 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.3930 (.3325) 
OR .6750 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.178 
(.9259)** 
OR 8.831 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0370 
(.0144)** 
OR .9636 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0022 (.0156) 
OR 1.002 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0119 (.0077) 
OR .9880 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0323 
(.0143)** 
OR .9681 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0043 (.0083) 
OR .9957 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0093 (.0086) 
OR .9906 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0027 (.0034) 
OR 1.002 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0043 (.0068) 
OR .9956 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.273 (.3257) 
 
2.208 (.3140) 
 
2.363 (.3348) 
 
2.325 (.3307) 
 
2.321 (.3264) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 266.96*** 254.32*** 275.77*** 267.29*** 276.82*** 
   AIC 756.836 755.809 772.62 770.680 770.873 
   Wald statistic (df) 226.96 (4)*** 230.55 (6)*** 217.81 (6)*** 213.36 (6)*** 223.08 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 114: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (1 Standard Deviation Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.194 
(.5654)*** 
-5.517 
(.4730)*** 
-5.568 
(.4989)*** 
-4.618 
(.6235)*** 
-5.613 
(.5156)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0056 (.0120) 
OR 1.005 
.0009 (.0102) 
OR 1.000 
-.0003 (.0089) 
OR .9996 
.0250 (.0154) 
OR 1.025 
.0074 (.0108) 
OR 1.007 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0076 (.0038)** 
OR 1.007 
.0084 (.0033)** 
OR 1.008 
.0086 
(.0033)*** 
OR 1.008 
.0040 (.0049) 
OR 1.004 
.0087 
(.0036)** 
OR 1.008 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
4.229 (.3223)*** 
OR 68.661 
4.283 
(.3280)*** 
OR 72.515 
4.294 
(.3297)*** 
OR 73.329 
4.373 
(.3327)*** 
OR 79.308 
4.438 
(.3355)*** 
OR 84.656 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.786 (.8544)*** 
OR 44.115 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.227 
(1.237)*** 
OR 186.295 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  3.511 
(1.262)*** 
OR 33.485 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.2780 (.4146) 
OR .7572 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.285 
(1.015)** 
OR 9.828 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0118 (.0164) 
OR .9882 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0046 (.0179) 
OR .9953 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0053 (.0295) 
OR 1.005 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0197 
(.0109)* 
OR .9804 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0210 (.0170) 
OR .9791 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0028 (.0063) 
OR .9971 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0077 (.0081) 
OR .9922 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0095 (.0085) 
OR .9905 
  
      *Economic    .0017 (.0034)  
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Development    
 
OR 1.001 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0058 (.0067) 
OR .9941 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.289 (.3282) 
 
2.266 (.3228) 
 
2.548 (.3506) 
 
2.550 (.3634) 
 
2.561 (.3535) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 268.04*** 258.72*** 305.57*** 299.96*** 300.39*** 
   AIC 760.839 766.283 778.286 777.07 783.064 
   Wald statistic (df) 226.92 (6)*** 225.80 (6)*** 208.63 (6)*** 198.03 (6)*** 205.55 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than one standard deviation above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 115: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X X X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
     
   Percent Rural 
 
     
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
     
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
     
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects      
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Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test      
   AIC      
   Wald statistic (df)      
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 116: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X X X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
     
   Percent Rural 
 
     
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
     
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
     
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
     
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test      
   AIC      
   Wald statistic (df)      
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 117: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of KPRF Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
X X X X X 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
     
   Percent Rural 
 
     
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
     
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
     
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
     
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
     
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
     
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test      
   AIC      
   Wald statistic (df)      
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the KPRF‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 118: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.940 
(.6002)*** 
X -5.623 
(.5934)*** 
-4.701 
(.6337)*** 
-5.762 
(.6175)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0208 (.0151) 
OR 1.021 
 -.0003 (.0122) 
OR .9996 
-.0187 (.0197) 
OR .9813 
-.0035 (.0150) 
OR .9964 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0036 (.0065) 
OR 1.003 
 .0002 (.0057) 
OR 1.000 
-.0093 (.0081) 
OR .9907 
.0043 (.0071) 
OR 1.004 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.2649 (.8374) 
OR .7672 
 -.3788 (.8583) 
OR .6846 
-.7784 (.9307) 
OR .4591 
-.5920 (.8716) 
OR .5532 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
3.143 (1.114)*** 
OR 23.195 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.883 (1.504) 
OR 6.579 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1810 (.1254) 
OR .8343 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.536 
(.9893)*** 
OR 12.630 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0647 (.0279)** 
OR .9848 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0615 (.0753) 
OR .9403 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0082 (.0065) 
OR 1.008 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0178 (.0237) 
OR .9823 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0152 (.0142) 
OR .9848 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0058 (.0032)* 
OR 1.005 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0114 (.0118) 
OR .9886 
Random Effects      
 707 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
1.194 (.3363) 1.386 (.3359) 1.068 (.3770) 1.142 (.3235) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 11.84***  19.70*** 4.23** 11.32*** 
   AIC 257.293  261.694 260.994 259.455 
   Wald statistic (df) 8.92 (6)  1.91 (5) 4.87 (6) 8.48 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 119: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-5.394 
(.5204)*** 
X -5.562 
(.5682)*** 
-5.014 
(.5663)*** 
-5.691 
(.5724)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.1057 (.0606)* 
OR .8996 
 -.0533 (.0416) 
OR .9480 
-.1242 (.1413) 
OR .8831 
-.0726 (.0956) 
OR .9299 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0025 (.0057) 
OR 1.002 
 .0015 (.0058) 
OR 1.001 
-.0090 (.0087) 
OR .9910 
.0052 (.0070) 
OR 1.005 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.4475 (.8591) 
OR .6392 
 -.1626 (.8663) 
OR .8498 
-.2719 (.8854) 
OR .7619 
-.2309 (.8467) 
OR .7937 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
2.014 (.7857)*** 
OR 7.498 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  .6858 (1.035) 
OR 1.985 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0658 (.0829) 
OR .9362 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.180 
(.8271)*** 
OR 8.852 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0143 (.0348) 
OR 1.014 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0154 (.1064) 
OR 1.015 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0057 (.0041) 
OR 1.005 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    -.0111 (.0119) 
OR .9889 
 709 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
.9979 (.3364) 
  
1.407 (.3351) 
 
1.306 (.3486) 
 
1.069 (.3276) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 6.13***  21.19*** 12.13*** 9.06*** 
   AIC 252.983  257.214 257.604 255.327 
   Wald statistic (df) 6.91 (4)  2.18 (4) 3.53 (6) 8.99 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 120: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of LDPR Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary Elections 
(2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-6.121 
(.6529)*** 
X -5.771 
(.5839)*** 
-5.118 
(.6746)*** 
-6.089 
(.6612)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0268 (.0155)* 
OR 1.027 
 .0174 (.0132) 
OR 1.017 
.0102 (.0220) 
OR 1.010 
.0210 (.0165) 
OR 1.021 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0039 (.0065) 
OR 1.003 
 .0005 (.0057) 
OR 1.000 
-.0112 (.0081) 
OR .9888 
.0036 (.0070) 
OR 1.003 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.5805 (.8681) 
OR .5595 
 -.7408 (.8406) 
OR .4766 
-1.013 (.8703) 
OR .3628 
-.9334 (.8597) 
OR .3931 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
1.776 (1.042)* 
OR 5.908 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
  1.117 (1.199) 
OR 3.056 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.1080 (.1331) 
OR .8975 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    2.326 
(.9779)** 
OR 10.240 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0384 (.0280) 
OR .9623 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0439 (.0615) 
OR .9570 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0029 (.0070) 
OR 1.002 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0275 (.0262) 
OR .9728 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0199 (.0144) 
OR .9802 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0068 
(.0033)** 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    -.0105 (.0118) 
OR .9895 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.315 (.3793) 
  
1.289 (.3315) 
 
1.118 (.3818) 
 
1.184 (.3522) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 11.60***  15.43*** 4.83** 10.06*** 
   AIC 260.958  261.870 260.743 259.533 
   Wald statistic (df) 6.23 (6)  2.77 (5) 5.81 (6) 7.95 (6) 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if the LDPR‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 121: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-1.840 (.8299)** X X -3.598 
(.5893)*** 
-3.142 
(.5095)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
.0160 (.0098) 
OR 1.016 
  -.0185 (.0227) 
OR .9816 
.0241 (.0130)* 
OR 1.024 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.0820 
(.0164)*** 
OR .9211 
  -.0746 
(.0241)*** 
OR .9280 
-.1035 
(.0198)*** 
OR .9016 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.8349 (1.036) 
OR .4339 
  -1.275 (1.210) 
OR .2792 
-2.625 
(1.488)* 
OR .0724 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
.0931 (2.051) 
OR 1.097 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0270 (.1337) 
OR .9733 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .3235 (1.515) 
OR 1.381 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1159 (.0681)* 
OR .8904 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0144 (.0086)* 
OR 1.014 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0855 
(.0503)* 
OR .9180 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0133 (.0118) 
OR .9866 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
    -.2084 (.3312) 
OR .8118 
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Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
1.374 (.5241) 
   
2.210 (.3769) 
 
2.456 (.3780) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 137.21***   115.12*** 185.00*** 
   AIC 595.985   541.210 561.011 
   Wald statistic (df) 33.72 (5)***   55.14 (6)*** 34.58 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 122: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-2.564 
(.4269)*** 
X X -3.353 
(.4504)*** 
-2.538 
(.4358)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
-.1345 (.1816) 
OR .8740 
  -.0510 (.2281) 
OR .9502 
-.3098 (.2272) 
OR .7335 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1040 
(.0196)*** 
OR .9011 
  -.0735 
(.0239)*** 
OR .9290 
-.1047 
(.0197)*** 
OR .9005 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.7953 (1.189) 
OR .4514 
  -.7172 (1.162) 
OR .4880 
-.9463 (1.200) 
OR .3881 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.384 (1.765) 
OR .0921 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .1704 
(.0380)*** 
OR 1.185 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -1.170 (1.148) 
OR .3102 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.4446 (.8509) 
OR .6410 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0142 (.0118) 
OR .9858 
 
      *Natural Resource      
 715 
Wealth 
 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.497 (.3842) 
   
1.981 (.3294) 
 
2.459 (.3756) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 187.58***   108.60*** 184.65*** 
   AIC 553.145   537.479 554.144 
   Wald statistic (df) 33.88 (4)***   54.22 (6)*** 31.53 (4)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 123: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of Yabloko Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-3.163 
(.4884)*** 
X X -3.975 
(.5892)*** 
-3.353 
(.5061)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
.0454 (.0155)*** 
OR 1.046 
  .0132 (.0266) 
OR 1.013 
.0454 
(.0153)*** 
OR 1.046 
   Percent Rural 
 
-.1023 
(.0194)*** 
OR .9027 
  -.0747 
(.0239)*** 
OR .9280 
-.1018 
(.0197)*** 
OR .9032 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
-.9051 (1.193) 
OR .4044 
  -1.573 (1.223) 
OR .2073 
-2.184 (1.358) 
OR .1124 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
-2.354 (2.068) 
OR .0949 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
     
   Caucasus Region 
 
     
   Economic 
Development   
  
   .0291 (.1481) 
OR 1.096 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.2644 (1.412) 
OR .7676 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.1022 (.1219) 
OR .9028 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0063 (.0097) 
OR 1.006 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0815 (.0530) 
OR .9216 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
     
      *Caucasus Region 
 
     
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   -.0132 (.0117) 
OR .9868 
 
      *Natural Resource     -.1748 (.3032) 
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Wealth 
 
OR .8396 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.501 (.3850) 
   
2.159 (.3635) 
 
2.458 (.3760) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 189.25***   113.32*** 186.33*** 
   AIC 546.982   540.133 556.417 
   Wald statistic (df) 44.91 (5)***   57.74 (6)*** 39.80 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if Yabloko‘s vote 
share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 124: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-13.412 
(2.384)*** 
-12.184 
(1.724)*** 
-12.772 
(1.679)*** 
-10.960 
(1.781)*** 
-12.317 
(1.758)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Minority 
 
-.0042 (.0274) 
OR .9957 
.0256 (.0138)* 
OR 1.025 
.0330 
(.0109)*** 
OR 1.033 
.0457 
(.0149)*** 
OR 1.046 
.0515 
(.0134)*** 
OR 1.052 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0290 (.0183) 
OR 1.029 
.0173 (.0080)** 
OR 1.017 
.0228 
(.0064)*** 
OR 1.023 
-.0026 (.0069) 
OR .9973 
.0012 (.0062) 
OR 1.001 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
5.450 (1.253)*** 
OR 232.803 
5.433 
(1.242)*** 
OR 229.060 
5.626 
(1.284)*** 
OR 277.745 
5.807 
(1.297)*** 
OR 332.620 
5.976 
(1.305)*** 
OR 394.093 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
2.579 (2.257) 
OR 13.188 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 3.330 (2.023)* 
OR 27.949 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  2.938 (2.269) 
OR 18.881 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0274 (.8433) 
OR .3955 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.280 (1.761) 
OR 3.596 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Minority      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
.0466 (.0298) 
OR 1.047 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0138 (.0193) 
OR 1.013 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  .0168 (.0243) 
OR 1.017 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0043 (.0094) 
OR .9957 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0237 (.0192) 
OR .9765 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0198 (.0190) 
OR .9803 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0079 (.0099) 
OR .0021 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0278 
(.0103)*** 
OR .9725 
  
      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0123 
(.0048)** 
OR 1.012 
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      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0234 
(.0099)** 
OR 1.023 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
2.944 (.6690) 
 
2.741 (.6195) 
 
2.871 (.6265) 
 
2.877 (.6073) 
 
2.898 (.6254) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 148.74*** 152.75*** 153.54*** 168.97*** 153.29*** 
   AIC 354.314 352.979 351.196 353.998 353.039 
   Wald statistic (df) 51.13 (6)*** 54.95 (6)*** 57.10 (6)*** 54.99 (6)*** 54.79 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 125: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-13.140 
(1.996)*** 
-12.639 
(1.857)*** 
-12.873 
(1.705)*** 
-11.148 
(1.874)*** 
-12.418 
(1.891)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
 
.0328 (.0087)*** 
OR 1.033 
.0390 (.0161)** 
OR 1.039 
.0371 
(.0105)*** 
OR 1.037 
.0447 
(.0138)*** 
OR 1.045 
.0464 
(.0118)*** 
OR 1.047 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0132 (.0045)*** 
OR 1.013 
.0159 (.0083)* 
OR 1.016 
.0228 
(.0065)*** 
OR 1.023 
-.0008 (.0069) 
OR .9991 
.0050 (.0061) 
OR 1.005 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
6.060 (1.283)*** 
OR 428.590 
5.803 
(1.266)*** 
OR 331.364 
6.024 
(1.286)*** 
OR 413.441 
6.447 
(1.319)*** 
OR 631.008 
6.671 
(1.326)*** 
OR 789.378 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
2.621 (1.521)* 
OR 13.757 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 4.654 (1.917)** 
OR 105.049 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  4.545 
(1.745)*** 
OR 94.227 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -.8580 (.7859) 
OR .4239 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    1.294 (1.688) 
OR 3.650 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Titular 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0083 (.0186) 
OR .9916 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0090 (.0166) 
OR .9909 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   -.0053 (.0088) 
OR .9946 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    -.0194 (.0169) 
OR .9807 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
     
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0038 (.0100) 
OR .9961 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0240 
(.0100)** 
OR .9762 
  
      *Economic    .0122  
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Development    
 
(.0048)** 
OR 1.012 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0202 
(.0100)** 
OR 1.020 
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.202 (.7308) 
 
3.003 (.6959) 
 
3.032 (.6350) 
 
3.086 (.6336) 
 
3.108 (.6602) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 168.93*** 165.82*** 169.21*** 197.08*** 204.40*** 
   AIC 348.898 347.455 347.320 349.206 348.811 
   Wald statistic (df) 47.71 (4)*** 49.53 (6)*** 56.35 (6)*** 51.97 (6)*** 51.12 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 126: Multilevel Logistic Analysis of United Russia‘s Strongholds in the 2011 Russian Parliamentary 
Elections (2 Standard Deviations Threshold) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Intercept 
 
-13.928 
(2.478)*** 
-11.754 
(1.708)*** 
-12.701 
(1.766)*** 
-9.687 
(1.700)*** 
-11.548 
(1.739)*** 
Raion-level Fixed 
Effects: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
 
-.0036 (.0277) 
OR .9963 
-.0189 (.0213) 
OR .9812 
-.0133 (.0130) 
OR .9867 
-.0241 (.0184) 
OR .9761 
-.0191 (.0125) 
OR .9812 
   Percent Rural 
 
.0289 (.0186) 
OR 1.029 
.0207 (.0081)** 
OR 1.021 
.0279 
(.0064)*** 
OR 1.028 
.0025 (.0066) 
OR 1.002 
.0083 (.0058) 
OR 1.008 
  Electoral Manipulation 
 
5.847 (1.267)*** 
OR 346.447 
5.838 
(1.287)*** 
OR 343.337 
6.471 
(1.458)*** 
OR 646.332 
6.567 
(1.507)*** 
OR 711.872 
7.001 
(1.441)*** 
OR 1098.57 
Region-level Fixed Effects:     
   Ethnic Region 
 
5.658 (2.186)*** 
OR 286.661 
    
   Muslim Region 
 
 5.718 
(1.726)*** 
OR 304.574 
   
   Caucasus Region 
 
  5.544 
(1.651)*** 
OR 255.908 
  
   Economic 
Development   
  
   -1.501 
(.8396)* 
OR .2228 
 
   Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .9329 (1.602) 
OR 2.541 
Cross-level 
Interactions: 
     
   Percent Other 
Minority 
     
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0130 (.0294) 
OR .9870 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 .0038 (.0236) 
OR 1.003 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0007 (.0177) 
OR .9992 
  
      *Economic 
Development   
  
   .0075 (.0126) 
OR 1.007 
 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
    .0104 (.0186) 
OR 1.010 
   Percent Rural      
      *Ethnic Region 
 
-.0137 (.0192) 
OR .9863 
    
      *Muslim Region 
 
 -.0063 (.0097) 
OR .9937 
   
      *Caucasus Region 
 
  -.0279 
(.0098)*** 
OR .9724 
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      *Economic 
Development    
 
   .0121 
(.0046)*** 
OR 1.012 
.0201 
(.0097)** 
OR 1.020 
      *Natural Resource 
Wealth 
 
     
Random Effects 
Parameter: Intercept 
(sd) 
 
3.068 (.7026) 
 
2.855 (.6249) 
 
3.136 (.6337) 
 
3.398 (.7339) 
 
3.276 (.6303) 
Model Fit:      
   Likelihood Ratio Test 153.86*** 172.75*** 188.03*** 235.35*** 221.77*** 
   AIC 365.798 362.755 364.292 370.826 371.268 
   Wald statistic (df) 41.62 (6)*** 47.12 (6)*** 44.67 (6)*** 37.69 (6)*** 40.24 (6)*** 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA; the dependent variable is 1 if United Russia‘s 
vote share is more than two standard deviations above the raion-level average, and zero otherwise; 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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